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PRECIS
The Australian Senate has proved to be somewhat 
of an enigma within the institutional framework of 
Australian federalism. It was the subject of intensive 
debate at the Federal Conventions of the 1890s; and 
the Founding Fathers envisaged that it would perform 
the dual functions of a House of Review and a States 
House .
This thesis describes pre-federation expectations 
about the Senate and Senators - expectations which even 
at that time were somewhat naive and over-optimistic. 
Detailed examination of both the membership and the 
legislative record of the Chamber for a seventy-two 
year period demonstrates that neither Senators nor the 
activity of the Chamber fulfilled those expectations.
Most Founding Fathers expected that the Senate 
would be a key focus for Federal-State interaction and 
that Senators would promote and protect States' interests. 
This has not been the case, partly because effective 
power within the Australian federation has progressively 
shifted from the State to the Federal level of government; 
and partly because neither State nor Federal governments 
have accepted that the Senate or the Federal Parliament 
is the arena within which inter-governmental relations
Vshould be pursued or examined. Nor have Senators regarded 
the States House function as a, let alone the, important 
area of Senate activity.
The Senate is seen to have performed more effectively 
as a House of Review than as a States House. Yet there 
have been noticeable variations in the nature of Senate 
scrutiny (of both legislation and of the executive) over 
the seventy-two year period. Acceptance of the conventions 
of cabinet government has led to a general disinclination 
by Senators to take full advantage of the extensive 
legislative powers the Constitution grants to the Chamber.
A major explanation for the uneven record of the 
Senate as a House of Review is the influence of party 
politics. Senators have seen themselves as pre-eminently 
party men; and their political allegiance has determined 
the manner in which legislative review and executive 
scrutiny has occurred. Political parties have also 
exacted a loyalty from Senators that competes with and 
generally supercedes any committment to the welfare of 
State interests.
Observers outside the Chamber have noted these 
developments; but rarely has criticism of the performance 
of the Senate been accompanied by calls for the restructuring, 
or even the abolition, of the Chamber. To some degree 
the Senate's caution, given its Constitutional powers, 
explains electoral unwillingness to sanction reforms.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Aims and Procedures
The orig inal motivation for th is  thesis was a 
desire to te s t  out the ap p licab ility , to Australian 
Federal Members of Parliament,' of the model of le g is ­
la tiv e  role conceptions developed by John Wahlke,
Heinz Eulau and other American researchers. These 
p o litic a l s c ie n tis ts  attempted to provide a research 
methodology which would enable an understanding of the 
behaviour of MPs by discovering th e ir  a ttitudes and 
motivations. The orig inal research study1 - which has 
inspired a host of la te r  p ro jec ts2 - investigated members 
of eight American State Legislatures. I f e l t  tha t the 
approach could be applied to Australian Members; and 
tha t Senators would be a particu larly  in teresting  group 
to study given th e ir  C onstitutionally prescribed roles 
as State representatives and members of a House of Review.
A Questionnaire and Interview Schedules3 were 
devised, modelled on those of Wahlke et al with appropriate 
changes to su it the d iffe ren t p o litic a l system. Between 
1969 and 1971 I approached members of the Senate, who
1 J.C. Vfohlke et al, The legislative System : Explorations in 
legislative Behavior, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1962.
For example: M.E. Jewell & S.C. Patterson, The Legislative
Process in the United States, Randan House, New York, 1966;
D.R. Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their Werld, U. of North 
Carolina Press, Chapel Ilill, 1960.
See Appendix I.3
2.
generally responded favourably. Their answers provided 
very interesting information about their own political 
attitudes, ambitions and views on the functions of the 
Senate. Analysis of responses according to the Wahlke 
schema was, however, both a time-consuming and a largely 
unrewarding task. In brief, I concluded:
i) that the categories of role orientation proffered 
by Wahlke et al had only limited applicability to 
these Australian Senators;
ii) that the categories were useful merely as a
classificatory, but not as an explanatory, tool;
iii) that there were serious terminological and
methodological problems with the Wahlke et al 
approach which question its value as a basis 
for comparative analysis.4
Concurrently with this interviewing of Senators,
I decided to investigate the views of commentators out­
side the Senate on the membership and functions of the 
Chamber. Firstly, the reactions of a sample of the 
Australian electorate were determined in answer to 
Questions inserted in the Second Wave (1969) of the 
Australian Survey Project. Secondly, I examined secondary 
sources for judgments on Senators and Senate performance.
This combination of approaches provided several 
interesting insights; for example, many Senators 
explained their actions in terms of how they perceived
4 For further comments on the results of this research see 
Appendix II.
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observers expected them to-behave; and reference back 
to the Constitutional prescriptions of Senate functions 
was common. Observers' judgments also referred to such 
expected/desired functions, as well as reflecting on 
the perceived performance of the Chamber - and on the 
degree to which activity matched expectations. To some 
degree observers seemed to be comparing Senate performance 
with an unrealizable ideal; and Senators appeared to be 
unduly apologetic about not living up to this ideal.
The views of the electorate were more realistic in terms 
of expectations, and less censorious on the actual record 
of the Senate (partly a reflection of lack of knowledge 
about the Senate and its activity).
What I had originally seen as sufficient information 
for a thesis was thus found to be wanting; my research 
had raised more questions than it had produced answers.
It was therefore necessary to collect further information. 
An obvious starting point was detailed perusal of the 
debates of the Federal Conventions of the 1890s, since 
the views of the Founding Fathers had formed a reference 
point for most evaluations of Senators and Senate activity 
during the Twentieth Century.
A second major area of new enquiry was detailed 
examination of the performance of the Chamber over time. 
Observers' judgments had been more favourable in some 
periods than in others; was this in any way reflecting 
variations in the nature of Senate activity? If so, why
4.
did such variations occur? In seeking answers to these 
questions, an immediate problem was the lack of detailed 
scrutiny of Senate activity in secondary sources. The 
major reference was J.R. Odgers' Australian Senate Practice,5 
intended to be an explanation of Senate procedures and 
practice, which has little evaluative comment. There 
were a few other sources on specific aspects of Senate 
activity6, and some general observations in other references.7 
On many aspects of Senate performance absolutely no research 
had been done; and I therefore had to start from scratch 
and work from the Senate Journals and Hansard. Again I 
was involved in a highly time-consuming (especially since 
I had decided to study the period 1901 to 1971) - though 
in this case very rewarding - exercise.
I submitted a thesis based on all of the above 
lines of enquiry in June 1974. At the time of submission 
it was apparent that the then Senate was exploring and 
threatening to use its Constitutional power in a hitherto 
unprecedented fashion. Similar action occurred in 1975.
When requested to 'revise' the thesis in 1975, I considered 
whether the terms of resubmission permitted or required 
an extension of the previously adopted time span. I was
advised that this could be outside the approved topic;
Published by the Coimonwealth Government Printer, Canberra; 1st 
ed. 1953, 2nd ed. 1959, 3rd ed. 1967, 4th ed. 1972, 5th ed. to 
appear late 1976.
6 A. Fusaro, "The Australian Senate as a House of Review: Another Look", 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol.12, 1966, reprinted 
on C.A. Hughes (ed.), Readings in Australian Government, University of 
Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1968. D. Solomon, "The Senate" in H. Mayer 
& H. Nelson (eds.), Australian Politics: a third reader, Cheshire, 
Melbourne, 1973. M. Mackerras, The Australian Senate X965-1967:
Who Held Control?, A.P.S.A. Monograph, No.9, Sydney, 1968.
For~exanple, the chapters in L.F. Crisp, Australian National Government, 
2nd ed., Lcngman, Croydcn, 1970. D. Solomon, Australia's Government-  
and Parliament, Nelson, Melbourne, 1973.
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moreover, to so extend the period to include the events 
of 1972-1975 could require a complete reorientation of 
the nature of the thesis and might be foolhardy given 
the lack (to date) of sufficient reliable information 
on events during those years.
I have therefore merely extended the period to 
cover the last year of the Twenty-Seventh Parliament 
(1972). I contend that this study of the Senate for 
the years 1901 to 1972 can stand in its own right, as 
well as serve as an historical background within which 
the events of 1972-1975 can be viewed. One important 
by-product of the so-termed 'Supply crises' of 1974 and 
1975 is, however, a greater questioning about the validity 
(or wisdom) of predicting the future from a review of 
past activities.
This revised version differs in the following 
respects from my former thesis:
A. the previous material has been re-organised and, 
to some degree, edited;
B. the analysis of Senators' role conceptions has 
been omitted from the text (a brief summary of 
the conclusions reached appears as an Appendix);
and the responses of Senators have been incorporated 
throughout the thesis where relevant;
6.
C. the original Chapter on the Federal Convention 
debates about the Senate has been expanded, and 
additional background material on overseas and 
Colonial legislatures up to 1900 is provided;
D. the review of Senate activity has been greatly 
expanded;
E. a new Chapter on Senate personnel over the 
seventy-two year period is included.
Chapters II, IV and V are wholly new; Chapters 
III, VI, VII, VIII and IX are, to varying degrees, revised, 
re-organised and expanded presentations of material 
contained in the original submission.
I found the task of revision somewhat difficult 
given a lack of specific, consistent guidelines within the 
examiners' comments. It was, however, apparent that a 
more coherent and integrated presentation was required, 
and that additional scrutiny of the activity of the 
Chamber was necessary. I hope that these suggestions 
have been satisfied, and that this submission meets the 
requirements of the examiners.
General Introduction to the Thesis
The Australian Senate was established by the Founding 
Fathers of the Commonwealth Constitution in relation to 
two different models of upper houses: the House of Review,
symbolized by the British House of Lords; and the States
7.
House, as first embodied in the American Senate. The 
structure and prescribed functions of the Australian 
Federal Upper House are pre-eminently an embodiment of 
the principles of federalism. Thus the Constitutional 
description of the Senate's place within the Australian 
Federal system of government differs in significant 
respects from the explicit functions of the House of 
Lords within the British political system.
Nonetheless, given that the cabinet system of 
government which provides the framework for British 
political practice had been established in the Australian 
Colonies prior to Federation and that this was also 
implicitly enshrined in Australian Constitutions at 
both the Colonial (later State) and Federal levels, 
expectations that the activity of the Senate would be 
in some ways similar to that of the British House of 
Lords cannot be ignored when studying the Australian 
Senate.
The second chamber in a federation is traditionally 
the house representing the governments or the people of 
the states, and in constitutions following the American 
model this chamber is granted wide powers vis a vis the 
other house which represents population. The relative 
power of the two houses may vary; but generally the 
States House is granted extensive legislative powers 
based on the presumption that these are necessary for 
it to fulfil its function of promoting and protecting 
the interests of the states within the federation.
8 .
On the other hand, the upper house in a bicameral 
legislature operating under the conventions of cabinet 
government has, in the light of British experience from 
the Eighteenth Century, been generally regarded as sub­
ordinate to the lower house (termed the house of government), 
especially in relation to influence on financial legis­
lation. Irrespective of whether or not membership of 
the executive is open to legislators sitting in either 
house, the responsibility of cabinet is only to the lower 
house. Moreover, in constitutions following the British 
model, the powers of the upper house are usually limited 
or constrained; the upper house may be denied the right 
of initiation, or of amendment to, or of veto over, 
specified classes of legislation (in particular, money bills) .
In the American model the separation of powers 
means that the President is not responsible (in the British 
sense of the word) to the legislature. Hence the existence 
of a second chamber which is potentially more powerful 
than the first is somewhat offset by the independence of 
legislature and executive. In one sense the struggle for 
power is thus less that of competition between rival 
legislative chambers, but more one between two institutions 
with logically separable functions. In a cabinet system 
of the British type, however, the interaction between 
executive and legislature is contained within the legis­
lature; and the subordination of one chamber to the other 
reflects the desire to reduce the level of internal com­
petition between the two legislative chambers.
9 .
Most second chambers or upper houses follow one 
of these models. In the Australian Senate there is an 
interesting fusion of the States House and the House of 
Review functions; Constitutionally the Senate is charged 
with the task of representing/promoting/protecting State 
interests and of reviewing legislative initiatives from 
the Lower House.
Any tendency of the Australian Senate to develop 
into a Chamber of the power and stature of the American 
Senate - which a reading of the Commonwealth Constitution 
suggests is possible, and which most of the Founding Fathers 
desired and expected - was (at least until October-November 
1975) thwarted by the cabinet system of government and by 
the nature of partisanship within Australian politics.
These are the two vital constraining factors which together 
effectively limit the degree to which the Senate can perform 
as a House of Review and especially the degree to which 
it can act as a States House.
There are other factors which have operated at 
certain periods of the Senate's existence which have 
affected the activity of the Chamber; for example, the 
calibre and motivations of Senators and their perceptions 
of Senate goals and functions; and the type of electoral 
method used for the election of Senators.
Until 1974 the prevailing argument was that the 
Senate's function was pre-eminently that of a House of 
Review in the Brycean sense. Convention debates demonstrate
10.
that delegates recognised the value of such a House of 
Review. However, practical considerations - the achieve­
ment of a federal system with sufficient guarantees for 
the smaller Colonies - forced the construction of a Senate 
with the ultimate power to refuse Supply and hence, by 
implication, to force the dissolution of a government. 
Delegates from the smaller Colonies successfully argued 
that to be an effective federal - that is, States - House 
the Senate should have powers equal to those of the House 
of the people. Acceptance of the principle of directly 
elected rather than nominated membership was another proffered 
justification for not restricting the powers of the Senate.
The only concession made to the potential danger of 
establishing so powerful a second chamber was the inclusion 
in the Constitution of machinery for solving deadlocks.
The record of the Senate as a legislature demonstrates 
that for the period 1901-1972 the Chamber itself chose to 
adhere to the Review model. Budgets were criticised and 
requests for amendment of Money Bills were sent down to 
the House of Representatives, but the ultimate action was 
only threatened (and not very convincingly at that?).
The only two instances of use of the formal deadlock 
machinery reflected Governments' desire to rid themselves 
of a particularly intransigent Upper House (controlled by 
Opposition members) rather than States' rights sentiments.
In general terms, the Senate's contribution to 
legislative review and executive scrutiny has varied 
over time, a reflection largely of the coincidence, or
11.
lack thereof, of the same party (or coalition) majority 
in the two Federal Houses. Where a government also held 
a majority of Senate seats, Senators appeared less intent 
on review; a hostile Senate, on the other hand, seemed 
often to reject or amend legislation merely to harrass 
a government.
The influence of partisanship is even more apparent 
when one reviews the activity 'of the Senate as a States 
House. Rarely have Senators from a particular State or 
States acted together irrespective of their party allegiance. 
To some degree the poor record of the Senate as a States 
House is a reflection of changes within Australian 
federalism which largely deny the possibility of the 
Senate performing this function.
The Senate's reactions to appropriation measures 
in 1974 and 1975 demonstrated that carrying the constraint 
of partisanship to the ultimate degree (opposition compen­
sation for the lack of a Lower House majority) led to the 
Senate abandoning a long-accepted, self-imposed constraint 
on its activities. Given party politics, the Senate's 
assertion of this Constitutional power had far more 
dramatic short-term consequences than were ever envisaged 
by the Founding Fathers; and may well have major reper­
cussions on the future of Senate powers as a result of 
some consequent moves to amend the Constitution.
From 1901 there have been recurrent suggestions 
for reconsideration of the structure and powers of the
12.
Senate. These have generally gained added fervour in 
periods when the Senate has been seen as partisanly 
intransigent. Some critics go so far as to advocate 
abolition of the Chamber. Others have suggested 
structural or technical changes (substituting functional 
representation; reforming as a house of committees; 
altering the electoral method, term of office, size 
of membership ; some have argued for restricting the 
powers of the Senate (purely in relation to financial 
measures, or by generally allowing the Chamber only a 
delaying power). Until 1972 few such changes had been 
instituted or suggested in Constitutional referenda. 
Recent events may provoke greater acceptance for any 
reform proposals. However, it seems highly unlikely 
that a move to abolish the Senate would be electorally 
acceptable in the near future, at least.
The most successful initiators of change may well 
be Senators themselves (as previously evidenced in their 
extension of the Chamber's committee system in 1970). 
They (like the Governor-General) are free to explore 
the limits of the Constitutional boundaries of their 
powers or (as in the 1940s and early 1950s) to take a 
very narrow view of their rights and responsibilities.
As previously noted, however, political parties are 
bound to have an important effect on the direction which 
Senators pursue at any point in time.
13.
Brief Outline of the Content of the Thesis
Apart from the Introductory and Concluding Chapters, 
the thesis is organised into three Sections.
SECTION I
The first Section presents the necessary background 
information on the composition and powers of the Senate, 
and on the expectations of Seriate performance aired by 
those who drafted the Constitution.
Chapter II includes a brief exposition on the development 
of and rationalisations for bicameralism and federalism, 
both overseas and in the Australian Colonies, prior to 
the Twentieth Century. It describes the two types of 
upper houses which the Founding Fathers of the 1890s 
could consider as models for a future Australian federal 
upper house: the upper house as House of Review (the
British House of Lords), and as a States House (the 
American Senate). The pattern of inter-House relationships 
in the Australian Colonies in the latter part of the 
Nineteenth Century was not directly similar to that in 
Britain; and the division of the nation into separate 
units which were progressively granted self-government 
raised the possibility of the simultaneous relevance of 
the American model of a federal upper house, wherein each 
Colony could enjoy an equal voice.
It must be noted that this Chapter is based on 
secondary sources and is merely an attempt to summarise 
those aspects of constitutional and political developments 
relevant to the concerns of this thesis.
14.
Chapter III provides a resume of the Constitutional 
provisions for the composition and powers of the Senate, 
and of the arguments about these provisions at the 
Australian Federal Conventions of 1891 and 1897-1898.
The discussion concentrates on the relevant strands of 
debate at the Conventions, and is a brief summary of 
majority and significant minority views on the Senate.
The final Constitutional provisions for the Senate are 
seen to represent a blend of the House of Review and 
States House models, and a unique combination of federalism 
and cabinet government.
Chapter IV reflects on the material discussed in the 
previous two Chapters, and points to various questions 
which the Constitutional provisions for the Senate left 
unresolved. The four major areas discussed are: the
compatibility (or lack thereof) of federalism and 
responsible government; the relative power of Federal 
and State governments; the effects of political parties 
(especially the Australian Labor Party) within the Federal 
Legislature; and the machinery for resolving inter-House 
deadlocks. Few of the Founding Fathers recognised that 
these would be, individually and collectively, major 
problems in the Twentieth Century and that developments 
in these areas would question, or even deny, the potential 
of the Senate to perform as either a States House or a 
House of Review.
15.
SECTION II
The second Section analyses the membership and 
performance of the Senate between 1901 and 1972.
Chapter V surveys Senate personnel for the seventy-two 
year period. Statistical information demonstrates that 
there were some differences between the type of persons 
who served in the two Federal Houses; however, such 
differences do not necessarily demonstrate that Senators 
have been, in Brycean terms, Members more suited to the 
Review function because of their maturity or expertise. 
Analysis of Senate personnel over time demonstrates some 
changes similar to general changes amongst the electorate 
in terms of, for example, educational qualifications and 
prior occupation. However, the most important differences 
amongst Members of both Federal Houses over time can be 
more successfully explained in terms of their party 
allegiances.
More detailed analysis of a particular set of 
Senators - those who were members of the Twenty-Sixth 
and Twenty-Seventh Parliaments - provides interesting 
evidence on the motivations and attitudes of certain 
Senators.
Chapter VI describes the record of Senate activity for 
the seventy-two year period. The major aspects covered 
are: number of sitting days; initiation of legislation;
fate of legislation in the Senate; action on Money Bills;
16.
general debate; and committees. The Chapter concludes 
with a discussion of the effectiveness of the Senate as 
either a House of Review or a States House, both in terms 
of the opportunities and constraints which apply, and in 
terms of Senators' evaluations of the record and possibilities.
Both of these Chapters are essentially descriptive. 
Evaluative comments are almost exclusively those of Senators 
interviewed between 1969 and 1971. The Section therefore 
provides the necessary information upon which judgments 
about the performance of the Senate can be formed.
Chapter VII seeks to provide additional explanations for 
the changes in Senate personnel and in the nature and 
tempo of Senate activity over time. Some changes have 
been internally inspired; others were responses to changes 
in the general political environment. A highly important 
factor has been the type of electoral method used for 
Senate elections; this has had marked effects on the 
party composition of the Chamber, and the introduction 
of proportional representation increased the possibility 
of hostile or evenly balanced Senates.
Proportional representation enhanced the electoral 
prospects of minor party and Independent Senators, which 
generally found themselves in a 'balance of power' position 
in the Chamber. Other interesting developments in the 
past fifteen years have been the appearance of dissidence 
amongst non-Labor Senators, and the election of a Senator
17.
to the Prime Ministership. It is also argued that the 
current Clerk of the Senate, J.R. Odgers, has had an 
influence on some Senators and has provided a legitimation 
for some Senators' exploration of the limits of Senate 
powers.
SECTION III
This Section discusses observers' evaluations of 
Senators and Senate performance over the seventy-two year 
period. It demonstrates that, irrespective of the mis­
givings many have had about the Chamber and its effective­
ness, few have advocated reform; and that proposals for 
restructuring the Senate have met with little success.
Chapter VIII presents the judgments of outside observers 
(especially academics, journalists and MPs) on Senate 
performance at certain points in time. Such comments 
reflect both the expectations of such observers (for 
example, the degree to which they regard the States House 
and House of Review functions as important or attainable) 
and their assessment of Senate activity in the light of 
these expectations and in more general terms. Many 
observers seem to be equally as idealistic and unobservant 
as were the Founding Fathers. The views of the electorate 
(expressed in Gallup Polls and in answers to the Australian 
Survey Project Questions) are perhaps more cynical and 
yet also more accepting of the value of retention of the
Chamber.
18.
Chapter IX discusses suggestions for reform or abolition 
of the Senate. The proponents of abolition have been 
singularly inactive in terms of concrete attempts to 
achieve this aim; this is in part a sign of the difficulty 
of achieval of such an aim, given the Constitutional 
structure and the disinclination of the electorate to 
sanction major change to that structure. A wide range 
of reform proposals have been raised. Their chances of 
acceptance are, in theory at least, greater; but few 
such proposals have been enacted. Movements for reform 
(and for abolition) are more likely to arise after specific 
events demonstrate some problem; but again the need for 
electoral sanction for most such suggested reforms reduces 
the possibility of any changes being effected.
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SECTION I
FRAMING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR THE 
AUSTRALIAN SENATE
20.
CHAPTER II
THE EMERGENCE OF BICAMERALISM AND FEDERALISM
The Emergence of Bicameralism
Jeremy Bentham is credited1 with coining the term 
bicameralism to describe a legislature of two houses. In 
the 1970s approximately fifty per cent of the world's 
legislatures are bicameral in structure, although the relative 
composition and powers of each pair of chambers vary markedly.2
The British Parliament adopted a bicameral form by the 
early Fourteenth Century and, with the brief exception of 
unicameralism under Cromwell in the mid Seventeenth Century, 
has retained the division into a House of Commons and a House 
of Lords (the first and second, or lower and upper houses 
respectively).3 Just why this bicameral, rather than a 
unicameral legislature evolved in Britain is a matter of some 
dispute. Marriott4 and Roberts5 argue that adoption of 
bicameralism was accidental. Pollard6 states that during the
A.W. Johnson, The Unicameral Legislature, University of Minnesota 
Press, Minneapolis, 1938, p.4, footnote 1.
See J. Blondel, Comparative Legislatures, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 
1973, pp.32-35, 144-153; M. Ameller (ed.), Parliaments, Cassell, 
London, 2nd rev. ed., 1966, pp.3-13.
The term 'House of Commons' was used as early as 1372; 'House of 
Lords' not until the early Sixteenth Century.
J.A.R. Marriott, Second Chambers: An Inductive Study in Political
Science, O.U.P., Oxford, 1910, p.3.
G.B. Roberts, The Functions of an English Second Chamber, Allen & 
Unwin, London, 1926, pp.24-28.
A.F. Pollard, The Evolution of Parliament, Longmans Green, London, 
2nd rev. ed., 1926, p.74.
6
2 1 .
reigns of Edward and Richard II Parliament increasingly 
became a large and unwieldy body, and that Edward III therefore 
summoned lords and clergy to meet in one group, and knights 
and burgesses in another. Both served the same function of 
advising the Monarch, who had complete discretion as to 
selection of those attending and the date and duration of 
meetings.
From the late Thirteenth Century the British Parliament 
gradually acquired additional functions as moves to curb the 
power of the Monarchy intensified.7 For example, in 1927 
Edward I was forced to concede Parliamentary consent for 
appropriation; by the mid Fourteenth Century Parliament was 
attaching conditions to money bills (specifying the purposes 
for which the money was to be spent and also demanding redress 
of certain grievances8) and slowly adopting a legislative role 
in addition to its advisory and judicial functions.
These moves culminated in development of the notion of 
mixed government, explicit (for instance) in Charles I's reply 
to the Nineteen Propositions addressed to him on the eve of the 
first Civil War. Henceforth political power was to be 
divided between the Monarch, the Lords and the Commons, each 
of which could veto legislation and each of which had special
For full details see, for example, W.E. Hearn, The Government of 
England: its structure and its development, George Robertson,
Melbourne, 18#3; A. Todd: On Parliamentary Government in England:
its origin, development and practical operation, Longmans Green, 
London, vol. 1, 1867, vol.2, 1869.
Origin of the convention of grievance debates on the second reading 
of appropriation Bills.
8
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p o w e r s  ( t h e  M onarchy a s  e x e c u t i v e  c o u ld  summon and d i s s o l v e  
P a r l ia m e n t ,  and c r e a t e  p e e r s ;  t h e  Commons had t h e  pow er o f  
i n i t i a t i o n  o f  s u p p ly ;  and t h e  L o rd s had j u d i c i a l  f u n c t i o n s 9 ) .  
The e s s e n t i a l  e le m e n t  in  th e  t h e o r y  o f  m ix ed  g o v e rn m e n t i s  
th u s  t h e  n o t io n  o f  e a c h  com ponent c h e c k in g  and b a la n c in g  t h e  
o t h e r s ,  w i t h  t h e  H ouse o f  L o r d s , r e p r e s e n t in g  t h e  a r i s t o c r a c y ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  im p o r ta n t  in  m a in t a in in g  an e q u i l ib r iu m  b e tw e e n  t h e  
v i c e s  o f  e x e c u t i v e  ty r a n n y  and 'r u d e  d e m o c r a c y ' .10 In  t h e o r y  
t h e  H ou se  o f  L o rd s s h a r e d  e q u a l l e g i s l a t i v e  pow er w i t h  t h e  
Commons u n t i l  t h e  e a r l y  T w e n t ie th  C e n tu r y 1 1 , and d u r in g  t h e  
E ig h t e e n t h  and e a r l y  N in e t e e n t h  C e n t u r ie s  t h e  pow er o f  t h e  
p e e r s  e n tr e n c h e d  in  t h e  L ord s w as u s u a l l y  p a r a m o u n t .12 B ut 
t h e  r e fo r m  m ovem en ts o f  t h e  N in e t e e n t h  C e n tu r y , c u lm in a t in g  in  
u n i v e r s a l  f r a n c h i s e ,  l a i d  t h e  L o rd s op en  t o  a t t a c k  a s  an  
u n j u s t i f i e d  b a s t i o n  o f  a r i s t o c r a t i c  p r i v i l e g e .  R a th e r  th a n  
s u b m it t in g  t o  any r e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  th e  Chamber a s  a p a r t i a l l y  
o r  w h o l ly  e l e c t e d  b o d y , t h o s e  who su p p o r te d  r e t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  
L o rd s  ch a m p io n ed  i t s  r o l e  a s  a b r a k e  upon and s a f e g u a r d  a g a i n s t  
r a d i c a l i s m  and m a j o r i t y  t y r a n n y .13 The c o n s e r v a t i v e l y  m in d ed
C.C. Weston, E nglish  C o n stitu tio n a l Theory and th e House o f  Lords, 
1556-1832, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1965, p p .2 -3 .
A .S . T u rb erv ille , The House o f Lords in  th e  E ighteenth  Century, 
Faber & Faber, London, 1958, p .430 .
See below, pp. , fo r  a surrmary o f  th e p r a c t ic a l e x c lip s e  o f  th e  
Lords' power over money b i l l s .
Weston, o p .c i t . , p .4 . Probably because the House was p r e tty  
q u iescen t. But th e  Duke o f  W ellington sa id  in  1818, "Nobody cares  
a damn fo r  the House o f  Lords; th e  House o f  Camions i s  everyth ing  
in  England, and th e  House o f  Lords nothing "j quoted by 
T u rb erv ille , o p . c i t . , p .24 .
For example, J .S . M ill:  "The same reason which induced th e  Remans
to  have two co n su ls , makes i t  d e s ira b le  th a t th ere  should be two 
chambers: th a t n e ith er  o f  then may be exposed to  th e corrupting
in flu e n c e  o f  undivided power, even fo r  th e  space o f  a s in g le  year". 
Quoted by M arriott, o p .c i t . , p . l .
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argued that since the acceptance of constitutional monarchy 
the danger was no longer absolutism of the Crown, but 
"government by ignorance and brute numbers"14 in the House 
of Commons.
During this period of gradual extensions to the 
franchise for elections to the House of Commons, the peers 
successfully resisted any attempts to undermine their House 
,(and also slowed the pace of moves to abolish their patronage 
cover the Commons15). As Turberville comments in relation to 
-the 18 32 Reform Act:
"The passing of the great Reform Bill 
is popularly and rightly regarded as one 
of the chief turning points in our 
constitutional history because it greatly 
extended the political influence of the 
middle classes; but the aristocracy still 
remained exceedingly powerful, their 
influence remaining much greater than they 
themselves had anticipated, much greater 
than their opponents had hoped would be the 
case. The fundamental explanation was 
that there could be no real revolution in 
the distribution of political power without 
a revolution in the distribution of real 
property...".16
During the Nineteenth and the early Twentieth 
Centuries rationalizations about the utility of second 
chambers were further refined in response to recognition of 
±he 'inefficient' nature of parliamentary procedure in the 
House of Commons and the increasing power of the executive — 
now cabinet - vis-a-vis both Houses of Parliament.17 The 
classic statement of
W. Bagehot, The English Constitution, Collins, Fontana, ed., Landen, 
1963, p.277."
15 A.H. Birch, Kepresentative & Responsible Government, Ch.4.
16 Cp.cit., p.407.
17 Äs first described by Bagehot, op.cit., especially in Chapter IV.
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"Functions Appropriate to a Second Chamber" was produced by 
the Bryce Conference established in 1917 to consider 
possible reform of the House of Lords. Lord Bryce isolated 
four functions:
(a) examination and revision of legislation 
sent up from the lower house;
(b) initiation of non-controversial legislation;
(c) interposition of delay in the process of 
legislation so that public opinion can be 
expressed and, if need be, reacted to;
(d) leisurely discussion of questions of 
national importance.18
By the Twentieth Century British Government, though 
still tripartite in formal structure, was recognised as 
essentially a system in which cabinet (drawn largely from the 
Commons though with a small component of peers) was 
predominant, the Monarch a constitutional cypher and the Lords 
a restricted19 and restrained check or curb on the House of 
Commons.
Legislative scrutiny, oversight of the executive and 
some initiation of non - controversial legislation are now 
regarded as the functions of a second chamber or House of 
Review.
Report on the Conference on Reform of the Second Chamber, London, 
1917, pp.
See also Hearn, op.cit., pp.541-542.
19 After the 1911 Parliament Act.
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In Ameller's terms:
"In democratic regimes the bicameral 
system is no longer explained by the need 
for a separate, aristocratic representation. 
Nowadays the theoretical arguments for a 
bicameral system are of two kinds: first
the concern for a more stable balance 
between the Executive and the Legislature, 
the unbridled power of a single chamber 
being restrained by a second chamber 
recruited on a different basis; secondly 
by the desire to make the parliamentary 
machine run if not more efficiently at any 
rate more smoothly by having a so-called 
'revising' chamber to maintain a careful 
check on the sometimes hasty decisions of 
a first chamber".20
However accidental the emergence of a divided 
legislature was in Britain, bicameralism was adopted by a 
large number of European countries21 in the Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Centuries - possibly merely as an incidental aspect 
of a system these countries desired to emulate. Britain's 
record of stability in government concurrent with adaptation 
to and absorption of demands for alleviating the political 
power of the aristocracy was admired throughout Europe; and 
the desire to achieve such evolutionary change led to imitation 
of the British political structure (including bicameralism).22
A Federal Justification for Bicameralism
In the British colonies bicameralism has been 
attributed to mere imitation of the mother country,23 and
20 Op.cit., p.8. See also Johnson, op.cit., pp.46-54.
21 For example, France, Spain, Italy, Austria, Belgium, Portugal, Holland.
22 See Roberts, op.cit., pp.28-35J Johnson, op.cit. p.5.
Marriott argues that bicameralism became a "constitutional fetish"; 
op.cit., p.5.
23
26.
again to accident. In the United States the original system 
of colonial government mirrored the British system - a 
governor advised by an executive council, meeting with a 
nominated assembly.24 Disagreements between councillors and 
assemblymen increased after the introduction of popular 
election of deputies, and the practice developed of separate 
assemblies, with the governor and his executive Council forming 
a second or upper house. In time the Upper House (unlike 
the House of Lords) became elective, though its members were 
landowners and there was a restricted (property) franchise.
By the mid-Eighteenth Century, when proposals for a 
federal union were under discussion, all but three of the 
American colonies had bicameral legislatures.25 Delegates 
to the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 could thus look to 
both the British system and to their own experience of 
bicameralism. 26 Moreover, the Americans had also experimented 
with unicameralism in the Confederate Congress, the 
shortcomings of which (similar to British experience of the 
Long Parliament) had been convincingly exposed by Convention 
delegate John Adams in his A Defense of the Constitutions of 
of Government of the United States of America.
24 One must note, however, that in the Eighteenth Century American 
governors retained a large area of executive (though not personal) 
power re vetoing legislation, appointing judges, pr oroging
and dissolving parliament - wheras British monarchs had ceased to 
exercise such power. See B. Bailyn, The Origins of American 
Politics, Knopf, New York, 1970.
25 See Johnson, op.cit., pp. 19-25; Marriott, op.cit., p.95.
26 See Johnson, op.cit., p.26. And note Marriott's conments, 
op.cit., pp.36-39.
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In the f i r s t  vote on bicameralism at the 1787 
Convention, only delegates from Pennsylvania (under the 
influence of Franklin) voted in the negative.27 During the 
four months of debate at the Convention only four delegates 
publicly spoke against bicameralism.28 I t  was otherwise 
accepted that i t  was desirable to have a Senate or Upper House 
as a "a body which should act as a check or curb on the 
(Lower) House."29 Delegate Randolph commented: "The object
of th is 2d. branch is  to controul the democratic branch of the 
Nat. Legislature"30, and Wilson insisted: "If the Legislative
authority be not restrained, there can be neither liberty  nor 
s ta b i l i ty 31; and i t  can only be restrained by dividing i t  
within i ts e l f ,  into d istinct and independent branches."32 
Madison concluded that Senators would be "the impartial umpires 
and Guardians of justice and general Good."33
31 May, 1787; M. Farr and (ed.)3 The Records of the Federal 
Convention of 1787, Yale U.P., New Haven, rev. ed.3 1966, Vol.l, 
pp.46-48. At the time Pennsylvania had a unicameral legislature.
28 According to Madison's notes, in Ibid. Patterson (16 June, Vol.l, 
p.251); Lansing (20 June, Vol.l, p.336); Sherman (20 June, Vol.l, 
p.341); Martin (14 July, Vol.2, p.4) . See also the Anti federalist 
"Centinel" No.l in C.M. Kenyon : The Antifederalists.
Babbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1966, pp.2-14.
C. Warren3 The Making of the Constitution, Barnes & Noble, New 
York, 2nd ed., 1937, p.194. Cf. "Thomas Jefferson once asked 
President Washington at breakfast why he had agreed to a Second 
Chamber in Congress. According to the story, Washington asked him, 
'Why did you pour that tea into your saucer?'. 'To cool i t ' , 
replied Jefferson. 'Just so', said Washington, 'we pour House 
legislation into the senatorial saucer to cool i t '." Quoted by 
A.M. McMullin, The Australian Senate: an Introduction, Government 
Printing Office, Canberra, 1969, p.5.
30 According to Madison's notes in Farr and, op.cit. , Vol.l, p.219. See 
also Hamilton, ibid, p.289; Madison, ibid, p.422; Morris, ibid,p.512.
31 For additional references to stability see Dickinson, ibid, p.86, 
and Hamilton, ibid, p.288.
32 Ibid, p.254.
3 3 Ibid, p.428.
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Some American delegates expressed a fear of majority 
tyranny, of the "turbulence and fo llies of democracy34 (as 
la te r  argued by J.S. Mill in relation to Britain). For th is 
reason they did not support election of members of the Upper 
House35 (though they approved of an elected Lower House) and 
the Convention eventually accepted a form of indirect election 
of Senators36 which, i t  was fe lt , would also guarantee that 
Senators would be men of greater wisdom and a b ilitie s  than 
members of the Lower House.37
During Convention debate on bicameralism in general, 
and on the membership and power of the Senate in particular, 
delegates frequently referred to the British po litica l system 
and the House of Lords. Some favoured imitation of th is; 
for example, Dickinson:
34 Madison, ibid, p.51. For similar arguments see Randolph, op.cit. ; 
Lansing, p.337; Mason, p.339; Madison, p.421. See also Kenyon, 
op.cit. , pp. xci-xciii.
35 For example, see Dickinson, ibid, p.150; Sherman and Gerry, p.48; 
Sherman, p.154; Pinkney, p.155. Cf. criticism of indirect 
election by Antifederalists Lcwndes and "Cincinatus" in Kenyon, 
op.cit. , pp. lxi, 179.
36 The major reason for adoption of nomination of Senators by State 
Legislatures was the desire to buttress the States house function of 
the Senate. This desire was also reflected in the (unsuccessful) 
moves to enshrine State recall of Senators. See Kenyon, op.cit. , 
pp.lxxxiii, lxxxv.
See Farrand, op.cit. : Madison, p.233; Sherman, p.234; Elseworth,
p.406. C.A. Beard, in his An Economic Interpretation of the 
Constitution of the United States, New York., 1929, argues that 
delegates were concerned to preserve the political influence of the 
upper propertied classes (to which most belonged) and supported 
election of Senators by State legislatures which were likewise 
(at least the Upper Houses) dominated by men of property. There 
are signs of such a viewpoint in speeches by Mason, Vol.l, p.339 
and Morris, Vol.II, p.202 of Farrand, op.cit.
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"wished the Senate to consist of the most 
distinguished characters, distinguished for 
their rank in life and their weight of property, 
and bearing as a strong a likeness to the 
British House of Lords as possible . .."38
Others argued that the British system was not a relevant
model because of the very lack of such an hereditary or
propertied class.39 Two delegates castigated their
colleagues for attempting to imitate any past or existing
model of government, on the grounds that political institutions
must be and are a product of the particular people and
circumstances in the country concerned.40
There were, indeed, unique and extremely practical 
reasons for the adoption of a particular type of bicameralism 
in the American Federal Legislature. It soon became apparent 
at the 1787 convention that a deadlock was developing between 
representatives of smaller and of larger Colonies on the 
question of the size of their representation in the Legislature. 
Delegates from the smaller Colonies (mindful of past experience 
of oppression by larger Colonies41) proposed equal repre­
sentation of each State in the new Upper House; the larger 
States insisted on representation proportional to population.42
38 Ibid, vol.I, p.150. See also Hamilton, pp.288-9, Morris, pp.512-514, 
542; and in vol.II, Morris, p.202; Mercer p.205.
39 In Ibid, vol.I, see Wilson, p.153; Butter p.233; Sherman, p.234; 
Pinkney, pp.400-404; Franklin, p.451; Morris, p.545; and in vol.II, 
Mason, p.203; Randolph, p.279. The Anti federalists were particularly 
ccnoemed to attack "aristocracy" in the Senate. The Anti federalist 
Papers, Michigan State U.P., Michigan, 1965, pp.181, 188-191.
See Kenyon, op.cit., pp.lxxix, 105-7, 316. See also A. Borden (ed.).
40 Ibid, vol.I, Pinkney, p.402 and Franklin, p.451.
See comments in Ibid, vol.I, by Brearly, p.177; Sherman, p.196; 
Madison, pp.437-438, 445; Elseworth, p.469.
See Ibid, vol.I, comments by Franklin, p.198; Gerry, p.467; Wilson, 
pp.482-4; and in vol.II, Pinkney, p.4; Wilson, p.10.
42
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Continuing debate on the method of election of members 
of the two Houses reinforced this division of opinion and in a 
vote on 21 June43 delegates from the three larger States voted 
in the negative - not in opposition to bicameralism per se 
but to what they termed "the apparent inflexibility of the 
smaller States"44 on the nature of the State representation 
in the Senate.
Sherman, originally an opponent of bicameralism,
expressed the mood of the Convention when he argued:
"If the difficulty on the subject of representation 
can not be otherwise got over, he would agree to 
have two branches, and a proportional representation 
in one of them, provided each State had an equal 
voice in the other."45
In vain Madison noted that in the Confederate Congress 
no small versus large State voting blocs had occurred - in his 
view, because there was no common interest between the large 
States46 - and that the real division between States would 
be a North versus South or slave versus free one.47
43 Ibid, Journal, p.353.
44 Madison in ibid, vol.II, p.19.
45 Ibid, vol.I, p.343. See also Franklin, p.199.
46 Ibid, vol.I, pp.447-448.
4 7 Ibid, vol.I, p.486 and vol.II, pp.9-10.
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On 2 July delegates recorded a tied vote on the 
question of equal State representation in the Senate and 
a committee was appointed to reconsider the question.48 
This reported49 in favour of two mutually conditioning 
resolutions which tied equal representation in the Senate 
to restrictions on the Senate's power over money bills.50 
After continuing debate the 'Great Compromise' was finally 
accepted at the very end of the Convention.51 Thus bicamer­
alism, originally accepted on the traditional ground of 
providing for legislative review, also proved instrumental 
in facilitating adoption of a new type of political system - 
federalism - in which could be incorporated both representation 
of population (in the House of Representatives or Lower House) 
and of States (in the Senate or Upper House).
As Arne H e r  notes,52 "Usage transformed this compromise 
into a generally accepted rule dictating one of the stock 
features of a federal Parliament". In debate on the drafting 
of the Canadian British North American Bill in the 1860s, and 
on the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Bill in the 1890s, 
bicameralism was accepted with little opposition.53
48 Ibid, Journal, pp.509-510.
49 Ibid, Journal, p.524.
50 The question of the pcwer of the Senate in relaticn to appropriation 
bills had first been raised cn 13 June, when a majority rejected a 
prohibition cn the initiation of money bills in the Senate (Ibid, 
Journal, p.224); and again cn 26 June, when the Convention unaminously 
agreed that both houses should be able to originate any category of 
legislation (Ibid, p.419).
51 8 September. Ibid, vol.II, pp.545-546. For an example of later 
opposition to equal State representation see "Gertinel" no.l in 
Kenyon, op.cit., pp.12-13.
52 Cp.cit., p.4.
See below, p.
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H o w e v e r , a l t h o u g h  f e d e r a l  u p p e r  h o u s e s  a r e  u n i f o r m l y  s e e n  
a s  S t a t e s  H o u s e s , t h e  A m e ric a n  s o l u t i o n  o f  e q u a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
f o r  t h e  c o n s t i t u e n t  S t a t e s  d o e s  n o t  a lw a y s  a p p l y . 54
The S t a t e s  H ouse  f u n c t i o n  f o r  f e d e r a l  u p p e r  h o u s e s  
h a s  b e e n  te r m e d  a  sy m b o l o f  "p o w e r c o n c e s s i o n s  m ade t o  g r o u p s  
o r  t e r r i t o r i e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  im p ro v e  t h e  v i a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  
n a t i o n - s t a t e . " 55 The n e e d  t o  m ake s i m i l a r  c o n c e s s i o n s  t o  
d i f f e r i n g  s o c i a l  o r  e t h n i c  g r o u p s  ( w h e th e r  m a j o r i t i e s  o r  
m i n o r i t i e s )  h a s  a l s o  l e d  t o  re n e w e d  s u p p o r t  f o r  b i c a m e r a l i s m  
i n  u n i t a r y  s y s t e m s .
B ic a m e r a l i s m  i n  The A u s t r a l i a n  C o lo n ie s
The A u s t r a l i a n  C o lo n ie s  o r i g i n a l l y  e x p e r i e n c e d  a  
s i m i l a r  p a t t e r n  o f  g o v e rn m e n t  t o  t h a t  i n  A m e r ic a :  a  C o l o n i a l
g o v e r n o r  ( a c t i n g  m e r e ly  a s  a n  a g e n t  o f  t h e  m o n a rc h  w i t h  
s t r i c t l y  l i m i t e d  a u t h o r i t y 5 5 ) a n d  a n  e x e c u t i v e  c o u n c i l ,  w i t h  
t h e  l a t e r  a d d i t i o n  o f  ' h y b r i d '  o r  'b l e n d e d '  u n i c a m e r a l  l e g i s ­
l a t u r e s  i n c l u d i n g  b o t h  t h e  G o v e r n o r 's  n o m in e e s  a n d  som e 
e l e c t e d  m e m b e rs . C r i t i c i s m  o f  t h e s e  e a r l y  L e g i s l a t i v e  
C o u n c i l s  w as f r e q u e n t , 5 7 an d  A u s t r a l i a n  C o l o n i s t s  b y  t h e  l a t e  
1 8 4 0 s  f r e q u e n t l y  in v o k e d  L o rd  D u rh a m 's  r e p o r t  on  t h e  C a n a d ia n
f b r  exam ple, in  Canada and M alaysia . See B lcn d e l, o p . c i t . p .3 4 .
J .  La Palcm bara, P o l i t i c s  W ithin N a tio n s , P re n tic e  H a ll, New J e r s e y , 
1974, p .1 1 5 .
56 See t e a m ,  o p . c i t . , p p . 129-130.
See H. P a rk e s , F i f ty  Years in  th e  making o f  A u s tra l ia n  H is to ry , 
Longmans Green, London, 1892, p p .39-49; E. Sweetman,
C o n s t i tu t io n a l  D evelopnent o f  V ic to r ia ,  1851-6, W hitcorbe & Ibmbs, 
M elbourne, 1920, Chs.V & VI; G. S e r ie ,  Ohe Golden Age: a  H is to ry
o f  th e  Golcny o f  V ic to r ia ,  1851-1861, M .U.P., M elbourne, 1963, p . l4 7 ;  
G .dV Conbe, R esponsib le  Government in  South A u s t r a l i a , S.A. Government 
P r in te r ,  A dela ide , 1957, p p .2 7 , 32-46; F.K . C row ley, A u s t r a l i a 's  
W estern T h ird , M acm illan, Landen, 1960, p .1 0 ; W.A. Towns le y .  The 
S tru g g le  fo r  Self-G overnm ent in  Tasmania, 1842-1856, Thsmanian 
GovernnEnt P r in te r ,  H obart, 1951, pp . 136-7.
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C o lo n ie s  in  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e i r  dem ands f o r  r e s p o n s i b l e  g o v ern m en t  
w it h  a b ic a m e r a l  l e g i s l a t u r e . 58 Thus S e r ie  n o t e s  t h a t  in  
V i c t o r i a ,  " D e s ir e  f o r  u n ic a m e r a lis m  w as r a r e  o r  n o n - e x i s t e n t " 5 9 , 
n o d o u b t  f o s t e r e d  by th e  s t r o n g  a rg u m en ts  f o r  b ic a m e r a l is m  
p r o f f e r e d  by B r i t i s h  S e c r e t a r i e s  o f  S t a t e ,  S ir  John P a k in g to n  
and t h e  Duke o f  N e w c a s t l e . 60 T o w n sley  c o n c lu d e s  t h a t  b i c a ­
m e r a lis m  was th e  d o m in a n t id e a  i n  t h e  A u s t r a l ia n  C o lo n ie s  
in  th e  1 8 5 0 s ,  and d e m o n s tr a te s  t h a t  T a sm an ian s r e g a r d e d  th e  
fo rm er  b le n d e d  C o u n c i ls  ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h a t  o f  New S o u th  W ales)  
a s  an awesom e ex a m p le  o f  " th e  te n d e n c y  o f  a s i n g l e  L e g i s l a t i v e  
Body t o  s t r u g g l e  f o r  t h e  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  th e  E x e c u t iv e  P o w e r ." 61
T h ree g e n e r a l  arg u m en ts  in  s u p p o r t  o f  b ic a m e r a l is m  
(w h ich  a r e  t o  a d e g r e e  in t e r t w in e d )  can  b e i d e n t i f i e d  in  th e  
s p e e c h e s  and w r i t i n g s  o f  A u s t r a l ia n  C o l o n i s t s  in  th e  1 8 5 0 s :  
th e  n e e d  f o r  a s e c o n d  cham ber t o  a c t  a s  a c h e c k  on th e  Lower 
H ou se; th e  ( s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d )  w is h  t o  p r e s e r v e  th e  e x i s t i n g  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  and e c o n o m ic  p ow er w h i l s t  c o n c e d in g  
t o  dem ands f o r  an e x te n d e d  f r a n c h i s e ;  and t h e  d e s i r e  t o  e m u la te  
B r i t i s h  P a r l ia m e n ta r y  s t r u c t u r e  and  p r o c e d u r e s .
In co n tra st to  the views o f  the 1849 Comnittee o f  the Privy Council 
on Trade and Foreign P la n ta tio n s, which "reluctantly"  proposed 
blended unicam eral le g is la tu r e s  for  the A ustralian  c o lo n ie s .
See Corbe, o p .c i t . , qu otation  p .1 6 . Earl Grey expressed  s im ila r  
Sentim ents (re the current in a b i l i t y  o f  New South Wales to  adequately  
cope w ith  a bicam eral le g is la tu r e )  in  le t t e r s  to  S ir  Henry Parkes 
in  February and May 1874. See Parkes, o p . c i t . , pp .267, 271-2; as 
d id  South A ustralian  Governor MacDcnnell; Corrbe, op . c i t . ,  p p .46-47.
59 "The V ictor ian  L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil, 1856-1950" in  H is to r ic a l S tu d ie s : 
s e le c te d  a r t i c l e s , s e r ie s  I ,  M .U.P., Melbourne, 1964, p .130 .
60 The Golden Age. . . , p.,147.
61 The words are those o f  Tasmanian Governor Denison in  Deceirber 1849. 
See Tcwnsley, o p . c i t . ,  p .1 3 5 .
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Firstly, an upper house was advocated because it could 
"interpose a check between rabid democratic notions and abuse 
of power",62 act "as a counterpoise to the popular element"63 
and "check... progress until such calm discussion has ensued 
as will really test the merits of any measure, and until an 
appeal can be made to the colonists at large . ..".64
Perhaps the most explicit statement comes from the 1874
Report of a Select Committee appointed to report on proposals
for self-government in Tasmania:
"The instincts of the assembly will be movement - 
progress - innovation; generally, it is hoped, of 
a useful character, but nevertheless subject to the 
defect incidental even to improvement when suddenly 
introduced. The instincts of the more conservative 
body will be caution - deliberation - resistance 
to change if not fairly and fully proved to be 
beneficial".6 5
Undoubtedly some were committed to the idea of an upper 
house as a curb or check per se, but most comments demonstrate 
similar conservatism to that expressed by the Philadelphia 
delegates (and by British philosophers such as Mill). In 
each Colony proposals for an elected Lower House were readily 
accepted (with varying franchises66), but debate on the 
composition of Upper Houses generally reflects arguments 
favouring preservation of the status quo. For example,
New South Wales pastoralist G.W. Rusden in a letter to Governor 
Macarthur, quoted by P. Loveday & A.W. Martin: Parliament: Facticns
and Parties, M.U.P., Melbourne, 1966, p.ll. See also ibid, p.15.
6 3 Conbe, op.cit., p .30.
64 Victorian Colonial Secretary J.V.F. Faster, quoted by Serie,
'"Ihe Victorian legislative Council...", p.129.
65 I&rliamentary Paper No.63 of 1874, quoted by Itwnsley, op.cit., p.144.
For similar sentiments, see Earl Grey's letter of 18 July 1847 to 
N.S.W. Governor Fitzroy, reproduced in C.M.H. Clark (ed.): Select
Documents in Australian History, 1788-1850, Argus & Robertson, Sydney, 
1950, p.369.
See Marriott, op.cit., pp. 156-161 for a consolidated statement cn 
the franchise for colonial legislatures.
66
35 .
Crowley notes that the Western Australian Council prior 
to self-government "looked very much like a landowners' 
and merchants' club"67; and these councillors "looked upon 
the gaining of responsible government at some time in the 
future, as a means of giving themselves a more complete 
control over the affairs of the colony In New South
Wales, W.C. Wentworth in 1853 proposed a nominee upper house 
representing what some derisively termed a "bunyip aristocracy".69 
Hawker notes that conservatives supported Wentworth's proposals 
for a nominee upper house "as a possible instrument to balance 
the 'true' and 'permanent interests' of the country against 
the masses represented in the Assembly".70
Wentworth's proposal was ridiculed within New South 
Wales, on the same grounds raised at the 1787 Convention - 
that no such hereditary aristocracy existed (especially in 
a colony originally settled by convicts).71 In Victoria,
South Australia and Tasmania elective Upper Houses were 
established. However, a desire to protect the interests of 
the propertied class was still evident, for in relation to 
those elected Upper Houses quite stiff property qualifications 
for both membership and franchise were enacted. The Victorian 
Select Committee report in 1853 proposed that the future 
Council should represent "the education, wealth, and more 
especially, the settled interests of the country";72 and
67 Qp.cit., p.69.
68 Ibid., p.71.
6 9 Quoted by Parkes, op.cit., p .35.
70 G.Nc Hawker, The Parliament of New South Wales, N.S.W. Government 
Printer, Sydney, 1971, p.6.
71 See especially Parkes, op.cit., pp. 39-49. See also Love day & Martin, 
op.cit., p.22.
72 Quoted by Sveetman, op.cit., p.46.
that the franchise for Council elections should include 
only "that portion of the community naturally indisposed 
to rash and hasty measures."73 Similarly, the equivalent 
Tasmanian Select Committee successfully argued that "the 
conservative element of the Constitution will be well 
secured by vesting the franchise in a body almost universally 
and instinctively opposed to innovation in a dangerous form."
In New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia 
proponents of an elective upper house were in the minority, 
and these Colonies gained, after self-government, nominee 
Councils. A major explanation for this is a desire to 
establish similar structures (and relations between 
institutions) to those in the mother country. In New South 
Wales:
"The men who drafted the constitution intended 
that the new system of government should be 
modelled on that of England as closely as 
circumstances would permit, and they had provided 
legislative institutions accordingly".75
Parkes unsuccessfully argued that the hereditary principle
was "fundamentally objectionable" in relation to the House
of Lords, and that "the principle of nomination in Colonial
Councils is ten times more objectionable on grounds of
common sense and simple justice between man and man."76
73 Quoted by Serie, "The legislative Council...", p.128.
74 Quoted by Tcwnsley, op.cit., p.139.
75 Loveday and Martin, op.cit., p.7. For similar continents re 
Western Australia see Crowley, op.cit., p.94.
76 Quoted in Parkes, op.cit., p.255.
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To Earl Grey he wrote in April 1874:
"The radical misconception in the efforts to 
construct a Second Chamber in the colonies h a s , 
it seems to me, been in the supposition that 
we could create any kind of Chamber like the 
British House of Lords. That is simply 
impossible .,.".77
At the time Earl Grey felt that an elective upper 
house "would either be without power enough to exercise 
any substantial power over legislation, or else it would 
be liable to bring the whole machine of government to a 
standstill by differences with the Assembly."78 (a prescient 
prediction).
The Victorian Executive Councillor Stawell agreed 
with Parkes: "...the Colony is essentially unsuited to
a House of Lords; the very fact of emigrating has a 
tendency to render us all equal ..." 79 Serie concludes 
that the draftsmen of the Victorian Constitution opted 
for an elective Upper House as the most effective means 
of preserving the conservatism (vis a vis the Assembly) 
of the Council.80 Stawell wisely noted that an Upper 
House of nominated but unlimited membership (as was 
established in New South Wales) would always be liable 
to 'swamping', or appointment of favourably - inclined
77 Quoted by ibid, p.270.
78 Quoted by ibid, pp.271-2. Grey was also concerned that the most 
suitable members would be unwilling to stand for election - and 
rued the loss of able men from the House of Commons after the 
abolition of rotten boroughs. His conclusion was to favour a 
unicameral legislature including within it life members.
Ibid, p.272-4.
79 Quoted by Serie, The Golden Age..., p.147.
80 "The Victorian Legislative Council...", p.128.
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new members, by a government, and so would be unable to 
perform its function of withstanding rash or hasty 
legislation. 81 In Tasmania the Select Committee reported:
"..there existed no analogy between the House 
of Lords and the upper house in a colony. A 
peerage could not be created, and, if it could, 
it would be wrong in principle and destructive 
of the best interests of society, to vest in a 
privileged and irresponsible class those powers 
which are inherent in the people."82
That the Australian Colonies differed in the type 
of Upper House established in the acts of self-government 
is partly a reflection of changed attitudes within the 
British Colonial Office. In 1852 there had been protracted 
arguments between Britain and South Africa before acceptance 
of an elective Upper House for the Cape Colony; and between 
Britain and New Zealand before agreement on a nominee Upper 
House. By the mid 1850s Britain was willing to allow 
Colonies to establish whichever form - elective or nominee - 
they preferred,83 although the dangers of either mode were 
mentioned to Colonists.81* In particular, Earl Grey, in 
response to Tasmania's proposal for what he saw as a "new 
and untried form of constitution" raised the question of 
deadlocks between the houses, and the lack of any machinery 
for their resolution in the proposed constitution.85
81 Quoted by ibid, p.129.
82 Quoted by Tcwnsley, op.cit., p.139.
83 Serie; The Golden Age..,, p.196
84 Concerning Victoria, see ibid, pp. 196-7; re Western Australia, see
J.S. Battye: Vfestem Australia: A History from its Discovery to
to the Inauguration of the Coimonwealth, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1924, p.383-5; re New South Vhles, see Parkes, op.cit. pp.267,271-4.
85 Tcwnsley, op.cit., pp. 136-7.
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The lack of any provision for formally resolving 
deadlocks between the Houses was a fundamental flaw in 
Australian Colonial Constitutions. Serie argues that, in 
Victoria, this was a conscious omission designed to further 
cement the power of the propertied conservatives in the 
Council.85 Whether the omission was deliberate or 
accidental, later events in all Colonies demonstrated 
continuing problems of inter-House relationships. The 
major battleground occurred in relation to financial 
legislation. In every Colony there were disputes as to 
the power of the Council in relation to appropriation bills, 
with the Lower House arguing for a Lords-Commons practice 
and the Council asserting (with varying success) the 
irrelevance of British practice to Australia.
The nature of this Lords-Commons practice should 
be briefly explained. From the mid-Seventeenth Century 
the House of Commons successfully asserted that the British 
Upper House should and could play only a restricted role 
in relation to supply. This practice was first formalized 
in the Commons' declaration of 1678:
"That all aids and supplies, and aids to His 
Majesty in Parliament are the sole gift of the 
Commons; and that all Bills for the granting 
of any such aids or supplies ought to begin 
with the Commons; and that it is the undoubted 
and sole right of the Commons to direct, limit, 
and appoint, in such Bills, the ends, purposes, 
considerations, conditions, limitations, and 
qualifications of such Grants which ought not 
to be changed or altered by the House of Lords." 87
86 "The Victorian Legislative Council ...", 
Quoted by Marriott, op.cit., p.67.87
p.128.
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Origination and amendment of money bills was henceforth 
a matter for the Commons alone;88 the Lords retained the 
right to reject in toto all measures, including money bills, 
and occasionally exercised this power during the following 
two hundred odd years. In the late Nineteenth Century, 
however, the practical limits to the veto were recognized 
when Gladstone, in retaliation to the House of Lords' 
rejection of the Paper Duty Repeal Bill of 1860-61, produced 
a composite budget containing the rejected measure and 
challenged the Upper House to accept it or reject it in toto. 
The Lords realized that rejection of supply was a weighty 
move, as Lord Salisbury commented:
"You cannot reject a money bill because you 
cannot change the Executive; to leave the 
existing Executive in power and yet to deprive 
them of the means of carrying on the government 
of the country would create a grave constitutional 
situation." 8 9
The House of Lords constitutionally retained the power to 
reject money bills until passage of the 1911 Parliament Act, 
but in practice did not exercise this power in the late 
Nineteenth Century. 90 In other words, a convention applied 
that the House of Lords would not play a significant role 
in relation to financial measures; it was only when this 
convention was broken, by the Upper House's rejection of 
the 1909-10 budget, that steps were taken to formally restrict 
the role of the House of Lords in relation to appropriation 
measures.
88 In 1661 the Lords had attempted to initiate a money bill, and in 
1671 and 1678 to amend money bills; the House of Commons statement 
aimed to forestall such attempts in the future.
89 Speech on the 1894 Finance Bill, quoted by Marriott, op.cit., p.54.
9 0 Erskine May in his Parliamentary Practice stated the position as:
"... The cram demands money, the Comrons grant it, and the Lords 
assent to the grant." Quoted by Todd, cp cit., 1st vol., p.427.
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Was the Lords-Commons practice directly applicable 
to the Australian colonies? This question was debated 
between the two Houses of the Queensland Parliament in 
1885-86. The Assembly asserted:
"It has been generally admitted that in British 
colonies in which there are two branches of the 
Legislature, the legislative functions of the Upper 
House correspond with those of the House of Lords, 
while the Lower House exercises the rights and 
powers of the House of Commons. This analogy is 
recognized in the Standing Orders of both Houses 
of the Parliament of Queensland, and in the form of 
preamble adopted in Bills of Supply, and has hitherto 
been invariably acted upon.
For centuries the House of Lords has not attempted 
to exercise its power of amending a Bill for 
appropriating the public revenue, it being accepted 
as an axiom of constitutional government that the 
right of taxation and of controlling the expenditure 
of public money rests entirely with the Representative 
House or, as it is sometimes expressed, that there 
can be no taxation without representation."91
The Assembly then quoted the 1678 resolution of the House 
of Commons. The Legislative Council, in reply, insisted on 
its amendments:
"Because the Council neither arrogate to themselves 
the position of being a reflex of the House of Lords, 
nor recognize the Legislative Assembly as holding 
the same relative position to the House of Commons. 
... If no instance can be found in the history of 
constitutional government in which a nominated 
council has attempted to amend an Appropriation Bill, 
it is because no similar case has ever arisen."92
The Council's argument was not accepted, and the Queensland 
Assembly's power over finance was not again seriously questioned 
until 190 7.9 3
91 Quoted by A.B. Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1912, Vol. It , pp.561-562.
92 Quoted in ibid, p.563.
93 See Marriott, op.cit., p.158; A. Todd, Parliamentary Government in
the British Colonies, 2nd rev. ed.f Longmans Green, London, 1894, pp.749-75
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In New South Wales, the question of the power of the 
Council in re la tion  to money b i l l s  was debated several times 
between 1856 and the turn of the century. In 1857 the Council 
had resolved that i t  had the undisputed righ t to amend any 
b i l l s ,  including appropriation measures. This argument was 
re ite ra ted  by the Council in 1860 and 1871. The Assembly 
specifically  rejected the Council's argument in 1861, but 
for most of the period gave at least de facto recognition 
to the Council's rights in rela tion  to money b i l l s .94 
jlhter-House deadlocks in New South Wales were generally 
resolved by the capitulation of one or the other House 
(mostly the Council) and, although proposals for deadlock 
machinery were aired, no procedure had been adopted by 1900.
In Victoria and South Australia, the fact tha t the 
Council was elective made analogies to British  practice 
less applicable.95 In both Constitutions the in i t ia t io n  
of money b i l l s  was limited to the Lower House; but there 
were no formal procedures for resolving deadlocks. In 
1857-58 South Australia adopted a convention tha t the Council 
would pass the annual estimates without amendment, but re ta in  
the righ t to suggest amendments to other financial measures.96 
In 1881 formal deadlock machinery (providing for a double 
dissolution afte r  two rejections) was adopted, in spite of 
the Council's critic ism  that th is was an attempt "not to 
reform the Council but to abolish a l l  i t s  powers."97 Yet 
by 1900 the machinery had not been used.
94 See Hawker, cp.cit. , pp. 133-135.
95 See Todd, ibid, pp.716-719.
96 See Keith, op.cit. , vol.2, p.626; Todd, Parliamentary Government 
in The British Colonies, pp.711-716.
97 The words of Councillor R.C. Baker, quoted by Goirbe, op.cit. , p.114. 
See also Keith, cp.cit., p.628.
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I n  V i c t o r i a n  C o l o n i a l  p o l i t i c s  t h e r e  w e re  c o n t i n u i n g  
d i s p u t e s  b e tw e e n  t h e  H o u ses  o v e r  m oney b i l l s .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  
i n  1 8 6 5 -6 6  t h e  m i n i s t r y  r e s p o n d e d  t o  C o u n c i l  r e j e c t i o n  o f  a  
t a r i f f  p r o p o s a l  b y  t a c k i n g  t h i s  o n to  t h e  a n n u a l  e s t i m a t e s .
A f t e r  t h e  C o u n c i l  l a i d  t h e  e s t i m a t e s  a s i d e ,  t h e  M i n i s t r y  
s u c c e s s f u l l y  p e r s u a d e d  th e  G o v e rn o r  t o  p e r m i t  a  l e v y  a n d  
e x p e n d i t u r e  f o r  s a l a r i e s  on  a  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  A sse m b ly  
a l o n e ,  w i t h o u t  p a s s a g e  th r o u g h  b o t h  H o u ses  o f  an  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  
b i l l .  (The A s s e m b ly 's  a rg u m e n t t h a t  t h i s  w as t h e  t h e n  B r i t i s h  
p r a c t i c e  w as r e j e c t e d  by t h e  V i c t o r i a n  S u p rem e C o u r t  a n d  
t h e  B r i t i s h  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e . 9 8 ) The C o u n c i l  c o n t i n u o u s l y  
r e j e c t e d  a n a l o g i e s  b e tw e e n  i t s  p o w e rs  a n d  t h o s e  o f  t h e  H ouse  
o f  L o r d s ,  a n d  b e tw e e n  1857 a n d  1878 r e j e c t e d  a t  l e a s t  f o u r  
m a jo r  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  m e a s u r e s ,  a n d  t h e  1874 b u d g e t . 99 I n  F e b ­
r u a r y  1878  t h e  A sse m b ly  a g a in  r e s o l v e d  t h a t  s u p p ly  s h o u l d  b e  
l e g a l l y  a v a i l a b l e  a f t e r  o n ly  A sse m b ly  a p p r o v a l .  The C o u n c i l  
p e t i t i o n e d  t h e  Q u e en , b u t  th e  G o v e rn o r  r e c e i v e d  l e g a l  a d v i c e  
t h a t  s u c h  a c t i o n  w o u ld  be  v a l i d ,  a n d  t h e  C o u n c i l  w as e v e n t u a l l y  
f o r c e d  t o  c a p i t u l a t e . 100 The G o v e rn m e n t t h e n  a t t e m p t e d  t o  
i n s t i t u t e  m a c h in e r y  f o r  c o n f i n i n g  t h e  C o u n c i l 's  p r e r o g a t i v e  
o v e r  m oney o r  t a x  b i l l s  t o  r e q u e s t i n g  am en d m en ts  a n d  d e l a y i n g  
p a s s a g e  b y  o n e  m o n t h . 101 The B i l l  p a s s e d  th r o u g h  t h e  A sse m b ly  
b u t  w as d e f e r r e d  b y  t h e  C o u n c i l .  L a t e r  p r o p o s a l s  m e t a  
s i m i l a r  f a t e ,  a n d  i t  w as n o t  u n t i l  1903 t h a t  V i c t o r i a  a d o p te d
m a c h in e r y  f o r  s o l v i n g  i n t e r - H o u s e  d e a d l o c k s . 102
88 K e ith , q p . c i t .  , pp . 600-601, 607-608, 613-614; M a r r io t t ,  o p . c i t .  j . 
p p . 162-163; G. T urner, A H is to ry  o f  th e  Colony o f  V ic to r ia ,
Ioigm ans Green, Lenden, 1904, v o l .2 ,  p p .123-133.
K e ith , c p . c i t . , v o l .2 ,  p .620; M a r r io t t ,  c p . c i t . ,  p p .600-601;
Todd, P a rliam en ta ry  Government in  th e  B r i t i s h  G o lo n ie s , p p .719-748. 
T u rn er, o p . c i t . , p p .198-202.
Hie p ro p o sa l a ls o  in c lu d ed  p ro v is io n  fo r  r e s o lv in g  dead locks betw een th e  
houses o v e r o rd in a ry  l e g i s l a t i o n .  See K eith , c p . c i t . , v o l .2 ,  p p .616-617. 
The C ouncil was fo rm ally  given th e  r i g h t  t o  su g g es t amendments to  
money b i l l s ;  in  cases  o f  co n tin u in g  deadlock  th e  C ouncil co u ld  be 
d is s o lv e d . See M a r r io t t ,  c p . c i t . ,  p .1 6 2 .
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In Colonies with nominee Upper Houses such disputes 
led to calls for substitution of the elective principle.
In New South Wales the Constitution (supposedly to entrench 
the balance between pastoralists in the Council and mercantilists 
and workers in the Assembly 10 3) prevented amendment of the 
Constitution and of the structure of the Legislative Council 
except by a two-thirds majority vote of each House.104 
However, repeated105 attempts to institute direct election 
of that Council have, to this date, not been successful. 
Councillors themselves have on occasions signified willingness 
to accept proposals for an elective Council, conditional 
upon formal recognition of their power to amend, if not 
reject, money bills.
In assessing the actual power of the New South Wales 
Legislative Council in the Colonial period, Loveday106 has 
argued that the Chamber "could force weak ministries to 
revise their bills, especially bills that were not considered 
vital, but it could not establish its own independent power 
of amendment". Hawker concludes that after 1861 the Council 
"took a secondary place to the Legislative Assembly in the 
political system" 107 and that it "proved not to be the 
impervious bulwark against demoncracy that conservatives 
had hoped for (though it had enough independence to be a 
force all ministries had to reckon with)". 108
103 Hawker, cp.cit., pp.3-6.
10i+ In spite of vehement opposition by conservatives, the requirement 
for a two-thirds majority for such change was amended in 1857.
See Loveday and Martin, cp.cit., p.16.
105 In 1859-60, 1861, 1862, 1072',' 1877, 1880, 1926, 1930, 1933, 1943,
1946. Hie Council is currently elected by the existing members of 
both State Houses.
106 P. loveday, "Hie legislative Council in New South Wales, 1857-70" in 
Historical Studies Australia and New Zealand, vol.ll, no.44, p.496. 
Cp.cit., p.131.
Ibid, p.18.
107 
10 8
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A  major explanation for such conclusions, and for 
the somewhat on again - off again tempo of reform moves, 
lies in the lack of any restriction on the maximum (though 
not the minimum) size of the Council. In the colonial period 
the oft-used government remedy against Council intransigence 
was a request to the Governor to appoint additional members 
to the Chamber. Such swamping occurred in 1868, 1879-1882 
(29 new appointments), 1888 (22 new members in a ten month 
period), 1899 (12 new members to enable acceptance of the 
new Federal Constitution).109 Governors frequently sought 
to bring the two Houses to a compromise solution in order 
to avoid the need to make new appointments110 , and usually 
sought the advice of the British Secretary of State before 
swamping. * 111 Governors frequently earned the wrath of 
Councillors for agreeing to additional appointments112 - and 
even criticism from their British advisors. Thus Lord 
Grenville wrote to the then Governor in October 1869:
"the whole value and character of the Upper House would be 
destroyed if every successive Ministry were at liberty to 
obtain a majority in that House by the creation of councillors.
109 See ibid, pp.18, 142, 194; Keith, op.cit., vol.II, p.574.
110 For exanple, Governor Denison in 1860J Hawker, op.cit., p.18.
111 Or refusing to make additional appointments, as in February 1865. 
For full details on correspondence between Governors and 
Secretaries of State see Keith, op.cit., vol.II, pp.569-574.
112 For example, the Council termed Governor Young's agreement to 
appoint new members in 1861 "an unconstitutional breach of the 
prerogative"; Hawker, op.cit., p . 18.
Quoted by Keith, op.cit., vol.II, p.572. See also Hearn's 
criticism of swamping, op.cit., pp.169, 174.
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Nevertheless, appointment of new members continued 
as the accepted and successful method for bringing the 
Council into line. In 1872 the New South Wales cabinet 
forwarded to Britain a proposal for reforming the Council 
on an elected basis as a means to avoid resort to swamping; 
the Secretary of State replied that he doubted whether an 
elected Council would be any less likely to disagree with 
the Assembly.114 Keith accepts this argument; his survey 
of the record of relationships between Upper and Lower 
Houses in the Colonial period leads him to conclude:
"Whatever may be the demerits of Nominated Second 
Chambers, it is difficult not to feel that their 
demerits are small and unimportant compared with 
the demerits of Elective Second Chambers."115
Consideration of inter-House relationships in those 
Colonies with elected Councils - South Australia, Tasmania 
and Victoria - generally supports this argument; though 
it must be noted that in the two first-mentioned Colonies 
a reasonable modus vivendi developed. In Victoria, however, 
such conflicts were more prevalent, and more bitter, than 
in any other Colony, and therefore deserve fuller treatment.
In South Australia disputes between the Houses were 
regulated according to the 1857 Compact (enshrined in 
legislation in 1913) 116; proposals for establishing a 
deadlock machinery were carried in 1881, but not used in 
the Colonial period. 117 As regards the Tasmanian Council,
114 Ibid, pp.572-4.
115 Ibid, p.599. Marriott agrees; op.cit., p.163.
116 Combe, op.cit., pp.90, 147.
117 Ibid, pp. 114-115; see also J.B. Hirst5 Adelaide and the Country
1870-1917 : Their Social and Political Relationship, M.uTp .
Melbourne, 1973. Keith, op.cit., pp.626-629; Coirbe, op.cit., Chs.4-12.
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Townsley comments that "for the first eighty years of 
its existence it stood for the conservative and even the 
reactionary forces in the Community".118 Yet this was 
not a problem; in Tasmania major inter-House disputes 
occurred in the Twentieth, not the Nineteenth, Century.
The pattern of inter-House relationships in Victoria 
is especially interesting. Earl Grey's misgivings about 
elected upper houses have already been noted. One Victorian, 
Griffith, had also sounded a warning about the danger of 
giving the 1855 Legislative Council the "power of absolutely 
stopping the whole legislation of the country...".119 
Their worst fears were realized; there were major disputes 
between the two Victorian Chambers in 1865-68, 1877-81, 1903 
and 1935-36120 , generally concerning financial legislation.
As in other Colonies, the lack of an explicit Constitutional 
statement on the financial powers of the Council, and the 
complete absence of any deadlock provisions, were major 
problems. Serie comments: "Deadlocks between the houses,
then, could only be solved by the withdrawal of the Assembly, 
or, sometimes, a concession by grace on the part of the 
Council." 121 Proposals to reform the powers of the Victorian 
Legislative Council were frequently aired, but with little 
success. The range of proposed solutions was: giving the
Council only a suspensory veto122 ; reconstituting the 
Chamber as a nominee house 123; and the provision of dead-
118 "ihe Parlianent" in F.C. Green (ed.)3 A Century of Responsible 
Government, 1856-1956, Tasmanian Government Printer, Tasmania, 1957, 
pp.35-36. See also Keith, op.cit., p.630; Townsley, op.cit.
119 CXioted in Serie, '"Ihe Victorian legislative Council...", p.129.
120 Ibid, p.131.
121 hoc.cit.
122 Proposed in 1878; see ibid, p.132.
123 Proposed in 1878; see ibid, p.132.
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l o c k  m a c h in e r y  124. The o n ly  a c h ie v e m e n t s  u n t i l  19 50 w e re  
g r a d u a l  e x t e n s i o n s  o f  t h e  f r a n c h i s e  -  a n d  t h e s e  s e r v e d  o n ly  
t o  r e i n f o r c e  t h e  p o w e r  o f  t h e  C o u n c i l ,  a s  i t  c o u l d  c l a i m  
a  p o p u l a r  b a s i s  o f  s u p p o r t  f o r  i t s  a c t i o n s .
A p a r t  f ro m  g e n e r a l l y  u p h o ld in g  i t s  p o w e r  i n  r e l a t i o n  
t o  f i n a n c i a l  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  th e  V i c t o r i a n  C o u n c i l  d e l a y e d  t h e  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  a  h o s t  o f  s o c i a l  a n d  e c o n o m ic  m e a s u r e s ;  
f o r  e x a m p le ,  s t a t e  a i d  t o  r e l i g i o n ,  m e a s u r e s  f o r  l a n d  
s e t t l e m e n t ,  p r o p o s a l s  c o n c e r n in g  m in in g ,  a b o l i t i o n  o f  
p l u r a l  v o t i n g ,  v o t e s  f o r  women, w o r k e r s  c o m p e n s a t io n ,  
p a y m e n ts  f o r  m em bers o f  p a r l i a m e n t . 125 The 1 8 5 8 -5 9  s e s s i o n  
w as u n d o u b te d ly  t h e  m o s t  h e a t e d ,  w i th  som e 32 b i l l s  
r e j e c t e d . 126 F o r  t h e  e n t i r e  C o l o n i a l  p e r i o d ,  h o w e v e r ,
S e r i e  r e c k o n s  t h a t  o n ly  a p p r o x im a te ly  9 p e r  c e n t  o f  a l l  
b i l l s  s e n t  t o  t h e  C o u n c i l  w e re  r e j e c t e d  o r  p o s t p o n e d ,  o r  
l a p s e d . 127 The n a t u r e  o f  t h o s e  u n s u c c e s s f u l  p r o p o s a l s  
d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  C o u n c i l ,  
n o t  u n e x p e c t e d  b e c a u s e  o f  th e  d o m i n a t i o n ,  a t  l e a s t  u n t i l  
t h e  1 8 9 0 s ,  o f  t h e  s q u a t t o c r a c y . 128 A c o n te m p o r a r y  
c o m m e n ta to r ,  K e l l y ,  n o t e d  th e  " w a t c h f u l  j e a l o u s y  w i t h
124 1861, 1880, 1896, 1898, 1928; th e re  was a lso  a  Foyal Conm issian 
1893-94. See i b i d , p p .132-4; The Golden Age, p p .295-305.
125 See H .G .Turner, A H is to ry  o f  th e  Colcny o f  V ic to r ia  f ro n  i t s  
d isco v e ry  to  i t s  ab so rp tio n  in to  th e  Coirmonwealth o f  A u s t r a l ia ,  
Longmans Green, London, 1904, v o l . I I ,  p p .180-2, 196-202;
S e r ie ,  "The l e g i s l a t i v e  G o u n c il,__ ", p p .137-140.
126 S e r ie ,  The Golden Age, p .3 1 8 .
127 "The l e g i s l a t i v e  C o u n c i l , . . . " ,  p .1 3 8 .
Of th e  f i r s t  C o u n c illo rs  e le c te d  in  1856, 15 h e ld  p a s to r a l  
l ic e n s e s  and 6 o th e rs  had been s q u a t te r s .  S e r ie ,  The Golden Age, 
p .2 5 4 . There was an ex ten s io n  o f  th e  f ra n c h is e  in  1881, b u t th e  
r u r a l  o v e r - re p re s e n ta t io n  co n tin u ed . S e r ie ,  "The L e g is la t iv e  
C o u n c i l , . . . "  p p .136-7, 150.
128
which they guard their 'dignity' and their 'privileges'." 129 
Assemblyman Higinbotham complained:
"The third estate which they had foolishly 
created was an oligarchy of wealth, insolently 
claiming to be the principal of the three 
(executive, lower and upper Houses)."130
In the early parliaments, the fluidity of factions 
and frequent changes in ministries left the Assembly rather 
powerless to assert its position over the Council. From 
the 1880s, however, deadlocks occurred less often - partly 
because the Council recognized that where public opinion 
was on the side of the Assembly, capitulation was eventually 
necessary.131 Serie concludes:
"The Council showed great skill, after 1880 at 
least, in knowing just how far to take its 
obstruction, in avoiding the major crises, of 
which there were in fact very few, which might 
conceivably have threatened its position as in 
the anxious years of the late seventies."132
Nonetheless, notes Turner, "There was always smouldering 
fire ready to break out into sudden flame at any supposed 
invasion of rights...".133
129 Quoted by Serie, The Golden Age, p.317. See also Turner, 
op.cit., p.20.
130 Quoted by ibid, p.144.
131 Serie, "Ihe legislative Council,...", pp.141, 147-8; 
Turner, op.cit., pp.147, 202, 216.
132 Ibid, p.148.
133 Cp.cit., p.20.
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Conclusion
This Chapter demonstrates that the delegates to the 
Federation Conventions of the 1890s could base arguments 
for or against bicameralism and the functions and powers 
of Second Chambers on a background of local, as well as 
overseas, experience. It has also been shown that Australians 
did not necessarily accept that the political institutions 
established during the Colonial period should be directly 
modelled on, or conform precisely to the supposedly accepted 
practices of, the British executive or Houses of Parliament.
It will therefore not be surprising to discover that, in 
drafting an Australian Constitution, the delegates of the 
1890s did not feel themselves bound to slavishly follow 
the Westminster model. The structure and powers of the 
Australian Senate were devised in response to considerations 
similar to those raised at the Philadelphia Convention - 
the fears and demands of the smaller Colonies.
The brief survey of Colonial inter-House relationships 
has demonstrated a potential source of problems at the 
projected Federal level of government. During drafting 
of the new Federal Constitution, the questions of the locus 
of ministerial responsibility to Parliament, of the power 
of the Upper House in relation to money bills, and of 
procedures for overcoming deadlocks between the Houses, 
were given far less attention than one would expect given 
the political crises of the colonial period.
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CHAPTER III
PROVIDING FOR A FEDERAL BICAMERAL 
LEGISLATURE IN AUSTRALIA
Introduction
The movement for federation of the Australian 
Colonies spanned a period of nearly fifty years - a somewhat 
"leisurely"1 process explained not by any opposition to 
federalism as a suitable system for uniting the Colonies, 
but by the lack of any major impetus to such union.2 Of 
the early period, Quick and Garran comment:
"Local problems, and the development of local 
institutions, engrossed the attention of the 
people; and probably no colony would have 
been prepared to accept the compromises and 
the partial sacrifices of local independence 
which a federal union would have involved."3
Between 1850 and 1883 self government was progressively 
extended to all Colonies except Western Australia (which 
became self governing in 1890). There was a degree of social
E.M. Hunt, American Precedents in Australian Federation, A.M.S.
Press, New York, 1968, p.12.
Evident in the collapse of moves initiated by Gavan Duffy in 
1857 to establish an intercolonial conference to consider federal 
union. This is in striking contrast to the battles between 
federalists and anti-federalists in America; see M. Bordon, (ed.),
The Anti-Federalist Papers, Michigan State U.P., Michigan, 1965;
C.M. Kenyon, (ed.), The Anti.federalists, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 
1966; J.T. Main, The Anti-Federalists: Critics of the Constitution, 
1781-1788, U. of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1961.
J. Quick and R. Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian 
Commonwealth, Sydney Book Co., Sydney, 1901, pp.99-100. As evidence, 
see the 1848 reply of the New South Wales Legislative Council to 
Earl Grey's suggestion for union between the colonies, quoted by 
C.M.H. Clark, (ed.), Select Documents in Australian History, 1788-1850, 
Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1950, p.371; and Governor Young's 
statement of the views of South Australian politicians on the same 
matter, ibid., p.376.
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and p o l i t i c a l 4 i s o l a t i o n  b e tw e en  C o lo n ie s ,  d u e l a r g e l y  t o  
u n d e r d e v e lo p e d  c o m m u n ic a tio n s  s y s t e m s .  D u r in g  t h i s  p e r io d ,  
e a c h  C o lo n y  p u r su e d  i t s  s e p a r a t e  eco n o m ic  d e v e lo p m e n t , v y in g  
w it h  o t h e r  C o lo n ie s  f o r  m ig r a n t s ,  in d u s t r y  and  e x p o r t  
m a r k e ts ;  and i n t e r c o l o n i a l  t r a d e  w as ham pered  by th e  
p r o t e c t i v e  t a r i f f  p o l i c y  o f  a l l  C o lo n ie s  e x c e p t  New S o u th  
W a le s .
By t h e  1 8 8 0 s ,  h o w e v e r , C o lo n i a l  p o l i t i c i a n s  r e c o g n is e d  
a n e e d  f o r  common a c t i o n  i n  c e r t a i n  a r e a s  -  e s p e c i a l l y  th e  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  u n ifo r m  c u r r e n c y  and c o o r d in a t e d  o v e r s e a s  
b o r r o w in g ; 5 and j o i n t  a c t i o n  t o  o v erco m e  t h e  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  
o f  t h e  C o lo n ie s  i n  d e f e n c e  t e r m s .6 In  1883  t h e  f i r s t  fo r m a l  
m a ch in ery  f o r  g o v e r n m e n ta l c o o r d in a t io n  -  t h e  F e d e r a l  C o u n c il  -  
w as e s t a b l i s h e d .  O r i g i n a l l y  h e r a ld e d  a s  a m ajor  s t e p  to w a r d s  
f e d e r a t i o n ,  i t  came u n d er  i n c r e a s i n g  a t t a c k  i n  th e  l a t e  1 8 8 0 s  
a s  a p o s i t i v e  h in d r a n c e  t o  e f f e c t i v e  C o lo n i a l  u n io n .  I t  w as 
c e r t a i n l y  a h i g h l y  i n e f f e c t i v e  b o d y : i t  la c k e d  any e x e c u t i v e
There was l i t t l e  co n tact between c o lo n ia l p o l i t ic ia n s  and 
governments u n t i l  the in te r -c o lo n ia l conference o f  1883. See 
Quick and Garran, op . c i t . , Part IV, "The Federal Movement in  
A u stra lia " , p .79  f f .
These arguments gained added importance during th e depression  o f  
th e 1890s.
W riters d isagree  as to  whether th ere was any r e a l  danger o f  German, 
French, Russian and/or Japanese in v a sio n . There i s  some evidence  
o f  popular apprehension about the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  a tta ck , 
e s p e c ia lly  from Germany; German d esign s on New Guinea led  
Queensland to  atterrpt to  annex New Guinea in  1883 ( th is  a c tio n  
was vetoed  by B r ita in ) . See Quick and Garran, o p . c i t . , pp.110,
115-117; L.F. C risp , A ustralian  N ational Government, Longmans, 
Melbourne, 3rd r e v .e d .,  1974, p p .4 -5 . On the o th er  hand, a v i s i t o r  
to  th e c o lo n ie s  in  t h is  period  f e l t  th a t Melbournians expressed n ot  
fe a r , but annoyance a t  German presumption; see  J.A . Froude, Oceana: 
or England and her c o lo n ie s , Longmans Green, London, 1886, pp .84, 
187, 159. C erta in ly , by the la te  1880s i t  was c le a r  th a t B ritia n  
wished th e co lo n ie s  to  them selves provide defence fo r c es .
and p o l i t i c a l 4 i s o l a t i o n  betw een  C o lo n ie s ,  due l a r g e l y  t o  
u n d e rd e v e lo p e d  co m m u n ic a tio n s  s y s te m s . D u r in g  t h i s  p e r io d ,  
e ac h  C o lo n y  p u rs u e d  i t s  s e p a ra te  econom ic d e v e lo p m e n t, v y in g  
w i t h  o t h e r  C o lo n ie s  f o r  m ig r a n ts ,  in d u s t r y  and e x p o r t  
m a r k e ts ;  and i n t e r c o l o n i a l  t r a d e  was ham pered by th e  
p r o t e c t i v e  t a r i f f  p o l i c y  o f  a l l  C o lo n ie s  e x c e p t  New S o u th  
W a le s .
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By t h e  1 8 8 0 s , h o w e v e r, C o lo n ia l  p o l i t i c i a n s  r e c o g n is e d  
a n e e d  f o r  common a c t io n  in  c e r t a i n  a re a s  -  e s p e c i a l l y  th e  
e s t a b l is h m e n t  o f  u n ifo r m  c u r re n c y  and c o o r d in a te d  o v e rs e a s  
b o r r o w in g ; 5 and j o i n t  a c t io n  to  overcom e th e  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  
o f  t h e  C o lo n ie s  i n  d e fe n c e  t e r m s .6 I n  1883 th e  f i r s t  fo r m a l  
m a c h in e ry  f o r  g o v e rn m e n ta l c o o r d in a t io n  -  th e  F e d e r a l  C o u n c i l  -  
was e s t a b l i s h e d .  O r i g i n a l l y  h e r a ld e d  as a m a jo r  s te p  to w a rd s  
f e d e r a t io n ,  i t  came u n d e r in c r e a s in g  a t t a c k  i n  th e  l a t e  188 0s  
as a p o s i t i v e  h in d r a n c e  to  e f f e c t i v e  C o lo n ia l  u n io n . I t  was 
c e r t a i n l y  a h ig h ly  i n e f f e c t i v e  b o d y: i t  la c k e d  any e x e c u t iv e
There was l i t t l e  contact between c o lo n ia l p o lit ic ia n s  and 
governments u n t i l  the in te r -c o lo n ia l conference o f  1883. See 
Quick and Garran, op . c i t . , P art TV, "The Federal Movement in  
A u s tra lia " , p .79  f f .
These arguments gained added importance during the depression o f  
th e  1890s.
W rite rs  disagree as to  whether th ere  was any r e a l  danger o f  German, 
French, Russian and/or Japanese invasion. There is  some evidence 
o f popular apprehension about the p o s s ib il ity  o f a tta c k , 
e s p e c ia lly  frcm Germany; German designs on New Guinea led  
Queensland to  a tte n p t to  annex New Guinea in  1883 (th is  ac tio n  
was vetoed by B r ita in )  . See Quick and Garran, o p . c i t . , pp .110 ,
115-117; L .F . C risp , A u stra lian  N a tiona l Government, Longmans, 
Melbourne, 3rd re v .e d .,  1974, p p .4 -5 . On the o ther hand, a v is i t o r  
to  the colonies in  th is  period f e l t  th a t Melbournians expressed not 
fe a r ,  but annoyance a t  German presumption; see J .A . Froude, Oceana: 
o r England and her co lo n ies , Longmans Green, London, 1886, pp .84, 
187, 159. C e rta in ly , by the la te  1880s i t  was c le a r  th a t B r it ia n  
wished the colonies to  themselves provide defence fo rces .
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or financial powers; had lim ited le g is la tiv e  ju risd ic tio n ; 
and was boycotted by New South Wales7 and, for most of i t s  
existence, by South A ustralia. Thus there is  a very clear 
p a ra lle l between the Australian Federal Council and the 
American Confederate Congress; and the former should also 
have been termed a confederate leg is la tu re .
The Federal Council aroused l i t t l e  enthusiasm amongst 
Colonial p o litic ian s  or populations. Although i t  continued to 
meet u n til 1899, from 1890 i t  was disregarded, and a tten tion  
was focussed elsewhere - specifically  on an in terco lon ia l 
conference convened (in response to proposals aired by New 
South Wales Premier S ir Henry Parkes) in February 1890. 
Representatives of the Colonies8 agreed on the need for an 
executive and le g is la tiv e  government for the whole continent, 
and for a fu rther conference one year hence to d ra ft a federal 
constitu tion . This Conference duly assembled in Sydney in 
March 1891 and produced a d raft constitu tion  which was the 
basis for a l l  future discussions and negotiations. After a 
hiatus of some y e a rs ,9 a second series of Federal Conventions
I t  was New South Wales Premier Sir Henry Parkes who firs t proposed 
a federal council; he envisaged a body of stature and power and 
described the actual Council established in 1883 as a farce, hence 
his Government's refusal to participate. See H. Parkes, Fifty Years 
in the Making of Australian History, Longmans Green, London, 1892,
pp. 583-602. Alfred De akin described the Council as: "__vagrant in
domicile and without a roof to shelter it , without a foot of 
territory to rest upon, without a ship or a soldier to protect i t ,  
without a single man in its service, or a shilling of its  own to 
pay one." From "The Federal Council of Australasia" in Australasian 
Review of Reviews, February 1895, quoted by H. de R. Walker, 
Australasian Democracy, T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1897, p.217.
And of New Zealand, who played an inactive role at the 1890 and 1891 
Conventions and was not involved in later developments.
The reasons for this hiatus are numerous: the critical reaction of
Colonial parliaments (especially the upper houses) to the 1891 bill; 
Colonial preoccupation with the banking crisis of 1892-1893 and 
subsequent economic problems; the appearance and activities of Labor 
parties in several Colonies; and New South Wales' disinterest after 
the resignation of Sir Henry Parkes.
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held in Adelaide, Sydney and Melbourne during 1897 and 1898 
produced important changes to the original 1891 draft 
constitution.10 Further negotiations (especially with New 
South Wales, which continuously raised objections to 
successive drafts) were followed by public referenda in 
1898, 1899 and 1900; the culmination of the federal 
movement was Royal Assent to the Commonwealth of Australia 
Constitution Act in July 1900.
Whatever may be the explanations for the slow tempo 
of moves towards union of the Australian Colonies, it is 
evident that this very leisurely progress was accompanied by 
the development of sufficient Colonial parochialism and sense 
of separate identity for federalism, rather than a unitary 
system, to be the form of union adopted. H. de R. Walker 
commented in the 1890s:
"In the absence of distinctions of race and 
language, in the general diffusion of Roman 
Catholics among the Protestants, and the 
steady determination to exclude coloured races, 
the early establishment of Federal relations 
would have produced among Australians a 
monotonous uniformity of characteristics, which 
has to some extent been prevented by the divergent 
political tendencies of the several Provinces."11
As did their American counterparts, Australian Federal 
Convention delegates devoted a large proportion of their time, 
and emotional energies, to debating the structure and 
composition of the federal legislature and to the question of
La Nauze feels that the 1900 Constitution is recognizably the 
1891 draft with "extensive plastic surgery". J.A. La Nauze, The 
Making of the Australian Constitution, M.U.P., Melbourne, 1972, 
p.78.
Op.cit., p.236.li
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inter-house relationships.12 In their "survey and scrutiny 
of the constitutional experience of the past",13 the 
Australian delegates looked at the Constitutions and political 
practices of America, Britain, Switzerland and Canada, and 
their own Colonial experiences.
Ready Acceptance of Federalism and Bicameralism
Australian Colonial Upper Houses had, as noted previously, 
often been seen as undemocratic enclaves of conservatism, 
partly because of the methods of selection of their membership 
(nominee or restricted franchise). Their performance was such 
that people saw them as either unnecessary and redundant, or 
as barriers to economic and social reform. Yet, despite this 
record, the need for a bicameral legislature was rarely 
questioned in the Federal Convention debates. There was 
certainly a general desire to ensure that the Federal Upper 
House would not merit such opprobrium. For example, there was 
ready acceptance of the principle of direct election of 
Senators and the desirability of formulating identical 
requirements for voters for and members of the Senate and the 
House of Representatives. In addition, many of the founding 
fathers desired, if possible, to grant equal legislative power 
to both Houses. With these provisions it was felt that the 
the Senate could act as a second sieve and perhaps even as a 
conservative brake on 'rude democracy'.14
12 J.E. Richardson, Patterns of Australian Federalism, C.R.F.F.R. 
monograph No. 1, A.N.U., Canberra, 1973, p.6.
13 J. Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, quoted by J.A.R. 
Marriott, Second Chambers : An Inductive Study in Political Science, 
O.U.P., Oxford, 1910, p.165.
La Nauze, op.cit., p.43.14
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F o r  t h e  f o u n d in g  f a t h e r s  t h e  m o s t i m p o r t a n t  c o n c e r n  
w a s ,  h o w e v e r ,  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  S e n a te  a s  t h e  e m b o d im e n t o f  
t h e  f e d e r a l  p r i n c i p l e  o f  r e p r e s e n t i n g  S t a t e s  (on  t h e  m o d e l 
o f  t h e  A m e r ic a n  S e n a t e ) . E ven  b e f o r e  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
C o n v e n t io n s  o f  t h e  1 8 9 0 s ,  l e a d i n g  C o l o n i a l  p o l i t i c i a n s  h a d  
m ad e  i t  p l a i n  t h a t  t h e y  w o u ld  n o t  c o n s i d e r  an y  fo rm  o f  u n io n  
w i t h o u t  a d e q u a t e  s a f e g u a r d s  f o r  t h e  m a in te n a n c e  o f  m o s t  o f  
t h e i r  e x i s t i n g  p o w e rs  a n d ,  p r e f e r a b l y ,  a l l  t h e i r  p r i v i l e g e s .  
T h a t  t h e  S e n a t e  w o u ld  b e  a  S t a t e s  H ouse  w as " t h e  p r i c e  o f  
A u s t r a l i a n  f e d e r a l i s m  -  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s a f e g u a r d  t h a t  t h e  
s t a t e s  d em an d ed  f o r  t h e  s u r r e n d e r  o f  e n u m e r a te d  p o w e rs  t o  a 
new  c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y . " 15
I n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  f e r v o u r ,  l e t  a l o n e  
a n y  m o v es to w a r d s  a  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  in d e p e n d e n c e  f ro m  t h e  
m o th e r  c o u n t r y ,  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  f o u n d in g  f a t h e r s  w e re  m uch 
m o re  a c c e p t i n g  o f  b a s i c  t e n e t s  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  p o l i t i c a l  s y s te m  
t h a n  t h e i r  A m e r ic a n  c o u n t e r p a r t s .  A l th o u g h  a  f e w 16 w e re  
w i l l i n g  t o  a b a n d o n  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  r e s p o n s i b l e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  t h e  
m a j o r i t y  o f  d e l e g a t e s  i n  1891 a n d  1 8 9 7 -1 8 9 8  r e g a r d e d  r e s p o n s i b l e  
g o v e r n m e n t  a s  a n  e s t a b l i s h e d  p r a c t i c e  t h a t  m u s t  b e  c o n t i n u e d ,  
a n d  t h e r e  w as c r i t i c i s m 17 o f  t h e  A m e ric a n  F e d e r a l  C o n s t i t u t i o n
15 G .S. R eid , " A u s t r a l i a 's  Coimonwealth P a rliam en t and th e  'W estm inster 
M odel' " ,  J o u rn a l o f  Commonwealth P o l i t i c a l  S tu d ie s , r e p r in te d  in
C.A. Hughes, ( e d .) ,  Readings in  A u s tra lia n  Government, U. o f  Q ueensland 
P r e s s ,  1968, p .1 1 3 .
16 G r i f f i t h  in  Q ueensland P a rliam en ta ry  D ebates on th e  p ro p o sa l f o r  th e  
1891 C onvention, V ol. l x i ,  1890, p .1 9 5 , quo ted  by Hunt, o p . c i t . , p .1 1 9 . 
See a ls o  C onvention D ebates, Sydney 1891, p p .3 1 f f .  (G rey), 48 (B arto n ), 
7 8 f f .  (K ingston); Convention D ebates, A delaide 1897, p p .2 7 f f .  2 1 0 ff .
345 (Baker and Downer), 133 (Symon), 3 2 4 ff. (Gordon); C onvention D ebates, 
Sydney 1897, p .7 8 2 f f .
17 F i r s t  a i r e d  by Cockbum a t  th e  1890 Melbourne C onference. See Hunt, 
o p . c i t . , p .1 0 5 . See a ls o  J .A . Cockbum , A u s tra l ia n  F e d e ra t io n , Horace 
M arsh a ll and Son, London, 1901, p .3 4 .
5 7 .
for its rejection of the principle.
At the 1891 Convention some delegates from the 
smaller18 Colonies argued that cabinet both could and should 
be responsible to both Houses of the Federal Parliament. For 
example, one speaker remarked that:
"... responsible government would mean the 
dominance of the lower house, whereas the balance 
of federation demanded that the Senate, like the 
House of Representatives, should be able to make 
and unmake cabinets and to influence cabinet 
policy." 19
Two suggested methods of ensuring cabinet responsibility 
to the Senate were the American system of Senate approval of 
ministerial appointments, and the Swiss scheme of a fixed term, 
elected cabinet. These small State delegates believed that the 
federal principle was far more important than the conventions 
of responsible government. However, their opponents stressed 
the over-riding importance of maintaining the traditions of 
cabinet government which were already operating in the 
Australian colonies, rather than importing some unknown 
procedure.20 This argument prevailed both in 189121 and in 
1897-1898.22
The terms 'large(r) ' and 'small(er) ' distinguish between the relative 
populations, not geographical areas, of colonies or States. New South 
Wales and Victoria have always been the 'large' colonies/States in 
this usage.
Convention Debates, Sydney 1891, p.49, (Downer). See also ibid., 
pp.52 (Thynne), 58ff. (Bird), 118 (Clark).
E.J. Hunt comments, "The failure of the Australian Constitutional 
conventions to accept British responsible government without 
modification resulted, of course, fron a desire to preserve the 
individuality and as much as possible of the authority of the 
colonies which the delegates represented." Op.cit., p.254. See 
also La Nauze, op.cit., p.40.
See, for example, Parkes' speech, Convention Debates, Sydney 1891, 
p.12; and Barton, ibid., p.48.
See Barton, Convention Debates, Adelaide 1897, p.380ff; and 
further debate in ibid., pp. 908-916.
22
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At the same time, however, the Australian founding 
fathers were taken with the idea of a notion for a continent, 
and impressed with the American solution of allowing for 
diversity within unity.
Reconciliation of the competing attractiveness of the 
British and American systems led initially to consideration 
of the Canadian Constitution as a model for the Australian 
delegates. Sir Henry Parkes, who had drafted proposals for 
consideration at the 1890 Conference, felt that any Australian 
constitution "would necessarily follow close upon the type of 
the Dominion Government of Canada", while still drawing on 
"the rich stores of political knowledge which were collected 
by the framers of the Constitution of the United States . . . ".2 3 
It soon became recognized, however, that the Canadian 
Constitution was not a satisfactory model; Cockburn notes that 
its provisions for Lieutenant-Governors, the composition of 
the Senate and for provincial powers (enumerated and limited) 
"did not appear to be compatible with the practically 
unrestricted autonomy hitherto enjoyed by the Australian 
colonies".24
Having rejected aspects of the Canadian system25 while 
still desiring to retain the Westminster style of executive-
23 Op.cit., p.588.
24 Cockburn, op.cit., pp.43-44. 1891 delegates Macrossan, O'Connor,
Inglis Clark, Barton and Griffith agreed, in speeches to their 
Colonial Legislatures. See Hunt, op.cit., pp.50, 53-58.
La Nauze notes in detail the similarities between the Canadian 
and Australian Constitutions. Op.cit., pp.51-53.
l e g i s l a t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  th e  A u s t r a l ia n  fo u n d in g  f a t h e r s  
g a v e  m ore d e t a i l e d  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t o  th e  A m erica n  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  and  t o  B r y c e 's  com m entary t h e r e o n . 26 S e v e r a l  
s e n i o r  d e l e g a t e s  had  c l o s e l y  s t u d ie d  t h e s e  and The F e d e r a l i s t , 2 
and had  e v e n  t r a v e l l e d  in  th e  U n it e d  S t a t e s . 28 Some 
a t t e n t i o n  w as a l s o  g iv e n  to  th e  S w is s  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  The 
r e s u l t a n t  1900 C o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  th u s  som ew hat o f  a p o t  p o u r i , 
a lt h o u g h  B r y c e 29 and C ockburn d i s a g r e e .  The l a t t e r  c o n c lu d e s :
59 .
"As th e  w ork p r o c e e d e d  i t  becam e e v i d e n t  t h a t  
many rea d y -m a d e  p r o v i s i o n s  . . .  w ere  n o t  a t  
p r e s e n t  a p p l i c a b l e  to  A u s t r a l ia n  c o n d i t i o n s .  
The m em bers o f  th e  C o n v e n tio n  (1 8 9 7 -1 8 9 8 )  
tu r n e d  m ore and more away from  th e  f a c i l e  
m eth od  o f  p r o p o s in g  c l a u s e s  from  th e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s ,  
S w it z e r la n d ,  and C anada. S c i z z o r s  an d  p a s t e  
w e re  l a i d  e n t i r e l y  a s i d e ;  e v e n  th e  v o i c e  o f  
e m in e n t  f e d e r a l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  so  p o t e n t  in  th e  
e a r l y  s t a g e s ,  grew  f e e b l e  in  t h e i r  e a r s . " 30
B ic a m e r a lis m  w as a c c e p t e d  b e c a u s e  o f  B r i t i s h ,  A m erica n  
and l o c a l  C o lo n ia l  p r a c t i c e ;  and f e d e r a l i s m  w as a s c a r c e l y  
q u e s t io n e d  m o d e l .31 An a d d i t i o n a l  e x p la n a t io n  f o r  su c h  r e a d y
La Nauze comments: " It (Bryce's book) was quoted or  referred  to
more than any o th er s in g le  work; never c r i t ic i z e d ,  i t  was regarded  
w ith  th e  same awe, mingled w ith reverence, as the B ib le  would have 
been in  an assembly o f  churchmen." O p .c it . , p .273 .
In  1891 two is su e s  o f  an A ustralian  F e d e r a lis t  were published; and 
th e  Tasmanian government (with the urging o f  I n g l is  Clark) sponsored  
p u b lic a tio n  o f  T.C. J u s t 's ,  The Leading Facts Connected w ith  
F ed era tion , which included  press and p o li t ic ia n s '  comments on 
American and Canadian Federalism  and ex tra cts  from The F e d e r a lis t ; 
Hunt, o p .c i t . , p p .56-58. I t  i s  in te r e s t in g  to  note th a t th ese  appears 
during th e 1890s, th a t i s ,  during the period o f  d ra ftin g  o f  the  
A u stra lia n  C o n stitu tio n , whereas in  America The F e d e r a lis t  appeared 
a f t e r  th e  d ra ftin g  and p rior  to th e  r a t if ic a t io n  o f  the completed 
C o n stitu tio n .
28 For example, Parkes, G r if f ith , I n g l is  Clark, Deakin, Bray and 
F o rrest. Hunt, o p . c i t . , p p .17-21.
29 Quoted by M arriott, o p .c i t . , p .165.
30 O p .c it . , p .4 2 .
31 Quick and Garran, o p .c i t . , p p .386-387. Motions by O 'loghlen  and 
Hancock in  th e  V ictor ian  le g is la tu r e ;  by Carruthers in  New South 
Wales; and by two Labor members in  South A u stra lia  in  1897, were 
e a s i ly  d efeated . Hunt, o p .c i t . , p p .100-101, 106.
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w ith  th e  same awe, mingled w ith reverence, as the B ib le  would have 
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In  1891 two is s u e s  o f  an A ustralian  F e d e r a lis t  were published; and 
th e  Tasmanian government (with th e urging o f  I n g l is  Clark) sponsored  
p u b lica tio n  o f  T.C. J u s t 's ,  The Leading Facts Connected w ith  
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American and Canadian Federalism and ex tra cts  from The F e d e r a lis t?
Hunt, o p .c i t . , pp. 56-58. I t  i s  in te r e s t in g  to  note th a t th ese  appeared 
during th e 1890s, th a t i s ,  during th e period o f  d ra ftin g  o f  the  
A u stra lian  C o n stitu tio n , whereas in  America The F e d e r a lis t  appeared 
a f te r  th e d ra ftin g  and p rior  to th e r a t i f ic a t io n  o f  the completed 
C o n stitu tio n .
28 For example, Parkes, G r if f ith , I n g l is  Clark, Deakin, Bray and 
F o rrest. Hunt, o p .c i t . , p p .17-21.
29 Quoted by M arriott, o p .c i t . , p .165.
30 O p .c it . , p .4 2 .
31 Quick and Garran, o p .c i t . , p p .386-387. Motions by O’logh len  and 
Hancock in  th e  V ictor ian  le g is la tu r e ;  by Carruthers in  New South 
Wales; and by two Labor members in  South A u stra lia  in  1897, were 
e a s i ly  d efeated . Hunt, o p .c i t . , p p .100-101, 106.
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acceptance of bicameralism was the meagre representation of 
members of the emerging Australian Labor Party at the 
Federal Conventions and in Colonial Parliaments.32
The Composition of the Australian Senate
The composition of the Senate is specified in Sections 
7-23, 41-50 and 53-57 of the Commonwealth Constitution. 
Briefly, these Sections provide that:
(i) each original State within the federation has
an equal number of representatives in the Senate - 
originally 6, now 10 per State;33
(ii) Senators are directly elected by the electors in 
each State voting as one electorate; they serve 
a six-year term, with half of the Senate retiring 
each three years (except when there is a double 
dissolution);
(iii) the conditions of eligibility for voting in
elections for and qualifications for membership of 
each House of Federal Parliament are identical;
See Quick and Garran's reference to the unsuccessful "Labour Ten" 
candidates for the 1897 election of New South Wales Convention 
delegates, op.cit., p.163. For further detail on A.L.P. 
representation in the 1890s, see Chapter IV, pp. foj£~iX2.4
33 Original States are those, referred to in the Preamble to the 
Constitution, which ratified the Constitution in 1899-1900. By 
Section 7 each original State is guaranteed at least 6 Senators 
(Section 24 guarantees each original State a minimum of 5 manbers 
in the House of Representatives). New States, and Commonwealth 
Territories, may be granted such represenation in either federal 
House as Federal parliament sees fit; there is no guaranteed 
minimum number of Representatives or Senators for new States or 
territories.
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(iv) the number of members of the Lower House, the
House of Representatives, is directly proportional 
to the number of Senators; under the 'nexus' 
clause (Section 24) the number of Representatives 
should be "as nearly as practicable" twice the 
number of Senators.
(i) Equal State representation:
The question of how the Senate would represent the 
States (equal or proportional representation, direct or 
indirect election) was debated at both the 1891 and 1897-1898 
Federal Conventions, but generally there was agreement amongst 
the delegates on the desired provisions.
The notion of a Federal Upper House with equal 
representation for the States was included in the constitutional 
drafts of Inglis Clark and Kingston which formed an initial 
basis for discussion at the 1891 Convention.34 Both Colonial 
statesmen had rejected the Canadian model and followed the 
American,35 and their choice was overwhelmingly accepted by 
delegates at that and subsequent Conventions. Representatives 
of the smaller Colonies demonstrated only too plainly their 
fear of being overridden by the larger States who would hold 
the majority of seats in the lower house, and most delegates 
from the larger Colonies recognized that if equal State 
representation were not adopted any plan for union would founder.
La Nauze, op.cit., pp.25-28. For the draft proposals, see ibid., 
pp.292-296.
35 Inglis Clark termed the American system "real federation", in
contrast to the Canadian mere "amalgamation". Convention Debates,
Sydney 1891, p.l05ff.
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However, delegates from New South Wales opposed the 
principle of equal State representation at the 1891 
Convention and in Adelaide in 1897; and this provision in 
the 1897 draft constitution was rejected by both Houses of 
the State Legislature (59-4 against in the Assembly).36 At 
the Sydney session of the Convention in August 1897, Victorian 
delegate Higgins made - in the words of La Nauze - "what he 
knew to be a hopeless attempt to replace equal State 
representation in the Senate with representation related to 
populations".37 Higgins noted that the Canadian, Swiss and 
German Constitutions did not provide for equal State 
representation;38 reminded Australian delegates of the 
closeness of the vote at Philadelphia on equal State 
representation in the American Senate;39 and reiterated 
Bryce's demonstration of the lack of any small versus large 
States voting patterns in the Senate after 1787.40 Higgins 
then proposed a sliding scale of representation: each State
would be eligible to three Senators for its first 100,000 
population, and an extra Senator for each additional 200,000 
population.41 By this stage most Victorian42 and New South 
Wales delegates had accepted the necessity of equal State
36 Quick and Garran, op.cit., p.183.
Op.cit., p.187. La Nauze also terms such arguments "idio-syncratic 
objections"; ibid., p.119.
38 Convention Debates, Adelaide 1897, p.641ff.
39 Loc.cit.
40 Ibid., p.96ff.
41 Ibid., p.649.
42 A motion for proportional representation had been rejected by the 
Victorian Legislative Assembly on a vote of 45 to 36. Hunt, 
op.cit., p.107.
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representation, and in the subsequent division only four 
of the total number of delegates supported Higgins.43 At 
the Sydney session in 1897, a similar proposal from both 
houses of the New South Wales Parliament supporting 
proportional representation was also negatived.44
Higgins doggedly repeated his arguments at the final 
session of the Convention in Melbourne in 1898,45 but the 
necessity for compromise had easily won out. Several speakers 
at the 1897 sessions had sympathized with his arguments; but 
Deakin46 (echoed by Reid47) argued that equal State 
representation was necessary for "a fair and equal contract" 
and to get small State acceptance; and Kingston48 (and 
Isaacs49) placed this necessity above the logic of Higgins' 
stand on proportional representation.
Griffith's first draft constitution bill, prepared for 
the 1891 Convention, specified that there would be eight 
Senators from each State.50 An amendment to substitute "six" 
for "eight" was negatived.51 At the Adelaide session of the 
1897 Convention the number of State representatives was 
questioned on grounds of economy; after rejecting a motion 
for four Senators per State,52 delegates settled on a minimum
43 The vote was 32 to 5. Convention Debates, Adelaide 1897, p.1190.
44 The vote was 41 to 5. Convention Debates, Sydney 1897, pp.256-355.
45 Convention Debates, Melbourne 1898, Vol. ii, p.2210ff.
46 Convention Debates, Adelaide 1897, p.649ff.
47 Convention Debates, Sydney 1897, p.666ff.
48 Ibid., p.283ff.
49 Ibid., p.303ff.
50 La Nauze, op.cit., p.53.
51 Quick and Garran, op.cit., p.412.
52 Convention Debates, Adelaide 1897, p.670.
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of six Senators for original States. Representation for any 
federal territories, or for any States created/admitted in the 
future, was to be a matter for Federal Parliament to decide, 
and no guarantee of a minimum, or of equal, representation 
applies.53 This distinction between original and other 
States was suggested by the Victorian Legislative Assmbly, 
and readily accepted by those delegates who had only supported 
equal State representation as a practical, albeit unappealing, 
compromise.5 4
In describing the 'Great Compromise' of the American 
Constitution, Hamilton wrote:
"... the equal vote allowed to each State, is 
at once a constitutional recognition of the 
portion of sovereignty remaining in the 
individual states, and an instrument for 
preserving that residuary sovereignty."55
This is a fine ex post rationalization given the bitterness of 
debate at Philadelphia, and the narrow final majority in the 
vote on equal State representation. In the Australian 
federation Conventions the debate was far less acrimonious, 
the necessity for compromise more readily accepted, and the 
opposing voices a tiny (though persistent) minority.
(ii) Election and term of Senators
The 1891 draft Constitution Bill followed the American 
and Canadian Constitutions in providing that Senators be
53 Constitution, Sections 71, 121.
54 Convention Debates, Sydney 1897, pp.394-414. See also Quick and 
Garran, op.cit., p.189.
The Federalist, Number 62, J.E. Cooke, (ed.), World Publishing 
Company edition, Ohio, 1965, p.417.
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c h o s e n  by S t a t e  L e g i s l a t u r e s .  G r i f f i t h 56 and P l a y f o r d 57 
s t r o n g l y  s u p p o r te d  t h i s  m ethod o f  i n d i r e c t  e l e c t i o n ;  and  
K in g s t o n ' s  p r o p o s a l  (b a se d  on h i s  p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  d i r e c t  
p o p u la r  e l e c t i o n )  to  a l lo w  e a ch  S t a t e  t o  s e t  t h e  m eth o d , was 
r o u n d ly  d e f e a t e d .  58
By 18 9 7  a m a j o r i t y  o f  d e l e g a t e s  w e re  w i l l i n g  t o  
a n t i c i p a t e  t h e  A m erica n  S e v e n te e n th  A m en d m en t,59 and  d i r e c t  
e l e c t i o n  o f  S e n a t o r s  (a s  o f  members o f  t h e  H ouse o f  
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s )  w as a d o p te d  w i t h  o n ly  tw o v o c a l  d i s s e n t e r s . 60 
T h ere  w as som e d e b a t e  on  t h e  m e r i t s  o f  m u l t i -  r a t h e r  th a n  
s in g le -m e m b e r  e l e c t o r a t e s , 61 b u t  a m a j o r i t y  e v e n t u a l l y  
e n d o r s e d  a p r o p o s a l  f o r  th e  w h o le  S t a t e  t o  b e  th e  e l e c t o r a t e  
" u n t i l  t h e  P a r l ia m e n t  o t h e r w is e  p r o v i d e s " .62 A rgu m en ts t h a t  
o n ly  r i c h  men c o u ld  h op e  t o  co m p ete  f o r  S t a t e - w id e  e l e c t o r a t e s 63 
w e re  c o u n t e r e d  by s p e a k e r s  w ho, m in d fu l o f  t h e  A m erica n
56 Convention D ebates, Sydney 1891, p .286.
57 Ib id . , p .287.
58 The vo te  was 34 to  6. Cockbum a lso  supported d ir e c t  e le c t io n , but 
f e l t  th is  was premature. Ib id . , pp.286, 588-599.
See e s p e c ia l ly  speeches in  Convention Debates, A delaide 1897, by 
Turner (p .3 9 f f ) ,  Isaacs (p . l7 6 f f ) ,  Quick ( p . l8 8 f f ) ,  Downer (p .210ff) , 
Reid (p .2 7 0 ff) , Clarke (p .304), and Trenwith (p .331).
60 Dobson, Convention Debates, Adelaide 1897, p p .670-672; F o rrest, 
Convention D ebates, Sydney 1897, p .361.
61 Lyne, Convention Debates, A delaide 1897, p p .668-669; F orrest  
and F raser, Convention Debates, Sydney 1897, p p .360-391. This 
had a lso  been endorsed by a l l  C olon ia l L eg is la tu res  excep t the  
New South Wales L e g is la t iv e  C ouncil.
62 C o n stitu tio n , S ection  7. The second paragraph o f  th is  S ectio n  
makes s p e c i f ic  allow ance (never acted  upon) fo r  Queensland
to  be d iv id ed  in to  d iv is io n s  fo r  Senate e le c t io n s  (r e f le c t in g  
th e  geographical s iz e  and sca ttered  population o f  th a t S t a t e ) .
See Quick and Garran, o p .c i t . , p .421 .
63 S ee , fo r  example, Convention Debates, Sydney 1897, F orrest 
(p. 361), Reid (p .3 6 6 ff) .
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experience, wanted to ensure that localism was confined to 
the House of Representatives.64
The six-year term for Senators was accepted in the 
1891 draft Constitution and only once questioned in later 
Conventions.65 It was generally accepted that the term for 
Senators should be longer than that for Representatives 
(three years). The provision that one-half of the 
membership retire every three years was designed to ensure 
that the Upper House would have "a perpetual existence",66 
that is, would be a continuous body (except when a dissolution 
occurs under Section 57).
Little time was devoted by Convention delegates to the 
question of filling casual vacancies which might arise on the 
death, resignation or expulsion of a Senator. The 1891 draft 
Constitution left the filling of casual vacancies to a joint 
sitting of the State Parliament (or to the Governor-in-Council 
if the vacancy occurred while Parliament was in recess).67 
After adoption of direct election of Senators in 1897, a similar 
provision was accepted as a temporary ad interim method for 
filling vacancies until a subsequent federal (either Senate 
or House of Representatives) election.68
64 Higgins in ibid., p.369. See also Trenwith's amusing refutation 
of the cost argument, loc.cit.
65 At the Adelaide session, by Higgins, who unsuccessfully proposed 
reducing the term to four years. Convention Debates, Adelaide 
1897, p.670.
66 Sir Henry Parkes' 1891 Resolutions, in Parkes, op.cit., p.605.
67 Convention Debates, Sydney 1891, pp.600-605.
68 Convention Debates, Adelaide 1897, pp.579-580, 1101.
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(iii) Qualifications for Senate electors and Senators
The previous Chapter noted the views prevalent in the 
late Nineteenth Century concerning the desirability (or 
otherwise) of elected Colonial Upper Houses. By 1890 the 
adult male franchise had been accepted for all Colonial Lower 
Houses except in Tasmania, and the 1891 draft Constitution 
Bill provided that those eligible to vote for State lower 
house elections would likewise be qualified electors for the 
House of Representatives. There was some debate about 
prescribing a uniform (i.e. federal) franchise, but this was 
rejected as an interference with State rights;69 as was, 
in 1897, any specific clause disallowing plural voting,70 
(then allowed in several Colonies), or providing for female 
suffrage,71 for voting for both Federal Houses. Thus the 
eligibility for voting for both Houses was the same: 
eligibility to vote in State Lower House elections.
Both the American and Canadian Constitutions required 
that Senators be at least thirty years old. Madison, in 
The Federalist, had argued that this would enable members to 
have a necessary "greater extent of information and stability 
of character".72 With a similar aim, Kingston’s 1891 draft 
advocated that "Senators were to serve for at least five years 
as members of their colony's legislature before being eligible
See debate on the Cockbum and Barton anendnents, Convention 
Debates, Sydney 1891, pp.613-637.
70 Convention Debates, Sydney 1897, pp.455-457.
71 Negated 23 to 12. Convention Debates, Adelaide 1897, pp.715-732. 
See also Quick and Garran, op.cit., pp. 483-487. At the tine of 
federation women were entitled to vote only in South Australia and 
Western Australia.
72 Number 62, in op.cit., p.415.
68.
for election as Senators".73 This proposal was never 
discussed at the Convention; but there was continuing 
discussion in 1891 about the desirability of a minimum age 
for Senate membership, and Griffith adopted the American 
minimum age of 30 in his draft.74 This was accepted by the 
Convention, and the 1891 draft Constitution Bill set a 
minimum age of 30 for membership of the Senate (21 for the 
House of Representatives) , with the requirement of 5 years 
(3 years) residence in Australia and a naturalisation period 
of 5 (3) years.75
In 1897 suggestions for a minimum age of 2576 
(Tasmanian proposal) and 30 (Victorian proposal) were 
rejected.77 There was little real debate on this question, 
however, and the common age requirement of 21 years was 
finally adopted for both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives (thus emphasizing very clearly that the Senate 
was not to be like Colonial/State Legislative Councils). 
Finally, having established identical qualifications for 
membership of either federal House, identical criteria for 
disqualification were adopted (Sections 44 and 45 of the 
Constitution).
73 See Appendix 3 of La Nauze, op.cit., p.295.
74 See Appendix 5 of ibid., p. 301.
75 Convention Debates, Sydney, 1891, pp.605-610.
76 Walker had moved for a miniimin age of 25 at the Adelaide session. 
Convention Debates, Adelaide 1897, p.1191.
77 Convention Debates, Sydney 1897, pp.989-990.
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(iv) The 'nexus'
The 'nexus' clause was inserted by the Constitutional 
Committee into the 1891 draft Constitution Bill at the same 
time that the minimum number of Senators per State was set 
at six.78 However, unlike the latter provision, the 'nexus' 
clause could not be altered at the will of the Federal 
Parliament, but stood in perpetuity unless removed by the 
referendum process. This was obviously another concession to 
the smaller Colonies; in retrospect it seems amazing that 
there was apparently no real debate on this provision at the 
1891 Convention. The clause was later debated in Committee 
at the Adelaide session of the 1897 Convention.79 Those in 
favour80 argued that it was necessary to prevent the House of 
Representatives growing so large that the smaller States 
would be swamped, both in that House and in a joint sitting; 
opponents81 saw no logic in relating the membership of the 
two Houses, resented any curb on the growth of the House of 
Representatives, and found the 'two-to-one' ratio unnecessarily 
rigid. However, no change to the 'nexus' clause was made at 
the Adelaide session. The New South Wales and Victorian 
Lower Houses later suggested removal of the provision, but 
this was rejected at the Sydney session,82 and a final attempt 
to remove the clause was also negatived at the final Convention 
in Melbourne.83 Thus the original 1891 provision survived
78 La Nauze, op.cit., p.138.
79 Convention Debates, Adelaide 1897, pp.435-436, 638-715, 1191.
80 For example, Barton, O'Connor, Glynn, Reid and Downer.
81 For example, Turner, Isaacs, Deakin and Higgins.
82 Convention Debates, Sydney 1897, pp.420-453.
83 Convention Debates, Melbourne 1898, pp.1827-1838.
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with only minor verbal redrafting.
The consequence is  that Section 24 effectively  prevents 
any d ras tic  increase in the size of the House of Representatives; 
to increase the size of the House, there must be e ith er an 
increase in the number of Senators per S tate, or of the 
number of S tates or te r r i to r ie s  having federal rep resen ta tion .84
An overview of the debates of the Conventions of the 
1890s reveals tha t the question of equal S tate representation 
and other provisions rela ting  to the composition of the 
A ustralian Senate did not necessitate any 'Great Compromise'.
The matter which caused greatest contention, and necessitated 
an A ustralian compromise, was the general question of the 
re la tiv e  power of the two federal Houses, and especially the 
Senate's righ ts in re la tion  to financial leg is la tio n .
The Relative Power of the Senate and the House of Representatives
The Senate has the same leg is la tiv e  power as the House 
of Representatives except in rela tion  to money b i l l s . 85
This has vexed numerous governments. In 1948 the Chifley Labor 
Government accepted the necessity of increasing the number of 
Senators (to 10 per State) in order to enable an increase in 
the size of the House of Representatives. In 1967 Liberal 
Prime Minister Holt unsuccessfully promoted a Constitutional 
Amendment to remove the 'nexus' clause. The national 'NO' 
vote was 59.75%; the vote in the three smaller States was: 
South Australia 66.09%, Western Australia 70.95% and 
Tasmania 76.94% against the proposal. J.R. Odgers, Australian 
Senate Practice, Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra,
4th ed. 1972, p.16. In 1974^  the two federal territories were 
granted two seats each in the Senate (they also have one seat 
each in the House of Representatives).
For a stric t definition of a money bill, see Odgers, op.cit. , 
Chapter 16, especially pp. 318-332.
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Section 53 of the Constitution prohibits the Senate from:
(a) initiating a money bill; (b) amending a money bill;
(c) amending any bill in such a way as to increase any 
proposed charge or tax. However, the Senate can address 
requests for amendment to the Lower House (including requests 
for amendment which might increase a proposed charge or 
burden on the people). Most important, the Senate has the 
full power of veto over all legislation - whether financial 
or non-financial.
The unrestricted veto power of the Senate has 
important consequences for the pattern of relationships between 
the two Houses of Federal Parliament. Moreover, it 
necessitated inclusion in the Constitution of machinery for 
resolving deadlocks between the Houses (Section 57), which the 
founding fathers believed would be likely given the near equal 
power of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
The preceding discussion demonstrated that during the 
Conventions of the 1890s delegates from the larger Colonies 
were willing to compromise over such matters as equal State 
representation and the relative size of the two chambers of 
the proposed Federal Parliament. On the question of the 
relative powers of the two chambers, however, the larger 
Colonies were adamant that the Senate should be subordinate 
to the House of Representatives. The debate on the powers of 
the Senate centred in particular on whether the upper house 
should, in accordance with the principles of responsible 
government, have restricted power in relation to consideration 
of financial legislation. A second related point of contention
72 .
was the possib ility  or desirability  of the executive being 
held responsible to the Senate as well as to the House of 
Representatives. Quick and Garran comment:
" . . .  the necessity of equal representation of 
States in the Senate was conceded from the 
outset, and Sir Henry Parkes, in his preliminary 
resolutions, had voluntarily offered i t .  This 
concession was made, however, subject to the 
definite and unequivocal condition that the 
House of Representatives should have the 
predominating voice in finance and in the 
control of the executive. ... But some of the 
colonies, not content with equal representation 
in the Senate, had claimed equal power for the 
Senate, and round these two standards the real 
b a ttle  of the Convention was fought."86
Sir Samuel G riffith  of Queensland, a former Premier and 
la te r  to be Chief Justice of Australia, threw down the gauntlet 
on the question of the powers of the Senate at the very 
opening of the 1891 Convention. Parkes had proposed that the 
Lower House should have "the sole power of originating and 
amending a ll  B ills, appropriating revenue or imposing taxation".87 
G riffith  announced that "the relative constitution and powers 
underlie the whole of what we have to do",88 and reminded 
delegates that i f  the two Houses were granted equal leg islative 
power th is  might not be compatible with responsible government.89 
Nonetheless he fe lt  the American example demonstrated the 
wisdom of having coordinate powerful houses.90 All but two91
86 Op.cit. , p.131.
87 Reproduced in Parkes, op.cit. , p.611.
88 Convention Debates, Sydney 1891, p.38.
89 See also Playford in ibid. , p.27ff.
While recognising the potential for deadlocks. Ibid. , p. 16.
9 1 These two were Legislative Councillors. There had been a series of 
bitter clashes between the Victorian Assembly and Council, which 
explains the vehemence of Victorian delegates. The typical Victorian 
view was stated by Munro, the then Premier, who said the federal 
government would be paralyzed if the House of Representatives was 
not given supreme financial power. Ibid., p.23ff. See also Deakin, 
ibid., pp.36ff, 187.
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of the Victorian delegates, together with Parkes,92 argued 
that on financial legislation the will of the Lower House 
should prevail. They therefore proposed that the Senate 
should either: have power to reject but not to amend money
bills;93 or have power to "revise and review" but not to 
veto. 94
Representatives from the smaller Colonies95 argued 
that the Senate should have an unrestricted right to reject, 
in whole or in part, and to amend all legislation including 
appropriation bills.96 Over two days of "rather tense 
debate"97 it became apparent that a compromise had to be 
reached if the Convention were to continue. In the 
Constitutional Committee the Victorian Attorney-General,
Wrixon, arguing on behalf of the two senior Colonies, proposed 
what was subsequently described as the 'compromise of 1891', 
whereby the Senate would have equal powers with the House of 
Representatives except in relation to the initiation and 
amendment of money bills. The senate would be able either to 
accept or to reject such bills in toto; but could only 
'request' amendments.98 His amendment included, as a concession 
to the smaller Colonies, a prohibition on 'tacking' extraneous 
matters to appropriation bills. Wrixon's proposal was based on
92 Ibid., p.154ff.
93 Wrixon in ibid., p.l82ff.
94 Deakin in ibid., p.185.
Supported by Fitzgerald and Dibbs, opposition leaders in Victoria 
and New South Wales respectively. Ibid., p.82ff.
96 Par example, in ibid., Baker (p.55ff) , Forrest (p.107).
97 la Nauze, op.cit., p.43.
98 Convention Debates, Sydney 1891, pp.254, 342.
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t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  b e tw e e n  t h e  two H o u ses  o f  t h e  S o u th  
A u s t r a l i a n  P a r l i a m e n t  a s  d e f i n e d  i n  t h e  co m p a c t  o f  1 8 5 7 . "
W r ix o n 's  p r o p o s a l  was i n c l u d e d  a s  C la u s e  55 i n  t h e  1891  
d r a f t  C o n s t i t u t i o n  and d e b a t e d  a t  t h e  c l o s e  o f  t h e  C o n v e n t io n .  
B a k er  (S o u th  A u s t r a l i a ) , on b e h a l f  o f  d e l e g a t e s  from  t h e  
s m a l l e r  C o l o n i e s ,  moved an amendment t o  rem ove any r e s t r i c t i o n s  
on  t h e  S e n a t e ' s  power o v e r  money b i l l s . 100 H is  amendment was  
d e f e a t e d ,  and t h e  W rixon  com p rom ise  a d o p t e d . 101
I t  w as r e a l i s e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  d e b a t e  on  t h e  q u e s t i o n  
w as b y  no m eans c o n c lu d e d ;  and from  1891  t o  1897  a ca m p aign  
a g a i n s t  t h e  'c o m p r o m ise  o f  1 8 9 1 ' w as w aged  i n  t h e  s m a l l e r  
C o l o n i e s .  A t  t h e  A d e l a i d e  s e s s i o n  o f  t h e  1897  C o n v e n t i o n ,  two  
f u l l  d a y s  w e re  s p e n t  d e b a t i n g  t h e  money b i l l  c l a u s e s  -  d i s c u s s i o n  
w h ic h  Q u ick  d e s c r i b e d  a s  " c e r t a i n l y  t h e  m o s t  m om entous i n  t h e  
C o n v e n t i o n ' s  w h o le  h i s t o r y " . 102
"The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  t h e  s m a l l  c o l o n i e s  s t o o d  
o u t  f o r  a s t r o n g  S e n a t e ,  and w e re  d i s p o s e d  t o  l e t  
R e s p o n s i b l e  G overnm ent t a k e  i t s  c h a n c e .  The 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  t h e  l a r g e r  c o l o n i e s  e i t h e r  
d e n i e d  S i r  R ic h a r d  B a k e r ' s  p r e m is s  t h a t  two H o u ses  
w i t h  e q u a l  p o w ers  w ere  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  an i d e a l  
F e d e r a t i o n ,  o r  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  i d e a l  m u st  be  
s a c r i f i c e d  t o  p r a c t i c a l  n e c e s s i t i e s . " 103
99 Quick and Garran, o p . c i t . , p p .128-139; La Nauze, o p . c i t . , p .5 3 .
100 Convention Debates, Sydney 1891, p .3 4 2 f f .
101 The vote  was 22 to  16. Those a g a in st  the 1891 compromise were 
a l l  the V ictor ian  d e le g a te s ,  a l l  but one o f  th e  New South 
Welshmen, 4 (of 6) frcm Queensland, 1 (of 4) from South 
A u stra lia )  and 3 (of 6) Tasmanians. Ib id . , p .365 .
102 Quick and Garran, o p . c i t . , p .172.
103 I b id . , p .166 . See a ls o  La Nauze, o p . c i t . , p p .141-142.
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Baker's argument104 for rejection of the 1891 compromise was 
supported by Downer, Fysh and Howe.105 Several small Colony 
representatives were prepared to accept some restriction on 
the Senate's power, although not to the extent provided in 
Wrixon's clause;106 and some delegates from the two largest 
Colonies also showed a willingness to compromise.107 The other 
New South Wales and Victorian delegates persisted in their 
rejection of any Senate power over money bills.108
The clause was then debated in the Constitutional 
Committee; it three out the 'compromise of 1891' by 14 votes 
to 10 and instead proposed that the Senate should have the 
power to reject or amend in detail any legislation except the 
annual budget.109 In other words, the Senate would be able to 
reject or amend in toto or in part general appropriation 
measures including laws imposing taxation (which was not 
possible under the 'compromise of 1891'). The Convention 
rejected this proposal from the Constitutional Committee and 
reinstated the 'compromise of 1891' with the addition of the 
provision for allowing the Senate to 'request' the omission or
104 Convention Debates, Adelaide 1897, p.30ff.
105 Ibid., pp.206, 243, 388ff., respectively. Hcwe warned that if the 
principle of co-equal houses were not adopted "federation might be 
greatly delayed".
106 See, in ibid., Wise (p.l05ff), Forrest (p.246). Reinstatement of 
the 1891 carp remise was made possible by the defection of 5 small 
State delegates - 2 from South Australia and 3 from Tasmania.
107 See, in ibid., McMillan (pp.118, 220ff.), Isaacs (p.l70ff),
Reid (p.273ff).
108 For example, see Higgins and Lyne, ibid., p.l57ff.
109 Ibid., p.441ff.
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amendment of particular items in money bills.110 These 
were the provisions of the draft Constitution Bill which 
was adopted at the Adelaide session.
Reactions to the Bill demonstrated that the matter of 
the Senate's power in relation to money bills was still a 
live issue. The Lower Houses in the three smaller Colonies 
and the Victorian and South Australian Legislative Councils 
urged acceptance of the Constitutional Committee's proposal; 
but the Victorian and New South Wales Legislative Assemblies 
opposed even the granting to the Senate of the power to 
suggest or make amendments to any form of financial 
legislation.* 111
At the Sydney session of the Convention in 1897, these 
suggestions were considered and "debate traversed the 
familiar ground";112 the provisions of the Adelaide draft 
Bill were finally accepted by a majority of 28 to 19.113 The 
debate was finally over.
Deadlock Machinery
Having granted the Senate a veto power over financial 
legislation, some procedure was necessary for resolving
110 Ibid., pp.484ff, 575. The debate saw a reiteration of the 1891
arguments, with both smaller and larger Colonies arguing that 
they were making unacceptable sacrifices. See, for example, 
Turner (p.485), Downer (p.486), Forrest (p.490), Symon (p.515).
111 Quick and Garran, op.cit., pp.183-186, Hunt, op.cit., 
pp.151-152.
112 La Nauze, op.cit., p.187.
11 3 Convention Debates, Sydney 1897, p.537.
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d e a d l o c k s  b e t w e e n  t h e  two H o u s e s  o f  f e d e r a l  P a r l i a m e n t .  I n  
18 9 1  p o s s i b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  h a d  b e e n  c a n v a s s e d , 114 b u t  
a d o p t i o n  o f  a  s p e c i f i c  m e th o d  w as d e f e r r e d .  A t  t h e  A d e l a i d e  
s e s s i o n  i n  1897 a  v a r i e t y  o f  s c h e m e s  w as  a i r e d :  a  j o i n t  
s i t t i n g  o f  b o t h  H o u s e s ; 115 a n a t i o n a l  r e f e r e n d u m  o r  a  ' d u a l 1 
r e f e r e n d u m  ( r e q u i r i n g  a  f a v o u r a b l e  m a j o r i t y  o f  S t a t e s  a s  w e l l  
a s  o f  v o t e r s ) . 117 S e v e r a l  d e l e g a t e s  q u e r i e d  why t h e r e  w as  
a n y  n e e d  f o r  d e a d l o c k  p r o v i s i o n s ,  a n d  p o i n t e d  t o  t h e  a b s e n c e  
o f  a n y  s u c h  m a c h i n e r y  i n  t h e  A m e r ic a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n . 118 When 
t h e  A d e l a i d e  d r a f t  B i l l  w as  d e b a t e d  by  C o l o n i a l  L e g i s l a t u r e s ,  
f u r t h e r  m e th o d s  w e r e  s u g g e s t e d .  The New S o u t h  W a le s  
L e g i s l a t i v e  A s s e m b ly  f a v o u r e d  a p u b l i c  r e f e r e n d u m ;  t h e  
V i c t o r i a n  A s s e m b ly  p r o p o s e d  b o t h  a  r e f e r e n d u m  a n d  a  d o u b l e  
d i s s o l u t i o n ;  a n d  T a s m a n i a  ( w h i l e  n o t  a c c e p t i n g  a n y  r e a l  
n e e d  f o r  d e a d l o c k  m a c h in e ry )  s u g g e s t e d  f i r s t l y ,  a  d i s s o l u t i o n  
o f  t h e  H o u se  o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a n d  t h e n ,  i f  t h e  d i s a g r e e m e n t  
p e r s i s t e d ,  r e s o l u t i o n  b y  a  v o t e  o f  f o u r - s e v e n t h s  o f  t h e  L ow er 
a n d  t h r e e - s e v e n t h s  o f  t h e  U p p e r  H o u s e . 119
T h i s  s o m e w h a t  b e w i l d e r i n g  a r r a y  o f  s u g g e s t i o n s  w as  
d e b a t e d  a t  t h e  1897  S y d n e y  s e s s i o n .  Some o f  t h e  m o s t  a m u s in g  
s p e e c h e s  r e f l e c t e d  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  a n y  p u b l i c  r e f e r e n d u m  o n  t h e
114 Convention D ebates, Sydney 1891, pp.214 (Thynne), 259 (Baker), 
p .3 6 7 f f  (Wrixon amendment n e g a t iv ed ) .
115 Convention D ebates, A delaide  1897, pp.52 (O'Connor), 279 (Reid).
116 I b i d . , pp .41  (T urner) ,  105 (H igg ins), 1150-1168 (Wise motion 
n e g a t iv e d ) , 1152 (Higgins motion n e g a t iv e d ) .
117 I b i d . ,  pp .41  (T urner) ,  105 (H igg ins), 333 (T renw ith ) , 1169 
( Isaac s  m otion n e g a t iv e d ) .
118 I b i d . , pp.66 (Braddon) , 220 (McMillan), 244 (Fysh) , 5 5 ff ,
1151ff and 1156ff (O'Connor and Symon).
119 See Hunt, o p . c i t . , p .159 ; Quick and G arran, o p . c i t . , p .185 .
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grounds of voter incompetence;120 and one speaker noted 
that the referendum was the tool of despots such as Julius 
Caesar and Napoleon.121 The Convention eventually accepted 
the need for some deadlock machinery,122 and voted firstly 
for consecutive dissolution of each House;123 and secondly 
for a simultaneous double dissolution followed by a joint 
sitting of both Houses.124 As La Nauze noteö, 125 delegates 
were really agonizing about deadlocks between the larger and 
smaller States - not about deadlocks between the Houses.
The establishment of some scheme for resolving inter-House 
disputes was undoubtedly necessary if the draft Bill was to 
be passed in the two larger Colonies (it would counteract 
criticism of their agreement to equal State representation).
The Sydney decision was rather clumsy, so the question 
of deadlock machinery was again debated at the Melbourne 
session in 1898. A proposal for a popular referendum was aired, 
and again defeated.126 Finally, the Convention adopted the 
double dissolution procedure, with the possibility of a 
subsequent joint sitting.127
Conclusion
The 1890s debates on the composition and powers of the 
Australian federal Legislature produced a unique blend of
120 Convention Debates, Sydney 1897, pp.689 (Walker), 691 (Glynn).
121 Wise, in ibid., p.647.
122 A vote of 30 to 15. Ibid., p.708.
123 Wise's motion, ibid., p.924.
124 A Carruthers/Reid motion, ibid., p.974.
125 Op.cit., pp.188-191.
126 Convention Debates, Melbourne 1898, Vol. i, p.2221.
12 7 Ibid., Vol. ii, p.2247.
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federalism and responsible government. The Senate was 
established with a dual function - as a House of Review128 
and as a States House.129 The original conception of this 
dual function of the Senate has been restated by the current 
Clerk of the Senate, J.R. Odgers. Firstly, he notes three 
aspects of the States House function:
" (a) safeguarding State Rights against any 
attempt at Federal encroachment;
(b) protection against the swamping of the 
interests of the smaller States by a big 
State majority in the House of Representatives;
(c) preservation of the individuality of the
_ , , 1)130States.
Odgers sees the Senate as an institutional device for 
protecting State interests both individually and collectively: 
individually, through equal State representation, which allows 
an equal opportunity for each State's representatives to air 
its problems and grievances; and collectively, through the 
near equal powers of the Senate and the House of Representatives, 
which enable the Senate on behalf of the States to reject 
legislation detrimental to the interests of all States (for 
example, proposals to alter the division of powers between the 
Federal and the State governments). Moreover, equal State 
representation ensures that States with large populations
128 See the speech by Parkes, Convention Debates, Sydney 1891, p.26.
129 See the speech by Barton, Convention Debates, Adelaide 1897,
pp.21-22.
130 In J. Rorke (ed.), Aspects of Australian Government, Platypus 
pamphlet, Department of Tutorial Classes, Sydney, 1962,
pp.47-48.
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(New South Wales and Victoria, and perhaps Queensland) and 
hence with the majority of seats in the House of 
Representatives,131 w ill not be able to usurp the rights of 
the smaller States.
Thus the States House function rela tes both to ac tiv ity  
within the Senate, and to the relationship between the two 
Federal Houses. The combination of equal State representation 
and the 'nexus' two-to-one ra tio  between the two Houses is  
po ten tia lly  important in rela tion  to Section 57 of the 
Constitution. I f ,  following a double dissolution, a jo in t 
s i t t in g  is  held, the requirement for an absolute majority 
decision a t such a jo in t s i t t in g  ensures that Senators, while 
not necessarily in a commanding p o s it io n ,132 are a t leas t not 
completely swamped by the Lower House numbers.
Secondly, Odgers prescribes the Senate's function as 
a House of Review:
(2) To act as a House of review with the 
responsibility  of expressing second opinions 
in rela tion  to leg is la tive  proposals 
in i t ia te d  in the House of Representatives;
(3) To i t s e l f  in i t ia te  non-financial leg is la tion , 
as the Senate sees f i t ;
(4) To probe and check the administration of the 
laws and to keep i t s e l f  and the public 
informed; and
(5) To maintain an oversight of the Executive's 
regulation-making power." 133
131 At present, these three States command 97 seats in the House 
of Representatives, as against 27 for the smallest States.
132 This depends on the respective numbers of government and 
opposition members in each House.
J.R. Odgers, Australian Senate Practice, Commonwealth Government 
Printer, Canberra, 3rd ed., 1967, p.2, and see his 4th ed., 1972, 
pp.2-4.
133
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This is clearly a restatement of the classic 
prescriptions for an upper house as outlined by Lord Bryce 
in his 1917 Report.
Bryce termed the Australian Constitution a "highly 
finished scheme of polity".134 In retrospect, at least, few 
modern commentators would be likely to agree. The Australian 
founding fathers, as the following Chapter will demonstrate, 
were curiously oblivious to certain developments of the 1890s 
(especially the implications of the appearance of the embryo 
Australian Labor Party); and both their hopes, and their 
fears, about the operation of the Senate and about inter-House 
relationships seem to be amazingly naive.
1 34 Studies in History and Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, p.469, quoted in 
Marriott, op.cit., p.165.
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CHAPTER IV 
UNFORESEEN PROBLEMS?
Introduction
The future envisaged for the Australian Senate by 
many of the Founding Fathers is well typified in the 
opening paragraph of Sir John Quick's commentary on the 
Senate:
"The Senate is one of the most conspicuous, 
and unquestionably the most important, of 
all the federal features of the Constitution, 
using the word federal in the sense of linking 
together and uniting a number of co-equal 
political communities, under a common system 
of government. The Senate is not merely a 
branch of a bicameral Parliament; it is not 
merely a second chamber of revision and review 
representing the sober second thought of the 
nation, such as the House of Lords is supposed 
to be; it is that, but something more than 
that. It is the chamber in which the States, 
considered as separate entities, and corporate 
parts of the Commonwealth, are represented. 
They are so represented for the purpose of 
enabling them to maintain and protect their 
constitutional rights against attempted 
invasions, and to give them every facility 
for the advocacy of their peculiar and special 
interests, as well as for the ventilation 
and consideration of their grievances."1
Were Quick's hopes realised? The performance of the Senate 
during certain periods - for the first decade after federation, 
and in the 1960s and early 1970s - can perhaps justifiably be 
regarded as reflecting "the sober second thought of the 
nation"; but few (inside or outside the Chamber) would 
maintain that the Senate has performed as a States House, or
J. Quick and R. Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the 
Australian Coirmonwealth, Sydney Book Company, Sydney, 1901, 
p. 414.
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that its existence has conspicuously or considerably enabled 
the Australian States to "maintain and protect their 
constitutional rights against attempted invasions."I 2
It is an easy - and typically academic - exercise to 
criticize luminaries of the past for holding expectations 
about the future which practice has since shown to be 
idealistic or naive. Nonetheless, such criticism might be 
fairly directed at the Australian Founding Fathers for 
their lack of recognition, or understatement, of certain 
basic problems which were not resolved within the Commonwealth 
Constitution. One does not expect Founding Fathers - or 
perhaps any members of the species homo sapiens - to be 
omniscient about future developments; and certainly there 
are a host of post-1901 developments, affecting the 
Australian Senate, which the delegates of the 1890s could 
not have foreseen. On the other hand, there are four problems 
about which some prescient delegates did, albeit unsuccessfully, 
caution or warn their colleagues, and about which complacency 
could reasonably be cited as a sign either of naivety, or of 
conscious self-blinkering.
These four problems can be briefly stated as:
(a) the combination of federalism and responsible 
government. Cockburn described this as "a 
novel and interesting course."3
I am here begging the question of whether the States desired, 
or attempted to achieve, such protection.
J.A. Cockburn, Australian Federation, Horace Marshall and
Sons, London, 1901, p.34.
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As noted in the previous Chapter, a few delegates 
felt that there would be some difficulty in reconciling 
the two, and expressed a willingness to dispense with 
responsible government so that federation could be achieved. 
But the majority of delegates favoured continuance of the 
known practices of Westminster-style responsibility, and 
only two delegates continued to sound an alarm about the 
incompatibility of federalism and responsible government.
(b) the relative power and importance of federal 
and State governments.
Most Founding Fathers seem to have believed that the 
States would be the pre-eminent level of government, and 
that the Constitution would buttress the position of the 
States vis-a-vis that of the federal government. Cockburn 
predicted that, just as States' rights had won out in 
America, so too would they be paramount in Australia.4 Other 
delegates argued that the Federal government would play only 
a very limited role.
(c) the emergence of disciplined political parties, 
and especially the impact of the Labor Party, 
in the federal legislature.
Most Convention delegates were Colonial politicians5 
and hence seasoned practitioners of the typical Nineteenth 
Century pattern of political rivalry : highly personal, 
unstable and concerned with the satisfaction of demands and
Ibid., p.141.
See Appendix 8 of J.A. La Nauze, The Making of the Australian 
Constitution, M.U.P., Melbourne, 1972, pp.328^333.
5
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expectations of small, usually local, interests. In that 
period, party organization - within and outside the 
legislatures - was in its infancy; and few Convention 
delegates envisaged the future development of highly 
organised parties. Political parties based on general 
philosophies or principles were unknown until the last 
decade of the Century; this was likewise the time at which 
the Labor parties were formed in Colonial legislatures. 
Although such Labor groups had significant parliamentary 
strength (especially in New South Wales, South Australia and 
Queensland) in the late 1890s, Convention delegates did not 
foresee the future line of parliamentary division between 
Labor and its opponents. There was therefore little concern 
expressed about the possibility of political parties 
providing a rationale for Senators' activity which could 
compete with, let alone override, concern for the rights and 
powers of the States.
(d) the nature and incidence of inter-House deadlocks.
The Convention records reveal that the central focus of 
most of the debate on some form of deadlock machinery was the 
desire to preserve the rights of the States, and hence the 
position of the Senate. Cockburn argued that Section 57 would 
only be used "in cases where some injustice or coercion was 
threatened against one or more States"6; and opposed the 
provision for a subsequent joint sitting as enabling 
"annihilation"7 of the States by that "spoilt child",8 the
6 Op.cit., p.202.
7 Ibid., p.221.
8 Ibid., p.222.
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House of Representatives. Little attention was given to 
the difficulties of a ministry which could not (for whatever 
reasons) command sufficient support in the Senate - in spite 
of colonial evidence (especially in Victoria) of recurrent 
parliamentary deadlocks hampering effective government.
For purposes of analysis it is convenient to treat 
these four areas separately, although it is clear that they 
are inter-related and that each provides evidence on a 
central theme: how the Founding Fathers expected the
federal system to operate. The four problems are particularly 
significant in relation to the possibility of the Australian 
Senate's functioning as either a House of Review or a States 
House; and the views of the Founding Fathers on these matters 
have been an important point of reference in Twentieth 
Century debate about the Senate. It is therefore necessary 
to discuss to what degree, and in what terms, the Founding 
Fathers saw the problems; and the contemporary Colonial 
and overseas experience they could draw upon for their 
opinions and expectations.
Federalism and responsible government
At the 1892 Convention Winthrop Hackett, a Western 
Australian delegate, produced an oft-guoted prediction:
"... either responsible government will kill 
federation, or federation in the form in which 
we shall, I hope, be prepared to accept it, will 
kill responsible government."9
5 Convention Debates, Sydney 1891, p.280.
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The majority view of Convention delegates was, 
however, that the British tradition of responsible 
government, as supposedly followed in the Colonies, was 
indispensable. It is therefore relevant to ascertain just 
what Convention delegates believed to be the nature of 
responsible government, and the degree to which British 
practice was actually followed in the Colonies.
The initial step towards parliamentary government 
in the Australian Colonies had been achieved merely by a 
despatch from the British Secretary of State to the Governors; 10 
and, as in Britain, the practices of responsible government 
were conventions which were not embodied in the Colonial 
Constitutions. In the absence of any Constitutional 
redefinition of the practical relationships between executive 
and legislature (either in Britain or in the Colonies),
Nineteenth Century politicians relied on the works of, for 
example, Bagehot, Erskine May, Todd and Hearn11 for guidance 
on the principles and practice of responsible government.
(The combination of appeals to British precedent and somewhat 
moralistic judgments on Colonial practice embodied in these 
works may have limited their appeal for Australian politicians.)
The effects of transition from gubernatorial to 
responsible government in the Colonies were stated by Todd to be:
10 W.E. Hearn, The Government of England : its structure and its 
development, George Robertson, Melbourne, 1867, p.8.
11 W. Bagehot, The English Constitution; R. Erskine May, Parliamentary 
Practice; A. Todd, On Parliamentary Government in England : its 
origin, development and practical operation, Longmans, Green,
London, 1867 (lstvol.), 1869 (2nd vol.); A. Todd, Parliamentary 
Government in the British Colonies, Longmans, Green, London,
2nd rev. ed., 1894; W.E. Hearn, op.cit.
88.
"... while the governor of a colony under 
the parliamentary system remains, as 
formerly, personally responsible to the 
Crown, through the secretary of state, for 
the faithful and efficient discharge of his 
high trust, in obedience to the instructions 
conveyed to him for his guidance, the members 
of his executive council, who are his 
constitutional advisers, now share - and, so 
far as the colony is concerned, entirely 
assume - the responsibility, which previously 
devolved upon the governor exclusively, of 
framing the policy of the local government; 
of embodying the same in measures for the 
sanction of the legislature; of making 
appointments to office; and of superintending 
and controlling all public affairs through 
the appropriate departments of state in the 
colony. "
It must be remembered that the responsibility referred 
to was essentially that of cabinet to both Parliament and 
the Governor; the Governor was in no way responsible to the 
colony, but was instead an agent of and responsible to the 
British Monarch.
The British tradition, as received in the Colonies via 
the writers mentioned above, was that ministers were members 
of parliament who collectively possessed its confidence for 
so long as they had a parliamentary majority, especially in 
the lower house; and that they were collectively accountable 
to parliament (and hence, indirectly, to the people) for all 
the actions of the government and of each individual minister. 
Accountability was realised through ministers being required 
to inform parliament about government measures, and to 
respond to parliamentary questioning and criticism of 
government administration. Finally, responsible government
12 Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies, p.49.
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meant that ministers collectively (normally via the prime 
minister) advised the Monarch - in the Colonies, the 
Governor - on government policy and activity, and on 
specific matters such as appointments to the upper house 
and parliamentary dissolutions.
Was the practice of responsible government in the 
Australian Colonies according to such British conventions?
Late Nineteenth Century commentators, whilst assuming that 
the British model should be directly applicable, demonstrated 
some misgivings. For example, in 1867 Alpheus Todd wrote:
"parliamentary government in our colonies 
is still in its infancy, and its success is 
as yet but problematical."13
Another English commentator, J.A. Froude, argued 
in 1886:
"To colonies where it has no natural 
appropriateness at all, where party is purely 
artificial, and party politics therefore are 
not a contest of principles but a contest of 
intrigues, only an English conviction that 
what is good for ourselves must be good for 
all mankind could have induced us to think of 
applying it." 14
In 1897 H. de R. Walker echoed these reservations about 
the wisdom of seeking to establish, ab initio, a pattern of 
legislative-executive relationships developed gradually in 
quite different social and political circumstances, and 
concluded that colonial practice was quite dissimilar to 
that in Britain.
On Parliamentary Government in England, Vol. 1, p.ix.
Oceania : or England and her colonies, Longmans Green, London,
1886, pp.107-108.
1 4
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"It is doubtful whether Responsible Government, 
in the sense of government by a Ministry which 
carries out a definite policy approved by the 
country, and, in return, receives allegiance 
from its supporters in Parliament, has ever 
been acclimatised in Australasia except in 
New South Wales under the influence of the 
late Sir Henry Parkes. How, indeed, could it 
be otherwise, when it was sought to transplant 
a delicate system, hallowed by conventions and 
dependent for its success upon the election of a 
special class of representatives, among a 
community necessarily ruled by men who had little 
experience of public life? Australian Parliaments, 
save on the rare occasions when some important 
issues, such as that'of the tariff, has come to 
the front, have not been divided on ordinary 
party lines, and have amused themselves with the 
excitement of a constant succession of new 
Ministries selected on personal and not on 
political considerations."15
It must be noted that in Nineteenth Century statements 
on the responsibility of the ministry to parliament it was 
generally assumed, if not explicitly stated, that cabinet 
accountability was essentially to the House of Commons alone. 
For example, although Hearn states that "in all questions 
of administration the King ought to accept the advice of his 
Peers", he qualifies this by noting that if the Lords differ 
with the Commons, this is not a necessary condition for the 
resignation of the cabinet.16 In fact, he contends that it 
is for the ministry to decide whether, in the particular 
circumstances, resignation is appropriate;17 and notes that 
"Ministers have, in the case of a hostile vote in the House 
of Lords, the opportunity of obtaining a contrary vote in 
the House of Commons",18 and, with such Commons approval, 
can (indeed should) continue in power.
15 Op.cit., pp.264-265.
16 Op.cit., p.160.
17 Ibid., pp.222-229.
18 Ibid., p. 216. See also Todd, On Parliamentary Government in 
England, Vol. 1, p.398.
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Lord John Russell argued that it was both improper, 
and unfair to the House of Lords, to allow that House to 
determine the executive;19 Todd concluded that "In deciding 
the fate of a ministry, the House of Lords ... are practically 
powerless"20 and that "... the fate of a ministry does not 
depend upon a vote in that House."21 Todd forcibly argued 
that this British practice applied directly within the 
Australian colonies,22 and was especially relevant to the 
powers of Colonial upper houses on money bills.23 In 
Chapter III it was, however, demonstrated that in some 
Colonies the upper houses were loathe to accept the 
applicability of British practice to Australia.
In the American model of federalism a quite different 
pattern of executive-legislative relationships was 
established: an executive independent (as regards both
method of selection and term of office) of the bicameral 
legislature; an equal right of veto over legislation, 
including appropriation measures, for the executive and for 
each chamber. Moreover, the American Senate was given 
legislative powers equal to those of the House of Representatives 
except in the area of initiation of money bills. It was 
argued that this virtual co-equal status of the Federal Houses 
was an essential component of the federal compact.24
19 Quoted by Todd, On Parliamentary Government in England, Vol. 1, p.27.
2 0 Ibid., p.31.
21 Ibid., p.387.
22 Parliamentary Government in the British Golonies, p.699.
23 Ibid., pp.709-751.
24 See Hamilton and Madison in The Federalist, J.E. Cooke (ed.) , Vforld 
Publishing Company, Ohio, 1965, p.197 (No. 31), p.222 (NO. 36), 
pp.289-290 (No. 45), and pp.296, 300 (No. 46).
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The Commonwealth Constitution, in Sections 61-64, 
provides for an executive (the Governor-General and his 
Federal Executive Council) and requires Councillors to be 
members of the Federal Parliament (either at the time of 
appointment or within three months thereafter25). In 
Bagehot's terms, this is a 'dignified' part of the Constitution; 
the 'effective' executive is the Prime Minister and cabinet. 
Quick and Garran explain the intent of these Sections:
"... the discretionary powers of the Crown are 
exercised by the wearer of the Crown or by its 
Representative according to the advice of 
ministers, having the confidence of that 
branch of the legislature which immediately 
represents the people."26
and:
"The Cabinet depends for its existence on its 
possession of the confidence of that House 
directly elected by the people, which has the 
principal control over the finances of the 
country. It is not so dependent on the favour 
and support of the second Chamber, but at the 
same time a Cabinet in antagonism with the 
second Chamber will be likely to suffer serious 
difficulty, if not obstruction, in the conduct 
of public business."27
The parallels between this and the views of commentators on 
the British system of responsible government are self-evident. 
In particular, Quick and Garran contend that cabinet would be 
accountable only to the House of Representatives, and that a 
hostile Senate might occasion difficulty, but not necessarily 
precipitate the resignation of a ministry. Whilst recognising 
that collectively such provisions "will promote the
25 For debate on this provision see Convention Debates, Sydney 1891, 
pp.765-776; Convention Debates, Sydney 1897, pp.793-799.
26 Op.cit., p.703.
27 Ibid., p.706.
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concentration of Executive control in the House of 
Representatives", these authors nonetheless argued that in 
matters other than financial legislation such provisions 
"ought not to impair the equal and co-ordinate authority of 
the Senate." 28
Opponents of the Westminster system,29 and delegates 
who felt that responsible government and federalism were 
incompatible, argued, per contra, that such "equal and 
co-ordinate authority" could not be achieved within the 
framework of the Commonwealth Constitution. Griffith, Baker, 
Hackett and Cockburn contended that in a federation the 
approval of the States House was essential for all executive, 
as well as legislative, acts; that the principles of 
federalism justified the requirement for Senate sanction, or 
disapproval, of a ministry.
The root of the disagreement can be stated simply: 
according to the Westminster system, a government could not 
be responsible to two chambers; but, if the central government 
was not responsible to the Senate, the spirit of federalism 
was negated. Hackett regarded the achievement of federation 
as relatively more important than concern about the nature of 
responsible government; he argued that the Constitution 
should be "free to develop itself in whatever direction it 
may see fit within certain defined bounds and principles."30
28 Ibid., p.707.
29 See Griffith, Convention Debates, Sydney 1891, pp.523-526; Barton, 
Convention Debates, Adelaide 1897, p.17.
30 Convention Debates, Sydney 1891, p.281.
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As grounds for his argument, Hackett referred to the record 
of responsible government in Canada - "distinctly not proved 
a success" - and in Great Britain - "distinctly proved a 
failure".31 Similarly, Griffith argued that delegates 
should aim "so to frame the Constitution that responsible 
government may - not that it must - find a place in it."32
Hackett's prediction was( reiterated by Sir Richard 
Baker at Adelaide in 1897 and Sydney in 1898.33 But Deakin 
convinced the majority of delegates that the only effective 
course was to enable the electorate "to drive home 
responsibility where it ought to rest", that is, to the House 
of Representatives.34 Crisp believes that the greater stability 
of colonial ministries between 1891 and 189735 and their 
fairly successful handling of the financial crises of 1892-189436, 
and a general desire to enshrine "the British principles of 
which they were all experienced practitioners"37 were the major 
reasons for rejection of proposals for an independent executive.
Whilst accepting the principle of cabinet within 
parliament, the Founding Fathers did not explicitly resolve the
31 Convention Debates, Sydney 1891, p.280.
32 Quoted by Quick and Garran, cp.cit., p.132.
33 Convention Debates, Adelaide 1897, p.27ff., Convention Debates,
Sydney 1898, pp.782-792.
34 Convention Debates, Adelaide 1897, p.508.
35 Earlier experience had been of a high degree of ministerial instability. 
In the period 1850-1890 there were 28 ministries in New South Wales,
42 in South Australia and 26 in Victoria? H. de R. Walker,
Australasian Democracy, T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1897, pp.264-265.
36 L.F. Crisp, Australian National Government, Longman, Victoria,
3rd rev. ed., 1974, pp.35-36.
37 Ibid., p.38.
95.
question of to whom cabinet was responsible. Quick and 
Garran pronounce that the British practice - responsibility 
only to the lower house - would be followed. Such 
prescription, in the absence of any explicit Constitutional 
provision, carries little weight. Constitutional 
conventions - as will be discussed in more detail later in 
the context of the power of upper houses in relation to 
supply - are merely a reflection of observed practice to 
date. The Commonwealth Constitution in no way precludes action 
by the Senate which could precipitate the resignation of 
a ministry (for example, the rejection of supply, a vote of 
no confidence in the ministry). That the Senate and other 
Federal institutions, for most of the period since federation, 
have not regarded Senate hostility as a sufficient cause for 
resignation of a ministry, is merely evidence of a 
constitutional convention which stands only for so long as it 
is observed.
The Relative Power of Federal and State Governments
The apparent intention of the Founding Fathers was 
evident in Parkes' resolution of 1891:
"That the powers and privileges and territorial 
rights of the several existing Colonies shall 
remain intact, except in respect to such 
surrenders as may be agreed upon as necessary 
and incidental to the power and authority of the 
National Federal Government."38
Convention Debates, Sydney 1891, p.22. Barton moved a resolution with 
almost identical wording at the commencement of the Adelaide session; 
Convention Debates, Adelaide 1897, p.17. Norris argues that this 
resolution "ran counter to the centralist tendencies of Parkes" and 
reflects the influence of an informal meeting of other delegates 
such as Griffith, Clark and Kingston with Parkes. See R. Norris,
The Emergent Commonwealth, M.U.P., Victoria, 1975, p.3.
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Note especially the word "surrender". A belief that the 
States would be the masters of the Federal government is 
clearly evident in delegates' speeches at the various 
Conventions.39 For example, Deakin asserted: "The
states will retain full powers over the greater part of 
the domain in which they at present enjoy those powers, 
and will retain them intact for all time."40 He felt that 
the States would probably "over-awe" the Federal government.41 
Similarly, in 1898 Sir John Forrest told an audience of 
his fellow Western Australians:
"It is generally supposed that all the important 
matters connected with the government of the 
colonies will be handed over to the Federal 
Government, and that we in this Colony - and 
all the other colonies - will have very little 
to do, or very little to control, and that we 
will become nothing more than a vestry board 
or municipal council. There is nothing further 
from the fact than that, ... We have all the 
powers of self-government which are material 
to u s . ... All the powers necessary for our
material growth and prosperity are still ours 
in the same way as at the present time."42
On the eve of federation, Cockburn commented:
"... we look to federalism not to destroy, but 
to protect and shield, those institutions under 
which we have so far attained our rights and 
privileges; and we look upon federalism as a 
cover, a powerful cover, under which we can 
advance to a still greater development of our 
freedom." 43
39 See, for exanple, Convention Debates, Sydney 1891, pp.42 (Fysh), 
60 (Mcllwraith), 82 (Deakin); Convention Debates, Adelaide 1897, 
pp.83 (Fraser), 271 (Reid) 298-299 (Deakin).
40 Convention Debates, Sydney 1891, p.383.
41 Convention Debates, Melaide 1897, pp.298-299. Cf. Madison 
jn~fliie~FederaIist, Number 45, op.cit., pp.289, 291.
42 Speech by the Rt. Hon. Sir John Forrest on the Federation of 
Australia at St. Georges Hall, quoted by Norris, cp.cit., p.35.
43 Cp.cit., p.141.
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The F o u n d i n g  F a t h e r s  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  l i m i t e d ,  e n u m e r a t e d  
s p h e r e  o f  e x c l u s i v e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  g r a n t e d  t o  t h e  F e d e r a l  
g o v e r n m e n t ,  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  f i n a n c e ,  a n d  t h e  s a n c t i o n s  
o f  t h e  H ig h  C o u r t  a n d  t h e  S e n a t e ,  w o u ld  t o g e t h e r  p r e v e n t  
a n y  u n d e s i r a b l e  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  o r  e r o s i o n  o f  S t a t e s '  r i g h t s .  
I n d e e d ,  t h e r e  w e r e  g l o w i n g  f o r e c a s t s  o f  t h e  f u t u r e  g r o w th  
o f  S t a t e  g o v e r n m e n t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 44 a n d  p r e d i c t i o n s  
t h a t  t h e  F e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t  w o u ld  r a p i d l y  e x h a u s t  i t s  
l e g i s l a t i v e  a u t h o r i t y  a n d  s i t  f o r  o n l y  tw o ,  t h r e e  o r  a t  
m o s t  f i v e  m o n th s  a  y e a r .  45
W h a t ,  t h e n ,  i s  t h e  e x p l a n a t i o n  f o r  t h e  l a t i t u d e  
( f o r  f u t u r e  e x p a n s i o n )  a l l o w e d  t h e  F e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  u n d e r  t h e  c o n c u r r e n t  t a x a t i o n  p o w e r  ( S e c t i o n  
5 1 ( i i ) ) ?  Q u ic k  a n d  G a r r a n 4 6 , a n d  l a t e r  c o m m e n t a t o r s 4 7 , 
a r g u e  t h a t  F e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t  a c c e s s  t o  a l l  a r e a s  o f  
r e v e n u e  r a i s i n g  ( a p a r t  f r o m  i t s  g u a r a n t e e d  m o n o p o ly  o f  
c u s to m s  a n d  e x c i s e  r e v e n u e )  w as p r o v i d e d  f o r  o n l y  a s  an  
e l e m e n t  o f  f l e x i b i l i t y ,  f o r  c o p i n g  w i t h  n a t i o n a l  e m e r g e n c i e s  
( f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  c o s t  o f  d e f e n c e  i f  t h e  n a t i o n  w e r e  u n d e r  
e x t e r n a l  a t t a c k ) . F o r  m o s t  d e l e g a t e s 48 , t h e  g u a r a n t e e  o f  
t h e  c u s to m s  a n d  e x c i s e  m o n o p o ly  w as a  m ore  t h a n  s u f f i c i e n t  
p r o v i s i o n  f o r  f e d e r a l  f i n a n c e  -  h e n c e  t h e  l e n g t h y  d e b a t e  
o v e r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  ' s u r p l u s '  a n d  t h e  e v e n t u a l
44 See, fo r  exairple, Gockbum, Convention D ebates, Sydney 1891, p .2 0 1 .
45 See Convention D ebates , A delaide 1897, pp .67  (Br addon), 1032 (H iggins); 
Convention D ebates, Melbourne 1898, V o l . I ,  p .266  (Glynn); V o l .2 ,  
p .1489 (H o lde r) .
46 C p . c i t . , p .5 4 9 .
47 See, f o r  example, N o r r i s ,  c p . c i t . , p .5 .
48 See, f o r  example, Convention Debates, Adelaide 1897, p . l l l  (Wise); 
Convention Debates, Melbourne 1898, V o l . I ,  pp.865 (McMillan),
898 (Dcwner), 1063 (D eakin j; V o l .2 , pp.979 (B ar ten ) ,  2482-2483 (Baker).
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1Braddon Blot' clause (Section 87). A few delegates 49 
queried whether the concurrent power over finance was 
wise; but others argued convincingly (at the time) that 
"for a considerable time - perhaps for ever - the Federal 
Government will rely on taxes raised through the Customs"50 
and that it would be "exceedingly difficult, if not 
Impossible, for the Federal Government to levy direct 
taxation."51
Section 96 was seen as another concession for flexi­
bility. Thi.s clause authorizes the federal Parliament to 
"grant financial assistance to any State on such terms and 
conditions as the Parliament thinks fit". Quick and Garran 
argue that this clause, like Section 87 (and similarly 
guaranteed for the first decade and "thereafter until the 
Parliament otherwise provides") were included as a "safety 
valve" for "exceptionable circumstances" - certainly not 
as a justification, or loophole, for a "regular system of 
grants in aid."52 Yet the omission of any requirement for 
uniformity or non-discrimination between States (as included 
in Section 51 (ii)), while farsightedly allowing for distri­
bution according to needs, at the same time enabled 
discriminatory (and therefore, in the future, partisan 
and/or federally dictated) assistance to States. Convention 
delegates may have believed that the two clauses (Sections 
96 and 87) would survive together53; this was not to be.
hs Thyme raised the question of land rates; Convention Debates, Sydney 
1891, p.677. Holder queried about defence spending (although he felt 
the Braddon, clause was a sufficient check); Convention Debates, 
Melbourne 1898, Vol.2, p.2425.
50 Baker, Convention Debates, Melbourne 1898, Vol.2, p.2483.
51 Wise, Convention Debates, Adelaide 1897, p.lll.
52 Cp.cit., p.871.
53 iDid/pp. 870-871.
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Another clause which potentially provided for 
alteration in the relative legislative power of the 
Federal government is Section 109: "When a law of a
State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, 
the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the 
extent of the inconsistency, be invalid".
One possible interpretation of the Commonwealth 
Constitution is that the system* would be one of co-ordinate 
federalism, of "a neat and tidy constitutional separation 
among seven units of the federation.1,54 Co-ordinate 
federalism describes a situation in which each government,
State and Federal, has an equal status and operates 
independently of the others. It therefore assumes that 
it is possible to divide power in a finite way - say, in 
the division of powers of governments in a constitution - 
and possible to maintain such a finite division. In practice, 
this is an unrealistic aim; and the Commonwealth Constitution 
exemplifies this in the provision, in Section 51, for a wide 
range of areas of concurrent governmental authority. Although 
the Founding Fathers did not include any machinery for inter­
governmental co-operation aside from the Inter-State 
Commission 55, the mere existence of this wide area of 
concurrent powers (let alone any future impetus towards 
'national1 action) was a sufficient basis for the future 
development of co-operative federalism in Australia.
54 G. S. Reid, "Political Decentralization, Co-operative Federalism and 
Responsible Government" in R.L. Matthews (ed.) , Inter-governmental 
Relations in Australia, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1974, p.25.
55 Sections 101-104 of the Commonwealth Constitution; such a Commission 
existed only between 1913 and 1920, although the tbit lam Labor Government 
foreshadowed its reintroducticn. See Crisp, op.cit., Chapter 5.
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It is now generally recognized that for a political 
system to operate as a federation a fair degree of co­
operation between Federal and State governments is necessary.56 
This raises a consequent problem, of relevance to prior 
discussion: that of determining the locus of responsibility
(or irresponsibility) for governmental action. Emy concludes 
that in Australia, the combination of a federal system and 
of responsible government creates "a widespread diffusion 
of power and authority" and "blurs the formal lines of public 
accountability" of State and Federal governments.57
The assumption that, within the federal system, the 
States would be the predominant units, is surely belied by 
the actual Constitutional provisions. With the inclusion 
of Sections 51(ii), 87 and 96, the Conventions had granted 
the Federal government sufficient avenues for avoiding the 
straight-jacket of State dominance. Deakin was seemingly 
the lone voice to warn that, at least in relation to finance, 
the Constitution did not buttress the position of the States. 
In 1902 he prophesied:
"The rights of self-government of the States have 
been fondly supposed to be safeguarded by the 
Constitution. It left them legally free, but 
financially bound to the chariot wheels of the 
Central Government. Their need will be its 
opportunity. The less populous will first 
succumb; those smitten by drought or similar 
misfortune will follow; and finally even the
See K.C. Wiearej Federal Government, 4th ed., O.U.P. paperback, 
London, 1963, especially pp.226-232.
Emy: The Politics of Australian Democracy, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1974,
p.240.
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greatest and most prosperous will, however 
reluctantly, be brought to heel. Our Constitution 
may remain unaltered, but a vital change will 
have taken place in the relations between the 
States and the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth 
will have acquired a general control over the 
States, while every extension of political 
power will be made by its means and go to 
increase its relative superiority."58
The past seventy-five years have demonstrated the development 
of just such a "dichotomy between formal powers and actual 
resources and power"59, and Federal ascendancy in financial, 
and hence overall political, power.
It is a common argument that the practice of federalism 
is subject to centrifugal and/or centripetal forces.60 The 
period of Australian experience of federalism is generally 
felt to have been dominated by an increase in the relative 
power of the federal government vis a vis the States, con­
currently with an expansion of co-operative (often 
simultaneously coercive) arrangements. The States may have 
expanded their responsibilities, but so too has the Federal 
government, and the latter's pre-eminence is hard to dispute, 
as later discussion will demonstrate.
Were the Founding Fathers oblivious to such forces 
for change? There is an apparent contradiction between 
the rhetoric of delegates in Convention debates - which 
basically stressed State independence, if not sovereignty - 
and the actual Constitutional provisions they established 
which allowed sufficient latitude for the Federal government, 
if it so desired, to expand the range of its activities.
58 Quoted by Crisp, cp.cit., p.124.
59 l b i d ' P-125.
See W.H. Riker, Federalism, Origin, Operation, Significance,
Little Brcwn, Boston, 1964; G. Sawer, Modern Federalism, 2nd ed., 
Pitman, Victoria, 1976, Chapters 5 & 6.
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It is generally received wisdom that the delegates of the 
1890s were primarily motivated by a desire to preserve the 
maximum possible sphere of authority for the Colonies about 
to be States. If this is a true reflection of their aims, 
the Founding Fathers can justifiably be criticised for 
naively assuming that they had provided a sufficiently 
limiting straight-jacket (which was guaranteed of survival) 
for the Federal government.
If the new Federal government were to be as impotent 
as delegates' speeches implied, why then did so many Founding 
Fathers move from Colonial to Federal Parliament in 1901?
Why did they choose to leave the sphere of supposedly pre­
eminent authority?
The explanation for this conumdrum is, I suggest, 
simple: delegates chose their words to suit the audience.
To sell federation, it was felt to be necessary to stress 
that there would be little alteration to the status quo. 
Norris61 demonstrates that both supporters and opponents 
of federation used States' rights arguments to back their 
case. In other words, they assumed (whether rightly or 
wrongly) that the electorate, when given the chance to 
accept or reject the draft Federal Constitution, would be 
concerned about the degree of disruption to existing 
arrangements consequent upon the adoption of federalism.
The campaigns before the ten public referenda on adoption 
of the Constitution demonstrated a wide variety of stances,
61 Norris, cp.cit., p.35.
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pro and ante federation, and the details of the proposed 
system. But, as Parker comments:
"Supporters of Australian union tried to ignore 
the existence of intercolonial jealousies. Its 
opponents, per contra, capitalized on them 
energetically, trying in every way they could 
think of to stimulate a fictitious sense of 
corporateness among the inhabitants of each 
colony. " 62
and: "... neither the active ministers nor the
responsible people were primarily concerned 
with the fact that the' proposed Australian 
Constitution was a federal one." 63
Blainey argues that the Australian public could be 
excused for feeling confused:
"... in the campaigns of 1898-99 an amazing medley 
of contradictory arguments was repeated so 
persistently that thousands of electors may have 
been quite confused about the likely consequences 
of federalism. 1,64
Norris adds that where conservatives and liberals, and well- 
known political enemies, joined forces as 'strange bedfellows' 
to support the draft Constitution65, and where employees 
and employers agreed as to the adverse effects of federation66 , 
public confusion was highly likely.
The weight which should be given to the rhetoric of 
the 1890s (whether expressed at the Conventions, at public
62 R.S. Parker, "Australian Federation: The Influence of Economic Interests
and Political Pressures" in Historical Studies, Selected Articles, First 
Series M.U.P., Melbourne, 1964, p.165.
63 Ibid, p.177
64 G. Blainey, "The Role of Economic Interests in Australian Federation: 
a reply to Professor R.S. Parker" in Historical Studies, Selected 
Articles, First Series, op.cit., pp.192-193.
65 Cp.cit., p.23.
66 Ibid, p.25.
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meetings or during the referendum campaigns) can in part 
be assessed by comparing the various utterances of Alfred 
Deakin, now regarded as an astute forecaster of the future 
practice of Australian federalism. In 1891, as quoted 
at the beginning of this section 67, Deakin argued that 
there would be little change in effective State power; 
and in 1897 he forecast that the Federal government would 
be "a comparatively feeble power when opposed to the great 
States". 68 But in 1902, having transferred to Federal 
Parliament (and shortly before becoming Prime Minister) 
he produced the prediction about the financial superiority 
of the Federal government (see above, pages 100, 101).
One could argue that the migration from colonial/ 
State to Federal politics reflected politicians' assessment 
that at the national level they would be most effectively 
able to safeguard the position of the States. The activity 
of these men in Federal Parliament belies this.
There therefore seem to be grounds for viewing the 
predictions of the 1890s about the future relative powers 
of the Federal and State governments with some caution; 
campaign propaganda is not necessarily a useful guide to 
either the aims or the expectations of politicians.
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See above, p.96.
Convention Debates, Adelaide 1897, pp.298-299.
The appearance and impact of disciplined political parties
Convention debates on the Senate demonstrate an 
implicit assumption on the part of most delegates that 
members of that Chamber would primarily be motivated by 
concern for the rights and privileges of their own States, 
and those of the States collectively. Speakers predicted 
that the House of Representatives would divide on liberal 
versus conservative lines69 , but that within the Senate 
radicals and reactionaries would join forces "when the 
rights of ... one colony are at stake against those of 
another"70 and that Senators would (given State property 
franchises) necessarily be conservative.71 Apart from 
the obvious potential for division into Free Trade and 
Protectionist lines on the matter of the tariff (which 
had been left for the Federal Parliament to determine) 
it was generally assumed that the only line of division 
within the Senate would be, as at the Conventions, that 
between the large and the small States.
Dissent from this assessment of Senators' activity 
was rare. One of the few prophet/realists was Queenslander 
Macrossan, who countered:
"The influence of party will remain much the 
same as it is now, and instead of members of 
the senate voting, as has been suggested, as 
states, they will vote as members of parties 
to which they belong."72
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69 See, for exanple, Convention Debates, Sydney 1891, pp.153, 413.
70 Downer, Conventi.cn Debates, Adelaide 1897, p.20.
71 For exanple, Rosa, Convention Debates, Melbourne 1898, pp.17, 33.
72 Convention Debates, Sydney 1391, p.434.
105 .
The appearance and impact of disciplined political parties
Convention debates on the Senate demonstrate an 
implicit assumption on the part of most delegates that 
members of that Chamber would primarily be motivated by 
concern for the rights and privileges of their own States, 
and those of the States collectively. Speakers predicted 
that the House of Representatives would divide on liberal 
versus conservative lines69 , but that within the Senate 
radicals and reactionaries would join forces "when the 
rights of ... one colony are at stake against those of 
another"70 and that Senators would (given State property 
franchises) necessarily be conservative.71 Apart from 
the obvious potential for division into Free Trade and 
Protectionist lines on the matter of the tariff (which 
had been left for the Federal Parliament to determine) 
it was generally assumed that the only line of division 
within the Senate would be, as at the Conventions, that 
between the large and the small States.
Dissent from this assessment of Senators' activity 
was rare. One of the few prophet/realists was Queenslander 
Macrossan, who countered:
"The influence of party will remain much the 
same as it is now, and instead of members of 
the senate voting, as has been suggested, as 
states, they will vote as members of parties 
to which they belong."72
69 See, for example, Convention Debates, Sydney 1891, pp.153, 413.
70 Downer, Convention Debates, Adelaide 1897, p.20.
71 For example, Rosa, Convention Debates, Melbourne 1898, pp.17, 33.
72 Convention Debates, Sydney 1891, p.434.
106.
Macrossan dismissed the possibility of the smaller States 
combining to outvote the two larger States. In 1897 his 
words were echoed by Deakin:
"The contentions in the Senate or out of it, 
and especially any contention between the two 
Houses, will not and cannot arise from questions 
in regard to which States will be ranked against 
States. If what I contend to be true, and I 
believe most firmly it is true, this conception 
of the larger states combining against the 
smaller states in the senate, or of the smaller 
states being coerced under a referendum by the 
larger states, is a mistaken apprehension. It 
is not in the least degree a question as to 
where the population is. It is a question of 
how the population will be politically divided."73
and in 1901, Cockburn wrote:
"As to the parties in the commonwealth being 
divided into conservative and liberal parties, 
from any thought and reading I have given to 
the matter it is the most arrant nonsense 
- possible. ...there will be those who wish to 
see local government, home rule and state entity 
preserved, and those who wish to see all these 
safeguards of the liberty of the people blurred, 
confused and obliterated in a central government."74
It is difficult to understand how most delegates 
could fail to recognize the inevitability of partisanship 
based on considerations other than States' rights appearing 
within the Senate. The Constitutional provisions of co­
equal powers (except in relation to finance) and of direct 
election by the same voters for the two Federal Chambers 
made it highly likely that parliamentary groupings would 
be along the same lines (though not necessarily with the 
same distribution of strength amongst groups) in both the 
House of Representatives and the Senate. Moreover, the 
difficulties that Senate candidates would encounter in
73 Convention Debates, Sydney 1897, pp.584-585.
74 Op.cit., pp.223-224.
seeking individually to build up sufficient electoral 
support, given the size (in terms of geography and 
population) of State-wide electorates, made the 
development of electoral machines to back up parlia­
mentary groupings both necessary and inevitable.
Indeed, such organized groupings had appeared 
within and outside Colonial legislatures in the 1890s. 
Therefore, in addition to criticizing most Convention 
delegates for not realizing the implications of the 
Constitutional provisions they had drafted, it is 
justifiable to accuse them of ignoring contemporary 
developments in Colonial politics - developments which 
provided sufficient evidence for the accuracy of the 
predictions of Macrossan, Deakin and Cockburn. For the 
same reason it is questionable whether one should term 
these 'predictions' rather than (albeit rarely expressed) 
realistic assessments of current Colonial practice and 
of its inevitable continuance in both State and Federal 
Parliaments. Macrossan argued that political parties 
were already established in Colonial legislatures; most 
of his fellow delegates seem, however, to have pretended 
that parties did not exist. Moreover, the nature of 
parliamentary groupings in the 1890s, and especially 
the appearance and policies of Labor politicians, pro­
vided some evidence for Cockburn's dismissal of the 
possibility of a liberal versus conservative division 
amongst Federal parliamentarians.
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K.C. Wheare argues that it is unrealistic to expect 
that any upper house which has the power to vote on 
legislation (irrespective of whether this power is confined 
to mere suggestion of amendments or delaying passage for 
some period) will not become subject to partisanship to 
some degree:
"... if second chambers are to be anything more 
than debating societies or discussion circles - 
and, if they are this, they will certainly not be 
valueless - party is bound to come in. ... There 
is nothing surprising in thi.s. The second chamber 
is invited to give its opinion upon measures and 
policies initiated and pushed forward by a party 
government, supported by a majority party or a 
coalition of parties and criticised by a minority 
party or parties in the lower house. How can it 
avoid politics and party politics at that? And 
why should it? A second chamber is part of a 
political system; its business is politics."75
It is quite naive to assume that, where political parties 
exist in the lower house of a bicameral legislature (and 
the Founding Fathers did predict party lines in the House 
of Representatives), such divisions could be excluded 
from the upper house. As Wheare notes, debates and 
divisions in the lower house would revolve around the 
question of support for or rejection of government policy. 
The Senate's attitude to legislation, irrespective of the 
reasoning which leads to its majority view, will naturally 
be crudely analysed as either acceptance or rejection of 
the policy of the party in power. Moreover, given a uniform 
electorate for both Houses of the Federal Parliament, it was 
highly predictable that the same interests or groups would 
contest both Senate and House of Representatives elections.
75 K.C. Vheare: legislatures, O.U.P., London 1963, pp.199-200.
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It is surely never a question of the chamber itself 
avoiding politics. Political parties will always seek to 
gain influence within a legislature that is capable of 
affecting (and, potentially, even effecting) government 
activity. This applies within the upper house whether it 
is nominee or elective. For example, the Irish Senate, 
supposedly representing vocational groups within the 
general electorate rather than territorial constituencies, 
has proven in practice to be largely a party house. 
Similarly, members of the American Senate accepted party 
labels long before the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment 
provided for direct election of Senators. Even in the 
House of Lords the majority of members take a party whip. 
Groups and interests seeking political power would naturally 
attempt to gain representation in a chamber like the 
Australian Senate which was given the Constitutional power 
to reject any legislation.
The provision of State-wide electorates for Senators
also provided fertile ground for party organisation. An
individual candidate who was previously electorally unknown
could be expected to experience severe difficulty in
successfully garnering electoral support within an extensive
geographical area - especially in the days of limited 
transport and communications networks. It comes as no
surprise to learn that the first intake of Senators in
1901 comprised men who were already well in the public
eye: 27 of the 36 had served in a Colonial legislature,
2 had been members of the Federal Council, 9 had been
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Federal Convention delegates and 9 had experience at the 
local government level.76 Aspiring Senate candidates who 
could not rely on past public service to enhance electoral 
knowledge of their name or views would welcome the services 
of an electoral machine in canvassing support.
The expectation that the lines of division in the 
Senate would be purely a reflection of State interests 
also assumes that this focus could be applied to all issues 
and legislation debated in the Chamber. This is a highly 
questionable assumption. What would be the relevance of 
a purely state view on a matter on which the Constitution 
had granted the Federal Parliament exclusive power?
It is therefore evident that Senators would be bound 
to divide, and be divided, on lines other than those of 
State interest. To what degree could State interest 
counterbalance any contradictory influence? The experience 
of the American Senate up to 1900 could have provided 
sufficient grounds for the Australian Founding Fathers to 
doubt the possibility of the pre-eminence of States' rights 
views. Until 1913 American State legislatures regularly 
despatched instructions to "their" Senators, and on several 
occasions Senators who ignored such instructions were 
recalled or forced to resign. From the late 1880s, however, 
the system of instructions ceased to be an effective 
determinant of Senators' actions. Senators looked to the 
State electorate for support for their voting record, and 
generally felt bound to follow only those instructions
76 See Chapter V , p.160 of this thesis.
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which they found palatable or felt were electorally popular. 
Direct election of Senators merely formalized this practice; 
and from that point instructions were rarely offered, and 
almost universally ignored or disobeyed.77
The provision for direct election of Senators like­
wise meant that any attempt by a State to direct the voting 
of Senators elected within that State could readily be 
countered by a Senator arguing that he represented the 
people of the State, not the State Parliament or Government. 
The best possibility for a State lay, therefore, in the 
hope that its Federal representatives would, of their own 
volition, put State interests first. As will be shown 
later in this thesis, there is some evidence that such a 
States' rights view was held, and acted upon, by Senators 
in the first decade after federation. But thereafter the 
States' point of view ceased to be as relevant, or as overt, 
within the Senate. Crisp argues that this reflects a change 
in the personnel of the Chamber:
"In accepting the final provisions for the Constit­
ution, status and functions of the Senate in 1898, 
then, individual members of the Convention had in 
their minds very different pictures and hopes of 
what it was to be and do. Most of them made the 
profound mistake of believing that their interests 
and the state of their own minds in 1898 would not 
be greatly dissimilar from those of the men and 
women who would elect Senators or be elected as 
Senators in the years to follow. In fact, after 
the first decade of the Commonwealth, relatively 
few Senators had prior experience in or attachments 
to the State Legislatures and Administrations.
77 W.H. Riker, "Hie Senate and American federalism", A.P.S.R., 
Vol.49, 1955, pp.452-469.
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Once the union was consummated and national economic 
policies were laid down, few men ever came to the 
Senate with the degree of provincialism in their 
thinking which was so evident in so many members 
throughout the Conventions.■7 8
From 1910 Senate and House of Representatives candidates 
were campaigning under the banners of nationally organized 
political parties. As R.J. May notes, it was not surprising 
that such parties provided a focus which not only competed 
with, but also outweighed, State interests:
"... at the national level national parties by 
their very nature must base their appeal to the 
nation on fundamental social and economic issues 
in the country at large. This will tend to cut 
across unit interests in national politics and will 
consequently reduce, if not eliminate altogether, 
the importance of the allocation with respect to 
units of seats in the central legislature, and in 
the extreme case, completely to undermine the 
function of a second chamber as a 'States house'".79
Sir John Quick's optimism about the Senate was dis­
sipated by the end of the second decade after federation:
"The ideal Senate of the Convention has not been 
realized; the Senate has been one of the great 
disappointments of federation. In this case the 
framers of the Constitution did not build better 
than they knew. They designed and built according 
to their lights, and according to precedents. They 
expected that the Senate would attract to its 
membership all the best and strongest represent­
ative men in Australia to whom the motto would be 
'None for Party, All for the State'; this antic­
ipation has not been realized. In actual practice 
the Senate has become a Chamber composed of members 
representing political parties similar in composition 
to those of the House of Representatives. Instead
Parliamentary Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, 3rd. ed., 
Longman, London 1961, p.177; and see his Australian National 
Government, op.cit., p.330.
79 R.J. May: Federalism and Fiscal Adjustment, O.U.P., London, 1969, p.25.
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of being a Council of States, it has become a 
party chamber. The principle of equality of 
State representation in the Senate was conceded 
for the protection of State rights and not for 
the representation of political parties. This 
unexpected development has been brought about 
to some extent by the evolution of new political 
parties and new political forces in Australia 
which were beyond the ken and vision of the 
framers of the Constitution.”80
This is a very eloquent, but not convincing, statement, as 
comments so far have suggested. An examination of the late 
Colonial period demonstrates, moreover, that political 
parties were by no means an "unexpected development ... 
beyond the ken and vision" of the Founding Fathers.
It is true that until the 1890s there were no groups 
resembling Twentieth Century political parties. Colonial 
legislatures included very loose coalitions of members 
joined together by their common loyalty to a particular 
leader. These groups had a fluid membership, with frequent 
transfers of support from one leader to another; men formerly 
opponents would later unite in government81; and a new 
cabinet was often distinguishable from its predecessors 
merely by the special 'fad' of the incoming Premier.82 The 
nature of these parliamentary groupings is reflected in an 
observer's description of South Australian politics in 1866:
80 The legislative Powers ... v pp.238-239.
81 For example, the 1893 Kings ten Ministry in South Australia included
three former Premiers. See G.D. Combe: Responsible Government in
South Australia, S.A. Government Printer, Adelaide 1957, p.125.
T.A. Goghlan; Labour and Industry .in Australia: from the first 
settlement in 1788 to the establishment of the Qoirrnonwealth in 1901, 
Ö.Ü.P., Iondon, 19l8, Vol.4, p,19l3.
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" P a r t ie s  a r e  d iv i d e d  upon p a r t i c u l a r  s u b j e c t s .
T h ere  i s  a s q u a t t i n g  p a r t y  and an a n t i - s q u a t t i n g  
p a r t y ;  a G overnm ent H ouse p a r t y  and a p a r ty  
o p p o se d  t o  G overnm ent H ouse; a r e l i g i o u s  endow m ent 
p a r t y  and a p a r ty  u n fa v o u r a b le  t o  r e l i g i o u s  
en d ow m en ts; b u t  a s  t o  w e l l - d e f i n e d  l i n e s  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  d e m a r c a t io n , y o u  m ig h t  a s  w e l l  lo o k  
f o r  in k  s p o t s  in  th e  m oon. T h is  w a n t o f  p a r ty  
o r g a n i z a t i o n  p r o d u ce d  a c h r o n ic  s t a t e  o f  
m i n i s t e r i a l  i n s t a b i l i t y . " 83
A c c o r d in g  t o  S e r i e ,  V i c t o r i a n  p o l i t i c s  u n t i l  t h e  1 8 7 0 s  
d e m o n s tr a te d  a b e w i ld e r in g  a s s o r tm e n t  o f  f a c t i o n s  and  
s h i f t i n g  a l l i a n c e s " . 84 L oved ay and M a rtin  d e s c r ib e  th e  
f a c t i o n s  p r e s e n t  in  New S ou th  W ales p o l i t i c s  u n t i l  th e  
1 8 8 0 s  :
" A l le g ia n c e s  in  th e  A sse m b ly , t h e  d i r e c t i o n s  in  
w h ic h  e x e c u t i v e  pow er f lo w e d  and t h e  s u p p o r t  t h a t  
m i n i s t e r s  c o u ld  command f o l lo w e d  b on d s o f  s h o r t ­
l i v e d  e x p e d ie n c y  t h a t  w ere  p e r s o n a l ,  l o c a l  and  
o f t e n  u n s t a b l e .  . . .  A f a c t i o n  w as j u s t  a group  
o f  members o f  v a r i a b l e  s i z e ,  a lm o s t  i n d i s t i n g u i s h ­
a b l e ,  s o  f a r  a s  i t s  p o l i c i e s  w e n t , from  any o t h e r  
g r o u p . " 8 5
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  and p o l i t i c a l  d e v e lo p m e n ts  w ere  much 
s lo w e r  in  W estern  A u s t r a l i a  and T a sm a n ia , and in  t h e s e  two  
C o lo n ie s  th e  p a t t e r n  o f  l o o s e  c o a l i t i o n s  c o n t in u e d  th r o u g h o u t  
th e  1 8 9 0 s . 86 C ro w ley  n o t e s  t h a t  th e  F o r r e s t  ' M i n i s t e r i a l i s t s '  
in  W estern  A u s t r a l i a  w ere  u n i t e d  p u r e ly  by  t h e i r  c o l l e c t i v e  
l o y a l t y  t o  th e  P r e m ie r , and th e  ' O p p o s i t i o n i s t s '  had  m e r e ly
83 A. F oster , quoted by G.D. Corrbe, Responsible Government in  South
A u str a lia , S.A. Government P r in ter , Adelaide 1957, p .9 8 . See a lso  
J .B . H ir s t , Adelaide and the Country 1870-1917: Their S o c ia l and
P o l i t i c a l  R e la ticn sh ip , M .U.P., Melbourne, 1973, p .6 7 .
84 G. S e r ie , The Golden Age: a H istory o f  the Colony o f  V ic to r ia ,
1851-1861, M .U.P., Melbourne, 1963, p .249 .
85 G.N. Hawker, The Parliam ent o f  New South W ales, N.S.W. Government 
P r in ter , 1971,~jp721. See a lso  P. Loveday and A.W. M artin, 
Parliam ent, Factions and P a r tie s , M .U.P., Melbourne, 1966, p . l .
86 See Goghlan, o p . c i t . , pp .2313, 2315-2316.
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"a mutual desire to overthrow the existing government and 
to press regional interests."87 Moreover, "Forthright 
members of the Opposition were invited to join his (Forrest's) 
Cabinet, and most did so when invited."88 Similarly, Townsley 
concludes that in the Tasmanian legislature in the 1890s:
"It is difficult to distinguish between groups of 
parliamentarians who backed this and then that 
ministry. Party divisions had not yet hardened 
as we now know them nor was there anything that 
remotely resembled party organization before the 
rise of the Labor Party in the early years of the 
Twentieth Century. There were, of course, con­
servatives and men who called themselves Liberal 
Progressives, and these men had perhaps the 
rudiments of a political philosophy which 
determined occasionally their actions. But far 
more often political decisions were made in 
response to interests and action took its form 
largely from the personalities who were engaged 
in the game . " 8 9
In the other four colonies, however, one can discern 
(at least in retrospect) the beginnings of party politics 
in the decade before federation. Electoral organization 
was very rudimentary, but within the legislatures there were 
far more unified and persistent voting groups - providing 
greater stability of cabinets in this period. In most 
colonies there were liberals and conservatives, and some 
Labor representatives. The signs of future party organization 
and policy are most evident in New South Wales, where, after 
the collapse of the faction system, parties appeared which
F.K. Crowley5 Australia's Western Third, Macmillan, London, 1960, p.117. 
88 Ibid, p.114.
W.A. Townsley, "The Parliament" in F.C. Green (ed.)^ Tasmania: 
a Century of Responsible Government, 1856-1956, Ihsmaman Government 
Printer, Tiöbart, 1956, p.ll. See also J7 Reynolds, "Premiers and 
Political leaders", in ibid, pp.115-238.
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have been described as "a coherent whole around some central 
principle and focussed on the legislature through outside 
organizations with wide electoral support."90
Labor candidates appeared in New South Wales in 1874, 
in Queensland in 1888, in South Australia in 1891, in 
Victoria in 1892, in Western Australia in 1897 and in 
Tasmania only after federation. Early Labor members are 
generally regarded as having been diligent attenders91, 
but they were, not surprisingly, no match for their seasoned 
liberal and conservative colleagues in terms of knowledge 
of and ability to manipulate parliamentary procedures. They 
were, moreover, rarely a disciplined or unified voting group. 
There were attempts made to establish pledges binding 
parliamentarians to extra-parliamentary and/or majority 
caucus decisions, but the very attempts to establish such 
disciplinary procedures led to splits and loss of members.92 
A clear example of disunity amongst Labor members, and its 
effects on Party influence in a Colonial legislature, is 
the division between New South Wales Labor MPs on the tariff 
question. The Parkes and Dibbs Ministries were frequently 
able to exploit Labor's disunity and parliamentary inexper­
ience.93 Coghlan notes that Labor was itself rather diffident 
about its prospects of playing a unified, influential role 
in Colonial Parliaments.94
90 Cp.cit., pp.152-153.
91 ftar exanple, see Walker, op.cit., p.5; Hawker, op.cit., pp. 180-183.
92 See Coghlan, op.cit., p.1893; J. Jupp: Australian Party Politics.
93 Cbghlan, op.cit., pp.1851, 1865.
94 Ibid, p.1843.
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The embryo Labor parties also pursued quite differing 
tactics within Colonial legislatures. In New South Wales 
the Party chose a program of 'support in return for 
concessions' which led them to back unofficially first the 
Parkes (Free Trade), then the Dibbs (Protectionist), then 
the Reid (Free Trade) Ministries.95 These Premiers sometimes 
found Labor tactics irksome; for example, Parkes commented; 
"They gave their support after a manner of their own, and 
very much as an ungracious man gives charity."96 By 1899, 
according to Coghlan, Labor was "a compact body of artful 
parliamentarians."9 7
The Queensland Labor Party also built up a reasonably 
large parliamentary representation in the 1890s; however, 
under the influence of its mentor William Lane, it pursued 
a quite different parliamentary strategy from that of the 
New South Wales party. Lane rejected the idea of Labor 
co-operating with or unofficially backing other parliamentary 
groups, arguing that the party should maintain a quite 
separate existence and seek to get a parliamentary majority 
its own right.98 Labor achieved sufficient representation 
in the Assembly to be the unofficial opposition party from 
1893, and in 1899 there was a six-day Dawson Labor Ministry.99
In both South Australia and Victoria the number of 
Labor members was far less than in either New South Wales
95 See Hawker, op.cit., pp.178-184.
96 Quoted by Coghlan, op.cit., p.1852.
97 Ibid, p.2180.
98 Ibid, pp.1888-1894.
99 See articles by Daltcn, Hughes and Murphy in D.J. Murphy, R.B. Joyce 
and C. A. Huges (eds.) , Prelude to Pcwer; the Rise of the Labor Party 
in Queensland 1885-1915, Jacaranda Press, Brisbane 1970. See also
Coghlan, cp.cit., pp.2254-2258.
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or Queensland; hence neither the ’support in return for 
concessions' strategy nor a totally independent stance 
were likely to achieve any benefits. Moreover, in Victoria 
the Liberals had a massive majority in their own right.
Labor's support was not therefore essential to the government, 
although the Party did generally vote with it. Victorian 
Labor members thus had "very slight influence"100, if any, 
on the governing Liberals and Labor members were frequently 
absorbed into the Liberal party. As a result, the Melbourne 
Age claimed during the 1894 election campaign that Labor 
members were not a separate party, but merely a wing of 
the Liberals.101
In South Australia the Labor Party's objection to 
the policy of the opposition conservatives led them into 
an alliance with the liberals.102 Relationships between 
the two parties were "very cordial".103 The policy 
convergence (which led to use of the term Lib-Labs in both 
South Australia and Victoria) was evident in the South 
Australian Trades and Labour Council platform adopted in 
1890; Coghlan describes this as "not a platform declaratory 
of the principles and aspirations of Labour, but a series 
of planks which Labour could endorse and Liberal candidates 
accept without sacrifice of principle."104 Coghlan also 
argues that the Kingston Ministry produced progressive social
100 Coghlan, op.cit., p.2230.
101 Quoted by ibid, p.2223.
102 Hirst, op.cit., p.I70.
103 Coghlan, op.cit., pp.2219, 2274.
104 Ibid, p.1931.
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legislation on its own initiative, with no apparent prodding 
from Labor.105
One can therefore conclude that: (a) there were
clear signs of a developing two-party system in New South 
Wales before federation 106; this, however, was a development 
unmatched in other Colonies and so could perhaps be regarded 
as a unique and possibly temporary phenomenon;
(b) Victoria and
to a lesser degree, South Australia, provided evidence of 
the weakness of Labor parties, particularly where their 
strength lay entirely in the cities and where there was some 
likelihood of their absorption by the Liberals; and perhaps 
even provided sufficient grounds for the Founding Fathers to 
dismiss Labor as a passing phenomenon; (c) in Queensland, 
Coghlan107 argues that the Labor Party's strategy of isolation 
limited its electoral appeal; yet its only possible allies, 
the Liberals, were weak and therefore to a large degree the 
party was unable to exploit its parliamentary strength;
(d) in the two
smallest Colonies political organization was not in sufficient 
evidence in the Colonial period for any conclusions to be 
drawn from the contemporary scene.
Such conclusions reached ex post do not necessarily 
sanction castigation of Convention delegates for failing to 
recognize contemporary developments. There is some evidence
105 Ibid, p.2281
106 Hawker, op.cit., p.198.
107 Coghlan, op.cit., p.1894.
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of a general tendency to dismiss New South Wales politics - 
based on a combination of distate and of fear that a similar 
pattern might emerge in other Colonies.108 On the other 
hand, New South Wales was an exceptional case.
As for the future of the Labor Party, Coghlan comments:
"The aims of Labour were ... much the same in 
all colonies, and this unity of aims made Labour 
an Australian party, and not particularly the 
party of any specific colony."109
Yet contemporary commentators who forecast the continuance 
of, let alone an important future for, the Labor Party were 
rare.
It is also interesting to observe that even Labor 
members were diffident about their future impact. Parker 
comments: "Both the Labour Party and its opponents at the
time were totally mistaken as to the part it was destined 
to play under federation." 110 Cockburn notes a general 
surprise at Labor's success in the first Federal elections.* 111 
There are several explanations for this. Firstly, Labor 
representation in Colonial legislatures generally declined 
during the 1890s; and falling electoral support was 
reflected in the election of only one Labor representative
(Trenwith112 ) to the 1897-1898 Convention. Secondly,
Colonial Labor representatives were occupied with domestic
108 See, for exanple, walker, qp.cit., p.52.
109 Qp.cit., p.1943.
110 "Australian Federation ...," op.cit., p.154.
111 Qp.cit., pp.5-6.
112 Trenwith was not necessarily regarded favourably by all his Labor 
colleagues, partly because of his alliance with the Turner Liberals 
in Victoria. See Coghlan, op.cit., p.2229.
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affairs in the Colonies - especially the passage of economic 
and social legislation. Since these fields were to fall 
within State, rather than Federal, authority, Labor men 
felt that their major tasks, and impact, would occur at 
the State level.113 A third, and highly important, factor 
was the lack of a positive stance by the Labor movement on 
the desirability, or otherwise, of federation. There was 
certainly general criticism of certain aspects of the 
Constitution: for example, the 'undemocratic' notion of
equal State representation, the powers of the Senate, the 
lack of provisions outlawing plural voting and property 
franchises, the omission of the Swiss initative and recall 
procedures and the difficult amendment process.114 But no 
positive verdict was given. In no Colony did the Party 
formally support federalism; generally the Party was either 
divided or did not seriously discuss the proposed Constitution.
The Labor view on upper houses was, however, well 
known: a preference for abolition, but a willingness
generally to accept pro tempore any moves to restrict the 
power of second chambers. H. de R. Walker describes Labor 
attitudes from the viewpoint of the 1890s:
113 Thus Trenwith successfully argued in 1898 against granting the 
federal government the power to institute an old age pensions 
scheme on the ground that this might delay colcnial/state 
implementation of such schemes; Convention Debates, Melbourne 
1898, pp.8-9, 25. Such a provision was later accepted as a help 
to nomadic workers who would not be covered by any state scheme. 
See also La Nauze, Alfed Deakin: a Biography, M.U.P., Melbourne, 
1965, pp. 169-170; Cogh'lan, op.cit., p .2365T
114 See Parker, op.cit., p.162; and J.A. La Nauze? Alfred Deakin: 
a Biography, M.U.P., Melbourne, 1965, p.169.
See: J. Bastin, "Federalism and Whs tern Australia" in Historical 
Studies, Selected Articles, First Series, op.cit., p.210;
Barker, op.cit., pp.161-162; Coghlan, op.cit., p.2365.
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"The policy pursued depends upon the constitution 
of the Council: if it is elective, it should be
so modified so to become a Chamber of paid 
representatives, subject to no property qualification 
and elected upon a wide franchise, such as the 
South Australian Council, in which a combination 
of Ministerialists and Labour Members has been 
able to obtain a bare majority. If it is nominee, 
the life tenure should be superseded by nomination 
for a short term of years, which will enable 
successive Ministries to introduce a new leaven 
of persons who are in touch with popular feeling, 
and will be prevented, by the limit placed upon 
the duration of their appointments, from being 
subjected to reactionary influences. The Council, 
that is to say, is to become a mere machine for 
registering the wishes of the Assembly."116
Though members of other parties of the period might have 
disagreed with the details of such proposed changes, it is 
probable that they would have accepted the Labor aim of 
transforming Colonial upper houses into bodies which could 
not frustrate the wishes of the Assemblies.
Inter-House Deadlocks
Neither the American nor the Canadian Constitution 
included any formal machinery for resolution of deadlocks 
between the two Houses of the federal legislature, and at 
the time of framing of the Commonwealth Constitution there 
was no machinery for resolving disputes between the House 
of Commons and the House of Lords. Some Australian 
Convention delegates therefore queried the necessity for 
provision of deadlock machinery in the Commonwealth 
Constitution. The (largely small State) opponents of such 
machinery would have undoubtedly agreed with Kunz117 that
116 Qp.cit., pp.274-275.
F.A. Kunz, The Modem Senate of Canada 1925-1963: a Pe-appraisal, 
U. of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1965, p.357.
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the lack of constitutional provisions enabling the lower 
house to solve a deadlock or impose its will on an 
intransigent upper house is a great source of power for 
the latter chamber.
It is generally agreed that inter-house disputes 
are more likely when the upper, as well as the lower, house 
is elective. The Canadians rejected the elective principle 
for their Senate on precisely these grounds:
"The real danger of collision would be where 
one Chamber invaded the prerogatives of the 
other, and that danger, if it existed at all, 
would be greatly increased were the Legislative 
Council made elective. If the members were 
elected they might say, 'We come from the 
people just as directly as the members of 
the Assembly do, and our authority is, there­
fore, as full and complete as t h e i r s 118
In other words, an elected upper house can contend that
it too has a popular mandate and may even argue this as
justification for opposing a government supported within
the lower house. Where the elective upper house has, as
does the Australian Senate, also the power to reject
financial measures, the invocation of a mandate argument
may have serious repercussions. As Emy has concluded, in
relation to the Australian Senate's precipitation of a
double dissolution in 1974:
"If it receives the ready power to reject supply, 
it would receive more than coequal status with 
the House of Representatives, and this would 
necessitate some rethinking of the principles 
of cabinet government."119
Canpbell, delegate to the 1864 Quebec Conference, quoted by 
H.B. Iees-Srnith; Second Chairbers in Theory and Practice, 
Allen & Unwin, Lenden 1923, p.55.
Op.cit., p.299.1 19
The record of Federal inter-House relationships will
be discussed and assessed later in this thesis. At this 
point it is relevant to ask: To what degree did the Founding
Fathers anticipate serious disputes between the Federal 
Houses? and, What were the lessons of previous Colonial 
and overseas experience of inter-house relationships?
It has already been noted that the larger Colonies 
regarded the inclusion of deadlock machinery as a necessary 
quid pro quo in return for their concession of equal State 
representation and of Senate power to reject money bills.
If, as New South Wales delegate Reid asserted, the latter 
was to be seen "not as an antiquated power never to be used, 
but as a real living power"120, deadlocks were quite pre­
dictable. Colonial legislatures certainly recognized the 
need for formal procedures for resolving inter-house 
disputes; as described in Chapter II, every Colony had 
experienced some period(s) of upper house intransigence, 
and in most there had been an attempt to establish such 
mach ine ry.
In 1883 C.J. Rowe commented on Colonial inter-house 
relationships:
"The Upper Houses in all the Colonies have 
perseveringly and persistently thrown out, 
blocked, or mutilated the most important 
measures passed by the Lower Houses, in 
furtherance of their mission as the champions 
of the satisfied few against the discontented 
many; and the Lower Houses have, with 
periodical regularity, insisted on the total
120 Convention Debates, .Adelaide 1897, p.485.
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alteration of the constitution of the Upper as 
requisite to the carrying on of legislation at 
all; and so, unseemly wrangling has become 
the prominent feature of colonial politics 
until at length is reached the necessary point 
where agreement is possible or compromise 
unavoidable . " 121
Given the lack of an hereditary aristocracy, Rowe saw no 
justification for the adoption of bicameralism in the 
Australian colonies; he also decried the activities of 
"wealthy and influential colonists" who abrogated to 
themselves "a peculiarly lofty position as of right".122 
He hopefully concluded that, however misguided its 
introduction, the experience of bicameralism in the 
Colonies with the continuing "mere struggle for mastery 
between the houses" might convince Australians of the 
need for modification, if not rejection, of bicameralism.123 
He certainly stressed the need for deadlock machinery to 
overcome the problem of hostile upper houses, if bica­
meralism were to be retained.124
In the Colonial period some upper houses successfully 
argued that the absence of any specific Constitutional 
prohibition on their rejection of supply sanctioned such 
action - in spite of the then contrary British practice,
121 Bends of Disunion, Longmans Green, London, 1883, p.191.
122 Ibid, p.325.
123 Ibid, pp.325-326.
124 Ibid, p.330.
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which Hearn argued made it "unconstitutional" for the House 
of Lords to alter a money bill.125 An important issue here 
is the authority of political conventions, that is, of 
extra-legal practices or usages observed over a period 
of time.126 There is the additional question of whether 
such conventions practised in another country should be 
binding on Australian legislatures. Alpheus Todd argued 
that British conventions about the role of the House of 
Lords in relation to supply were, and should be, binding 
on colonial practice.127 But what if (as occurred) Colonial 
upper houses rejected this argument? Todd himself describes 
acceptance of this convention in Britain as a sign of the 
"temperate and forbearing policy" and "counsels of moder­
ation" of both British Chambers.128 That this was largely 
a temporary acquiescence by the House of Lords was apparent 
in the first decade of the Twentieth Century, when the 
Lords themselves saw fit to reject supply. The existence 
of a heretofore accepted convention did not in any way 
restrain the House of Lords from deciding in that period 
to act in a manner which led to the substitution of a new 
convention about inter-House relationships (until the 
ratification of formal Constitutional restrictions on 
such activity in the Parliament Act of 1911) .
125 Cp.cit., pp.121-123.
12 5 See Hearn, op.cit., p .6.
127 Parliamentary Government in The British Colonies, p.709; 
see also Hearn, op.cit., p.353.
128 Ibid, p.754.
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As colonial upper houses had frequently shown no 
sign of moderation and forbearance, it was prudent of the 
Founding Fathers to provide some machinery for resolving 
deadlocks between the two Federal Houses. They were, 
however, non-committal as to whether such deadlocks would 
arise frequently, and as to whether the double dissolution 
procedure would be often utilized. For the period 1901- 
1975, only four double dissolutions, and one joint sitting, 
eventuated. This by no means implies a lack of disagreements 
between the Houses; but such disagreements have occurred 
within a system which has operated in a manner unsuspected 
by most Founding Fathers.
Conclusion
In describing the Canadian Senate, Kunz notes that 
the States House function, for that chamber at least, was 
essentially "a rhetorical device, a psychological rather 
than a political remedy"129 used to sell Confederation to 
the weaker provinces.
"The assertion of the federal function of the 
Senate at the time of Confederation, therefore, 
was rather a well-calculated political device 
used as a constitutional tranquillizer to 
palliate the sectional fears of the weaker 
partners to federalism from the numerical 
majorities of the House of Commons."130
This implies that the State House function was not 
seriously considered as a prescription for the behaviour
129 Cp.cit., p.319.
130 Ibid, p.317.
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of Canadian Senators. Moreover (as is true in Australia), 
neither the Senate nore the lower house in Canada has 
since Confederation been given many opportunities on 
which it could protect or defend State interests.
"The Senate has never had to deal with an 
encroaching executive wilfully violating the 
sacred domain of provincial rights. Rather, 
the danger has been posed by general, historical, 
and universal trends, which the Senate has been 
too fragile to resist. The movements and counter­
movements that so fundamentally transformed 
Canadian federalism in the last two generations 
or so have clashed outside the Senate."131
These comments are a close parallel to the arguments 
of the current Clerk of the Senate, who defends the per­
formance of the Senate as a States House in the following 
terms:
"The fact is that, when the need is there, the 
Senate indeed functions as a States House. ...
In general, however, the mere existence of the 
Senate operates to dissuade a Government from 
even considering proposals unfavourable to State 
interests. The Senate's potential therein alone 
justifies its existence as a States House."132
"The power of the Senate to assume its role as 
the protector of State interests is ever present, 
and the fact that the Senate, in recent years, 
has not had to invoke it frequently is a tribute 
to wise government rather than a criticism that 
the Senate does not fulfil its function as a 
States House. Without a States House to reckon 
with governments may not be so wise."133
"The oft-made assertion that the Senate is a failure 
as a States House has no justification whatever 
until the Senate, faced with a proposal harmful 
to State interests, shirks its responsibilities 
as a States Assembly. It cannot be said that 
any such situation has yet arisen."134
131 Ibid, p.322.
132 J.R. Odgers? Australian Senate Practice, Cormnonwealth Government 
Printer, Canberra, 4th ed., 1974, p.5.
133 I b i d ' P-7-
1 34 Ibid, p.10.
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The accuracy of Odgers' views can be judged after 
a review of the record of Senate activity. He is, however, 
expending energy on a wasted cause, for realistically one 
must accept that performance of the States House function 
is unlikely to be an important area of Senate activity.
As Wheare concludes:
"It is hard to escape the conclusion that if 
cabinet government is adopted in a federation, 
and if it is worked on the assumption accepted 
in Britain and in Commonwealth countries up to 
now, a second chamber cannot be an effective 
safeguard of states' rights, even if it be given 
in law equal power with the lower house. The 
conventions of cabinet government are so strong 
that, in the end, they will weaken, if not 
nullify, the legal powers of the second chamber. 
This is not to say that states' rights cannot 
be safeguarded in federations where there is a 
cabinet system; but the safeguards must be 
provided in other ways."135
Partisanship also affects the degree to which a second 
chamber can function as a House of Review. Roberts argues 
that the first and third of the Brycean functions (critical 
review and interposition of a time-lag before passage of 
legislation) are unlikely, if not impossible, given the 
activity of political parties in the Australian Senate 
since 1909.136 Lees-Smith notes that anyone who expected 
the Federal Upper House to act as a conservative bulwark 
to change would derive "little comfort" from the early 
record of the Senate, which under Labor domination allowed 
the enactment of a great many "advanced" "socialist proposals".137
135 legislatures, cp.cit., p.206.
136 G.K. Roberts: cp.cit., p.204.
H.B. Lees-Smith, Second Chambers in Theory and Practice, Allen &
Urwin, Iondon, 1923, p.108.
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The important consideration is not partisanship 
per se, but the coincidence, or lack, of a particular party 
or coalition majority in both houses. An additional factor 
is the degree to which members of political parties vote as 
a bloc in parliamentary divisions. If the parties are 
tightly disciplined voting blocs, the results of divisions 
will be highly predictable: the party or coalition with
a majority of seats in the chamber will win. (Where the 
party majority is sufficient, instances of rebellion can 
be withstood.)
Where such tight voting patterns apply within each 
house of a bicameral legislature following the Westminster 
system (the government is the party or coalition of parties 
with the support of a majority of the members of the lower 
house), there is a range of possible patterns of inter­
house relationships:
(i) the government party or coalition holds the 
majority of seats in the upper house; the result 
of divisions will then (barring defections) be a 
repetition of the lower house verdict;
(ii) the government party or coalition lacks a 
majority of its own supporters in the upper house, 
but can rely on other parties, and/or independent 
members, to a greater or lesser extent (depending 
on the general political situation, particular 
issues, or, most likely, the political coloration 
of these members) for sufficient support to enable 
it to outvote the party or parties which officially
131.
oppose it; the result is a reasonably predictable 
endorsement of the lower house verdict;
(iii) the government and the opposition forces each 
command one-half of the numbers in the upper house; 
this is a very interesting situation, especially in 
the Australian Senate where there is an even and 
equal number of representatives per State, no 
provision for a casting vote by the presiding officer 
and where a tied vote counts as a negative138; a 
skilful government may be able to successfully walk 
this tightrope and so enjoy continuing reendorsement 
of its viewpoint;
(iv) neither the government nor the official opposition 
commands a majority in the upper house, the remaining 
seats being held by other party and/or independent 
members whose voting patterns are unpredictable; the 
result of any division will therefore be uncertain;
(v) the government party or coalition is opposed in 
the upper house by a majority of members who form 
the official opposition; in this situation, there 
is an ever-present danger of legislative collision.
(It must be remembered that in each of these situations the 
unanimity, or sufficiently high solidarity, of the members 
of the government and of the opposition parties is assumed.
The myriad of potential consequences in a situation where 
party bloc-voting is not the norm are ignored because, 
although this may be highly relevant - even the major focus
13 8 So that no State gains an extra vote, and therefore greater 
representation than any other State.
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of research - for most leg is la tu res , i t  has never occurred 
in Australian federal p o litic s . In the major Australian 
p o li t ic a l  p a rtie s , parliamentary discip line is  well- 
established and members rarely cross the floor in d iv is io n s .)139
In the f i r s t ,  second, and possibly the th ird  of the 
above scenarios, parliamentary ac tiv ity  w ill have the 
appearance of a se t piece, and the degree to which the 
deliberations of the upper hous'e w ill amount to "sober 
second thought" is  questionable. I t  is  commonly argued 
th a t an upper house under the thumb of the government is  
most likely  to be a 'rubber stamp' leg is la tu re , which rarely  
exercises the f i r s t  and th ird  Brycean functions.
In the f if th  situa tion  - an opposition-controlled 
upper house - th a t opposition may use i t s  majority, continually 
or occasionally, to fru s tra te  (whether by delay or by outright 
rejection  of measures) a government's leg is la tiv e  program.
Again, the influence of partisanship negates the hopes for 
unbiassed re flec tio n . Moreover, as Sir Henry Maine noted, 
such a h o stile  upper house may claim i t  has a "riva l 
in f a l l ib i l i ty " 140 to that of the lower house. Given the 
composition and powers of the Australian Senate, and the 
lack of c la r ity  about m in isteria l responsib ility  to th is
See J.M. Ritchie, "Parliamentary Voting Cohesion: a Case Study of
Parliamentary Voting Patterns in the Federal House of Representatives, 
1929-1943", unpublished B.A. (Hens) Thesis, Department of Government, 
University of Sydney, 1965.
Quoted by J.A.R. Marriott, Second Chanbers; an Inductive Study in 
Political Science, O.U.P., Oxford, 1910, p.47; see also Bryce:
Report on the Conference cn Reform of the Second Chairber, London,
1917, p.5.
1 40
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Chamber, an opposition controlled Senate could precipitate 
resignation of a ministry - for example, by rejection of 
supply or by a vote of no confidence in the government.
For most of the period since federation the Senate, and 
the legislature generally, have not regarded Senate 
hostility as a sufficient cause for resignation of a 
ministry, nor have Senators exercised the ultimate weapon 
of rejection of supply. However, in April-May 1974 and in 
October-November 1975 opposition-dominated Senates invoked 
the power to reject/delay supply for overtly political 
(and, arguably, short-term) ends. This was clearly a 
situation in which the Senate was acting as if it possessed 
"rival infallibility". The repercussions of the events of 
1974 and 1975 are still to be assessed; but they provide 
a dramatic exposure of the problems aired in this Chapter.
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SECTION II
THE ACTIVITY OF THE SENATE AND SENATORS 
BETWEEN 1901 AND 1972
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CHAPTER V
MEMBERS OF THE SENATE, 1901-1972 
Introduction
The calibre expected of members of a House of Review 
is illustrated in the Report of the Bryce Committee: they
should be "persons of experience in various forms of public 
work"; "persons possessing special knowledge of important 
departments of the national life"; and people who can 
"judge political questions with calmness and comparative 
freedom from prejudice and bias".1 Similarly, Madison in 
The Federalist urged the minimum age of 30 for American 
Senators so that they would possess a "greater extent of 
information and stability of character"2; and Hamilton 
predicted that members of the Federal Upper House would be 
"less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction."3 The 
characteristics desired of members of an upper house were 
therefore seen to be maturity, experience/expertise and 
impartiality. The Brycean model of expected functions of 
an upper house therefore implies that the membership would 
be more conservative than that of the house of government.
The Bryce Conference was unable to reach agreement 
on how best to recruit or provide for the selection of 
such individuals - for example, on whether they should be 
elected or nominated. Parker agrees that it is difficult
1 Report of the Conference on Reform of the Second Chamber, London, 
1917, p.
2 The Federalist, Number 62, World Publishing Company edition,
J.k. Cooke-"(ed.), Chio, 1965, p.376.
3 The Federalist, Number 27, ibid, p.175.
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to guarantee that an upper house will attract such men of 
superior wisdom and unbiassed judgment.4 In the Colonial 
period Australian politicians frequently criticised American 
Senators for failing to live up to such an ideal.5 (This 
is partly the explanation for Convention delegates' rejection 
of both nomination of Australian Senators and of a higher 
age requirement for Senators as against Members of the 
House of Representatives.)
Have members of the Australian Senate exhibited 
such maturity, experience/expertise and impartiality? 
Deakin felt that members of the first Senate were indeed 
of a high calibre:
"That there are more men of first-class ability 
in the Senate than have ever been assembled in 
any Legislative Council in Australia is already 
evident. Though only half as numerous as members 
of the House, the Senators have nearly as many 
men entitled to a front rank place in politics."6
But after the first decade of the Twentieth Century, observers 
were questioning both the calibre and the impartiality of 
Senators. Sir John Quick, for example, felt that the 
calibre of American Senators was far higher than that of 
members of the Australian Federal Upper House.7 Other 
commentators described post 1910 Senators as "mediocre
4 Checks and Balances in present-Day politics, New Zealand University 
Press, Wellington, 1951, p.13.
See editorials in The Age in the late 1890s; debate in the Victorian 
Legislative Asseirbly in 1897 on the corruption of American Senators, 
both quoted by E.M. Hunt, American Precedents in Australian Federation, 
A.M.S. Press, New York, 1968, p.116.
Federated Australia, J.A. La Nauze (ed), M.U.P., Melbourne, 1968, p.58.
The Legislative Pavers of the Commonwealth and the States of Australia, 
Charles Maxwell, Melbourne, 1919, p.239.
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party hacks" within a "stagnant backwater"8; the Chamber 
was seen as a "sunset home"9, "a resting place for those 
the various parties have wanted to reward with an easy job 
and a good salary"10. Such criticisms are focussing on 
the impact of the development of machine politics and party 
tickets from the end of the second decade after federation - 
a development which Quick deplored for excluding the 
"nomination of desirable candidates who would not stoop 
or bow down to party managers and party organisers."* 11
The coincidence between observers' images of Senators 
and the influence of partisanship is again evidenced in the 
far more flattering comments on Senate personnel which 
appeared in the 1960s and early 1970s. In this period 
either government and non-government representation in 
the Chamber was equal, or government Senators were a 
minority of the total membership. Professor Henry Mayer 
notes that from about 1965 journalists and academics 
rediscovered the Senate and Senators; he felt that the 
impetus for this rediscovery was: the new party composition
of the Chamber (especially the emergence of the Democratic 
Labour Party as the 'balance of power' group in the Senate); 
the appearance of young, ambitious Senators in the two 
major political parties (and of 'rebellious' backbenchers in 
the Government parties); and the boost to Senators' morale
H. Mayer, introduction to M. Mackerras, The Australian Senate 1965-
1967: Who Hald Control?, A.P.S.A. Monograph Number 9, 1968, p.l.
A.F. Davies, Australian Democracy, 2nd ed., Longmans, London, 1964, p.41.
D. Solomon, Australia's Government and Parliament, Nelson, Melb., 1973,p.46
11 Loc.cit.
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by the election of a Senator as Prime Minister.12 Journalist 
David Solomon commented: "Since the mid 1960s ... the
Senate's image has undergone a considerable change, mainly 
because of changes in its political composition."13 Solomon 
also argued that:
"There has developed also an unusual esprit de 
corps among Senators. They may not have the aura 
and prestige of Senators in the United States, 
but they do have the same sense of belonging 
to an exclusive clubhand are all quite convinced 
that their chamber can do and does do a worthwhile 
job. All would subscribe to the theory that the 
Senate has already surpassed the House of Repre­
sentatives as the most important functional part 
of the legislature."14
Russell Schneider, also a journalist, predicted further 
changes in the composition of the Senate:
"The Senate's growing prestige is certain to 
attract increasingly interesting members. It 
will cease to be a retirement home for party 
hacks (as distinct from machine men from the 
parties who can bring qualities to the chamber 
which will act to its benefit. ...) It will 
also attract a number of men interested in 
politics who wish to avoid the constituency 
burdens of the House of Representatives but 
who still have something to offer to Australian 
public service. And as Labor backbencher 
George Georges said last week, the Senate 
will also be forced to 'seek younger, more 
qualified men to enter the chamber. There 
will be a growing emphasis not so much on 
specialists but on men able and anxious to 
inquire'."15
Professor G.S. Reid argued that this resurgence of the
12 Op.cit., pp.1-2.
13 Loc.cit.
14 "A will to find a way for reform", The Australian, 23 March 1970.
1 5 "New directions, new purpose", Bulletin, 31 October 1970, p.27.
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Senate and Senators reflected the lesser degree of executive 
dominance over the Senate as compared to the House of 
Representatives.15
Such comments illustrate how the image of Senators 
has varied over time; posit that the party composition 
of the Chamber is a major determinant of the calibre and 
activities of Senators; and demonstrate that assessments 
of Senate personnel are frequently based on comparisons 
between the membership of the two Federal Houses. The 
accuracy of such observations on Senate personnel, and 
the degree to which Senators live up to idealised expect­
ations about members of an upper house, will be examined 
in this Chapter through a survey of members of the Senate 
between 1901 and 1972.
Information on the 308 individuals who were at some 
time members of the Senate between 1901 and 1972 is presented 
in five sections. The first compares Senators with members 
of the House of Representatives (MHRs) in terms of collective 
data on their socio-economic characteristics, prior political 
and parliamentary experience and their tenure in the Federal 
Parliament. The second section re-examines this information 
in terms of Senators' party allegiance, in order to determine 
whether there are any significant differences in the type 
of members recruited by different political parties. Both 
these sections exclude any reference to the 25 Senators
"Australia's Canmonwealth Parliament and the 'Westminster Model'", 
Journal of Contioiwealth Political Studies, vol.2, No.2, May 1964, 
reprinted in C.A. Hughes (Id), Headings in Australian Government, 
University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1968, p . 114.
16
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who also at some time served in the House of Representatives 
(that is, they refer to a total of 283 Senators). The third 
section briefly considers these 25 Senators. The fourth 
section analyzes the membership of the Senate in selected 
years, with a view to enabling comparisons between the 
composition of the Chamber over time.
Information presented in the first four sections of 
this Chapter is primarily based' on: Commonwealth Parliamentary
Handbooks, between 1901 and 1972 (First to Seventeenth 
Editions); C.A. Hughes and B.D. Graham: A Handbook of
Australian Government and Politics 1890-1964, A.N.U. Press, 
Canberra, 1968; J. Rydon: A Biographical Register of the
Commonwealth Parliament, 1901-1972, A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 
1975. Further information was obtained by the author from 
interviews and correspondence with Senators, and from general 
research (for example, in newspapers and secondary sources).
I am also indebted to Professor Rydon for access to her as 
yet unpublished accumulated statistics on Federal Members, 
based on information contained in A Biographical Register ... .
The Chapter then considers in more detail one 
particular group of Senators - those who were members of 
the Twenty-Sixth and Twenty-Seventh Parliaments. Between 
1969 and 1972 questionnaires were distributed to, and 
interviews conducted with, most of the then members of 
the Senate. The information obtained provides a more 
detailed, and personalized, view of Senate personnel.
Analysis of these Senators' reasons for and method of entry 
to the Chamber, their career aspirations and their general
141.
assessment of the functions of the Senate provides another 
reference point from which to examine the members of the 
Federal Upper House.
Senators and MHRs 1901-1972: a Collective Portrait
As noted above, the information discussed in this 
section refers to the 283 Senators who did not also sit in 
the House of Representatives. Senators are considered in 
relation to their: birthplace, sex, religion, education,
prior occupation, prior politically relevant experience, 
general parliamentary experience, age on entry to and 
departure from the Chamber, tenure within the Senate and 
the manner in which they entered and left the Chamber.
In each category comparisons are drawn between Senators 
and the 589 members of the House of Representatives.
Place of birth (See Table V:l)
Approximately 30 per cent of Senators were born 
outside Australia (approximately 20 per cent of MHRs and, 
overall, 23 per cent of the 872 members under discussion).
A degree of geographical mobility is evident from the 
figures in Table V:l; only 57 per cent of Senators 
(63 per cent of MHRs and 61 per cent of all these Federal 
MPs) were born in the State they later represented in 
Federal Parliament. The contribution of the two larger 
States - New South Wales and Victoria - is marked: 44 per
cent of all Federal MPs were born in one of these two States. 
The provision for equal State representation in the Senate
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h a s  h o w e v e r  m o d i f i e d  t h i s  i m p a c t ;  o n l y  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  
29 p e r  c e n t  o f  S e n a t o r s ,  a s  a g a i n s t  52 p e r  c e n t  o f  MHRs, 
cam e f ro m  t h e s e  tw o  S t a t e s  a l o n e .
S ex
The A u s t r a l i a n  F e d e r a l  P a r l i a m e n t  i s  d e f i n i t e l y  a  
m a le  p r e s e r v e .  O n ly  7 women h a d  b e e n  e l e c t e d  t o  t h e  S e n a t e  
b e f o r e  D ece m b e r  1 9 7 2 17 (a n d  3 women t o  t h e  H ouse  o f  
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ) .  T h i s  i s  p a r t l y  a  r e f l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  
p a u c i t y  o f  women c a n d i d a t e s  -  5 p e r  c e n t  o f  a l l  S e n a t e  
c a n d i d a t e s  b e t w e e n  19 0 1  a n d  1972 ( s e e  T a b l e  V : 2 ) .  The 
d i s i n c l i n a t i o n  o f  women t o  s t a n d  (a n d  o f  p a r t i e s  t o  p r e ­
s e l e c t  t h e m 1 8 ) i s  s l o w l y ,  b u t  n o t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  d e c r e a s i n g . 19 
Y e t  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  T w e n t i e t h  C e n t u r y  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  50 p e r  
c e n t  o f  t h e  t o t a l  A u s t r a l i a n  p o p u l a t i o n  h a v e  b e e n  f e m a l e .
TABLE V : 2
WOMEN CANDIDATES FOR THE SENATE, 1 9 0 1 -1 9 7 2  ( p e r c e n t a g e s )
P e r i o d NSW V i c . Q ld
S t a t e
S. A. W. A. T a s . T o t a l
1 9 0 1 - 1 9 1 3 2 . 0 3 . 3 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 .0 1 .2
1 9 1 4 - 1 9 3 1 1 . 7 2 . 0 0 .0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 .0 0 . 6
1 9 3 2 - 1 9 5 0 5 . 4 7 . 7 5 . 6 4 . 2 8 .0 0 .0 5 . 2
1 9 5 1 -1 9 7 0 6 .9 9 . 2 1 0 . 3 5 . 7 1 3 .9 1 .2 8 .2
S o u r c e : P a r l i a m e n t a r y P a p e r s 1 9 0 1 - 1 9 7 5 , E l e c t o r a l
S t a t i s t i c s  f o r  e a c h  e l e c t i o n .
17 S ena to rs  Tangney (1943-1968), Robertson (1950-1962), Vfedgwood
(1950-1971), Rankin (1951-1971), B u t t f i e  Id  (1955-1965, 1968-1974), 
Breen (1962-1968) and G u ilfo y le  (1971- ) .
18 See a l s o  S. E nce l,  E q u a l i ty  and A u th o r i ty :  a  Study o f  C la ss ,
S ta tu s  and Power in  A u s t r a l i a ,  C hesh ire ,  Melbourne, 1970, p p .224-226, 
231-232.
19 In  th e  1974 e l e c t i o n s ,  14 p e r  c e n t  o f  Senate c a n d id a te s  were waren.
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R e l i g i o n
TABLE V :3
RELIGION OF FEDERAL MPs, 1 9 0 1 - 1 9 7 2  ( p e r c e n t a g e s )
R e l i g i o n S e n a t e H ouse A l l  M em bers
A c t i v e  Roman C a t h o l i c 2 . 8 1 . 7 2 . 1
Roman C a t h o l i c 1 8 .4 1 6 .7 1 7 .2
A c t i v e  P r o t e s t a n t 1 4 . 8 1 9 .7 1 8 . 1
P r o t e s t a n t 5 3 . 7 5 1 .9 5 2 .5
O t h e r 1 . 1 1 .9 1 .6
F r e e t h i n k e r 4 . 6 3 .6 3 .9
Unknown 4 .6 4 .6 4 . 6
S o u r c e :  U n p u b l i s h e d  s t a t i s t i c s  c o m p i l e d  b y  J o a n  Rydon
b a s e d  on  i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  h e r  A B i o g r a p h i c a l  
R e g i s t e r  o f  t h e  C om m onw ealth  P a r l i a m e n t ,  
1 9 0 1 -1 9  72 , A .N .U . P r e s s ,  C a n b e r r a ,  1975 .
S l i g h t l y  l e s s  t h a n  t h r e e - q u a r t e r s  o f  S e n a t o r s  ( a n d  
o f  a l l  F e d e r a l  MPs) w e r e  c l a s s i f i e d  a s  P r o t e s t a n t .  The 
p r o p o r t i o n  o f  F r e e t h i n k e r s  a n d  o f  n o n - P r o t e s t a n t  no n -R o m an  
C a t h o l i c s  i s  i n s i g n i f i c a n t ,  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  c e n s u s  f i g u r e s .  
H o w e v e r ,  Roman C a t h o l i c s  w e r e  u n d e r - r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  b o t h  
H o u s e s  o f  F e d e r a l  P a r l i a m e n t  i n  c o m p a r i s o n  w i t h  t h e  
p r o p o r t i o n  o f  Roman C a t h o l i c s  i n  t h e  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n  
(19 p e r  c e n t  i n  P a r l i a m e n t  c o m p a r e d  w i t h  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  
o n e - q u a r t e r  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n 2 °)-
For exairple, th e  1966 census r e v e a le d  t h a t  26 .3  p e r  c e n t  o f  the  
A u s t r a l ia n  p o p u la t io n  d e sc r ib e d  them selves as Roman C a th o l ic ;
N.W.H. B la ik ie ,  " I te lig ious  Groups and Nbrld Views" in  F . J .  Hunt (e d ) , 
S o c i a l i s a t i o n  in  A u s t r a l i a ,  Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1972, p .104 .
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Education
TABLE V :4
LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF FEDERAL MPs 1901-1972 (percentages)
Level Senate House All Members
Primary 40.3 33.1 35.4
Secondary 31.1 31.1 31.1
Tertiary 7.1 8.0 7.7
Graduate 14.1 21.7 19.3
Unknown 7.4 6.1 6.5
Source: Unpublished statistics compiled by Joan Rydon
based on information in her A Biographical
Register of the Commonwealth Parliament,
1901-1972, .A.N.U. Press , Canberra, 1975.
For the seventy-two year period, approximately 
21 per cent of Senators had previously embarked on some 
form of tertiary education; a further 31 per cent had 
completed secondary schooling; and 40 per cent had not 
progressed beyond primary level. The figures for the 
two Houses are comparable, with one exception: approxi­
mately 22 per cent of MHRs, but only 14 per cent of Senators, 
were graduates. Collectively, Federal MPs had a higher 
level of education than the general population.21
For exanple, even in 1961 only 10 per cent of the electorate had 
entered (but not necessarily graduated from) a tertiary institution; 
30 per cent had at best conpleted primary school; Australian 
Gallup Poll 1961, analyzed by A.F. Davies and S. Enoel (eds), 
Australian Society: a Sociological Introduction, 2nd ed.,
Cheshire", Melbourne, 19 70, pp. 110-113.
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Investigation of the type of school attended
TABLE V :5
TYPE OF SCHOOL ATTENDED BY FEDERAL MPs 1901-1972 (percentages)
School Senate House All Members
Government 37.2 40.7 39.6
Roman Catholic 10.9 8.9 9.5
Other Private 23.8 28.2 26.8
Other* 16.8 12.2 13.8
Unknown 11.3 9.8 10.3
* Other: Outside Australia, or private tuition.
Source: Unpublished statistics compiled by Joan Rydon
based on information in her A Biographical 
Register of the Commonwealth Parliament, 
1901-1972 , A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 19 75 .
reveals that a significantly higher proportion of Senators 
(and of all Federal MPs) attended non-government (or private) 
schools than the corresponding proportion of the general 
population: only approximately 40 per cent of Federal MPs
attended a government (state) school, in contrast to 
approximately 25 per cent of the total population.22
In 1966, 74 per cent of secondary school pupils attended 
government schools, 17.4 per cent Roman Catholic schools 
and 8.5 per cent other non-state schools. These proportions 
have remained fairly stable throughout the Twentieth Century; 
Enael, op.cit., p.146.
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Prior occupation
TABLE V :6
PRIOR OCCUPATION* OF FEDERAL MPs 1901-1972 (percentages)
Occupation* Senate House All Members
Primary Producer 20.5 19.7 20.0
Lawyer 12.7 12.2 12.4
Teacher, Author, Journalist 2.8 7.3 5.9
Other Professional 2.8 7.9 6.3
Businessman 8.5 11.7 10.7
Agent, Retailer 7.4 10.7 9.6
Accountant, Secretary 3.9 3.7 3.8
Clerk, Administrator 4.d 6.4 6.0
Engineer, Builder, 
Contractor 4.2 2.7 3.2
Shearer, Miner 8.8 2.9 4.8
Party, Union Official 5.3 2.4 3.3
Unskilled Worker 18.0 12.2 14.1
* Only one entry per member, of the major occupation 
before entering Federal Parliament.
Source: Unpublished statistics compiled by Joan Rydon
based on information in her A Biographical 
Register of the Commonwealth Parliament, 
1901-1972, A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1975.
Analysis of Senators' prior occupations reveals some 
surprises. Table V:6 shows that lawyers were by no means 
as numerous as popular myth predicts (-approximately 13 per 
cent of Senators); nor are there as few businessmen as we 
have been wont to believe (less than 9 per cent of Senators, 
and nearly 11 per cent of all Federal MPs). On the other 
hand, the most numerous group is, predictably, that of 
primary producers (this category comprises all those on 
the land who are self-employed, from the wealthiest grazier 
to the full-time market gardener). The next most numerous 
group is that of the unskilled.
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It must be remembered that these are total proportions 
for a seventy-two year period, and that therefore changes 
in occupational patterns over time are hidden. Nonetheless, 
it is clear that the distribution of Federal MPs amongst 
occupational categories is dissimilar to the general pattern 
of occupational stratification in Australia; for example, 
in 1966 only 15.6 per cent of the total population were 
classified into professional/administrative/executive/ 
managerial occupations.2 3
The Senate has contained fewer teachers and journalists, 
professionals, businessmen, agents and retailers, and 
clerical/administrative employees than the House of 
Representatives; but more primary producers, lawyers, 
builders and contractors, party and union officials and 
skilled and unskilled workers. In other words, Senators' 
backgrounds are disproportionately at the very top and 
at the bottom of the status scale of occupations. The 
next section will demonstrate that these differences 
(and earlier noted dissimilarities in the religion and 
educational level of Senators and MHRs) can largely be 
related to the party composition of the Senate, as against 
that of the House of Representatives, and to the background 
of Labor compared to non-Labor MPs.
2 3 Ibid, Table 7.5, p.118.
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Prior politically relevant experience
TABLE V :7
PRIOR POLITICALLY RELEVANT EXPERIENCE 
OF FEDERAL MPs, 1901-1972 (percentages)
Position* Senate House All Members
Elected Party Officer 
Union/employees' organization
60.4 47.7 51.8
Member 39 .9 29.5 32.9
Farmers' Organisation Member 12.4 16.3 15.0
Businessmens' Association Member 4.2 4.0 4.1
Professional Association Member 
Union/employees' Organisation
18.7 21.9 20.9
Official 33.6 22.4 26.0
Professional Association Official 2.8 3.4 3.2
Union Employee 15.5 12.2 13.3
Party Employee 7.1 1.9 3.6
* Multiple entries for MPs.
Source: Unpublished statistics compiled by Joan Rydon
based on information in her A Biographical 
Register of the Commonwealth Parliament 
1901-1972, A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1975.
Analysis of MPs' activities in union/professional 
associations and in political parties prior to their election 
to Federal Parliament reveals that they are 'joiners' and 
'activists' to a degree far in excess of the average 
Australian.24 More than 50 per cent had held an elected 
party position - significantly more Senators than MHRs.
Over two-thirds of Federal MPs (slightly more Senators 
than MHRs) had been a member of a union or a professional/ 
occupationally related association. Approximately 23 per 
cent of Senators (compared with only 15 per cent of MHRs) 
had at some time been an employee of the party or of a
24 See D. Aitkin, "Electoral Behaviour" and J.S. Via stem & P.R. Wilson, 
"Politics: Participation and Attitudes", Chapters 36 and 37 
respectively of H. Mayer & H. Nelson (eds), Australian Politics: 
a Ihird Reader, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1973.
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union (an explanation for the traditional criticism that 
too many Senators were old hacks put out to grass or rewarded 
for prior faithful service).
In addition to the information contained in Table V:7, 
it can be recorded that 23 per cent of Senators (compared 
with 26 per cent of MHRs and 25 per cent of all Federal MPs) 
had served in the local government field; and that 32 per 
cent of Senators (37 per cent of MHRs and 36 per cent of 
all Federal MPs) had war service.
General Parliamentary experience
TABLE V:8
FEDERAL MPs' STATE PARLIAMENTARY EXPERIENCE, 1901-1972
(percentages)
Chamber Senate House All Members
State Legislative Council 8.1 3.3 4.9
State Legislative Assembly 25.8 27.3 26.8
Both State Houses 4.9 1.9 2.9
Nil 61.1 67.4 65.4
Source: Unpublished statistics compiled by Joan Rydon
based on information in her A Biographical 
Register of the Commonwealth Parliament,
1901-1972, A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1975.
More than one-third of Senators (slightly less MHRs, 
and overall approximately 35 per cent of all Federal MPs) 
had at some time served in a State Parliament. More Senators 
than MHRs had served in a State Legislative Council, or in 
both State Houses, as well as in Federal Parliament. However,
as the figures in Table V:8 show, most of the Federal MPs 
who had State Parliamentary experience had been members of
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a State Lower House. Moreover, as Table V:9 shows, the 
usual sequence was for State Parliamentary service before 
entry to the Federal Parliament; only 1 per cent of 
Senators (but 4 per cent of MHRs) served first in the 
Federal and then later in a State Parliament. This is 
partly a reflection of a greater election casualty rate 
amongst MHRs. On the other hand, approximately 6 per cent 
of Senators, as against 3 per cent of MHRs, completed a 
circle of State to Federal and 'then return to State 
Parliament.
TABLE V :9
SEQUENCE OF FEDERAL MPs1 PARLIAMENTARY CAREER 1901-1972
(percentages)
Sequence Senate House All Members
State - -* Federal Parliament 32.2 25.6 00•r~CN
State --> Federal -- y State
Parliament 5 .6 2.7 3.7
Federal -— > State Parliament 1.1 4.1 3.1
Nil 61.1 67.4 65.4
Source: Unpublished statistics compiled by Joan Rydon
based on information in her A Biographical 
Register of the Commonwealth Parliament,
1901-1972, A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1975 .
Federal Parliament career
Senators were more likely than MHRs to have stood 
unsuccessfully before their election to Federal Parliament 
(a later Section will reveal that few Senators had a desire 
to enter that Chamber in particular, and that most merely 
wanted a berth in Federal Parliament). On the other hand, 
Table V:10 demonstrates that former MHRs were more likely 
than ex-Senators to reinvolve themselves in the electoral
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battle. However, the most important point is that over 
two-thirds of Federal MPs (66 per cent of Senators and 
72 per cent of MHRs) were successful on their first attempt 
at election to Federal Parliament.
TABLE V :10
FEDERAL MPs' UNSUCCESSFUL ELECTION ATTEMPTS,1901-1972
(percentages)
Time of Attempt Sen ate House All Members
Before Federal MP 25.1 15.6 18.7
Before and after Federal MP 1.1 2.7 2.2
After Federal MP 7.7 10.0 9.3
Nil 66.1 71.6 69.8
Source: Unpublished statistics compiled by Joan Rydon
based on information in her A Biographical 
Register of the Commonwealth Parliament, 
1901-1972, A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1975.
Due to the Constitutionally prescribed method for 
filling casual vacancies in the Senate, it is possible for 
a person to commence his/her term without electoral sanction. 
Between 1901 and 1972 a total of 60 Senators (7 per cent 
of the total) commenced service in the Chamber after 
appointment to fill a casual vacancy. Table V:ll lists 
these 60 Senators who filled 63 casual vacancies. On 48 
of the 63 occasions, the appointee was chosen by a vote of 
both Houses of the relevant State Parliament. Apart from 
4 who served in both Houses of Federal Parliament, these 
Senators who originally filled casual vacancies are included 
in all Tables in the first, second and fourth sections of 
this Chapter (Tables V:l-23, 25-29).
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TABLE V :11
SENATORS FILLING CASUAL VACANCIES, 1901-1972
Name State Year Party Party of 
Predecessor
Fate on 
expiration 
of Term
Abbott, R.H.S. Vic. 1928 CP CP Retired
Arkins, J.G.D. NSW 1935 UAP UAP Defeated
Barwell, H.N. SA 1925 Nat. ALP Resigned
Bonner, N.T. Qld 1971 Lib. Lib . Elected
Brennan, T.C. Vic. 1931 UAP Nat. Elected
Brown, W .W.C. Vic. 1969 ALP ALP Elected
Buttfield, N.E. SA 1955 Lib. Lib. Elected
Cameron, M.B. SA 1969 Lib. Lib. Defeated
Collett, H.B. WA 1933 Lib./Nat. Nat. Elected
Cooke, J.A . WA 1952 ALP ALP Elected
Cotton, R.C. NSW 1965 Lib. Lib. Elected
Courtice, B. Qld 1937 ALP ALP Elected
Davidson, G.S. SA (1961
(1962
Lib. 
Lib.
Lib. 
Lib.
Retired
Retired
Drake-Brockman, T.C. WA 1958 CP CP Elected
Earle, J. Tas . 1917 Nat. ALP Elected
Fraser, A.J. Vic. 1946 Lib. ALP Defeated
Gardiner, A. NSW 1928 ALP ALP Defeated
Garling, H.C. NSW 1921 Nat. Nat. De feated
Gibbs, W.A. NSW 1925 ALP ALP Retired
Grant, C.W. Tas. (1925
(1932
Nat.
Nat.
Nat.
ALP
Defeated
Elected
Greenwood, I.J. Vic. 1968 Lib. Lib. Elected
Hannan, G.C. Vic. 1956 Lib. Lib. Elected
Hannan, J.F. Vic. 1924 ALP ALP De feated
Hayes, J.B. Tas. 1923 Lib. Lib. Elected
Heatley, W.C. Qld 1966 Lib. Lib. Elected
Kneebone, H. SA 1931 ALP CP Defeated
Latham, C.G. WA 1942 CP CP Defeated
Laucke, C.L. SA 1967 Lib. Lib./Indep. Elected
McBride, P.A.M. SA 1937 UAP CP Elected
MacDonald, A.N. WA 1935 Nat. Nat. Elected
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TABLE V:1 1 (contd)
Name State Year Party Party ofPredecessor
Fate on 
expiratior 
of Term
MacDonald, J.V. Qld (1922
(1928
ALP
ALP
Nat.
Nat.
Defeated 
Defeated
McClelland, J.R. NSW 1971 ALP ALP Elected
McLachlan, A.J. SA 1926 Nat. Nat. Elected
Macke liar, C.K. NSW 1903 Prot. Prot. Retired
Marriott, J.E. Tas . 1953 Lib. Lib. Elected
Marwick, T.W. WA 19 36 CP CP De feated
Massy-Greene, W. NSW 1923 Nat. Nat. Elected
Mattner, E.W. SA 1944 Lib. UAP Defeated
Mooney, P.F. NSW 1931 Lang. Lab . Nat. Retired
Mulcahy, E. Tas . 1919 Nat. ALP Elected
O'Loghlin, J.V. SA 1907 ALP Lib. Defeated
Ormonde, J.P. NSW 1958 ALP ALP Elected
Plain, W. V i c . 1925 Nat. Nat. Elected
Powe r , J .M . NSW 1924 ALP ALP Died in Office
Poyser, A.G. V i c . 1966 ALP ALP Elected
Reid, R. V i c . 1903 FT FT Retired
Robinson, A.W. SA 1928 N a t . Nat. Defeated
Robinson, W.C. WA 1952 CP Lib. Defeated
Rowe11, J . SA 1917 N at. ALP Elected
Sandford, C.W. Vic. 1957 ALP ALP Elected
Saunders, H.J. WA 1903 FT FT Retired
Scott, D.B. NSW 19 70 CP CP Retired
Shannon, J.W. SA 1912 Lib. Nat. Defeated
Sheehan, J.M. V i c . 1938 ALP ALP Elected
Sim, J.P. WA 1964 Lib . Lib. Elected
Vardon, E.C. SA 1921 Nat. ALP Defeated
Verran, J. SA 1927 N a t . ALP Defeated
Webster, J.J. Vic. 1964 CP CP Elected
Whiteside, G.I. Qld 1962 ALP ALP Defeated
Withers, R.S. WA 1966 Lib. Lib. Defeated
Source: Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook 1971,
Government Printer, Canberra, 1971.
C ommonwe a1th
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TABLE V :12
MPs'  AGE ON ENTRY TO AND DEPARTURE FROM FEDERAL PARLIAMENT,
1 9 0 1 - 1 9 7 2  ( p e r c e n t a g e s )
On E n t r y
A l l
On D e p a r t u r e
A l l
Age JL. H o f  R Members S^ H o f  R Members
2 0 - 2 9 1 . 8 4 . 2 3 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 3 0 . 3
3 0 - 3 9 1 4 . 5 2 7 . 2 2 3 . 1 2 . 1 4 . 2 3 . 6
4 0 - 4 9 3 3 . 6 3 9 . 4 3 7 . 5 1 0 . 6 1 7 . 5 1 5 . 3
5 0 - 5 9 3 6 . 0 2 4 . 3 2 8 . 1 1 7 . 0 2 5 . 5 2 2 . 7
6 0 - 6 9 1 2 . 4 4 . 6 7 . 1 2 9 . 7 2 1 . 6 2 4 . 2
7 0 - 7 9  1 . 8
80 +
S t i l l  i n  
P a r l i a m e n t  1972
0 . 3 0 . 8 1 7 . 9
2 . 1
2 0 . 5
8 . 7
1 . 2
2 1 . 1
1 1 . 6
1 . 5
2 0 . 9
S o u r c e :  U n p u b l i s h e d  s t a t i s t i c s  c o m p i l e d  b y  J o a n  Rydon
b a s e d  on i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  h e r  A B i o g r a p h i c a l  
R e g i s t e r  o f  t h e  Com m onw eal th  P a r l i a m e n t ,
1 9 0 1 - •1972 , A .N .U . P r e s s ,  C a n b e r r a ,  1 9 7 5 .
TABLE V : 13
TENURE OF FEDERAL MPs, 1 9 0 1 - 1 9 7 2 ( p e r c e n t a g e s )
N o . o f Y e a r s S e n a t e House A l l  Members
0 -  5 2 9 . 0 3 3 . 1 3 1 . 8
6 - 1 0 2 8 . 3 2 3 . 9 2 5 . 3
1 1 - 1 5 1 9 . 1 2 2 . 8 2 1 . 6
1 6 - 2 0 1 4 . 8 1 2 . 9 1 3 . 5
2 1 - 2 5 6 . 7 3 . 9 4 . 7
2 6 - 3 0 1 . 4 2 . 2 2 . 0
3 1 - 3 5 0 . 7 0 . 7 0 . 7
3 6 - 4 0 - 0 . 3 0 . 2
40 + - 0 . 2 0 . 1
S o u r c e :  U n p u b l i s h e d  s t a t i s t i c s  c o m p i l e d  b y  J o a n  Rydon
b a s e d  on i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  h e r  A B i o g r a p h i c a l  
R e g i s t e r  o f  t h e  C om m onw eal th  P a r l i a m e n t ,  
1 9 0 1 - 1 9 7 2  , A .N .U .  P r e s s ,  C a n b e r r a ,  19 75 .
F rom  T a b l e  V :1 2  i t  c a n  b e  s e e n  t h a t  t w o - t h i r d s  o f  a l l  
F e d e r a l  MPs e n t e r e d  t h e  P a r l i a m e n t  i n  t h e i r  f o r t i e s  o r  f i f t i e s .  
D e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  S e n a t e  a s  a  home f o r  s u p e r a n n u a n t s  i s  p a r t l y  
t r u e ,  i n  t h a t  o v e r  12 p e r  c e n t  o f  S e n a t o r s ,  a s  a g a i n s t  l e s s
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than 5 per cent of MHRs, were aged 60 or over on entry 
to Federal Parliament. Moreover, fifty per cent of Senators, 
but only 29 per cent of MHRs, were at least 50 years old 
at the time of entry.
Table V:13 presents the average tenure of members 
of both Federal Houses. Few (8 per cent) served for more 
than twenty years; and over fifty per cent served for at 
most ten years. Allowing for h six year term for Senators 
as compared to three years for MHRs, there are no major 
differences in the average tenure of members of the two 
Federal Houses: less than a quarter of Senators served
more than two terms, and only 20 per cent of MHRs served 
more than four terms.
Given this relative similarity in tenure, and 
the tendency for Senators to enter Federal Parliament 
somewhat older than MHRs, it is not surprising to discover 
(Table V :12) that the average age on departure of Senators 
is higher than that of MHRs (20 per cent of Senators, but 
only 10 per cent of MHRs, were at least 70 years old at 
the time they left the Chamber).
In what manner do Federal MPs leave the Parliament 
voluntarily, or as a result of electoral defeat?
157.
TABLE V :14
MPs* REASON FOR LEAVING FEDERAL PARLIAMENT, 1901-1972
(percentages)
Reason Senate House All Members
Died in Office 16.3 12.2 13.5
Retired 28.3 22.7 24.5
Defeated at Election 30.0 37.9 35.3
Lost Preselection 
Defeated after Loss of
1.4 1.4 1.4
Preselection 3.2 4.7 4.2
Still in Parliament 1972 20.5 21.1 20.9
Source: Unpublished statistics compiled by Joan Rydon
based on information in her A Biographical 
Register of the Commonwealth Parliament, 
1901-1972, A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1975.
Table V:14 shows that for Federal MPs collectively, the 
odds on their being 'involuntarily retired' are 2 in 5, 
and that Senators were less likely than MHRs to be defeated 
at an election. More Senate than House Seats were vacated 
on the death or retirement of their incumbents. For members 
of both Houses, the initial gaining of preselection was the 
important hurdle: only about 6 per cent of Federal MPs
were denied re-endorsement by their party. Some 35 per cent 
of sitting Federal Members were rejected by the voters; 
for Senators who filled casual vacancies (see Table V:ll) 
the chances of re-election were much the same (33 per cent 
of casual appointees, and 30 per cent of all Senators, 
failed to regain election).
Conclusions
The most important differences in the composition 
of the two Federal Houses for the period 1901 to 1972 are
therefore:
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(a) fewer Senators than MHRs had tertiary education 
qualifications;
(b) the occupational background of Senators was more 
varied than that of MHRs;
(c) Senators were more likely than MHRs to have been 
party or union employees and/or activists;
(d) Senators spent a greater number of years in Parliament 
(State and Federal) and generally entered the Federal 
Parliament older than MHRs.
These differences provide some evidence for concluding 
that the Senate has contained people of more varied and 
extensive experience (prior to entry to Federal Parliament). 
Only on subjective grounds could one determine whether 
this means that Senators were more mature, and possessed 
greater expertise, than Members of the House of Represent­
atives .
The Party Composition of the Senate, 1901-1972
Having investigated differences between the personnel 
of the two Federal Chambers, it is necessary to examine 
Senators in more detail. This section demonstrates that 
a breakdown of the information presented above in terms 
of the party label of Senators reveals clear distinctions 
between Labor and non-Labor members of the Federal Upper
House.
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TABLE V :15
STATE OF PARTIES IN THE SENATE, 1 9 0 1 - 1 9 7 2 1
Y e a r  o f  ~ 
E l e c t i o n ^ L i b e r a l - C . P . A . L . P . D . L . P . I n d e p e n d e n t
1901 28 8 - -
1903 22 14 - -
1906 21 15 - -
1910 13 23 - -
1913 7 29 - -
191 4 5 31 - -
1917 24 12 - -
1919 35 , 1 - -
1922 24 12 - -
1925 28 8 - -
1928 29 7 - -
1931 26 10 - -
1934 33 3 - -
19 3 7 20 16 - -
19 40 19 17 - -
1943 14 22 - -
19 46 3 33 - -
19 49 26 34 - -
1 9 5 1 32 28 - -
1953 31 29 - -
1955 30 28 2 -
1958 32 26 2 -
1 9 6 1 30 28 1 1
1964 30 27 2 1
1967 28 27 4 1
19 70 26 26 5 3
S o u r c e :  J . R .  O d g e r s : A u s t r a l i a n  S e n a t e  P r a c t i c e , 4 t h
e d . ,  C om m onw eal th  G o v e r n m e n t  P r i n t e r ,  C a n b e r r a ,  
1 9 7 2 ,  p . 6 .
1 .  N o t e  t h a t  t h i s  T a b l e  g i v e s  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  S e n a t e  
e l e c t i o n s ,  a n d  d o e s  n o t  r e f l e c t  c h a n g e s  i n  p a r t y  
c o m p o s i t i o n  r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  t h e  f i l l i n g  o f  c a s u a l  
v a c a n c i e s  o r  s u b s e q u e n t  b y - e l e c t i o n s .
2 .  I t  m u s t  b e  n o t e d  t h a t  ( e x c e p t  a f t e r  a  d o u b l e  d i s ­
s o l u t i o n )  S e n a t o r s  do n o t  t a k e  up  t h e i r  s e a t s  u n t i l  
t h e  f i r s t  d a y  o f  J u l y  f o l l o w i n g  a  S e n a t e  e l e c t i o n .
T a b l e  V :1 5  s t a t e s  t h e  p a r t y  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  
S e n a t e  a f t e r  e a c h  h a l f  ( o r  f u l l ,  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  two 
d o u b l e  d i s s o l u t i o n s )  S e n a t e  e l e c t i o n .  M o s t  S e n a t o r s  h a v e
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belonged to either the Labor Party or to one of the major 
non-Labor Parties (Protectionist-Free Trade, Liberal, 
Nationalist, United Australia and National Country Parties). 
Only approximately 3 per cent of all Senators (and of 
MHRs) between 1901 and 1972 were either Independents, 
or representatives of a minor party (in the Senate, the 
latter were all25 Democratic Labour). For statistical 
purposes, these minor party and Independent Senators are 
excluded from all but one of the following eight Tables.
Major party Senators are divided into four groups: 
Australian Labor Party (ALP), Liberal (Lib. which includes 
members of the two Federal Parties of this name and 
Nationalist and United Australia Party Senators), National 
Country Party (NCP) and Protectionist-Free Trade (P/FT).
For the period 1901-1972, 43 per cent of Senators 
(42 per cent of MHRs) were first elected as Labor Party 
candidates26; 45.6 per cent of Senators (43.6 per cent 
of MHRs) belonged to the Liberal Party or to one of its 
predecessors; and 8.5 per cent of Senators (11.5 per cent 
of MHRs) were members of the National Country Party. The 
remainder (2.9 per cent) were Protectionist-Free Trade 
members in the first decade after federation.
The collective statistics on the socio-economic 
characteristics, prior political and Parliamentary experience,
1 am excluding Senator R. J.D. Turnbull, who successfully stood for
2 Senate elections as an Independent, but for seven months in 1969-70 
was titled Parliamentary leader of the Australia Party.
Meirbers are categorised by their party label on entry; this slightly 
overstates the proportion of ALP MPs, as in 1916, 1931 and 1955 some 
MPs originally elected on ALP endorsement transferred to non-Labor.
26
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and Senate career patterns of members of the Chamber 
between 1901 and 1972 were re-examined in terms of 
Senators' party allegiance. (A tabular presentation 
of the results of this scrutiny of Senators by party 
was deemed unnecessary where significant differences 
between Labor and non-Labor Senators were not apparent 
or where the important differences could best be stated 
verbally).
Birthplace
The only significant difference uncovered is that 
over two-thirds of Protectionist-Free Trade Senators were 
born overseas, as against approximately one-third of 
Senators belonging to the other major parties. However, 
this difference is less a reflection of the party allegiance 
of Senators than of a progressive decrease in the proportion 
of the Australian population born overseas2 7 (this general 
demographic trend is also reflected in the fact that 
members of the most recently formed of the four major 
groups, the National Country Party, were the least likely 
Senators to have been born overseas).
Sex
It is impossible to determine how many women 
unsuccessfully stood for Senate preselection28 by one of 
the major parties. However, the records for all Senate 
elections over the seventy-two year period reveal that
See C. A. Price, "Immigrants'', Chapter 6 of Davies and Enoel, op.cit.
Some evidence is provided on Liberal candidates for preselect ion by 
K. West in Power in the Liberal Party, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1965, 
Chapter 2, and by Enoel in Equality and Authority, op.cit., pp.224-227.
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only 50 per cent of the women Senate candidates had major 
party endorsement. The most common party label of women 
candidates was in fact that of the most persistent (at 
least until the late 1960s) Australian minor political 
party - the Communists - who endorsed about one-third of 
all women Senate candidates'.
The Labor Party was the least likely of the four 
major groups to sponsor women pandidates for the Senate; 
and only one woman Senator - Dame Dorothy Tangney - was 
a member of the ALP. The Liberal and National Country 
Parties sponsored four times as many women Senate candidates 
as Labor (for example, in Senate elections from 1940 to 
1970 there were 27 Liberal, Country or Liberal-Country 
Party endorsed women but only 7 Labor women candidates).
Religion
Table V:16 reveals a clear distinction between 
Labor and non-Labor Senators in terms of religion (the 
same pattern applies amongst MHRs). The non-Labor Parties 
are overwhelmingly Protestant in terms of their Federal 
Parliamentary representatives; whereas almost half of 
Labor Senators were Roman Catholic by religion. The 
Labor Party also included the majority of Freethinkers. 
Amongst the total electorate, the largest single denomin­
ational grouping has always been that of the Church of 
England; and together the Protestant Churches accounted 
for between fifty and sixty per cent of the population;
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the proportion of Roman Catholics has slowly increased 
(partly as a result of the migration programme) to 
approximately one-quarter of the population at the time 
of the 1966 census.29 Therefore the overwhelming pre­
ponderance of Protestants in Federal Parliament is atypical 
of the electorate, and even of the voters who support the 
non-Labor Parties.30 At the same time, it must be noted 
that the representation of Roman Catholics in Labor 
Parliamentary ranks is similar to the proportion of the 
Labor vote which comes from Roman Catholics.31
TABLE V :16
RELIGION OF SENATORS, 1901-1972, BY PARTY (percentages)
Party
Religion ALP Lib. NCP Prot/Ft
Roman Catholic 37.2 7.5 8.3 8.6
Protestant 48.8 83.0 91.7 91.3
Other 0.8 1.9 0.0 0.0
Freethinker 8.3 1.9 0.0 0.0
Unknown 5.0 5.7 0.0 0 .0
Source: Unpublished statistics compiled by Joan Rydon
based on information in her A Biographical 
Register of the Commonwealth Parliament, 
1901-1972, A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1975.
Education
Examination of the level of education achieved 
again reveals variations between Senators of different 
parties. Table V:17 shows that, for the period 1901-1972,
See K.S. Inglis, "Religious Behaviour" in Davies and Encel, op.cit., 
pp.436-437.
30 See Aitkin in Mayer & Nelson, op.cit., pp.308-309.
31 See Aitkin in Mayer & Nelson, op.cit., pp.308-309.
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TABLE V :17
LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF SENATORS, 1 9 0 1 - 1 9 7 2 ,  
( p e r c e n t a g e s )
P a r t y
BY PARTY
L e v e l ALP L i b . NCP P r o t / F t
P r i m a r y 6 2 . 8 2 5 . 5 2 0 . 8 1 3 . 0
S e c o n d a r y 2 0 . 7 3 4 .9 5 8 . 3 3 9 . 1
T e r t i a r y 3 . 3 1 1 . 3 1 2 . 5 4 . 3
G r a d u a t e 7 . 4 1 8 . 9 8 . 3 2 6 . 1
Unknown 5 . 8 9 . 4 0 . 0 1 7 . 4
S o u r c e : U n p u b l i s h e d s t a t i s t i c s c o m p i l e d b y  J o a n  Rydon
b a s e d  o n  i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  h e r  A B i o g r a p h i c a l  
R e g i s t e r  o f  t h e  Com m onw eal th  P a r l i a m e n t , 
1 9 0 1 - 1 9 7 2 ,  A .N .U .  P r e s s ,  C a n b e r r a ,  1 9 7 5 .
TABLE V : 18
NUMBER OF SENATORS WITH DEGREES, BY PARTY
P a r t y
Y e a r ALP Lib /N C P D L P / O t h e r T o t a l
1922 — 1 — 1
1940 - 1 - 1
19 49 2 4 - 6
1955 2 5 2 9
1 9 6 1 6 5 2 13
1966 6 4 2 12
1971 3 7 4 14
S o u r c e s : D. A i t k i n ,  "No M. A. , No M. P . ? " , N a t i o n ,
N o . 2 1 1 ,  28 J a n u a r y  1 9 6 7 ,  p p . 4 - 5 ;  
C om m onw eal th  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  H andbook  1 9 7 1 , 
C om m onw eal th  G o v e r n m e n t  P r i n t e r ,  C a n b e r r a ,  
1 9 7 1 .
63 p e r  c e n t  o f  L a b o r  S e n a t o r s  a s  a g a i n s t  l e s s  t h a n  25 
p e r  c e n t  o f  n o n - L a b o r  S e n a t o r s  h a d  c o m p l e t e d  o n l y  p r i m a r y  
s c h o o l .  T a b l e s  V :1 7  a n d  V : 1 8  t o g e t h e r  r e v e a l  t h a t  f a r  
m ore  n o n - L a b o r  t h a n  L a b o r  S e n a t o r s  e m b a r k e d  o n  t e r t i a r y  
e d u c a t i o n  a n d  g a i n e d  d e g r e e s .  The f i g u r e s  f o r  P r o t e c t i o n i s t  
F r e e  T r a d e  S e n a t o r s  i n  T a b l e  V :1 7  a r e  e s p e c i a l l y  i n t e r e s t i n g  
g i v e n  t h e  t h e n  l e v e l  o f  e d u c a t i o n a l  a c h i e v e m e n t  o f  t h e  
g e n e r a l  p o p u l a t i o n ,  t h o s e  S e n a t o r s  w e r e  v e r y  much an
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educated elite. Table V:18 demonstrates that minor party 
and Independent Senators were also more highly educated 
than the average major party Senator.
Table V:19 in part reflects the religious differences 
between Labor and non-Labor Senators. Over half of ALP
TABLE V :19
TYPE OF SCHOOL ATTENDED BY SENATORS, 1901-1972, BY PARTY
(percentages)
Party
School ALP Lib. NCP Prot/Ft
Government 51.2 30.2 33.3 0.0
Roman Catholic 17.4 4.7 8.3 0.0
Other Private 1.7 40.6 50.0 34.8
Other* 14 .9 14 .2 8.3 56.5
Unknown 14.9 10.4 0.0 8.7
* Outside Australia, or private tuition.
Source: Unpublished statistics compiled by Joan Rydon
based on information in her A Biographical 
Register of the Commonwealth Parliament, 
1901-1972, A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1975.
Senators attended government schools, and one-sixth Roman 
Catholic private schools. In contrast, only about one- 
third of non-Labor Senators went to government schools, 
and over forty per cent attended private, non-Roman 
Catholic schools.
Prior occupation
Table V:20 reveals a clear status distinction in 
the prior occupations of Labor and of non-Labor Senators.
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TABLE V :20
PRIOR OCCUPATION OF SENATORS, 1901-1972, BY PARTY
(percentages)
Party
Occupation* ALP Lib. NCP Prot/Ft
Primary Producer 7.4 28.3 70.8 4.3
Lawye r 5.8 20.8 0.0 30.4
Teacher, Author, Journalist 3. 3 1.9 4.2 3.0
Other Professional 0.8 3.8 0.0 4.3
Businessman 1.7 13.2 12.5 31.7
Agent, Retailer 7.4 5.7 12.5 8.7
Accountant, Secretary . 1.7 8.5 0.0 0.0
Clerk, Administrator 9.1 1.9 0.0 0.0
Engineer, Builder, Contractor 1.7 3.8 0.0 21. 7
Shearer, Miner 16.5 3.8 0.0 4.3
Party, Union Official 9.9 0.9 0.0 4.3
Unskilled Worker 34.7 7.5 0.9 0.0
* Only one entry per Senator, of the major occupation 
before entry.
Source: Unpublished statistics compiled by Joan Rydon
based on information in her A Biographical 
Register of the Commonwealth Parliament, 
1901-19 72, A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1975 .
Over one-third of Labor, but only 7 per cent of non-Labor 
Senators were skilled or unskilled workers before entry 
to the Chamber. Nearly every Senator who had held a 
clerical/administrative position, including party and 
union officials in this group, was Labor. In those 
occupations which are accorded high status, non-Labor 
Senators predominated; for example, business, accountancy 
and engineering; and four-fifths of all lawyers were non- 
Labor Senators. Over 70 per cent of primary producers 
were Country Party Senators; and the remainder were mostly 
Liberals (the Labor Senators classified as primary producers 
were, with two exceptions, members who had retired by 
the end of the second decade after federation).
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Protectionist-Free Trade Senators, an elite in educational 
terms, were also disproportionately professionals by 
occupation; the interesting contrast between them and 
other non-Labor Senators is the small number of primary 
producers (more than compensated for by the number of 
businessmen).
The overall conclusion to be drawn from Table V:20 
is that Labor Senators, like Labor voters32, were more 
likely to have occupied manual positions before entry to 
the Chamber, whilst non-Labor Senators (and especially 
the early ones) generally held professional positions.
Prior politically relevant experience
It has already been noted that few non-Labor 
Senators had been employed as party or union officers 
prior to their entry to the Senate. Table V:21 reveals 
that such positions were rarely part of the total prior 
employment experience of non-Labor Senators, whereas 
approximately 43 per cent of Labor Senators had at some 
time filled such positions. Similarly, two thirds of 
Labor Senators, but only about one-sixth of non-Labor 
Senators, had held official positions in unions or 
professional associations. It must be noted, however, 
that the more striking differences are between Liberals 
and other Members: over two-thirds of Labor and of
National Country Party Senators had been members of some
32 See ibid, p.305.
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TABLE V :21
PRIOR POLITICALLY RELEVANT EXPERIENCE OF SENATORS, 
1901-1972, BY PARTY (percentages)
Party
Position* ALP Lib. NCP Prot/Ft
Elected Party Officer 
Union/employees' Organisation
6 8.6 58.5 70.8 21. 7
Member 78.5 9.5 4.2 8.7
Farmers' Association Member 
Businessmens' Association
3.3 13.2 62.5 4.3
Member
Professional Association
0.8 5.7 0.0 13.0
Member
Union/employees'
8.3 32.0 0.0 34.8
Organisation Official 
Professional Association
65.3 9.4 4.2 2.0
Official 0.8 6.6 0.0 0.0
Union Employee 32.2 2.8 4.2 0.0
Party Employee 12.4 2.8 4.2 0.0
* Multiple entries for Senators.
Source: Unpublished statistics compiled by Joan Rydon
based on information in her A Biographical 
Register of the Commonwealth Parliament, 
I90r-1972 , A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 19 75 .
sectional organisation or association, and over two-thirds 
had been elected party officers. Liberals were less likely 
to be 'joiners' and party activists.
Given the embryo nature of party organisation in the 
late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries, it is no 
wonder that Protectionist-Free Trade Senators were far 
less likely to have held party office. The high proportion 
of these early Senators who had been members of professional 
associations (especially business associations) is a 
direct reflection of the prior occupations of these
Senators.
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G e n e r a l  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  e x p e r i e n c e
An e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  S e n a t o r s '  p r i o r  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  
e x p e r i e n c e  r e v e a l e d  n o  s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t i s a n  d i f f e r e n c e s .
S e n a t e  c a r e e r
R e f e r e n c e  b a c k  t o  T a b le  V : l l  r e v e a l s  t h a t  o n l y  
o n e - t h i r d  o f  t h e  S e n a t o r s  who e n t e r e d  t h e  C ham ber b y  
f i l l i n g  a  c a s u a l  v a c a n c y  w e re  'L a b o r .  T h i s  i s  l a r g e l y  
a  r e f l e c t i o n  o f  c h a n c e ;  a l t h o u g h  i f  a l l  new a p p o i n t e e s  
h a d  b e e n  o f  t h e  sam e p a r t y  a s  t h a t  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  
i n c u m b e n t ,  L a b o r  c o u l d  h a v e  f i l l e d  an  a d d i t i o n a l  t h r e e  
v a c a n c i e s . 3 3
In  t e r m s  o f  a g e  on e n t r y  t o  t h e  S e n a t e ,  T a b l e  V :2 2  
sh o w s  t h a t  few  L i b e r a l  S e n a t o r s  j o i n e d  u n d e r  t h e  a g e  o f  
4 0 ;  a n d  t h a t  t h e  n o n - L a b o r  P a r t i e s  c o l l e c t i v e l y  w e r e  
m ore  l i k e l y  t o  s e l e c t  c a n d i d a t e s  a g e d  o v e r  50 a t  t h e  
t i m e  o f  e n t r y  ( e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  N a t i o n a l  C o u n t r y  P a r t y ,  
a p p r o x i m a t e l y  21 p e r  c e n t  o f  w h o se  S e n a t o r s  e n t e r e d  
a f t e r  a g e  6 0 ) .
C o m p a r a b le  n u m b e r s  o f  L a b o r  a n d  o f  n o n - L a b o r  
S e n a t o r s  h a d  l e s s  t h a n  t e n  y e a r s '  t e n u r e  i n  t h e  C h a m b e r .
On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  15 p e r  c e n t  o f  L a b o r ,  a s  a g a i n s t  o n l y  
6 p e r  c e n t  o f  L i b e r a l  a n d  4 p e r  c e n t  o f  N a t i o n a l  C o u n t r y
33 Cn 8 occas io n s  non-Labor appo in tees  f i l l e d  Labor v a ca n c ie s ;  on 
5 occas io n s  Labor c an d id a te s  f i l l e d  non-Labor v a can c ie s ;  in  th e  
rem ain ing  cases  th e  ap p o in tee  was o f  th e  same p a r ty  as the  
p rev io u s  incum bent. See Conmonwealth P arl iam en ta ry  Handbook 1971,
17th e d . ,  Conmonwealth Government P r i n t e r ,  Canberra, 1971, p p .663-668.
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TABLE V :22
SENATORS' AGE ON ENTRY TO AND DEPARTURE FROM THE SENATE,
1901-1972 , BY PARTY (percentages)
On Entry On Departure
Age ALP Lib . NCP Prot/Ft ALP Lib. NCP Prot/Ft
20-29 1.7 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0
30-39 19.0 8.5 20.8 13.0 1.7 0.9 0.0 13.0
40-49 38.0 39.6 16.7 8.7 14 .0 8.5 8.3 8.7
50-59 32.2 35.8 41.7 43.5 13.2 21.7 20.8 17.4
60-69 8.3 12.3 16.7 26.1 28.9 28.3 25.0 47.8
70 + 0.8 0.9 4.2 8.7 20.7 20.8 25 .0 13.0
Still in Senate 1972 21.5 18.9 20.8 0.0
Source: Unpublished statistics compiled by Joan Rydon
based on information in her A Biographical 
Register of the Commonwealth Parliament, 
1901-19 72 , A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1975 .
Party Senators, had more than 20 years' service in the 
Senate. Thus, although proportionately more Labor 
Senators entered the Chamber in their thirties and 
forties, their average longer tenure meant that there 
were no significant differences between the average age 
on departure from the Senate of Labor and non-Labor 
members (Table V:22).
Protectionist-Free Trade Senators were mostly in their 
fifties and sixties on entry; their tenure was short 
(78 per cent served only one term, and none served more 
than two terms); hence only a small number were still 
serving at the age of 70.
Security of tenure was demonstrably greater for 
National Country Party Senators than for those of other 
parties: none of these Senators lost their preselection;
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TABLE V:23
SENATORS' REASON FOR LEAVING THE SENATE, 1901-1972, 
BY PARTY (percentages)
Party
Reason ALP Lib. NCP Prot/Ft
Died in Office 19.0 12.3 33.3 4.3
Retired 24 .0 30.2 29.2 52.2
Defeated at Election 29.8 33.0 16.7 39.1
Lost Preselection 
Defeated after Loss of
0.8 2.8 0.0 0.0
Preselection 5.0 1.9 0.0 4.3
Still in Senate 1972 21.5 19.8 20.8 0.0
Source: Unpublished statistics compiled by Joan Rydon
based on information in her A Biographical 
Register of the Commonwealth Parliament, 
1901-1972, A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1975.
a very high proportion (one-third) died in office; and 
only 17 per cent left the Senate because of election 
defeat. Table V:23 also shows that the short tenure of 
Protectionist-Free Trade Senators is partly a reflection 
of a high election casualty rate - 39 per cent. Labor 
Senators were the most likely to lose preselection; but 
they were less likely to be defeated in an election than 
Liberal Senators.
Conclusions
A variety of conclusions can be drawn from the 
material presented in this section. Firstly, there were 
some variations amongst the three groups of non-Labor 
Senators:
(a) Protectionist-Free Trade Senators differed from later 
Members in terms of birthplace, education, prior 
occupation and overall Parliamentary experience.
172.
(a) continued
These differences reveal both changes in the general 
socio-economic characteristics of the Australian 
population and a change in the type of person 
attracted to a Federal Parliamentary career during 
the Twentieth Century;
(b) National Country Party Senators differed from Liberals
in that, of the formerr fewer were born outside 
Australia, a smaller proportion had a tertiary 
education, almost all were in rurally associated 
occupations and their Senate career was less likely 
to be terminated involuntarily.
Secondly, Labor Senators differed from the three non-Labor 
groups:
(c) in terms of basic socio-economic characteristics
(religion, type and extent of education, and prior 
occupation); the general conclusion is that Labor 
Senators completed a lower level of education and 
held lower status occupations before entry to the 
Chamber;
(d) Labor Senators were, however, more active in extra-
parliamentary politics prior to their election; 
and, because of their tendency to enter the Chamber 
younger and to have a longer tenure, were likely 
to be the most experienced Senators. In other 
words, more Labor Senators pursued a career in 
politics, both within and outside the Parliament.
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Members Who Served in Both Federal Houses
As mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter, there 
were 25 Senators who at some time were members of the House 
of Representatives. Table V:24 lists their names and shows 
the periods and sequence of their Federal Parliamentary career.
TABLE V :24
FEDERAL MPs WHO HAVE SERVED IN BOTH FEDERAL HOUSES
Abbott, P.P. (NSW-CP)
Badman, A.O. (SA-CP)
Best, R.W. (Vic.-Prot)
Dein, A.K. (NSW-UAP)
Duncan-Hughes, J.G. (SA-UAP)
Fairbairn, G. (Vic.-Nat.) 
Fitzgerald, J.F. (NSW-ALP) 
Gibson, W.G. (Vic.-CP)
Gorton, J.G. (Vic.-Lib)
Guy, J.A. (Tas.-Lib)
Hannan, J.F. (Vic.-ALP)
Higgs, W.G. (Qld-ALP)
Jessop, D.S. (SA-Lib)
Keane, R.V» (Vic.-ALP)
Leckie, J.W. (Vic .-UAP/Lib) 
McBride, P.A.M. (SA-UAP)
McColl, J.H. (Vic.-Anti Soc.) 
Marwick, T.W (WA-CP) 
Massy-Greene, W. (NSW-Nat.) 
O'Keefe, D.J. (Tas.-ALP)
Pratten, H.E. (NSW-Nat.) 
Rankin, G.J. (Vic.-CP)
Story, W.H. (SA-ALP)
Thomas, J. (NSW-Nat.)
Wilson, K.C. (SA-Lib)
Period in 
Senate
Period in 
in H. of R. Sequence
1925-29 1913-19 H, S
1932-37 1937-43 S H
1901-10 1910-22 S —^ H
1935-41 1931-34 H — S
1931-38 1922-28;
1940-43
H, S, H
1917-23 1906-13 H, S
1962- 1949-55 H, S
1935-47 1918-29; 
1931-34
H— * S
1950-68 1968- S H
1950-56 1929-34;
1940-46
H, S
1924-25 1913-17 H, S
1901-06 1910-22 S, H
1971- 1966-69 H, S
1938-46 1929-31 H, S
1935-47 1917-19 H, S
1937-44 1931-37;
1946-58
H — ? S; H
1907-14 1901-06 H S
1936-37 1940-43 S, H
1923-38 1910-22 H —  ^S
1901-06;
1910-20
1922-25 S, H
1917-21 1921-28 S— > H
1950-56 1937-48 H — ) S
1904-17 1917-22 S—  ^H
1917-23;
1925-29
1901-17 H — f S
1938-44 1949-54;
1955-66
S, H
Source: Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook 1971,
Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra, 1971
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Sixteen of the 25 served in the House of Representatives 
before entering the Senate; but for 9 of these the move 
to the Senate came after losing their House seat - so 
there is little sign of the American pattern of graduating 
to the Senate after experience in the Lower House. Moreover 
13 of the 25 stood for the other House after being defeated 
in elections for the House in which they had first served - 
evidence of a persistent desire to continue a Federal 
Parliamentary career in whichever House an opportunity arose
Only 6 of the 25 were Labor Senators; equal numbers 
of these transferred from the Senate to the House, and from 
the House to the Senate. In terms of socio-economic 
characteristics, the 25 Senators were generally typical 
of their particular party colleagues.
Four of these 25 Senators entered the Chamber as 
appointees to casual vacancies; three had already served 
in the House (and one of these later returned to the House); 
only one was a Labor man.
The average tenure of these 25 Senators was fifteen 
and a half years (3 were still serving in 1972) for service 
in both Houses, and 7 years' service in the Senate alone.
The overall conclusion is that there are no
significant differences between these Senators and the 
other 283 who served only in the Federal Upper House.
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Variations in Senate Personnel Over Time
The figures presented so far in this Chapter give 
a collective view of Senate personnel, which could hide 
variations in the type of Senators serving at different 
points of time. In the introduction to the Chapter it 
was noted that observers have remarked on what they saw 
to be a varying calibre of Senators in different periods. 
Were these observations accurate? Tables V:25-29 provide 
information on which to assess variations in the composition 
of the Senate over time. Five years were selected: 1901
(36 members elected to the First Parliament); 1914 (36
members elected in the double dissolution election of 
September 1914); 1931 (a half Senate election in December
1931 added 18 Senators to the 18 whose term had not yet 
expired); 1951 (an enlarged Senate of 60 members elected 
in the double dissolution election of April 1951); and 
1970 (a half Senate election in November 1970 added 32 
Senators to the 28 whose term had not yet expired) .
Birthplace 3 4
The number of Senators born overseas decreased 
markedly betwen 1901 and 1914, and has continued to 
decrease ever since. In June 1970 only 4 of the serving 
Senators had been born outside Australia; 70 per cent 
of Protectionist-Free Trade members of the first two 
Parliaments had, on the other hand, been born overseas.
34 Tabular presentation of information on birthplace, sex and 
religion of Senators in the selected years was deemed unnecessary.
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Sex
Table V:2 demonstrated a slow increase over time 
in the number of women candidates for the Senate. This 
may eventually be reflected in an increase in the number 
of women Senators (in June 1970 there were 3 women in 
the Chamber).
Religion
A comparison of the religion of Senators in the 
different periods revealed no significant variations 
over time.
Education
Table V:25 presents the level of education of 
Senators at the selected time periods. This Table firstly 
reveals the phenomenon noted earlier about the elitism 
of early Senators. The educational level of those elected 
to the Senate in 1901 was far higher than that of those 
elected in 1914, and was only partly matched by that of 
the 1931 Senators. Secondly, the Table shows that between 
1914 and 1970 there was a progressive reduction in the 
proportion of Senators with only a primary level of 
education, and an increase in the numbers who were 
graduates of tertiary institutions. This pattern parallels 
an increase in the level of education completed by the 
population generally, although Senators are on average, 
at any point, far better educated than the rest of the 
population.
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TABLE V :25
LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF SENATORS OVER TIME 
(percentages)
1901 1914 1931 1951 1970
Primary IT7T 55.6 22 .2 23.3 0.0
Secondary 16.7 8.3 16.7 45.0 55.0
Tertiary 13.9 2.8 2.8 6.7 13.0
Graduate 11.1 2.8 13.9 15.0 23.3
Other* 33.3 27.8 22.2 6.7 0.0
Unknown 13.9 2.8 22.2 3.3 8.3
* Overseas or private tuition •
Sources: Unpublished statistics compiled by Joan RydonA Biographical Register of the Commonwealth
Parliament, 1901-1972, A . N .U. Press, Canberra
1975; Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbooks,
1st to 17th editions
Prior occupation
It is hard to discern many progressive changes in 
the occupational stratification of Senators from the 
material presented in Table V:26. Certainly, the proportion 
of skilled and unskilled workers has decreased from 1914; 
and the number of clerks and administrators has increased 
over this period. These changes do correspond with general 
shifts in the occupational stratification of the Australian 
workforce during the Twentieth Century. On the other hand, 
in the professional category (grouping together lawyers, 
teachers/authors/journalists, accountants/secretaries and 
other professionals) the proportion has declined from 
approximately 31 per cent in 1914 to 25 per cent in 1970. 
This is dissimilar to a slow, but continuing, increase in 
the professional component of the total workforce . In
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TABLE V :26
PRIOR OCCUPATION OF SENATORS OVER TIME 
(percentages)
Occupation* 1901 1914 1931 1951 1970
Primary Producer 8.3 2.8 30.6 30.0 21.7
Lawyer 33.3 5.6 13.9 11.7 15.0
Teacher, Author, Journalist 13.9 25.0 5.6 8.3 1.7
Other Professional 2.8 0.0 8.3 1.7 5.0
Businessman 8.3 0.0 11.1 5.0 1.7
Agent, Retailer 2.8 8.3 0 .0 8.3 10.0
Accountant, Secretary 0.0 0.0 0 .0 5.0 3.3
Clerk, Administrator 
Engineer, Builder,
2.8 2.8 2.8 6.7 13.3
Contractor
Shearer, Miner, Skilled
11.1 00•CN 2.8 3.3 3.3
Worker 8.3 41.7 16.7 5.0 6.7
Party, Union Official 8.3 5.6 8.3 11.7 15 .0
Unskilled Worker 0 .0 5.6 0.0 1.7 0 .0
Other 0.0 0.0 0 .0 1.7 3.3
* Only one listing per Senator
Sources: Unpublished statistics compiled by Joan Rydon:
-• A Biographical
Register of the Commonwealth Parliament,
1901-19 72 , A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1975 ; 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbooks, 1st 
tö 17th editions.
other occupational categories, (for example, primary 
producer, businessman, agent/retailer) the proportions 
have varied from period to period. Thus the only link 
between change in the occupational stratification of the 
workforce and the prior occupation of Senators in 
particular periods is a similar decrease in blue collar 
and an increase in white collar employees.
Table V:26 again reflects the eliteness of the 
first Senators.
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Other political and Parliamentary experience
Table V:27 combines information on the political 
and Parliamentary experience of Senators in the five 
selected years. The significant changes over time are:
TABLE V:27
OTHER POLITICAL EXPERIENCE OF SENATORS OVER TIME
(percentages)
Position* 1901 1914 1931 1951 19 70
Local Government 25.0 19.4 11.1 30.0 15.0
State Parliament 75.0 58.3 41.7 16.7 13.3
House of Representatives 0.0 0 .0 2.8 5.0 3.3
Party Employee 0.0 0 .0 2.8 0.0 13.3
Union Employee 11.1 11.1 16.7 6.7 11.7
* Multiple entries for Senators; experience before
during and after Senate term counted.
Sources: Unpublished statistics compiled by Joan Rydon:
A Biographical
Register of the Commonwealth Parliament, 
1901-1972, A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 19 75; 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbooks, 1st 
to 17 th editions.
the number of Senators with experience at the local 
government level, in State Parliament and/or in the House 
of Representatives, seems to be progressively decreasing; 
the number who have held paid party positions is perhaps 
increasing; and the number of Senators who have been 
union employees has been reasonably constant over time.
Senate career
Table V:28 implies that the average on entry 
of Senators has generally been increasing over time. The 
First Senate had the highest proportion of Senators aged
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TABLE V :2 8
AGE ON ENTRY OF SENATORS OVER TIME (percentages)
Age 1901 1914 1931 1951 19 70
20-29 5 .6 2.8 2.8 0.0 0 .0
30-39 25.0 27.8 16.7 18.3 15.0
40-49 13.9 38.9 44.4 41.7 46.7
50-59 33 .3 27.8 30.6 33.3 33.3
60-69 16.7 2.8 5.6 5.0 5 .0
70 + 5.6 0.0 0.0 1.7 0 .0
Sources: Unpublished statistics compiled by Joan Rydon:
A Biographical
Register of the Commonwealth Parliament, 
1901-1972, A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 19 75 ; 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbooks, 1st 
to 1/th editions.
under 30; yet this Senate also had the highest proportion 
of Senators aged 60 or over. Thus it is more correct to 
note that, from 1901, the proportion of Senators entering 
in their forties and fifties has progressively increased 
(from 47 to 80 per cent).
The average age of members of the Senate in the 
selected years has also increased: it was 49 years in
1901, 49 years 11 months in 1914, 55 years 1 month in 1931, 
54 years 4 months in 1951, and 55 years 8 months in 1970.
The tenure of Senators prior to the selected election 
dates is presented in Table V:29. (This Table necessarily 
omits members of the First Senate, of whom it has previously 
been stated that three-quarters had prior Colonial parlia­
mentary experience. For purposes of comparison with later 
Senators, the average Colonial tenure of these Senators 
was not extensive: 45 per cent served for ten years or
less before entering the Senate).
181.
TABLE V : 29
PRIOR SENATE TENURE OF SENATORS OVER TIME 
(percentages)
No. of Years 1914 1931 1951 19 70
0 11.1 8.3 13.3 20.0
1- 5 44.4 38.9 51.7 21.7
6-10 11.1 22.2 15.0 30.0
11-15 33.3 19.4 15 .0 16.7
16-20 0.0 5.6 3.3 3.3
21-25 0.0 2.8 1.7 8.3
26 + 0.0 2.8 0.0 0.0
Sources: Unpublished statistics compiled by Joan Rydon:
A Biographical
Register of the Commonwealth Parliament, 
1901-1972, A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1975; 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbooks, 1st 
to 17th editions.
Variations in the average tenure of Senators between 
1914 and 1970 in part reflect the nature of the particular 
election year. For example, 1914 and 1951 were double 
dissolution elections, which partly explains the high 
proportion of Senators who had not to that date served 
a full six year term (56 and 65 per cent respectively, 
compared with 47 per cent of Senators in 1931 and 41 per 
cent in 19 70) .
Conclusions
This Section has demonstrated some progressive 
changes in Senate composition over time: in particular,
an increase in the level of education of Senators, a 
decrease in the proportion of former manual employees 
and a decrease in Senators' prior Parliamentary experience. 
The average age of Senators has (perhaps surprisingly) 
increased over the seventy-two years.
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There appear to be more striking differences in 
the personnel of the Senate in terms of party allegiance 
than from a chronological viewpoint. Party composition 
is also an explanation for what seems to be a retrogressive 
Senate membership in 1914 as against 1901 (especially 
in terms of the educational level and prior occupation 
of Senators): in that double dissolution election, 31
of the 36 members returned were Labor.35
Senators in the Twenty-Sixth and Twenty-Seventh Parliaments
The material presented so far in this Chapter is 
useful in providing an overview of the collective member­
ship of the Senate over an extensive period. It is, however, 
only a skeletal picture of Senate personnel. This final 
section will add flesh to the bare bones by providing a 
more detailed consideration of a particular group of 
Senators who were serving between 1969 and 1971.
Three general aspects are covered: Senators' reasons
for and method of entry to the Chamber; their views on 
membership and responsibilities of the two Federal Houses; 
and the degree to which they felt their period in the 
Chamber was fulfilling.
In the other selected years, the conposition of the Chairber as a 
result of the election was: 1901 - 8 Labor and 28 non-Labor;
1931 - 10 Labor and 26 non-Labor; 1951 - 28 labor and 32 non-Labor; 
1970 - 26 each for Labor and ncn-Iabor, 5 Democratic Labor and 
3 Independents.
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The com m ents r e p r o d u c e d  and a n a ly s e d  w ere  e l i c i t e d  
by a w r i t t e n  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  d i s t r i b u t e d  t o  a l l  m em bers o f  
th e  S e n a te  d u r in g  t h e  T w e n ty -S ix th  P a r l ia m e n t ,  and by  
i n t e n s i v e  i n t e r v i e w s  w it h  S e n a t o r s  from  b o th  th e  T w en ty -  
S ix t h  and T w e n ty -S e v e n th  P a r l ia m e n t s .  A t o t a l  o f  48 
S e n a t o r s  r e sp o n d e d  t o  e i t h e r  o r  b o th  a p p r o a c h e s ,  y i e l d i n g  
41 c o m p le te d  q u e s t i o n n a i r e s  and 46 i n t e r v i e w s . 36
R e lu c t a n t  and a c c i d e n t a l  S e n a t o r s
In  th e  Q u e s t io n n a ir e  S e n a to r s  w ere  a s k e d :
Q u e s t io n  3 ( A ) : What in f l u e n c e d  y o u  t o  f i r s t
run f o r  e l e c t i o n ?
S e n a t o r s  u n f o r t u n a t e l y  g e n e r a l l y  o n ly  s e l e c t e d  on e  o f  th e  
s u g g e s t e d  a n sw er s  (a  f la w  i n  th e  Q u e s t io n n a ir e  d e s i g n ) .
The v a s t  m a j o r i t y  (35 o f  th e  48 a n sw e r s )  n o t e d  t h a t  'a n  
i n t e r e s t  in  p o l i t i c s '  w as t h e  m o t iv a t io n ;  8 S e n a t o r s  
r e f e r r e d  t o  th e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  o t h e r  members o f  p a r l ia m e n t  
and 3 t o  th e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  p a r ty  o f f i c i a l s ;  2 S e n a t o r s  
g a v e  a p u r p o r t e d ly  a l t r u i s t i c  a n sw er  ( f o r  e x a m p le , "A 
d e s i r e  t o  s e r v e  th e  co m m u n ity " ); and o n e  S e n a to r  r e f e r r e d  
t o  h i s  fa m ily  a s  th e  i n f l u e n c e  on h i s  d e c i s i o n  t o  s t a n d  
f o r  p a r l ia m e n t .
The q u estion n aire  and in terv iew  schedules may be found in  Appendix I . 
This research was o r ig in a l ly  undertaken for  the purpose o f  t e s t in g  
th e a p p lic a b il ity  to  A ustralian  Senators o f  the model o f  le g is la to r s '  
r o le  conceptions developed by J.C . Wahlke e t  a l  in  th e ir  The 
l e g i s la t iv e  System: E xplorations in  L e g is la t iv e  Behavior, John Wiley
& Sons, New York, 1962. This undertaking, w h ils t  h ig h ly  time con­
suming, proved to  be o f  lim ite d  value in  terms o f  provioilng su ita b le  
ca teg o r iza tio n  o f ,  l e t  a l n e  exp lanation  fo r , Senators' behaviour.
A summary o f  the con clu sion s reached i s  included  in  Appendix II .
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In interviews and in informal conservations, however, 
most Senators listed a variety of factors which influenced 
their original decision to stand for parliament. An interest 
in politics would surely be a necessary prerequisite. More­
over, the vast majority of Senators had had as a central 
goal the achievement of a seat in parliament. There were, 
however, varying methods which they pursued in order to 
realise this aim and varying triggers which led them to 
seek and gain a position in the Senate.
A strong motivation towards politics is exemplified
in the following comments:
"This interest has persisted since my 
days at school."
"I was one of twelve kids being brought 
up during the depression so I naturally 
became very interested in politics. I 
was a branch secretary at 22, secretary 
of my union at 30 and then State A.L.P. 
Secretary. I was then on the Federal 
Executive for many years."
"I have been a member of the A.L.P. since 
I was a boy. I even had Hansard sent 
to me on the battlefront during World 
War I. I have attended every Victorian 
A.L.P. Conference bar one since 1920."
"My mother was very keen on public affairs 
and politics, and I became a voluntary 
party worker before I could vote. I then 
joined a party branch and soon became 
chairman."
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For several Senators their interest in politics was sharpened 
because a relative was actively involved in politics:
"You could say I was born into politics.
My father was a Tasmanian M.H.A. from 
1922-1946. My elder brother then took 
over the seat. I became a party organiser 
in 1945 and later full-time secretary to 
the Leader of the Opposition (State)."
"My father's cousin was in State politics.
He became Attorney-General, was then sent 
to the U.K. as Agent-General, and later 
entered British politics. This sparked 
my interest as a child. I joined the 
party leaving school and was quite an 
active member."
All except two of the Senators had had a long-standing 
involvement in the party machine and/or union affairs. They
3 7began by distributing 'how to vote' tickets in their teens, 
then became branch secretaries and delegates to state 
conferences in their twenties; later, Labor men held the 
post of State Secretary, sat on the party Executive, or worked 
within the A.C.T.U. or the A.W.U.; a large proportion of non- 
Labor Senators had been State President of their party. Six 
Senators had worked as secretary or personal assistant to a 
political leader, and cited this as an added impetus to their 
developing a desire to be an MP (and a positive aid in 
achievement of this aim).
Many gained experience by contesting State elections, and 
10 Senators had had prior parliamentary experience. Some of 
these moved on to the Senate after their term in State politics
3 7 Or even earlier; for example, "I have taken an active interest in 
politics since I handed out 'how to vote’ cards at the age of 9."
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was unexpectedly cut short; others made a conscious decision 
to move up to the broader arena of national politics. Other 
Senators had previously refused offers of seats in either 
State Parliament or the House of Representatives - because 
it was then unsuitable (children very young, job or farm 
requiring their full attention) or because they were more 
interested in the Federal rather than the State arena.
For example:
"I was interested in politics from when 
I first started working at age 14. I 
later became interested in a political 
career and stood unsuccessfully for a 
State seat. I only did this for 
experience because I preferred the 
federal focus."
"My original involvement in local govern­
ment opened up the idea of serving in 
parliament. I joined the party, became 
president of the branch and then chairman 
of the district party committee. I had 
my eyes on a State seat but the sitting 
member was refusing to budge. After 
visiting legislatures in the United 
Kingdom and the United States I then 
enlarged my interest to federal rather 
than State issues."
"I had initial overtures about State 
parliament when I was in my thirties 
but I felt my family was too young."
"I was asked to nominate for a seat before 
my marriage, but refused. Then later I 
was offered a State seat but my family 
was young and the salary was very low 
because it was the depression so it was 
financially impossible."
"I was asked to nominate for a State seat 
and lost by two postal votes. I was then 
given the Senate nomination, for which I 
am very glad as the questions I'm interested 
in are federal, not state matters."
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Other parliamentarians or party officials were 
instrumental in urging several Senators to seek pre­
selection. For example:
"I was influenced to stand for Senate 
selection by the late Senator Sam Cohen 
and other members."
"I had been quite happy maintaining my 
interest in the organisational side of 
the party until the vacancy arose and 
other party members suggested I should 
try for it."
For some non-Labor Senators their desire to gain a 
parliamentary seat was activated by a particular political 
event or issue during a Labor administration. For example:
"I became very troubled about Communist 
activity at Port Kembla in the late 
1940s."
"I found myself forced into politics by 
the actions of the first Labor govern­
ment in South Australia for 27 years."
"I was a Shire Councillor but not a 
member of a party until Chifley's 
proposal for bank nationalisation 
moved me to try for endorsement."
A few Senators can be termed reluctants in that a 
parliamentary career was their secondary aim. For example, 
one Labor Senator remarked: "I had two ambitions in life -
to be a member of the State (or Federal) Industrial Commission 
or a Senator." At 56 he gained a Senate seat after failing 
to achieve his alternative (and preferred) aim. For other 
A.L.P. members their original ambition of working in the party 
machine was later replaced by the desire for a parliamentary 
position. For example, two Western Australian Labor Senators 
mentioned that the party was a 'closed shop' in their State
188.
due to boss Joe Chamberlain; Federal Parliament thus seemed 
to provide their best opportunity for a full time political 
career.
Other reluctants denied that they had had any intention 
of seeking a parliamentary career until they were strenuously 
persuaded to do so. For example, a Country Party Senator 
modestly commented:
"Having had a fairly wide experience 
(federal level) in primary industry 
matters, apparently they considered 
I had something to contribute."
A former Liberal Party State Secretary said:
"I never wanted to enter parliamentary 
politics. I believe that the 
administration of a political party 
is far more important than being an 
MP or even a Minister. I came to 
the Senate extremely reluctantly 
on ...'s retirement."
Some stated that they only accepted nomination when no 
other suitable candidate could be found. For example:
"I didn't want to come to the Senate 
because I already had a safe Legis­
lative Council seat. The party 
approached me because I was from the 
x North-west coast of Tasmania and they
needed a candidate from there to 
balance the ticket. My family thought 
I was a renegade to leave State politics."
(father and brother both MLA's).
"I only entered to keep out an unsuitable 
candidate after having unsuccessfully 
tried to get someone else suitable to 
nominate."
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One young Liberal Senator, having already rejected a Legis­
lative Council offer, debated for four months before agreeing 
to accept the Senate nomination; having then won it, he spent 
an agonizing eight months until he was due in Canberra, during 
which he was again unsure as to whether he‘d made the right 
decision. (Having been in the Senate for a few years he now 
has no regrets at all).
However, these reluctants were few in number and one can 
perhaps accept their disclaimers with some cynicism.
Demonstrating that Senators were motivated towards a 
parliamentary career is, however, only part of the story. A 
more interesting question is whether a Senate seat was the 
aim they were pursuing, or whether perhaps they may have 
preferred to get pre-selection for some other chamber. Did 
they merely regard the Senate as one of several possible arenas 
in which they could pursue a parliamentary career, or were they 
specifically aiming at Senate membership? The short answer 
is that most became Senators by accident, not by design.
Only six of the Senators interviewed stated,a specific 
preference for entering the Senate, rather than some other 
chamber. It is interesting to note that these Senators were 
all elected in either 1964 or 1967.
One Liberal Senator stated that, although he had at the 
time of his election a conscious desire to enter the Senate, 
he suspected that this desire was intensified by the knowledge 
that there would be no House of Representatives vacancy in the 
foreseeable future; and early in his Senate career he would 
have happily transferred to a safe Representatives seat if
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he had had the chance. Another, a most fluent defender of 
the importance and attractions of the Senate, was an ambitious 
Liberal who might well transfer to the House of Representatives 
if his political star rises and his senior cabinet ambitions 
are realised.
The most interesting of these six was a young Liberal 
Senator who mapped out his whole education (B.A., Ll.B.) and 
life pattern for a career in the Senate. He decided whom he 
could replace and determined when the incumbent would be due 
to retire. In the party he followed a strategy of not pushing 
his way up through the ranks as he felt that this would be 
bound to result in him being not only much loved but also much 
hated. In other words, he aimed to be a dark horse candidate 
who attacked from the rear by surprise. He spent the years 
until the sitting Senator retired in raising his young family, 
building up his law practice and generally getting on to a 
sound financial footing. He diversified his appeal by becoming 
a weekend farmer. The only upset to his grand strategy occurred 
because the sitting Senator retired six years earlier than 
anticipated! Nevertheless he then stood for and gained the seat.
It is interesting to note that this ambitious Senator saw 
no impediment to a Ministerial career through occupying a seat 
in the Senate rather than the House of Representatives. On 
the Labor side, however, several of the young, ambitious members 
opted for the Senate in the short term as an easier place from 
which to make a reputation in the party. In contrast to the 
House of Representatives, the smaller number of members, the 
stress on debating, the possibility of specialising in and
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becoming a party spokesman on selected issues, and the presence 
of a fair few party colleagues who were spoils system appointees, 
together meant that the intelligent and conscientious Labor 
Senator could quickly make an impression. These Labor Senators 
readily admitted that they would later (if their party became 
the government, or after they had built up a sufficient reputation)
i
seek to move to the House of Representatives, where they felt 
the most senior portfolios were available. For example:
"I would like to transfer, and had the 
chance to prior to the 1969 House of 
Representatives elections. But the 
party wanted me to continue in the 
Senate for fear of losing the seat.
I would still like to transfer to 
the House in the future."
Two other Labor Senators said they would transfer to '"do a 
Gorton act" but that otherwise they felt they could realise 
their ministerial ambitions in the Senate (and they did).
Undoubtedly, many Senators found it easier to get nomination 
for the Senate than for a House of Representatives place.
Former union or party secretaries could thus maximise their 
State-wide following. A first generation Australian (parents 
Greek migrants) found far less discrimination and opposition 
to his Senate campaign than during prior State attempts. The 
two women in the sample agreed that it was far easier for them 
to get nomination as part of a team than as an individual 
candidate. D.L.P. Senators recognised that for as long as 
preferential voting was retained for the House of Represent­
atives and most State parliaments the Senate was their best 
opportunity.
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For about half of those interviewed one can only say
that their presence in the Senate rather than the House of
Representatives was quite accidental; having made the
decision to aim for a Federal seat, a Senate vacancy happened
to present itself as the first possibility for achieving
this aim. For example:
"I was happy to take whatever vacancy 
came up."
"I tried for a State xseat and came second 
in the pre-selection ballot. There were 
no other House seats available so I then 
stood in the ballot for Senate pre­
selection, and won."
"I took the first vacancy which arose, 
and this happened to be for the Senate."
"I would just as happily have run for 
the House of Representatives if the 
opportunity had been there - it was 
a circumstantial accident."
"I was party secretary when at the last 
minute a replacement Senate candidate 
was needed because the selected candidate's 
wife had an accident and he pulled out."
The conclusion is that Senators were looking for a 
parliamentary berth, but that few specifically wished this 
to be in the Senate.
Comparing the Senate and the House of Representatives
When I queried Senators as to the ideas they had 
about a Senator's role or about Senate functions before 
their election, many demonstrated that they had little 
knowledge about these. Several referred to the partisan 
role they expected (and were expected) to follow, which 
is a general role expectation unrelated to specific 
membership of the Senate.
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In testing Senators' perceptions of their role in 
specific terms, the first approach was to ask:
Interview Question 5:
Can you see any differences between your 
role as a Senator and that of an MHR?
Probes - what differences? Are these important? 
Do you feel the general public recognise these 
differences?
Answers to this question reveal Senators' views on their 
relationship with their electorate, and demonstrate that 
most feel they are by no means as tied to representation 
of constituents as their colleagues in the lower house. 
Moreover (and this same feeling applies, as we shall later 
see, to their relationship with their political party) 
Senators welcome the feeling of being less constrained 
by constituency duties.
Senators could clearly distinguish between the work
and duties of a Senator and those of a member of the lower
house. The role of the MHR was described as primarily
that of an ombudsman for his electorate:
"The House of Representatives member 
has a particular role in the electorate, 
looking after affairs there; whereas a 
Senator does this to a much lesser degree 
and his span is over the whole State."
"Senators, with proportional representation, 
can thumb their nose to the electorate if 
they're number 1 or 2 on the party ticket. 
Therefore there's a different outlook 
among Senators in contrast to House of 
Reps men, who have an electoral neurosis - 
they must always be weighing up electoral 
consequences."
"... the role of an MHR is primarily 
that of an ombudsman for his electorate. 
His primary field of activity is in 
solving any problems which his own 
electors may have vis-a-vis the federal 
government. By himself, his legislative 
power is negligible.... As a Senator 
you've got an obligation to the electorate 
from which you come but in terms of a 
State electorate as a Senator has it's 
a rather amorphous remote sort of body."
It is important to note that Senators were not denying 
that performance of such ombudsman duties is a part of their
own activity. In fact, only 3 Senators (7 per cent of
—
respondents) gave a negative response to the Question,
"Do you think it is part of your job to cater to constituency 
queries?" A Liberal Party elder statesman replied bluntly:
"I consider telephone, social service queries are the 
responsibility of House members." An Independent Senator 
described how he had educated constituents to approach 
"the right quarter" - an MHR who was deputy leader of 
the opposition and so bound to receive and act on all 
constituency grievances'. Most Senators are allocated, by 
their party, responsibility for dealing with constituency 
matters in areas of the State where the House of 
Representatives member is of another party. Liberal Party 
Senators from Tasmania and South Australia, and Labor 
Senators from Western Australia, Queensland and Victoria, 
were thus heavily involved in performing what is typically 
an MHR's duty. The following comments are representative 
of responses to the Question, "Do you get much corres­
pondence from people in your State?"
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"The A.L.P. zones up N.S.W., and each 
Senator maintains liaison with party 
branches in 4-5 non-Labor electorates,
(this would be a blend of rural and 
metropolitan seats)."
"As a N.S.W. Senator where the Country 
Party holds the majority of country 
seats I get few enquiries from these 
areas; but I do get a few from city 
dwellers and from those in rural seats 
held by the A.L.P."
"I think the amount of correspondence a 
Senator gets is largely governed by the 
representation of the parties and perhaps 
where that representation is. Before the 
1969 elections Labor held only 3 H. of R. 
seats in W.A. and I received a fair amount 
of correspondence; but now that Labor has 
6 seats, correspondence has fallen off."
One Senator felt that during 1969 he had received the most
mail of any federal member of parliament, because he was
campaigning in three House electorates and dealing with
constituency matters in those specific areas in addition
to his normal roving responsibility for any queries
directed to an A.L.P. Senator from New South Wales.
A group of 10 Labor Senators regarded receiving
and dealing with constituency matters as the most important
(6) or the only (4) aspect of their role as a Senator. One
of these had obviously been conditioned by his prior
activities as an M.H.R.:
"I would have preferred to stay in the 
House of Representatives because it's 
alive, because I was representing 
people."
This Senator felt that "the House of Representatives is the 
only house that matters" and strongly supported the A.L.P. 
plank on abolition of the Senate, as did a further 6 of these 
Labor Senators.
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Senators of other political complexions generally saw
what Wahlke et a l 38 have described as the "tribune" role as
only one aspect of their behaviour, and did not find it
stimulating; in fact, most would have preferred to avoid
such direct relationships with constituents:
"I feel our role should extend more to over­
all problems rather than to specific grievances - 
however, we must not neglect any specific 
queries as sometimes the query comes from a 
Liberal supporter in an area with a Labor member."
"... the job of messenger boy or ombudsman 
shouldn't be the job of an MHR or a Senator."
One hard-working young Senator saw the performance of the
ombudsman duties as an unwelcome distraction from what he
termed the "parliamentary role", that is, research into the
principles behind legislation and vigilance towards preserving
the type of social values and objectives he supported:
"I think the members of the House of 
Representatives have wittingly or 
unwittingly tended to develop their 
role to something of an ombudsman or 
a cross between an ombudsman and an 
extension of the social service 
agencies. I think that this is 
unfortunate because I think the 
parliament should be devoting its 
time, more of its time, and the 
members of the parliament should be 
devoting more of their time to their 
parliamentary role rather than to 
their role as a go-between, between 
the government as such and the people.
... So far as the Senators are concerned 
in comparison with the House of Repre­
sentatives, I think that their role 
ought not38 to be that of the local
37 J.C. Wahlke et al, The legislative System: Explorations in
legislative Behavior, Wiley & Sons, New York, 1962, especially 
pp.247-248, 252-254.
Pny entasis/underlining in quotations from Senators was 
provided by Senators themselves.
representative at all; in theory 
it ought to be their role principally 
as a parliamentarian; but inevitably 
to a greater or lesser extent you 
become involved in the small matters 
and if there is nobody else to do 
them, obviously, you've got to do them."
A further three Senators noted that they were forced 
to deal with constituency queries because of the expectations 
either of constituents or of party pre-selection committees.
In other words, external expectations of the behaviour 
of Senators were seen to be identical to general expectations 
about members of the lower house. Senators felt that the 
public generally did not understand the functions of the 
Senate; and that this ignorance explains why many electors 
expect Senators to perform the ombudsman role. Some Senators 
would like to educate the electorate about Senate functions 
and how the Senate is constituted in order to lessen these 
electoral expectations'.
D.L.P. Senators, at that time the only parliamentary 
representatives of their party in the whole of Australia, 
could not avoid the ombudsman role for any of their 
supporters. However, only one found this irksome; the 
others were only too happy "to provide service".
Senators could thus at best be termed reluctant ombuds­
men. Although I do not have figures which would allow a firm 
statement on the amount of time which members of the two 
federal houses devote to constituency duties, a very 
substantial majority of Senators believed that the volume
of constituency queries, and the proportion of time which 
they devoted to electoral work, was far less than for M.H.Rs.
Other aspects of the perceived difference in the role 
of the Senator as compared with that of the M.H.R. can in 
part be attributed to this lesser emphasis on the ombudsman 
role for Senators. For example, several Senators appreciated 
what they felt was a greater opportunity to focus on broader 
(state, national or international) issues. The State-wide 
electorates enable Senators to study national issues in a 
way that is difficult, if not nearly impossible, for members 
of the lower house tied to a defined small geographical area.
"The M.H.R. has a more parochial role 
to play in parliament - he must 
concentrate on electorate issues and 
only any (if there is any) spare time 
can be devoted to national issues.
In contrast, the Senator represents 
the whole State, and issues which 
arise in his State as a whole are more 
inclined to be national issues."
"As a Senator one can take a national 
outlook; representing a whole State 
means one is not tied to the minutiae 
of detail related to one small little 
area."
"A Senator can go more deeply into the 
requirements of nation and State than 
an M.H.R. because the latter is absorbed 
with day-to-day issues and must think 
twice about the effect of his vote on 
the electorate."
One Senator said he personally received, on average, only 7 or 8 
mail enquiries per week; but State MPs passed on other queries 
to him, and when travelling round the State he was also approached 
for help or advice. Another said his correspondence included on 
average 24 letters per day, about half of which required a written 
reply. A third Senator estimated an average of 5 constituency 
queries a week - but in one particular week he had received 85 
letters.
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However, Senators also portrayed the Senate as an environ­
ment more conducive to the development of individual personality 
and to role performance because of a lesser emphasis placed on 
partisanship in the Senate. This merits further attention.
One Senator described the differences between Senators 
and M.H.R.s in terms of interest in general legislative 
rather than partisan aspects of government:
" (in the House of Representative^ the 
tendency is for big majorities and a 
steamroller type of approach. I think 
the difference is the Representative is 
more interested in politics as such and 
the average Senator is more interested 
in the theory of government, the principles 
behind the legislation, the principles 
which need to be preserved, and to seeing 
that these principles are preserved."
Several Senators commented that political parties have a less
pervasive influence on Senators' behaviour:
"A Senator can be very largely non-partisan."
"There's more freedom in the Senate, for 
example, in voting without really 
endangering the fate of the government."
Answers to two issues raised in the Questionnaire provide 
further evidence of Senators' perception of the impact of parties 
on Senators' behaviour.
Question Under what circumstances (apart from free 
II.A.
votes) need a Senator not vote with his party?
Question Do you feel that any of the parties currently 
II.E.
represented in the Senate exert too much 
discipline over their members?
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Not only are A.L.P. Senators effectively precluded 
from crossing the floor in divisions; most accept this 
constraint and would not even conceive of rebellion:
"I would feel an obligation to vote with 
my party on all occasions (other than a 
free vote)."
"Labor Senators are under pledge to vote 
in Parliament in accordance with ail 
decisions of caucus; with this I agree."
"Senators like other members of the 
Parliament are elected because they 
belong to a party and embrace its 
policy and platform and under no 
circumstances should they not vote 
with their party after the party has 
made a decision."
"Under no circumstances. I can fight 
it out in the party caucus, but must 
then abide by the majority decision."
Some A.L.P. Senators were, however, willing to conceive of 
situations in which they might feel compelled (by conscience) 
to vote independently; and they recognised what would be 
the consequences of such action:
"On a matter where I considered it clashed 
with my conscience I would consider not 
supporting my party and, having advised 
them, take whatever consequences developed."
"Never, unless a matter of vital principle 
is involved. I believe it necessary to 
then sever your connection with party if 
this step (is) taken."
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"On questions of conscience I could 
imagine a situation arising where one 
may feel impelled to do this. I can't 
be definite as no such occasion has 
arisen."
"The situation hasn't arrived yet but 
perhaps one could seek and get a pair 
to avoid a situation which one might 
have strong personal views on."
For none of these four Senators, has a matter arisen on which
they found other considerations competing with party loyalty
to the extent that they seriously contemplated voting against
their party.
We can thus conclude that A.L.P. Senators perceived them­
selves as being bound to follow the dictates of their party. 
The five Country Party Senators to some degree saw themselves 
as similarly bound to vote in accordance with party policy; 
however, each allowed for, and all bar one (a recently elected 
Senator) had practised dissent from the party line. They 
recognised that a Country Party Senator need not vote with 
his party:
"On matters of conscience and where one 
is rigidly opposed to the party's policy 
after having debated the matter in the 
Party Room;"
"On matters on which he holds very strong 
views and where he has informed his party 
of his intention;"
"When he believes the legislation is against 
the national interest of the country."
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Liberal Senators also recognised that disagreement over a 
matter of principle was an acceptable reason for cross­
voting; a Liberal could cross the floor:
"When, on his own judgment of his 
competing loyalties, he feels 
strongly enough to do so;"
"On matters of conscience when he 
is sure he is right after subjecting 
his viewpoint to adequate check;"
"Where he, after due consideration, 
believes that a matter of vital 
principle is involved. Not when it 
is a difference in method;"
"On matters of principle or conscience - 
provided he has informed his Leader 
and his Senate colleagues well before­
hand - but not to bring about the 
defeat of a government, without first 
resigning from his political party."
These Liberal Senators were not advocating a carte blanche
for rebellion; but their belief confirms the received
wisdom about the Liberal Party being a party in which, as
one Senator put it, "one is free to vote or otherwise
according to conscience". What seems to be a somewhat
gentlemanly stress on the correct form of behaviour -
/"one must inform the party in advance" - is in fact hard 
political reality; with relatively evenly divided voting 
strengths, no whip would want to find he was minus a vote 
he had counted on.
One Liberal Minister provided what is more of an 
exhortation to, rather than a mere justification for, voting 
by conscience - on the grounds that only in this way would a 
Senator practice the role of legislative scrutineer:
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"As a Senator with the Constitutional 
function of fa] second chamber of 
review he is bound to exercise an 
independent vote on all matters.
Political prudence will prevent its 
use to destroy government, which is 
not the function of the Senate."
Only one Senator - also a Liberal - referred to
justification of cross-voting on "an issue which seriously
affects his State".
It would be misleading to calculate the percentage of 
Senators who put forward any particular type of answer to 
these questions, since the number of Labor as against non- 
Labor respondents to the Questionnaire was quite dispro­
portionate to the actual voting strengths at that time of 
their respective parties in the Senate.40 Howeverf one can 
note that:
(a) only one-quarter of Labor respondents allowed any 
possibility of cross-voting (and for these it would 
mean severance from the party);
(b) all non-Labor Senators and the D.L.P. Senators 
regarded cross-voting as legitimate within 
specified circumstances;
(c) the most commonly accepted legitimation for 
cross-voting was where a Senator is following 
his conscience;
(d) only two Senators specifically related cross­
voting to the functions of the Senate, but one 
can surmise that this legitimation was assumed 
under (c) by other Senators,
40 See Appendix I for details on the number of Labor as against 
non-Labor respondents.
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Answers to Question H E  revealed another contrast between 
Labor and non-Labor Senators. All Labor Senators, plus two 
Government Ministers, denied that any party exerted two much 
discipline over its members; all but 4 non-Labor Senators 
(the two Ministers referred to plus two other Government back­
benchers who felt all parties exerted undue discipline) said 
that the A.L.P. was the only party which exerted too much 
discipline over its members. A few Liberals reiterated that 
there was no discipline imposed by their party:
"The Liberals do not exert discipline.
There is a self-imposed discipline."
"The Liberal Party does not exert 
discipline - but relies on loyalty,"
Other Liberals agreed with a Labor Senator that "party
discipline is very important in the context of the modern
party", but felt that the A.L.P, was unduly restrictive:
"All parties must exercise some 
discipline; the Labor party m  my 
opinion exercises too much."
"As a House of Review and States 
House, party discipline is 
unnecessarily strict."
Only two A.L.P, Senators were willing to accept this 
criticism of their party:
"I believe our party to be too rigid 
at times."
"Party lines are at present too strict 
for the good of the parties and of 
parliament."
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We can thus conclude that non-Labor Senators believed that 
for their Labor colleagues, party discipline was an excessive 
constraint on behaviour. However, there was general acceptance 
of the need for some degree of party discipline and for restraint 
on the part of Senators so that rebellion for the sake of 
rebellion did not occur. (Several Liberal Senators criticised 
one of their colleagues who frequently dissented from his party 
in order, they felt, either to protect his personal business 
interests or to gain media publicity).
The following thoughts from a young Liberal Senator provide 
a lengthy, but very valuable conclusion on the relationship 
between a Senator and his party:
"To me there are times when the interests 
of the nation come before the interests 
of the party; they’re not very often 
but they do arise. This does involve 
differing with your own party and does 
involve voting against your own party, 
which is not something that anybody 
does with relish. But I think there are 
times when you have to. An example is 
the preservation of civil liberties, the 
preservation of the people from the 
growth of the bureaucracy - the tendency 
which any government has to put through 
legislation which its bureaucracy puts 
up to it without perhaps as critically 
as it should examining potential effects 
on individuals. ... I don't and never have 
accepted the idea that you can shelter 
behind a party decision. It may be just 
some particular issue which enables you 
to say: 'Well look, I'm sorry, I differ
with you; I've tried to persuade you 
within the party room; I haven't succeeded 
there [butjI still intend to abide by the 
deep conviction which I have.' But you've 
got to always relate that to the need for 
balance, the need for a party system and 
the general need for people, so far as 
possible, to support the general decisions 
of the party; to try to alter those 
decisions by arguing within the party 
itself. But I would always reserve the
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right of any Senator to differ 
outside the party if he wishes 
to, running the risk that he does 
and knowing that he runs the risk 
that he'll have to leave the party 
as a result. But I would never be 
prepared to say that, simply for the 
sake of not having to leave the party, 
or simply for the sake of keeping the 
job, or something else like that, that 
your principles where they're very 
fundamental be completely overridden 
by the other considerations."
Fulfilled Senators
The verbal and written comments I obtained from 
Senators indicated that they were generally supportive 
of the Senate as a chamber. This implies that, irrespective 
of whether or not they consciously strove to enter the 
chamber, after being a Senator for some years they were 
generally 'hooked'j as an American Congressman is reported 
to have said:
"I have never taken dope but I imagine 
the politician is rather like a dope 
addict. It (politics) gets on your 
back and you can't shake it."41
The degree to which Senators were satisfied with 
their position and performance was queried in both Inter­
views and the Questionnaire. In interviews Senators were 
asked what they would miss most on leaving the Senate, 
and with what aspects of their performance they were 
satisfied or dissatisfied. Overwhelmingly (and not 
surprisingly, since their ego was at stake) Senators 
stated that they were quite satisfied and that they would
41 Quoted by C.L. Clapp, The Congressman: His Work as he Sees It,
Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1$63, p.430.
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regret leaving the chamber. For example:
"The Senate role is very enjoyable, most 
challenging and exciting."
"The life of a Senator is far more 
rewarding than that of a party official."
(his former position.)
"I would rather be a Senator, doing what 
I'm now doing than any other job I know of."
" (I would miss) the intrigue and the 
science of numerology."
"I'm interested in parliamentary pro­
cedures; I find grappling with national 
problems of intense interest and I enjoy 
being a part of the decision-making 
process on a national plane."
"Having been for a number of years 
closely involved with political 
activities and then, on a particular 
day, to cease to have any close 
involvement, must create a vacuum."
"I would miss being embroiled in matters 
of public controversy, being close to 
where the news is breaking, and meeting 
so many people."
"You can if you wish be the first with 
the latest, you can know what's going 
on a lot earlier than you would other­
wise be able to. You can enjoy the 
good old pastime of listening to all 
the rumours that float around the place."
"(I would miss) the opportunity to parti­
cipate in what is one of the greatest 
forums available; to put forward ideas 
which I believe are important; to parti­
cipate through the availability of that 
forum in what I think is the interest of 
the development of the country. I would 
feel, I think, if I left the Senate a 
sense of frustration whenever I became 
excited about an issue and no longer had 
the possibility of being able to participate. 
If you get beaten on it, well that's just 
too bad, but at least you've been able to 
participate; but if you're not here then 
the best you can do is make representations 
to somebody else, to try to put forward 
your view. As everybody knows nobody 
could put forward your views as well as 
you can yourself'."
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It is readily apparent that most if not all of these 
responses could have come from members of the House of 
Representatives; Senators were valuing a position in the 
federal parliament in terms that did not imply any significant 
advantages resulting from their being in the Upper rather than 
the Lower House. in the same vein many Senators commented 
that they would miss their parliamentary friends:
"I would miss the comradeship. It's 
not true that parliament is like a 
jungle, with knives and so on. There's 
a sense of camaraderie and one makes 
close personal friends."
" [i would miss] the companionship of 
people essentially in one's own age 
group."
However, as one Senator caustically remarked, the same sentiment 
is true "of anyone retiring from a job".
Three Senators expressed a lack of fulfilment and wished 
they had pursued a career outside the Senate:
"I have not been as happy in the Senate 
as I was when I was full-time union 
secretary. I can't look back and see 
any achievements in terms of assistance 
to the community, whereas I felt I was 
a real contact and help while with the 
union."
"I would still prefer to be an Industrial 
Commissioner, but I do like being a 
Senator."
"I definitely rate my years as party 
secretary as more interesting and more 
important than my time in the Senate.
However, I've enjoyed being here."
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Most Senators, however, wished to retain their 
seats until retirement. Only 5 said they would ever 
consider transferring to the House of Representatives, 
and none said they would seek a move to State politics.
These Senators were thus generally satisfied with their 
position; though it is doubtful whether their sense of 
fulfilment was related to the fact that they were members 
of the Senate rather than of, say, the House of Repre­
sentatives .
Conclusion
The comments quoted above provide further information 
on two areas covered earlier in this Chapter: the degree
of similarity between Senators and members of the House of 
Representatives; and the differences in outlook of Labor 
and of non-Labor Senators. The concluding Section of the 
thesis will reproduce other comments of Senators which 
illuminate these differences, as well as provide a frame­
work for evaluating the record of Senate activity to be 
examined in the next Chapter.
It can readily be seen that Senators are unrepre­
sentative of the general population in terms of most of 
the basic socio-economic indices, viz. age, sex, occupation, 
educational achievement and type of schooling. This is 
neither unexpected nor, for that matter, unwelcome, as 
Professor Sol Encel demonstrates.42
42 Equality and Authority^ op.cit., Chapter 12.
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It is, on the other hand, hard to regard Senators 
collectively as an elite group. Is this perhaps a sign 
of the unattractiveness of a Parliamentary career given 
the low esteem in which many Australians hold their MPs?43 
Or of the disincentive of fairly meagre Parliamentary 
salaries until the 1960s?
The composition of the Senate has changed over 
time - partly a reflection of general socio-economic 
changes in the total population - but perhaps not to the 
degree which might be regarded as desirable (there are 
continuing calls for greater representation of business­
men and economists in the Parliament).
There were striking differences between Senators 
of different parties in the period up until the 1960s 
(more detail on this will be provided in Chapter VI); 
these differences are now decreasing, and could well 
become insignificant in the future. Comparisons between 
Senators and members of the House of Representatives 
reveal some differences which may, however, be perpetuated 
(for example, the broader occupational experience and 
the longer tenure of Senators).
The import of these differences and variations 
over time can in part be demonstrated in the legislative 
record of the Senate for the seventy-two year period - 
the subject of the next Chapter.
Ch. 11.43 See Encel, Equality and Authority...,
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CHAPTER VI
AN OVERVIEW OF SENATE ACTIVITY, 1901-1972 
Introduction
Have the changes in Senate personnel over time 
been accompanied by variations in the performance of the 
Senate as a legislature? Can the record of the Senate be 
assessed in terms of the Brycean functions of a House of 
Review? To what degree has the Senate been an effective 
States House?
This Chapter examines the record of the Senate for 
the period 1901-1972 in terms of: sitting days; Senate
initiation of legislation; fate of legislation in the 
Senate; general debate; Question Time and adjournment 
debates; petitions; and committees. The Chapter concludes 
with an attempt to assess the record of the Senate as a 
States House and as a House of Review.
Sitting Days
Over the seventy-two year period the Senate has 
met for an average of 53 days per year.1 Comparisons 
over time, as presented in Table VI:1, reveal that:
a) by decade, the average number of sitting days
of the Senate was highest in the period 
immediately after federation (the highest per 
annum total was 93 days in 1902); least during 
the 1930s and especially the 1940s (the lowest
For the nunber of sitting days per annum see the table in J.R. Odgers, 
Australian Senate Practice, 4th edition, Commonwealth Government 
Printer, Canberra, 1972, p.130.
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per annum total being 22 days in 1934). From 
the mid 1960s the number of sitting days per 
annum has been slowly climbing.2
TABLE VI:1
AVERAGE SITTING DAYS OF FEDERAL PARLIAMENT, BY DECADE
Senate
House of 
Representatives
1901-1910 
1911-1920 
1921-19 30 
1931-1940 
1941-1950 
1951-1960 
1961-1970 
1971-1972
71
51
51
43
36
48
60
68
95
70
67
58
70
63
62
67
Based on J.R. Odgers, Australian Senate Practice,
Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra, 1972, 
p.130.
The periods in which the number of sitting days 
per annum was highest - the first decade and from the 
mid 1960s - are exactly the periods for which observers' 
comments about Senators (and, as we shall see in Chapter 
VIII, about the Chamber) were most flattering.
b) generally, the Senate has sat for less days per 
annum, and per decade, than the House of 
Representatives3 (whose average for the period 
1901-1972 was 69 days per year). The figures 
for the 1940s demonstrate the greatest disparity 
between the Houses (an average for the Senate of 
36 days, and for the House of 70 days; and in 
1948 the per annum figures for the Chambers were
For 1971-1975 the average nuuber of sitting days per annum was 70.
Ihe Senate sat for more days per annum than the House of representatives 
in 1916, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1972; and for an equal nunber of days 
in 1959 and 1970.
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respectively 39 and 90). From 1961, however, 
the two Houses have sat for a comparable 
number of days per annum.
It should be noted that both Australian Federal 
Houses sit for considerably fewer days per annum than 
central or federal Chambers in America, Britain, Canada 
and New Zealand.4
The life of a Parliament commences within thirty 
days after the return of the writs for a House of 
Representatives election (Constitution, Section 5), 
irrespective of whether or not there was a half or full 
Senate election held concurrently with the general election.5 
Thus at the commencement of a new Parliament both Houses 
meet on the same day. However, the distribution of sitting 
days within a Parliament, and within a session6, varies 
between the Houses.
There are several reasons for this variation in the 
distribution of House and Senate sitting days over a year.
The days and hours of meeting of the Senate are determined 
by the members of that Chamber - and therefore, if there 
is a non-government majority in the Chamber, cannot be 
determined by the government. In May 1950 an Opposition 
controlled Senate, in retaliation to a Government attempt
4 See H. Nelson, "Democracy1 s Dodo: the Back-bencher" in H. Mayer
and H. Nelson (eds), Australian Politics: a Third Reader, Cheshire,
Melbourne, 1973, p.560.
Senate and House elections have often been out of step; see 
Chapter VII, p.
6 Within each Parliament there may be one or mere sessions,
terminated by the prorogation of the Parliament by the Governor- 
General, as provided for in Section 5 of the Constitution.
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to alter the normal pattern of sitting days7, successfully 
instituted a sessional order fixing the future sitting 
hours and days of the Senate. The sessional order, which 
was renewed in each subsequent session, provided that the 
Senate sit on Tuesdays and Wednesdays from 3 pm, and on 
Thursdays from 11 am, unless the Chamber decided otherwise. 
The customary pattern is for the House of Representatives 
to sit for four days per week. For both Houses, however, 
this pattern can be, and is, altered where necessary.
Members of the Twenty-Sixth and Twenty-Seventh 
Senates disagreed as to what would be the most desirable 
number of sitting days per year. Of the 35 answers to a 
Question on the length of Senate sessions (Questionnaire 
Number 19 (A)), only one favoured a decrease; 19 argued
for longer sessions; and 15 favoured retaining the current 
length of sessions. The odd man out expressed his distaste 
for "repetitive, superfluous speeches." Those who advocated 
no change generally remarked that extension of Parliamentary 
sessions would hinder a Senator's representative respons­
ibilities (most of these Senators came from the more 
distant States). Typical comments from those who favoured 
longer sessions were:
"We could be rather more leisurely in considering 
legislation, have more time for consideration."
"I believe Parliament should sit for more days 
in the year; apart from legislation it is the 
only satisfactory way to keep a check on the 
government of the day."
The Government wanted Senators to sit on a Friday (19 May 1950) to 
complete consideration, of the Commonwealth Bank Bill 1950 (the vehicle 
for Menzies' 1951 Double Dissolution); Opposition Senators boycotted 
the sitting, and sufficient Government Senators were absent to mean 
that the day's sitting lapsed through lack of a quorum. See Odgers, 
op.cit., pp.27, 129.
215.
"Can anyone run a business on 50 days a year?"
A second explanation for the variation in the pattern 
of sitting days of the two Houses is the common tendency for 
the Senate to adjourn for longer periods within or between 
sessions. Before extensions to the Committee system in 
1970, the Senate frequently felt it had insufficient 
material (especially legislation) to consider in the early 
stages of a Parliament or session. For example, in March 
1963 the date of summoning of the Senate for a new session 
was postponed for a week to enable passage of legislation 
by the House before the reassembly of the Senate.8 It will 
be demonstrated shortly that most legislation is initiated 
in the House of Representatives; the Senate awaits its 
receipt. The paucity of legislation before the Senate at 
the commencement of a Parliament or session is in direct 
contrast to the problem which the Senate normally encounters 
at the closing stage of a session - the 'floodgate phenomenon' 
(the rate of flow of Governmental legislation generally 
increases progressively through a session).
At the close of a session the Senate may therefore 
be faced with a large number of Bills, finally dealt with 
by the House of Representatives; the Chamber must choose 
between despatching these with great speed (if the Senate 
wishes to rise with the House) or considering them in a 
leisurely fashion (and so continuing to sit after the 
rising of the House). From the mid 1960s the latter
8 Odgers, op.cit., p.127.
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course was generally adopted, and the Senate session 
therefore covered a longer period of time (though still 
not necessarily a larger number of sitting days or sitting 
hours) than that of the House of Representatives.
In replies to my Questionnaire, Senators were 
unanimous that the floodgate phenomenon produced a 
farcical situation at the end of a session. Some 
Senators felt that the problem was a sign of governmental 
laziness and inefficiency, and something which could be 
solved. Another Senator remarked that it was a common 
move for governments to introduce controversial or highly 
complex legislation at the end of a session in the hope 
that it would evade detailed scrutiny. Several suggestions 
were made to cope with the problem: for example, break
the link between Senate and House sessions:
"This has always been a problem but I believe 
the only way to solve it is for the Senate to 
sit on after the rising of the House of 
Representatives and conclude its business in 
a proper manner. The House of Representatives 
could be recalled if amendments were carried 
in the Senate."
"The Senate should assemble later and continue 
after the House finishes."
"The Senate should insist on proper time for 
consideration of ail Bills and should not 
meet until legislation is available for 
consideration and should not adjourn when 
the House adjourns if business is available 
for discussion."
Other suggestions were: employ more draftsmen; have
debate on legislation in the Senate once it has been 
introduced in the House. Other Senators argued that
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the Upper House should refuse to accept Bills which 
arrived at the very end of a session:
"I believe the Senate should warn the 
Government that it will not pass last 
minute legislation. If there is no 
improvement, it should defer Bills".
"Many Bills which are rushed through 
in the final days could be held till 
the next session and be dealt with in 
that fairly inactive period."
"There should be time limits when Bills 
can be introduced in either House."
"We should refuse to accept any Bill 
from the House of Representatives in 
the last two weeks."
Several of these suggestions would undoubtedly be 
unpalatable to any government.
Within and at the end of a session (but not of a 
Parliament) the Senate adjourns to a date to be fixed 
by the President. The date for summoning of Senators 
was, by convention, determined by the President on the • 
advice of the Government. In May and June 1967, however, 
non-Government Senators amended the standard adjournment 
motion to require the President to reconvene the Chamber 
on the request of an absolute majority of the Members of 
the Chamber. Such a request was transmitted to and acted 
upon by the President in June 1967. The purpose of the 
motion, and of the meeting of the Senate on 20 June 1970, 
was to enable, if necessary, Opposition disallowance of 
postal regulations foreshadowed by the Government.9 This 
action established the right of the Senate to determine
9 The Opposition argued that any such increases should be included 
in the August budget. See C.P.D.: Sen: vol.34, pp. 1894-1898.
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its sittings - a right which the House of Representatives, 
being controlled by the Government, cannot exercise.
It is interesting to debate whether the Senate 
could exercise this power to determine its own sittings 
after the prorogation of the Parliament (that is, after 
the dissolution of the House of Representatives). The 
current practice is that the Proclamation dissolving 
the House discharges Senators'from attendance until the 
commencement of the next session, and the Senate (supposedly 
a continuing body except in the case of a Double Dissolution) 
therefore is in suspension. Yet it has become established 
practice that the Senate may authorize its committees to 
function whilst the House is dissolved.10 The as yet 
unresolved question is whether a Senate resolution providing 
for recall of the Chamber whilst the Parliament is prorogued 
could or would prevail.* 11
Senate Initiation of Legislation
The vast bulk of legislation considered by Federal 
Parliament has been and is Government sponsored, and most 
Government legislation is initiated in the House of 
Representatives. Of the total of 5004 Bills enacted 
over the period 1901-1972, only 490, or approximately 
ten per cent, were initiated in the Senate.12 Table VI:2 
lists the number of Bills enacted, by House of origin, 
for each decade.
10 See Cdgers, op.cit., pp.473-476, 552-554.
11 See Ibid, p.128.
12 See the table in Ibid, pp.277-278.
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TABLE VI:2
NUMBER OF BILLS ENACTED, AND HOUSE OF INITIATION,
BY DECADE
Number of Bills Enacted Bills
Enac ted Initiated in Senate
Number Per Cent
1901-1910 232 42 18
1911-1920 401 61 15
1921-1930 465 52 11
1931-1940 751 72 10
1941-1950 725 64 9
1951-1960 955 117 12
1961-1970 119 8 66 6
1971-1972 277 16 6
Based on J.R. Odgers, Australian Senate Practice, 4th
edition, Commonwealth 
pp .277-2 78 .
Government Printer, Canberra, 1972,
It is evident that the ]number of Bills enacted
by Federal Parliament per decade has increased progressively
from 1901. A comparison of Tables VI:1 and VI:2 shows
that the legislative workload of Federal MPs has increased 
alongside a decrease (at least until the mid 1970s) in the 
number of sitting days. On the other hand, the number of 
Acts initiated by the Senate has not appreciably increased 
over the seventy-two year period (the highest per annum 
total being 20 in 1958, of a total of 83 Acts in that year). 
Therefore, the proportion of total legislation initiated 
by the Senate has decreased - from a peak of 18 per cent 
in the first decade to only 6 per cent from 1961.
Three reasons may be given for this low level of 
Senate initiation of legislation: the Constitutional
prohibition on Senate origination of Money Bills; the
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la c k  o f  s u c c e s s  o f  P r iv a t e  M em bers' B i l l s  i n i t i a t e d  in  
th e  U pper H ou se; and th e  number (and ty p e  o f  p o r t f o l i o )  
o f  S e n a te  M i n i s t e r s .
A p p r o x im a te ly  5 p e r  c e n t  o f  a l l  B i l l s  c o n s id e r e d  
b y F e d e r a l  P a r l ia m e n t  a r e  c l a s s i f i e d  a s  Money B i l l s  ( c a r r y  
th e  D r a fts m a n 's  mark ' T * ' 13) and t h e r e f o r e  m u st o r i g i n a t e  
w i t h i n  t h e  H ouse o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
Of th e  490 A c ts  i n i t i a t e d  in  t h e  S e n a te  b e tw e e n  
1901  and 1 9 7 2 ,  o n ly  3 w ere  P r iv a t e  M em bers' B i l l s . 14 A 
f u r t h e r  95 P r iv a t e  M em bers' B i l l s  w ere  i n i t i a t e d  in  th e  
S e n a te  o v e r  th e  p e r i o d 1 5 ; o f  t h e s e ,  19 p a s s e d  th r o u g h  
a l l  s t a g e s  in  th e  S e n a t e ,  b u t  la p s e d  o r  w ere  d e f e a t e d  in  
th e  H ouse o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  The v a s t  m a j o r i t y  o f  th e  
r e m a in in g  P r iv a t e  M em bers' B i l l s  la p s e d  o r  w ere  d is c h a r g e d  
i n  t h e  Chamber; o n ly  12 w ere  d e f e a t e d  in  a d i v i s i o n .
I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  n o t e  t h a t  o n e - t h i r d  o f  a l l  
P r iv a t e  M em bers' B i l l s  i n i t i a t e d  in  t h e  S e n a te  w ere  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  A l t e r a t i o n  m e a su r es  s e e k in g  e x t e n s i o n  o f  
F e d e r a l  p o w e r . 16
13 The mark 'T*' i s  p laced on the bottom r ig h t hand s id e  o f  th e f i r s t  
page o f  B i l l s  the Draftsman regards as measures to  which the Senate 
can only req u est amendments. The Senate may and on occasion s has 
dispu ted  the c la s s i f i c a t io n  o f  a p a r tic u la r  B i l l ;  see  Ib id ,
p p .334-335, 340-341.
14 The C o n c ilia tio n  and A rb itration  Act 1909 (Senator Needham); the 
D aylight Saving Repeal Act 1917 (Senator Gardiner); and the 
Comronwealth E lec to ra l Act 1924 (Senator Payne).
15 See Journals o f  the Senate, and B i l l s  Not Passed Into Law and 
B i l l s  Vfoich O rig in a lly  Lapsed But Subsequently Passed, Session s  
19Ö1-2 to  1968-69, Parliam entary Paper Number 44 or 1970.
16 Hie su b jec t areas were: t r u s t s ,  corporations and monopolies (11);
in d u s tr ia l m atters (7); trade and commerce (3); p r ic e s  (2).
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There have been more Private Members' Bills initiated 
in the Senate than in the House of Representatives. The 
restricted time available in the Lower House for debate 
on non-Government business explains this difference. The 
number and fate of Senate Private Members' Bills, however, 
implies that members of the Federal Upper House have not 
devoted undue energy to fulfillment of the Brycean function 
of initiation of non-controversial, non-government legislation.
A final explanation for the paucity of Senate 
initiated legislation is a natural result of the relative 
Ministerial representation in the two Chambers. There is 
no Constitutional or legal requirement for Ministerial 
representation in the Senate (although the wording of 
Section 44 of the Constitution - precluding payment of 
salary to other than Ministers - would require that there 
be at least one Senate minister performing the function of 
leader of the government in the Chamber). In practice, 
the distribution of portfolios amongst members of the 
two Houses is determined by the Prime Minister (in a 
non-Labor Government) or by caucus (in a Labor Government).
Between 1901 and 1972 the number of Senate 
Ministers increased from 2 in the first decade, to 3 in 
the second, 3 or 4 in the third and fourth, and generally 
5 from 1940. The proportion of Senate ministers was 
either one-fourth or one-fifth of the total ministry.17
17 See the Cabinet lists in C.A. Hughes and B.D. Graham, A Handbook 
of Australian Government and Politics, 1890-1964, A.N.U. Press, 
Canberra, 1968, pp.4-36.
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Given tha t m inisters usually introduce the leg is­
la tion  pertaining to th e ir  own Department, the volume of 
Senate in itia te d  Government leg is la tion  could be expected 
to be far lower than tha t of the House of Representatives. 
However, Table VI:2 reveals tha t on average only 10 per 
cent of Acts (and a t most 18 per cent in any one decade) 
were in itia te d  by the 20 or 25 per cent of the ministers 
who were Senators.
The explanation for th is  d isparity  is  the nature 
of the portfo lios held by Senate m inisters, which tend 
to be low in status within the ministry, and not the type 
of po rtfo lio  which occasions much le g is la tio n .18
Odgers argues tha t the 'nexus' relationship  between 
the House and the Senate should be applied to the d i s t r i ­
bution of portfo lios between the Houses19; i f  th is  had 
applied the number of Senate ministers would have increased 
through the decades from 3 to some 8 or 9. Senators 
agreed with Odgers on th is  matter; typical answers to 
my Questionnaire20 were:
"I believe m in isteria l positions should be 
proportionate to representation or nearly 
so, i .e .  2 to 1 or thereabouts."
"The Senate should have a t le a s t one-third 
of the m inisters, as numerically i t  has 
one-third of the to ta l Parliament."
18 Hie most ccmmcn Senate portfolios are Works, Repatriation, Home 
Affairs/Interior and Vice-President of the Executive Council.
8 Senators have held the Defence portfolio; but there have only 
been 2 Ministers for Foreign Affairs and 5 Attorneys - Gene r al 
from the Senate. See Ibid.
19 Op.cit., pp.8, 545.
Question 14(A).
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"I believe the Senate should provide 
33 per cent of the ministry and not 
20 per cent."
"I believe the number of Senators and 
House members in the ministry should 
be in proportion to the number of 
members from each House in the Government 
party(ies)."
Several Senators referred to the impossibility of a Senate 
minister being able to exercise both responsibility for 
his own portfolio and adequate* representation of the 3 or 
4 portfolios for which he is Senate spokesman for the 
House minister. To lessen the burden on Senate ministers, 
and to improve executive response to Senate scrutiny, two 
Senators suggested that all ministers should attend Senate 
Question Time.
A more important facet of Senators' views on minist­
erial representation in the Chamber is their querying of 
the necessity for any Senators to hold portfolios. Slightly 
less than half of responses argued that, ideally, there 
should be no Senate ministers. For example:
"I would not have any ministers in the 
Senate if I had my way, and I don't think 
it was really meant to be by the Founders."
"There's a good argument in principle against 
having any ministers in the Senate, but in 
practice it's hard to see how this would work. 
If th.e backbench is strong the presence of 
ministers is no real problem, but there would 
be a problem if the backbenchers were weak.
The fact that ministers are bound detracts 
from the Senate acting as a House of Review."
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"I don't think we should have any ministers 
in the House. I think this leads to ambitious 
men coming in and continuing to be ambitious.
I think that it is far better if they go in 
there with a thought in mind that they are 
there for a job and that is to review 
legislation and to represent their States, 
not to try and climb over the top of the 
next bloke and try to end up in a ministerial 
position."
"The true role of a Senator is a watchdog 
over the peoples' right. This cannot be 
done if one is a minister under the cabinet 
system."
On the general question of Senate initiation of 
legislation, only one-third of Senators favoured an 
increase.21 The common view, evidenced in the following 
quotations, was that initiation of legislation was a 
minor, or even an inappropriate Senate function.
"I find it of little significance where 
legislation is introduced."
"I do not believe this is the function 
of the Senate."
"It is not really necessary in the system 
of things. The Senate's best role is not 
in legislative initiation."
"You can't properly review if you initiate." 
Fate of Legislation in the Senate
The poor success rate of Private Members' Bills 
has already been mentioned. Table VI:3 depicts the fate 
of government legislation considered by the First to the 
Twenty-Seventh Senates. (Note that no distinction is 
made in terms of the House of origination). Conclusions
2 1 Questionnaire, Question 18(B).
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which can be drawn from this Table are:
a) Only a very small proportion (slightly more than 
1 per cent) of Bills was rejected outright by 
the Senate. A further 1 per cent of Bills were 
initially rejected, but later enacted in either 
an identical or an only slightly amended form;
b) Approximately 12 per cent of the government 
legislation considered by the Senate was amended 
in the Chamber. (This figure ignores the plethora 
of unsuccessful amendments moved, and refers only 
to the total number of Bills amended, not to the 
actual number of amendments moved);
c) Over the seventy-two year period, the number of 
Bills rejected or amended by the Senate decreased 
both in absolute terms and in proportion to the 
number of Bills enacted;
d) Senate amendments (or requests for amendments) 
were in most cases either totally or substant­
ially successful. Only 4 per cent of Senate 
amendments or requests were rejected by the 
House of Representatives. In 56 per cent of 
cases the House accepted the Senate view; in 
the remaining instances a compromise was reached.
The general conclusion from this evidence is there­
fore that there were only a relatively small number of 
instances of Senate rejection or amendment of legislation; 
however, the amendments proposed by the Senate were almost 
always successful. This is particularly evident if one 
isolates out Senate requests for amendments to Money Bills.
2 2 7 .
Odgers cites 58 Money Bills to which the Senate made 
requests; in only 5 cases were Senate requests not 
accepted by the House; on a further 10 Bills the Senate 
pressed its requests and a compromise between the Houses 
was reached. On the remaining Bills Senate requests 
were accepted (though often after Senate reiteration 
of its  request).22
A general rider must be added to this view of the 
Senate so successfully persuing its  amendments and requests. 
Further examination of amendments proposed in the Chamber 
reveals that a high proportion could best be termed 
technical; that is, they embodied a 'tidying up' or 
reformulation in more precise terms which did not alter 
the general policy implications of the Bill. Moreover, 
most of these technical amendments were proposed by the 
minister in charge of the Bill in the Chamber. I t is 
d ifficult to determine the proportion of Government 
amendments which reflected governmental reconsideration 
after reactions (from Parliamentarians and from interested 
groups) aired in the synapse between House and Senate 
deliberations.
Table VI:3 reveals that the number of Bills rejected 
(though not necessarily the number amended) by the Senate 
was striking in three periods: during the Fifth, Twelfth
and Twenty-Second Parliaments (1913-1914, 1929-1931 and 
1955-1958). In these three periods non-Government 
Senators held a majority of seats in the Chamber.
See Odgers, op.cit., pp.354-362. Senate reactions to Money Bills 
will be discussed in rrore detail later in this Chapter.
22
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TABLE VI:4
THE PARTY COMPOSITION1OF THE SENATE AND OF THE 
FEDERAL MINISTRY, 1901-1972
Parliament Ministry Senate Majority
1901-1903
1903-1906
1906-1910
1910-1913
1913- 1914
1914- 1917 
1917-1919 
1919-1922 
1922-1925 
1925-1928
1928- 1929
1929- 1931 
1931-1934 
1934-1937 
1937-1940 
1940-1943 
1943-1946 
1946-1949 
1949-1951 
1951-1954
1954- 1955
1955- 1958 
1958-1961 
1961-1963 
1963-1966 
1966-1969 
1969-1972
Non-Labor Non-Labor
Non-Labor Labor Non-Labor
non-Labor (1904)
Non-Labor —9 Labor (1908-09) "
-9 non-Labor
Labor
Non-Labor
Labor —9 non-Labor
Non-Labor
Non-Labor
Non-Labor
Non-Labor
Non-Labor
Labor
Non-Labor
Non-Labor
Non-Labor
Non-Labor —9 Labor
Labor
Labor
Non-Labor
Non-Labor
Labor
it
(1916-17) "
Non-Labor
it
i
ii
ii
ii
ii
ii
ti
(1941-43)
Labor
ii
ii
Non-Labor
II
tied2
Non-Labor
ii 3tied — > Uncertain 
Uncertain
Notes
1. For simplicity, parties are grouped as Labor or non- 
Labor, 'Non-Labor' includes Protectionist/Free Trade, 
Liberal, Nationalist, United Australia Party, Liberal/ 
National Country Party.
2. Tied: 30 Government and 30 non-Government.
3. Uncertain: relatively even Government and non-Government
representation, with the D.L.P. and/or Independents 
holding the balance of power.
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T a b le  V I : 4 d e p i c t s  th e  p a r t y  c o m p o s it io n  o f  th e  
S e n a te  v i s - a - v i s  t h a t  o f  th e  F e d e r a l  G overnm ent b e tw e e n  
1901  and 1 9 7 2 . For m o st o f  th e  p e r io d  s i n c e  f e d e r a t i o n  
th e  G overnm ent h e ld  a m a j o r i t y  o f  th e  s e a t s  in  th e  U pper  
H ou se . D is c o u n t in g  th e  f i r s t  d e c a d e 2 3 , t h e  im p o r ta n t  
e x c e p t i o n s  a r e  th e  p e r io d s  1 9 1 3 -1 9 1 4  ( th e  Cook L ib e r a l  
M i n i s t r y ) ,  1 9 2 9 -1 9 3 1  ( th e  S c u l l i n  L abor G overn m ent) and  
from  1955 ( e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  1 9 5 5 -1 9 5 8  M en z ie s  L i b e r a l -  
C o u n try  P a r ty  G o v e r n m e n t) .
C om p arison  o f  T a b le s  V I : 3 and V I : 4 d e m o n s tr a te s  
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a c o in c id e n c e  b e tw e e n  f l u c t u a t i o n s  in  
S e n a te  r e j e c t i o n  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  and th e  G o v ern m en t/ 
O p p o s i t io n  b a la n c e  in  t h e  Chamber. In 1 9 1 3 -1 9 1 4  6 p e r  
c e n t  o f  a l l  G overnm ent l e g i s l a t i o n  c o n s id e r e d  b y  th e  
S e n a te  w as r e j e c t e d ;  in  1 9 3 1 -1 9 3 4 , 8 p e r  c e n t ;  and  
in  1 9 5 5 -1 9 5 8 , 5 p e r  c e n t .  In  o t h e r  w o r d s , t h e  o c c a s io n s  
on w h ic h  m o st g o v ern m en t l e g i s l a t i o n  w as r e j e c t e d  w ere  
P a r l ia m e n ts  in  w h ic h  th e  g o v ern m en t d id  n o t  h a v e  a 
m a j o r i t y  in  th e  S e n a t e . 24
A more d e t a i l e d  p i c t u r e  o f  S e n a te  l e g i s l a t i v e  
a c t i v i t y  o v e r  t im e ,  and d e t a i l s  o f  th e  l e g i s l a t i o n  r e j e c t e d  
by t h e  S e n a t e ,  i s  p r o v id e d  in  th e  Summary o f  e a c h  o f  th e  
T w en ty -S e v e n  P a r l ia m e n t s  in c lu d e d  a s  A p p en d ix  I I I .
During th is  period  most Governments h e ld  on ly  a m inority o f  th e  
se a ts  in  the House o f  R ep resen tatives, and no Government had a 
m ajority in  both Federal Hauses. The high r e je c t io n  ra te  for  
1903-1906 (4 per cen t o f  a l l  Government le g is la t io n )  i s  a c le a r  
r e f le c t io n  o f  m in is te r ia l in s t a b i l i t y .
This co incidence was even mare marked in  the p eriod  1972-75, when 
th e  Writlam Labor Government faced a h o s t i le  Senate and su ffered  
th e r e je c t io n  or deferred, o f  20 (of 456) B i l l s  in  the Twenty- 
Eighth Parliam ent and 58 (of 203) in  the Twenty-Ninth Parliam ent -  
i . e .  4 per cen t o f  Government le g is la t io n  in  1972-74 and a staggerin g  
29 per cent in  1974-75. See the document incorporated in  Hansard by 
Senator D. McClelland on 15 October 1975, C .P.D .: Sen, pp. 1143-1145.
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The Senate and Money Bills
An earlier Chapter referred to debate at the Federal
Conventions of the 1890s on the financial power of the
Senate, and to the eventual compromise whereby the Senate
was prohibited from either originating or itself amending
legislation classified as Money Bills. There is no
Constitutional or statutory definition of a Money Bill;
Odgers' working definition is:'
"... a proposed law which appropriates revenue 
or moneys, or imposes taxation, and which shall 
not originate in the Senate."25
To be more specific; those Bills which must originate in 
the House of Representatives and to which the Senate can 
only request amendments are: taxation Bills and Bills
appropriating for the ordinary annual services of the 
Government. Other categories of financial legislation 
can be initiated in and amended by the Senate26 (but not 
so as to increase "any proposed charge or burden on the 
people"27). There are no restrictions on the Senate's 
power to veto any type of financial legislation, or on 
its right to press (repeat) its requests for amendment.
To what degree has the Senate utilized its extensive 
powers over Money Bills?
, The right of the Senate to initiate certain classes
of financial measures was claimed in the first months of
25 Qp.cit., p.312.
26 M d '  PP-314-317, 334.
Constitution, Section 53. For debate on this restriction see 
Ibid, pp.340-343, 346-348.
2 31.
the First Parliament; in June 1901 a Post and Telegraph 
Bill was initiated in the Upper House. For the seventy- 
two year period, however, only occasional use was made of 
this possibility.28 In 1921 President Givens ruled that 
a Bill initiated in the Senate which involved an approp­
riation of revenue could be dealt with by the Senate, 
then sent to the Lower House where an appropriation clause 
could be included; the Bill would then be returned to the 
Senate for final approval.29 Again, little use was made 
of this p r o c e d u r e . 30
Table V I : 3 demonstrated the success of Senate amend­
ments and requests. For those financial measures which 
the Senate is entitled to amend, the procedure is the same 
as for ordinary legislation. Standing Orders 236 and 237 
provide that, where the House of Representatives does not 
agree to Senate amendments, or itself amends Senate amendments, 
the Upper House has complete discretion as to whether it 
continues to insist on its amendments, makes further 
amendments, or lays the Bill aside. Thus on Bills which 
the Senate is entitled to amend and on which it reiterates 
its amendments, the Lower House is eventually forced either 
to concede or c o m p r o m i s e 31, or to allow the Bill to lapse.
Other instances were: the Income Tax Assessment Bill 1923; the
Vhaling Bill 1935; the Post and Telegraph Rates Bill 1949; the 
Air Navigation (Charges) Bill 1964; and the Air Navigation 
(Charges) Bill 1970.
29 Odgers, op.cit., p.317.
30 Exaitples are: the Aluminium Industry Bill 1960; the Blcwering Water 
Storage Works Agreement Rill 1963; the Chowilla Reservoir Agreement 
Bill 1963; the Social Services Bill 1966; the Scholarships Bill 
1967; and the Independent Schools (Financial Assistance) Bill 1968.
31 Standing Orders 237 and 241 provide guidelines for reaching some 
finality on a Bill that has been back and forth between the Houses.
2 3 2 .
On B i l ls  to  which the Senate may only re q u e s t 
amendments, the p o s it io n  is  re v e rse d ; i f  the  House of 
R ep re sen ta tiv e s  r e je c t s  Senate re q u e s ts , i t  i s  the  Senate 
which must decide w hether to  concede (by n o t co n tin u in g  ' 
to  p re s s  i t s  re q u e s t)  o r to  veto  the  e n t i r e  B i l l .  The 
House of R ep re sen ta tiv e s  has g e n e ra lly  adopted the  view 
o f Quick and G arran32 t h a t  the Senate is  n o t e n t i t l e d  to  
re p e a t i t s  re q u e s ts  a f t e r  House r e je c t io n  o f th e se ; the  
Senate has upheld i t s  r ig h t  to  p re ss  req u es ts  s in ce  1903. 
M orever, in  most cases the  House has conceded (whether 
im m ediately o r  a f t e r  Senate r e i t e r a t i o n 33) -  though o fte n  
p re fa c in g  such concession  w ith  a s ta tem en t th a t  i t s  a c tio n  
in  no way r e f le c te d  accep tance o f the S e n a te 's  r i g h t  e i th e r  
to  ex p ec t House accep tance  of Senate req u es ts  o r to  
r e i t e r a t e  r e q u e s t s .34
A ccording to  Quick and G arran, the phrase  'o rd in a ry
annual s e rv ic e s ' r e f e r s  to
" . . .  the  v a rio u s  p u b lic  departm ents manned and 
equipped to  ca rry  on the genera l work o f the  
Government departm en ts, . . . ,  the money to  pay 
fo r  which i s  voted  by P arliam ent from y ear to  
y e a r . " 3 5
The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Gonroonwealth, Angus 
and Robertson, Sydney, 1901, pp.671-673.
Odgers notes tha t on 35 of the 58 Bills to which the Senate requested 
amendments between 1901 and 1972, the House immediately accepted 
Senate requests; cn 3 the Government introduced a new B ill 
incorporating the Senate's requests. Cn 11 occasions the Senate 
pressed i t s  requests; cn 8 Bills the House finally  acceded, and 
on 2 occasions the Government produced a new B ill incorporating 
the Senate requests. Op.cit. , pp.354-362.
Odgers concludes; "The hopelessness of the House of Representatives 
position is  manifest in the very fact that, notwithstanding i ts  
'without prejudice' resolutions, i t  continues to receive and 
consider the Senate's reiterated  requests, stubbornly refusing to 
admit the Senate's undoubted right to  press a request." Ibid, p.354.
C p.cit., p.669.35
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U n d e r  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  -  w h ic h  S e n a t o r s ,  b u t  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
a l l  G o v e r n m e n t s , h a v e  a d h e r e d  t o  -  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  f o r  
new w o r k s  o r  f o r -  p o l i c i e s  n o t  p r e v i o u s l y  a u t h o r i s e d  
c a n n o t  fo r m  p a r t  o f  t h e  ' o r d i n a r y  a n n u a l  s e r v i c e s '  a n d  
t h e r e f o r e ,  u n l e s s  t a x a t i o n  B i l l s ,  a r e  a b l e  t o  b e  o r i g i n a t e d  
i n  a n d  am en d ed  b y  t h e  S e n a t e . 36
On o c c a s i o n s  t h e  S e n a t e  h a s  h a d  t o  f o r c e  a  G o v e rn m e n t  
t o  a c c e p t  t h i s  v i e w .  The m o s t ' i n t e r e s t i n g  e x a m p le  o c c u r r e d  
i n  1 9 6 4 -1 9 6 5  w hen  t h e  t h e n  n o n - L a b o r  G o v e rn m e n t  a n n o u n c e d  
t h a t  i n  f u t u r e  an  o m n ib u s  A p p r o p r i a t i o n s  B i l l  ( i n c l u d i n g  
A p p r o p r i a t i o n s  f o r  W orks a n d  S e r v i c e s  p r e v i o u s l y  p r e s e n t e d  
a s  s e p a r a t e  m e a s u r e s )  w o u ld  b e  i n t r o d u c e d .  S e n a t o r s  w e r e  
i n d i g n a n t  a t  t h e  r e v e r s a l  o f  a  p r a c t i c e  f o l l o w e d  f o r  m ore  
t h a n  f i f t y  y e a r s ;  a n d  a  C o m m it te e  o f  G o v e rn m e n t  S e n a t o r s  
h e a d e d  b y  S e n a t o r  C orm ack  r e p o r t e d  i n  f a v o u r  o f  c o n t i n u a n c e  
o f  t h e  p r e c e d e n t .  The G o v e rn m e n t  c a p i t u l a t e d 37 a n d  t h e  
T r e a s u r e r  a n n o u n c e d  t h a t  i n  f u t u r e  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  e x p e n d i t u r e  w o u ld  b e  o p e n  t o  S e n a t e  
a m e n d m e n t :  p u b l i c  w o r k s  a n d  c o n s t r u c t i o n ;  a c q u i s i t i o n
o f  s i t e s  a n d  b u i l d i n g s ;  p l a n t  a n d  e q u i p m e n t  c a p i t a l  i t e m s ;  
new p o l i c i e s  n o t  a u t h o r i z e d  b y  s p e c i a l  l e g i s l a t i o n ;  a n d  
S e c t i o n  96 g r a n t s  t o  t h e  S t a t e s . 38 T h i s  w as  an  i n s t a n c e  
o f  t h e  S e n a t e  a c t i n g  f o r c i b l y  t o  p r o t e c t  i t s  p o w e r s  o v e r  
f i n a n c i a l  l e g i s l a t i o n .
For f u r t h e r  deb a te  on t h i s  q u e s t io n ,  see  Odgers, o p . c i t . , p p .321-325.
Except abou t defence  e x p e n d i tu re ,  which was h e n c e fo r th  in c lu d ed
i n  the  A p p ro p r ia t io n  B i l l  f o r  th e  o rd in a ry  annual s e r v ic e s .
38 CPH:H o f  R (13 May 1965), V ol.46 , pp. 1484-1485.
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The final matter for consideration in this Section 
is the Senate's power to veto Money Bills. Earlier in 
the Chapter it was shown that the Senate has not rejected 
many Government Bills, whether ordinary or Money Bills. 
Moreover, during the period 1901-1972 the Senate never 
rejected Supply.
Odgers comments:
"The only restrictions on the exercise by the 
Senate of its financial powers are the restraint 
which it traditionally exercises and the electoral 
sanction. A Senate which used its powers 
capriciously could suffer only one fate - 
punishment at the ballot-box. But a Senate, 
which correctly interprets the mood of the 
electorate, has a quite remarkable annual 
opportunity - by refusing to join in the grant 
of Supply - to bring about the dissolution of 
the House of Representatives and the resignation 
of the Government which that House virtually 
appoints. This greatest of the Senate's powers 
has never been used. But like the latent power 
to imprison persons for breach of Parliamentary 
privilege, it is there to be brought out and 
used when circumstances warrant."^9
He argues that the power of veto "should be used circum­
spectly and wisely", taking into account the fact that the 
House of Representatives is "the governing House" and 
that, where a Government has a mandate, "the Senate may 
yield". On the other hand, he urges the duty of the 
Senate to check upon the Lower House and Senators' right 
to oppose "extreme measures for which a Government has 
not a mandate."40
39 Cp.cit., p.364.
40 Ibid, p.4.
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One could argue that the fact that the Senate never 
rejected Supply during the seventy-two year period demon­
strated such discretion and wisdom. On the other hand, 
the possibility of Senate rejection of Supply is closely 
tied to the relative balance between government and non­
government representation in the Chamber. A Senate 
dominated by the government party or parties is presumably 
unlikely to reject Supply. A hostile Senate may (and this 
occurred, most notably in 19704 1 ) debate such action.
The events of 1974-1975, outside the scope of this 
thesis, demonstrated that even a hostile Senate intent on 
using the threat of exercise of the power to reject Supply 
in order to unseat a government, may be so influenced by 
precedent that it avoids the ultimate step of rejection.42
In September 1975 the then Attorney General,
K.E. Enderby, argued that the Senate's power to veto 
Supply "had atrophied and become a dead letter." Not 
only Odgers, but also legal advice from two eminent Queen's 
Councillors43, rejected this argument. Of the debate on 
this issue from 1974, it may be briefly stated that no 
finality has been reached. Odgers himself leaves open the 
question of what type of situation warrants/justifies 
Senate exercise of its power over Money Bills.44
41 See debate cn the States Receipts Duties (Administration) Bill 
1970, CPD:Sen., Vol.44, p.2647ff.
42 In May 1974 and October 1975 the Senate formally deferred 
consideration of Supply.
H3 See the opinions from S.E.K. Hulme and T.E.F. Hughes, incorporated 
in CPD:Sen, (16 October 1975) pp. 12 31-12 34.
44 Cp.cit., p.364.
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General Debate
Senators interviewed between 1969 and 1971 regarded 
the opportunities for debate in the Senate as far more 
extensive, and flexible, than those applying in the House 
of Representatives. Such opportunities would necessarily 
be greater in a smaller House; however, Senate Standing 
Orders also maximise both the possibilities for debate 
and the time allowed an individual speaker. In the 
Interview Schedule I asked (Question 15 (A)):
It is said that the individual member has more 
chance to speak in debate and even to introduce 
legislation in the Senate than in the House of 
Representatives. Would you agree?
All respondents agreed that the individual Senator had 
more opportunities to speak than the MHR (and 60 per cent 
felt that a Senator had more opportunities to both speak 
and introduce legislation). Typical responses were:
"Because of numbers Senators have the 
opportunity to speak more frequently."
"You have the same debating time and 
working time with half the numbers."
In addition, 63 per cent of respondents felt that the 
standard of debate was far higher in the Senate than in 
the House of Representatives.45 This is a subjective 
judgment; and it should be noted that, in response to 
another Question, few Senators felt that Senate debate 
had much influence on the outcome of divisions.46
45
46
Interview Question 15 (B). 
Question 4(B).
237 .
In order to assess the opportunities for debate 
provided for Senators it is necessary to first list those 
occasions (Motions) on which debate is not possible. 
(Similar restrictions apply for MHRs.) Briefly, the 
following motions cannot be debated:
i) the closure motion ("That the Question be now 
put") 4 7;
ii) formal motions (motions on which no Senator 
objects to their having precedence over all 
other motions and Orders of the Day)48;
iii) motions for the immediate determination of an 
objection to a ruling of the President49;
iv) motions for the postponement of business50, 
adjournment of debate51, printing of a 
petition5 2;
v) motions for suspension of a Senator53, for 
extension of a speaker's time54;
vi) motions for the withdrawal of strangers55;
vii) motions for the declaration of a Bill as an 
urgent Bill5 8;
viii) motions for the first reading of ordinary Bills
(i.e. not for the first reading of Money Bills)57;
ix) in committee, motions that the Chairman vacate
the Chair and that the Chairman report progress58.
Apart from these restrictions, any Senator is 
entitled to speak once (and twice in the committee stage) 
on any matter under debate (Standing Order 407). Until 
1919 there was no time limit to Senators' speeches. After
4 7 Standing Order 431. 5 5 Standing Order 379.
4 8 Standing Orders 70 to 73. 56 Standing Order 407B; the
49 Standing Order 61. guillotine procedure was adopted in 1926.
5 0 Standing Orders 74 and 65. 5 7 Standing Order 189.
51 Standing Orders 422, 431, 435 and 436.
52 Standing Orders 96 and 97. 5 8 Standing Orders 280 and 281.
5 3 Standing Order 438.
5 4 Standing Order 407A.
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a 1 filibuster' effort by Senator Gardiner on the Commonwealth 
Electoral Bill 1918 (he spoke for 12 hours), Standing Order 
407A was adopted59; this limits a Senator to speaking 
for one hour except: (a) on the Address-in-Reply debate;
(b) on the first reading of a Money Bill; and (c) when 
moving the second reading of a Bill. On each of these 
occasions the time limit is one and a half hours. Addition­
ally, a Senator exercising the right of reply can speak 
for only 30 minutes; and in Committee, a Senator can speak 
for only 15 minutes on any one occasion. In 1972 a further 
proviso was added stipulating that when Senate proceedings 
were being broadcast, a Senator could speak for a maximum 
of 30 minutes. Special time restrictions apply to matters 
such as debate on the election of a President, on the 
adjournment motion, on matters of urgency and on urgent 
Bills.60
In most of the above categories, the time allowed 
for a Senator to speak can be extended by suspension of 
Standing Orders. The time limits for speeches by MHRs, 
and the number of occasions on which they can speak, are 
far more restrictive than the provisions applying for 
Senators.61 The greater number of sitting days per annum 
of the House of Representatives is not of a sufficient 
margin for the twice as many MHRs to be afforded an 
opportunity to speak equal to that allowed Senators.
Further problems for the MHR are: the Government's
Not without strong opposition; See CPD:Sen, Vol.89, pp. 11477-11502. 
60 Standing Orders 64 and 40 7B.
6 1 See House of Representatives Standing Orders, Nos
ability to set the order, nature and time devoted to 
business in the House; the disproportionate number of 
ministers and hence of ministerial statements and second 
reading speeches; and the time devoted to debate on 
censure motions moved by the opposition. A former President 
of the Senate, Sir Alister McMullin, summarised the Senate 
procedural rules which facilitate critical review by 
Senators:
"Business is conducted more deliberately 
than in the hard pressed Lower House and 
more time is allowed Senators speaking in 
debate. For example, in discussing the 
principle of a Bill at the second reading 
stage, a Senator may speak for one hour, 
but a Member of the House of Representatives 
is allowed only 30 minutes. Then again, 
in the Committee stage of a Bill when the 
details may be considered clause by clause, 
Senators have unlimited opportunities to 
speak, for 15 minutes at any one time, 
compared with two opportunities, of 10 
minutes each, available to a member of 
the House of Representatives. Another 
rule which safeguards the exercise of 
the reviewing function of the Upper House 
is that, when a Senator has the floor, he 
holds it until the expiration of his time.
In contrast, a Member of the House of 
Representatives may be ’gagged* - i.e., 
interrupted by another Member moving 
that the Question by put - or by a 
motion that he be not further heard."62
It is fitting that the Senate, as a House of Review, 
has procedures and rules of debate which foster the 
possibility of detailed scrutiny of legislation.
The Australian Senate: an Introduction, Government Printing
Office, Canberra, 1969, p . 3. This pamphlet was written for 
distribution to all visitors to Parliament House.
62
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Question Time and Adjournment Debates
Question Time, and to a lesser extent the debate 
on the Adjournment motion at the end of each day of 
sitting, afford MPs the opportunity to enforce executive 
accountability to the Federal Parliament. The Standing 
Orders of the Senate have never prescribed a limit to 
the duration of time devoted to Questions without notice; 
in practice, the Leader of the Government in the Senate 
terminates Question Time (often by requesting that any 
further Questions be placed on the Notice Paper for 
later answer). In the Senate, Question Time normally 
lasts for between 45 and 60 minutes (the fact that only 
45 minutes of Questions are broadcast by the A.B.C. is 
probably as much of a determinant of the duration of 
Question Time as the whim of the Government Leader).
By Standing Order 99 certain types of information, language 
and subject matter cannot be the subject of a Question.63 
Questions on Notice (i.e. Questions for which prior notice 
has been given to the Clerk) are raised, where time 
permits, at the cessation of Questions without notice; 
alternatively, both Question and answer can be incorporated 
in Hansard.
At Question Time Senators have three important 
advantages over MHRs: they can repeat a Question to 
which they have not received an answer; they can ask 
supplementary Questions based on information provided
63 See Odgers, op.cit., p.165.
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in an answer to a previous Question; and they can ask 
more than one separate Question during Question Time on 
a particular day.64 During Question Time in the House 
of Representatives, supplementary Questions are prohibited, 
and Members are unable to ask more than one Question on 
a particular day (unless their colleagues waive precedence 
to them, as often happens within the opposition party).
The time limit for Question Time in the House has varied, 
according to Standing Orders, but has usually been between 
30 and 45 minutes per day.
From 1901 to 1903 Senate Adjournment Debate could 
only be concerned with the question of whether or not 
the Chamber should adjourn at that point (generally 10.30 
or 11.00 pm). However, a resolution passed in October 
1903, and adopted as Standing Order 63 in December 1905, 
provides that debate can occur on matters not relevant 
to the actual question of adjournment.65 Therefore the 
debate on Adjournment of the Senate provides another 
opportunity for Senators to raise matters relating to 
the government's administration. There is a time limit 
of one hour for each speaker66; in practice, most Senators 
speak for only a few minutes, and the total Adjournment 
Debate covers from one to one and a half hours.
Scrutiny of the executive is not the only topic 
for debate at Question Time or in the Adjournment Debate.
64 See Ibid, pp.163, 174-175.
65 See Ibid, pp. 147-149.
66 Standing Order 40 7A.
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Both of these provide an opportunity for airing of 
constituency grievances; the presentation of Petitions 
is another avenue for ventilation of electoral views.
Petitions
In both Chambers of Federal Parliament Members 
have the opportunity to present Petitions - seeking 
redress of grievances or demonstrating the viewpoint 
of a person or persons. MPs are bound to present any 
Petitions addressed to them, irrespective of their 
content or of the MP's views on the content. In the 
Senate, presentation of Petitions was a common phenomenon 
in the First Parliament (a total of 201); a rare occurrence 
from then until the late 1960s (in eight sessions only 
1 petition was presented); and a revived practice from 
the late 1960s (159 in 1968-1971)67.
The presentation of Petitions is not a very effective 
weapon for citizens. The subject matter is recorded in 
Hansard, but generally no action is taken thereupon. In 
1970 the Clerk of the Senate recommended establishment 
of a Senate Committee on Petitions to examine the nature 
of and subsequent action to be taken about Petitions; 
he noted that in countries such as the United Kingdom,
New Zealand, West Germany and the Netherlands, such 
separate committees exist and report to the Legislature.68 
Although his suggestion was not acted upon, the specialist
67 See the table in Odgers, op.cit., p.153.
68 Parliamentary Paper nuriber 2 of 1970, pp.18-24.
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Standing committees established in 1970 were authorised 
to consider any relevant Petitions referred to them by 
the Senate, and a few Petitions were so referred. However, 
one can only conclude that Australian Federal MPs, Senators 
and MHRs alike, have not generally regarded Petitions as 
deserving of any attention other than mere tabling in 
the Legislature.
Senate Committees
The current Clerk of the Senate has cited seven 
factors which he believes create the necessity for a 
system of committees - both select and standing - within 
any legislature:
"(1) Increasing governmental responsibilities 
and activities;
(2) The impact of the tremendous progress in 
science and technology;
(3) The complexity of legislation which cannot 
always be satisfactorily considered within 
narrow Parliamentary time-tables;
(4) The inadequacy of opportunities and means
on the floor of the House to discharge fully 
Parliament's important duty to probe and 
check the Administration;
(5) The inadequacy of present-day means for the 
ventilation of citizens' grievances against 
administrative decisions or acts;
(6) Growing Executive expertise and secrecy; and
(7) The need, in an increasingly expert world, 
for parliamentarians to be able to call 
upon scholarly research and advice equal 
in competence to that relied upon by the 
Administration."6 9
Report for the Standing Orders Gommittee cn Standing Committees, 
issued in 3 parts by the Clerk's Office in November 1969,
January 1970 and March 1970, Part II, p.5.
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I t  is common for members of Upper Houses to devote 
a fa ir proportion of their energies to committee work. 
Australian Senators are no exception; consistently since 
1901 the Senate has outpaced the House of Representatives 
in terms of the number, type and activ ities  of Parlia­
mentary committees.
Following British practice, the Australian Senate 
s its  as a Committee of the Whole for the detailed, clause 
by clause examination of legislation after the second 
reading stage. Every Bill which is discussed in the 
Senate is subjected to examination in the Committee of 
the Whole (though the amount of time spent on this stage 
varies from Bill to B ill). In contrast, in 1963 the 
House of Representatives adopted Standing Order 222 which 
permits omission of the Committee stage i f  no Member 
objects. This provision has been u tilised  to the extent 
that on average only about one-quarter of the Bills which 
are debated in the Lower House are now given detailed 
consideration. 7 0
In addition to the Committee of the Whole, the 
Senate from 1901 established a variety of small committees 
which can be labelled select committees in that the ir 
membership is less than that of the fu ll Senate. Most 
of these select committees were ad hoc select committees 
established with a limited frame of reference (for example, 
to consider a particular topic or B ill and to report back
In 1971 only 24 per cent of the total nunber of Bills which 
passed the House of Representatives were debated in Committee ;
G.S. Reid, "Parliament and the Bureaucracy", in Vfao Runs 
Australia?, Angus and Robertson for A. I.P.S., Sydney, 1972, p.8.
70
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to the Chamber within a specified time period). The 
first of these Committees - on Tasmania and Australia 
Steamship Communication - was appointed by the First 
Senate on 26 July 1901. For the seventy-two year period
a total of 38 Select Committees reported back to the Senate.71 
The tempo of Senate select committee activity increased 
in later decades: 12 of these committees were established
from 1960.
The narrow terms of reference and prescribed nature 
of select committees have both positive and negative features. 
On several occasions Committees reported that they were 
unable to investigate a matter in sufficient depth, or 
that their terms of reference were too narrow.72 In addition, 
Senators felt that by giving attention to only this type 
of parliamentary committee they were neglecting the need 
for continuing oversight of the executive. For this 
executive scrutiny to be possible a system of standing 
committees (whose frame of reference is broader and which 
are established for the duration of a session or Parliament 
and may be automatically reconstituted at the beginning 
of a new session or Parliament) seemed more useful.
In 1929 the Senate established a Select Committee 
to consider a system of standing committees; this reported 
in favour of establishing two specific standing committees - 
on regulations and ordinances and on external affairs - and
Odgers, op.cit., provides a complete list on pp.430-432.
See Report for the Standing Orders Committee on Standing 
Committees, Part II, p.4; and Report of the Senate Select 
Committee on Offshore Petroleum Resources, 1971, pp. 192-193.
72
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recom m ended c h a n g e s  t o  th e  S e n a te  S t a n d in g  O rd ers  s o  t h a t  
B i l l s  c o u ld  b e e a s i l y  r e f e r r e d  t o  e i t h e r  s e l e c t  o r  s t a n d in g  
c o m m it te e s .  The reco m m en d a tio n  f o r  an e x t e r n a l  a f f a i r s  
c o m m itte e  w as ig n o r e d .  S ta n d in g  O rd ers w ere  am ended in  
1 9 3 4 , b u t  l i t t l e  u s e  w as made o f  th e  p r o c e d u r e ;  in  th e  
s e v e n t y - t w o  y e a r  p e r io d  o n ly  3 B i l l s  w ere  r e f e r r e d  t o  a 
s e l e c t  c o m m it t e e .73
The o n ly  lo n g  te r m  a c h ie v e m e n t  a f t e r  th e  1929 R e p o r t  
w as th e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  in  1932 o f  th e  R e g u la t io n s  and  
O r d in a n c e s  C o m m itte e . T h is  s e v e n  member C om m ittee  s c r u t i n i z e s  
a l l  r e g u l a t i o n s  and o r d in a n c e s  t a b le d  in  th e  S e n a te  w i t h i n  
th e  fram ew ork o f  fo u r  p r i n c i p l e s  e n u n c ia t e d  in  th e  1929  
R e p o r t :
" ( 1 )  T h at th e y  a r e  in  a c c o r d a n c e  w it h  t h e  S t a t u t e ;
(2 ) t h a t  t h e y  do n o t  t r e s p a s s  u n d u ly  on p e r s o n a l  
r i g h t s  and l i b e r t i e s ;
(3 ) t h a t  th e y  do n o t  u n d u ly  make th e  r i g h t s  and  
l i b e r t i e s  o f  c i t i z e n s  d e p e n d e n t  upon  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  and n o t  upon j u d i c i a l  
d e c i s i o n s ;
(4 ) t h a t  th e y  a r e  c o n c e r n e d  w it h  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
d e t a i l  and do n o t  am ount t o  s u b s t a n t i v e  
l e g i s l a t i o n  w h ic h  s h o u ld  b e  a m a t te r  f o r  
P a r lia m e n ta r y  e n a c t m e n t ." 74
The C om m ittee  i s  a s s i s t e d  by a l e g a l  a d v i s e r  who 
c o n s id e r s  D e p a r tm e n ta l s u b m is s io n s  in  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e
73 The Central Reserve Bank B i l l  1930; the C o n stitu tion  A ltera tio n  
(Avoidance o f  Double D isso lu tio n  Deadlocks) B i l l  1950; the  
Camonwealth Bank B i l l  1950 (No.2) ;
Such a procedure can be manipulated by non-government Senators 
to  delay con sid eration  o f  measures or in  l ie u  o f  formal 
r e je c t io n  o f  a B i l l .
74 Parliam entary Paper Number S . l  o f  1929-1931, paragraph 23, 
p p .544-545.
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reasons for and the potential effects of a regulation 
or ordinance; he submits his views for full Committee 
consideration. ’ Like all other Senate committees, the 
Regulations and Ordinances Committee has no executive 
power; it can only report to the Chamber, which may 
either accept or reject its recommendations. Moreover, 
individual Senators, whether or not they are members of 
the Committee, may move for the disallowance of any item 
of delegated legislation. The practical situation is 
that individual Senators (and MHRs) rarely have the time 
or the expertise to personally examine in detail every 
piece of delegated legislation. The House of Represent­
atives, from the establishment of the Regulations and 
Ordinances Committee, rarely took any interest in delegated 
legislation; and few Senators who are not members of the 
Committee were involved in this aspect of Parliamentary 
scrutiny of the executive. Odgers concludes:
"... both Houses of Parliament are content to leave to this important committee the 
^.Parliamentary oversight of the Government's 
regulation making power."75
It is a sign of the respect which this Committee is granted 
that its recommendations are generally adopted by the 
Chamber. 76
Although external observers and some Senators called 
for the creation of additional standing committees over
75 Qp.cit., p.421.
For further discussion on this Committee, see Ibid, pp.403-408.
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the following 30 years, no steps were taken until the 
late 1960s. During the Twenty-Sixth Parliament the 
Senate Standing Orders Committee began a study of the 
case for establishing a network of standing committees 
similar to those in the British, Canadian and New Zealand 
Legislatures. At the request of the Committee the Clerk 
produced a Report77 which included:
(a) a brief resume of the advantages and functions 
of standing committees;
(b) a thoughtful examination of committees existing 
in the House of Commons and the Canadian Senate, 
and a brief note on parliamentary committees in 
New Zealand, with reference to their relevance 
to the Australian Senate;
(c) proposals for six specialist 'watchdog' committees 
on statutory corporations, science and technology, 
petitions, broadcasting and television, narcotics, 
and national publicity and public relations;
(d) proposals for six legislative and general purpose
committees in the areas of: external affairs and
defence; transport and communications; trade, in­
dustry and labour; legal, constitutional and home 
affairs; health, welfare, education and science; 
and national finance and development.
77 Report for the Standing Orders Coirmittee, op.cit.
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The Clerk suggested that the committees proposed in 
(c) and (d) could enquire into any matter referred to them 
by the Senate; and that such references could cover 
legislation before the Chamber, matters of concern which 
may in the future be the subject of legislation, investi­
gation of the administration of existing legislation and 
consideration of the relevant sections of the annual 
Estimates. At the same time, he stressed that the proper 
role of the committees was that of "inquiry and counsel 
and of throwing light into dark corners"; committees 
could not make policy or criticise existing policy, and 
would be wiser to avoid "hot and controversial political 
issues".7 8
Without denigrating the efforts of Senate Select 
Committees, the Clerk felt that standing committees 
would be preferable in that they would enable 
continuous scrutiny of an area of governmental
78 Ibid, Part II (January 1970), p.5.
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activity; the terms of reference might not be so narrowly de­
fined and such committees could consider a particular proposal 
in the light of past, present and future considerations.
During 1969 and 1970 numerous schemes for committee systems 
were unofficially circulated within the Senate (by Senators 
Cotton and Murphy in particular). There was certainly general 
acceptance of the need for some standing committees; but due to 
the variety of schemes being mooted and to the detailed nature 
of the Clerk's Report, the Standing Orders Committee decided to 
put the matter before the Senate as a whole. The Clerk's Report 
was then printed without any accompanying comments or recommenda­
tions.79 This move was designed to avoid initially committing 
any of the major parties, for both the Prime Minister and the 
Leader of the Opposition had reservations about the Odgers 
Report.
However, the reaction to the Report amongst Senators and 
the media was immediate and favourable; for example, David 
Solomon commented:
"Before the Senate at the moment is a report 
written by its Clerk, Mr. J. Odgers, which 
proposes changes to the workings of the 
Senate which imply a complete restructuring 
of the functioning of the Senate and the 
whole parliamentary system. If carried 
through logically and completely the reforms 
would give the Senate everything which re­
formers overseas have been edging towards 
for decades." 80
Parliamentary Paper No.2 of 1970.
80 "A Will to find a way for reform", The Australian, 23 March 1970, p.9. 
See also, The Bulletin, 28 March 1970, pp. 25-27j The Australian, edi­
torials 18 March 1970 and 19 March 1970; The Canberra Times, editorials 
18 March and 23 March 1970, and 24 March 1970; the Australian Financial 
Review, 17 March 1970; Incentive, 25 May 1970; The Australian Parlia­
mentary and Legislative Review, 19 March 1970.
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To many observers the Odgers proposals seemed so far 
reaching that it'was felt unlikely that they would be accept­
able to party leaders. In spite of the Clerk's stress on 
the advisory, non-inquisitional nature of such committees 
journalists felt that Prime Minister Gorton was already 
chagrined by the activities of Senators (none the least those 
of his own party) and would not favour any scheme which might 
result in "Australian Fullbrights or Kefauvers or, perhaps, 
McCarthys." 81 The Australian noted that, "A disposition to 
suffer restraint gladly has not been a marked feature of the 
present Government or Prime Minister. " 82 In similar vein 
The Canberra Times commented:
"The traditional dislike of governments for 
any kind of scrutiny of their actions could 
make the adoption of Mr Odgers' proposals 
difficult." 33
In the event the leaders of the coalition parties, of 
the Labor Party and the Democratic Labor Party (Senators 
Anderson, Murphy and Gair respectively) each put forward a 
motion relating to the establishment of standing committees 
in the Senate. Each motion accepted the need for some system 
of standing committees, but there was disagreement over the 
desired type of committees and over the manner in which they 
should be introduced.
Senator Gair's proposal recommended establishment of 
those committees recommended in the Odgers Report, but with 
a gradual phasing-in period over not less than twelve months
ft 1 Incentive, number 246, 25 May 1970, p.3.
32 Editorial, 19 March 1970.
8 3 Editorial, 23 March 1970.
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and with the initial establishment of only two committees. 
Senator Murphy proposed the immediate establishment of seven 
specific standing committees similar to those proposed by 
Odgers, viz: foreign affairs and defence; constitutional
and legal affairs; health and welfare; finance and govern­
ment operations (including finance for States, statutory 
corporations and local government); education, science and 
the arts; social environment (including housing, transport, 
communications and the provision of other facilities); and 
primary and secondary industry and trade. Senator Anderson 
proposed a gradualist approach whereby the Senate should first­
ly establish five estimates committees (relating to the minis­
terial responsibilities of the 5 Senate Ministers) which would 
scrutinise in detail the annual estimates; and that only after 
considering their operation would the Senate discuss further 
committee developments.
These three motions and the Clerk's Report were consid­
ered in the Senate on 4 and 11 June 1970. Much to the amaze­
ment of observers, Senators voted to accept both the Murphy 
and the Anderson proposals (the votes were 27-26 and 26-25 
respectively); Senator Gair's proposal for the gradual intro­
duction of the legislative standing committees was also 
accepted. 84 On 17 August 1970 Senators agreed on the member­
ship of the two sets of committees (with a Government member 
as Chairman and representation for each of the parties and 
for independents). It was determined that the Standing
84 For debate on the proposals see C.P.D.rSen, Vol.44, pp.2047-2074,
2342-2367, 2755-2762 and Vol.45, pp.103-109 (4 June, 11 June,
18-19 June and 19 August 1970 respectively).
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Committee on Health and Welfare and the Standing Committee on 
Primary and Secondary Industry and Trade would be the initial 
committees; one reference was made to the latter Committee,85 
and two matters (plus a Petition) were referred to the former.86 
The 1970-1971 Estimates were referred to the five committees 
and Senators felt that this was an admirable improvement on 
the former pattern of merely full Committee of the Senate 
consideration.87
Six months after the establishment of the Estimates 
Committees and of the first two Legislative and General Pur­
pose Standing Committees the President reported to the Senate:
"With the specialised knowledge acquired by 
Senators at Committee hearings, debate is 
noticeably more penetrating. There is a 
new and valuable rapport with officers of 
the Public Service. And, with all-Party 
goodwill, there is a recognition of the 
role of Committees in the strengthening of 
the parliamentary system.
In that favourable climate the Senate can 
go forward with confidence in the further 
development of its Committee system."88
"The Senate has been fortunate in having 
its new Committee system well received and 
presented by the press. This has stimulated 
public interest in the Committees' concept 
and work and such interest is in the univer­
sal trend towards increased public participa­
tion in the consideration of national affairs.
Freight rates on the Australian National Line services to and 
frcm Tasmania.
All aspects of repatriation; problems of handicapped persons; 
petition relating to crime in Australia.
See Odgers, op.cit., pp.366-369 for details on their operation; 
and Committees of the Australian Senate, Report by the President, 
Parliamentary Paper No. 32 of 1971, February 1971, pp.3-7. See 
also "Parliament: losing control" in Bulletin, 30 August 1969,
p.29.
88 Committees of the Australian Senate, op.cit., paras 87-88, p.15.
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All those associated with both the new 
Committees and earlier Committees of the 
Senate are impressed by this growth of 
public interest and participation and 
believe that the benefits flowing there­
from will prove to be an outstanding 
feature of the Committee system."89
On 15 March 1971 the Senate adopted the President's 
recommendation that the Senate should implement the 
remaining five Legislative and General Purpose Standing 
Committees, and this was achieved by 6 October 1971.
During 1970 and 1971 a total of 17 matters and 7 petitions 
were referred to the seven Standing Committees.
Apart from these Select and Standing Committees, 
there are also a number of joint Parliamentary committees 
whose membership comprises both Senators and MHRs. Examples 
of Statutory Joint Committees are the Joint Committee on 
the Broadcasting of Parliamentary Proceedings, the Joint 
Committee of Public Accounts and the Public Works Committee. 
There have also been Joint Select Committees, such as the 
1956-1959 Committee on Constitutional Review and the Joint 
Committee on the Australian Capital Territory. Further 
details on these Joint Committees and on domestic standing 
committees can be found in Odgers, Australian Senate 
Practice, 4th edition, Chapter 20.
The major thrust of the Senate's Committee work 
has therefore been, from the very beginning, in select 
committees and, from 1970, in legislative standing committees.
89 Ibid, para. 85, p.14.
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S e l e c t  C o m m ittees  h a v e  b e e n  in f r e q u e n t  in  th e  H ouse o f  
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  A lth o u g h  some MHRs h a v e  s u g g e s t e d  
a d o p t io n  o f  a s y s te m  o f  s t a n d in g  c o m m itte e s  in  th e  
Low er H o u se9 0 , and th e  House S t a n d in g  O rd ers C om m ittee  
recom m ended a s e t  o f  7 l e g i s l a t i v e  and g e n e r a l  p u r p o se  
c o m m it te e s  f o r  t h a t  H ouse in  1 9 7 0 9 1 , i t  seem s u n l i k e l y  
t h a t  su c h  c o m m it te e s  w i l l  a p p ea r  in  th e  f o r s e e a b l e  f u t u r e .
A g o v ern m en t may v a lu e  s e l e c t  c o m m itte e s  a s  a u s e f u l  
m eans o f  s t i l l i n g  b a c k b e n c h e r s '  f r u s t r a t i o n  by  k e e p in g  
them  b u sy  w i t h in  g u i d e l i n e s  i t  h a s  p r e d e te r m in e d ;  b u t  
s t a n d in g  l e g i s l a t i v e  c o m m itte e s  p r o v id e  MPs w it h  an 
o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  am ass e x p e r t i s e  w h ic h  can  b e  h a r n e s s e d  
t o  c o n t i n u a l l y  s c r u t i n i s e  th e  g o v e r n m e n t. Such s t a n d in g  
c o m m it te e s  in  th e  S e n a te  may p r o v e  t o  b e  a n n o y in g  t o  a 
g o v e rn m e n t; in  th e  H ouse o f  g o v ern m en t th e y  w o u ld  be  
q u i t e  u n a c c e p t a b le .
One s h o u ld  a l s o  n o t e  t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  h a v e  
shown v a r y in g  a t t i t u d e s  on th e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  
s t a n d in g  c o m m it te e s ,  d e p e n d in g  on w h e th e r  t h e y  a r e  in  
g o v ern m en t o r  in  o p p o s i t i o n .  D u r in g  th e  p e r io d  when th e  
S e n a te  w as m ov in g  t o  e x t e n d  i t s  c o m m itte e  s t r u c t u r e ,  th e  
g r e a t e s t  e n th u s ia s m  w as am on gst L abor and D . L . P .  S e n a t o r s  -  
th e n  in  o p p o s i t i o n .  In th e  U pper H ouse th e  G overn m ent
90 See L iberal MHR H.B. Turner in  the Canberra Times, 28 September 
1965, p .2  and 8 September 1967, p .2 ; and h is  speech in  the  
Estim ates debate, 30 August 1966, CPD:H o f  R, p p .551-555. A lso  
Labor MHR Gordon Bryant, a member o f  the P arty 's committee cn 
parliam entary procedure and s tru c tu re , urged adoption o f  
le g i s la t iv e  stand ing committees on 21 August 1970, CPD-.H o f  R, 
V ol.H .69 , p p .401-404.
91 In a Import c irc u la ted  by the Speaker, S ir  W illiam  Aston, on 
1 June 1970.
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Parties, being outnumbered, were powerless to prevent 
some changes and therefore concentrated their energies 
on delaying tactics. They were, however, able to squash 
any such moves in the Lower House. At a party meeting 
Prime Minister Gorton and several other Ministers argued 
that an erosion of executive power would necessarily 
result from any introduction of standing committees in 
the House of Representatives. % (This was precisely the 
reason why disgruntled backbenchers such as H.B. Turner 
and John Jess supported the Speaker's Report 1) The Deputy 
Prime Minister argued that, because a Labor MHR (Bryant) 
had formally proposed the motion in the House, the Government 
parties must reject the idea:
"Since when, Mr McEwen demanded to know, had
the Government required to take its direction
from the Opposition? Was this Government of
theirs going to go out there and demonstrate
that it was now allowing backbench members of
the Opposition to persuade it sind push it around?"92
After these stirring words a motion to allow debate in 
the House on Bryant's motion was lost, and a proposal 
for the establishment of standing committees in the 
Lower House was delayed indefinitely.
The Labor Party provides further evidence on the 
different viewpoint a party may hold depending on its 
being in government or in opposition. The Labor Party, 
and especially its Senate Leader Lionel Murphy, were 
the most persistent supporters of legislative standing
92 R. Aitchison, From Bcb to Bungles, Sun, Melbourne, 1970, p.261.
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committees. Yet on gaining power in December 1972, the 
Labor Party proceeded very leisurely in re-establishing 
the Senate Committees. And in government Labor attempted 
to increase the number of joint Parliamentary committees - 
which in opposition they had criticised as restricting 
the Senate's ability to adequately staff its own Committees.
As one Senator cynically remarked:
"A government doesn't like committees very 
much because it wants to govern unfettered 
if possible."
Whilst Senators expressed some reservations about 
the Committee of the Whole stage in terms of its providing 
adequate scrutiny of legislation, they were convinced that 
select committees, and the Regulations and Ordinances 
Committee, were very valuable. The fruits of such committee 
activity were seen to be: the amassing of information;
a lessening of partisanship; and more searching scrutiny 
of the executive (especially the bureaucracy). Typical 
comments from those interviewed were:
"Senate Committees to date have done well.
All have brought to light very valuable 
information indeed - valuable for reference 
material and, in the long run, as a basis 
for legislation. Such expert analysis and 
evaluation is very necessary; and committees 
also serve to raise the level of knowledge 
of individual Senators."
"The ability to call witnesses is very helpful; 
the witnesses themselves are delighted at 
the opportunity to be heard, and they have 
a real, sensible contribution to make."
"... the amount of party partisanship is 
remarkably low."
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"The argument that the Senate acts as 
a House of Review is perhaps valid in 
relation to the Regulations and 
Ordinances Committee. Such a committee 
is only possible in the Senate because 
it's not a House of government and so 
disallowance is possible without defeating 
the government."
"The Estimates Committees reassert 
Parliament's authority over the 
bureaucracy, limit the Permanent Head's 
discretion and generally more responsible 
spending should result."
"The committee system heralds the return 
of power to the Senate and to MPs against 
the executive."
At the same time, Senators realised that an extended 
committee system could be a mixed blessing if certain 
pitfalls were not avoided. From experience they argued 
firstly, that subjects assigned to committees should 
not be too extensive and enquiries should not be allowed 
to continue for too lengthy a period. Secondly, that 
committees should not be used as instruments for pigeon 
holing a topic or Bill. Thirdly, that there should not 
be too many committees (because of the small size of 
the membership and hence the load on individual Senators). 
Most Senators therefore accepted the value of committee 
work, but recognised that the mere number of committees 
had no necessary relationship with the effectiveness of 
the Senate as a House of Review.
The Senate as a House of Review
How do Senators evaluate the performance of the 
Chamber in terms of expectations about a House of Review?
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Several of those interviewed were pleased with the 
Senate's record: For example:
"Senators can make parliamentary scrutiny 
of the public service real. As it is, most 
public servants are scared of the Senate 
(in contrast to the House of Representatives) 
because Senators will probe for days and days 
if they smell anything is wrong. This scrutiny 
is very necessary as parliament is meant to 
be supreme and MPs are meant to be answerable 
to the people. And if the people can get 
their revenge against MPs, why not the same 
action against public servants?"
"The Senate debates legislation more on its 
merits than on the political mileage that 
can be got out of it. The Representatives 
tend to think 'Will I win or lose?' - but 
not so in the Senate."
"The Senate is a very persuasive chamber - 
debates count for a lot, Senators are 
constantly influencing each other, facts 
are important and there's less stress on 
party. The House of Representatives no 
longer operates as a legislative chamber; 
there's too much government control, nothing 
can be done against the will of the government 
and no criticism is possible. However, the 
Senate is capable of acting as, and has acted 
as, a true legislative Chamber."
Those who expressed reservations about the Senate's 
effectiveness as a House of Review argued that pressure 
of time, lack of information, lack of research assistance 
and party politics were the most important problems.
For example:
"The Senate's role as a House of Review is 
overrated. For example, when there is a 
complicated Bill and/or when a Senator has 
little notice or time for preparation - yet 
the legislation may have been eight or nine 
months in the making and advice may have 
been gained from all sorts of experts.
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How can the intricacies of a complicated 
Bill be effectively reviewed by a Senator 
on the spot? In many ways review is 
farcical."
"Too many Bills follow too quickly, and 
under the present set-up there is no 
researching time available to study the 
full import of many amendments in most 
Bills."
"When you are away from Canberra the 
research facilities are not readily 
available."
"Time is far too limited, especially for 
Western Australian Senators because of 
travel and because the Senator is expected 
to be in his State each weekend."
"Being on a Senate Select Committee which 
is very time consuming, it is difficult 
to always have the time one would like for 
study on all issues."
"I believe Members of the Federal Parliament 
should have research staffs at least some­
thing like conmensurate with those of U.S. 
congressmen."
"A system should be implemented whereby all 
of us are given an outline of proposed 
legislation when it is being prepared by the 
draftsmen. This would enable Senators (and 
MPs) to consider the issue, do background 
research and so remove the problem of snap 
decision-making."
"In a small sense the Senate does perform 
as a House of Review; but in 9 9 per cent 
of cases, party lines are established in the 
party rooms and votng is the same for both 
the House of Representatives and the Senate.
In this sense Senate proceedings are just 
an unnecessary, pointless repetition. But 
it's very good when amendments do come up." 
(A.L.P. Senator)
"There is the opportunity for every Senator 
to serve as a proper member of a House of 
Review - but because most Liberal Senators 
are ambitious they crawl to the Prime Minister 
because he has the patronage of cabinet 
positions to spread around. So few Liberals 
are willing to really review and Bills aren't 
properly discussed in party meetings."
(Liberal Senator)
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Most Senators felt that circumstances militated 
against their ever being able to be adequately conversant 
with the varied range of matters discussed in Parliament.
They therefore argued that specialisation was necessary. 
Although 50 per cent of Senators who answered the 
Questionnaire expressed an interest in 6 or more of 10 
nominated areas93, only 8 Senators (20 per cent) felt 
that it was desirable and possible to be a generalist.
44 per cent commented that a Senator must specialise or 
'gain an expertise in a few fields of information1; and 
32 per cent felt that a Senator should combine both a 
specialist interest in a few fields and a general interest 
in the broad range of legislation. As one Senator concluded:
"It simply becomes a matter of priorities.
To be an authority one would have to read 
all the material available - this is obviously 
impossible. Waffling in debate occurs because 
members have no information and no time to get 
any."
On the question of whether an extended committee 
system would improve the Senators' ability to scrutinise, 
many expressed reservations. Even before the introduction 
of legislative standing committees, several Senators refused 
to take any part in committee work. Adding further committees 
would only add to the time problems of conscientious Senators 
(and many noted how their constituents did not appreciate 
why they were spending increasingly more time in Canberra 
rather than in their home State). Moreover, for committees
9 3 Question 5 (B).
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to add to the expertise of Senators they would have to 
do extra 'homework'. One Senator feared that to many 
Senators the extension of the committee system would 
be like the provision of "manna from heaven - all 
necessary information would drop into their laps in an 
immediately usable form".
Senators are therefore all too ready to cite 
explanations (excuses?) for what they see as a somewhat 
unsatisfactory record as a House of Review. It is 
extremely difficult for a person outside the Parliament 
to pronounce a final judgment on this. Should one 
evaluate actual performance against expectations/ideals?
In what ways could one assess a chamber's diligence in 
reviewing legislation? A numerical overview of the number 
of Bills which were amended or rejected by the Senate 
(or of the actual number of successful amendments or 
requests) may be misleading. It tells nothing about the 
quality of those amendments or requests. On that basis 
alone one cannot determine the utility/necessity of 
changes. And from whose standpoint should one determine 
utility - that of a government, of the electorate, of 
concerned interest groups? Concentration on rejection 
or amendment also implies that the real test of Senate 
scrutiny lies in the number of observable instances on 
which the Senate so acted. But does the low figure of 
Senate rejections and amendments (as compared with the 
total volume of legislation) reflect that Senators did 
not feel that alteration was necessary. It could equally 
be a sign of Senate laziness or inability to spot problems 
in legislation.
263.
To test such questions it would be necessary to 
do in-depth analyses of the content and probable effects 
of legislation, - determining the desires and reactions of 
interested parties and the general community, weighing 
up competing pressures and then by some means determining 
whether: the legislation as drafted does or does not
accord with expectations; and whether Senate scrutiny 
led to enactment of 'desirable' (to any or all groups 
in the polity) legislation (for example, if amendments 
were made where necessary to ensure this result). To 
undertake such research for all legislation processed by 
Federal Parliament since federation would be a mammoth 
task. And could the results be worth the labour?
The problem is not just amassing the information; 
it is also a question of developing a suitable, methodology 
as a guide to both the collection and the evaluation of 
information. As Ken Turner remarked in relation to the 
New South Wales Legislative Council:
"We cannot really say whether the Council 
was ineffective, since there is no objective 
way of measuring how much legislation ought 
to have been blocked."94
In the absence of any objective standards, observers will 
interpret the performance of the Senate according to their 
own expectations and values. Given the variety of observers 
and of possible expectations, there will be a range of 
reactions to the record of the Senate as a House of Review.
9 4 House of Review? The New South Wales legislative Council, 1934-68, 
Sydney U.P., Sydney, 1969, p.87.
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Observers may view Senate performance (in relation to a 
particular measure or in a specific period) as 'obstruction1, 
or as * independence', or as 'useful review', depending 
on their own subjective criteria.
The Senate as a States House
It is equally difficult to devise a methodology 
within which to evaluate the Senate's record as a States 
House. If one uses Hansard and the Senate Journals as a 
source, the crude answer is that Senate division lists do 
not reveal many examples of Senators voting in State blocs. 
During the first three decades of the Senate's existence 
there were several examples of such State blocs on tariff 
questions.95 But one must remember that on such matters 
Senators are traditionally granted a free vote. On other 
legislation voting patterns have almost always been on 
party, not State, lines.
Only 7 instances of Senators voting together as a 
State bloc irrespective of party are cited by secondary 
sources. The Clerk of the Senate, who is most anxious 
to rebut criticism of the Senate's performance as a States 
House, cites only three examples: Western Australian
Senators on the Gold Tax Bill 1939; Tasmanian Senators 
on the Land Tax Assessment Bill 1952; and South Australian 
Senators on the Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Power Bill 
Bill 1958. He also cites Senate rejection of the Aerodrome
95 See Cdgers, op.cit., pp.5, 10-11.
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(Passenger Charges) Bill 1968 and the five 1970 measures 
concerning States Receipts Duties as instances on which 
legislation which was judged to be inequitable to certain 
States was rejected.96 Sawer cites the abandonment of 
the Conciliation and Arbitration Bill 1903 as evidence of 
Government anticipation of a hostile Senate reaction to 
possible interference with State interests.97 A similar 
situation occurred in 1970 when Prime Minister Gorton 
deferred the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Bill.98
Critics of the Senate's performance as a States 
House also refer to a number of measures which they feel 
were inimical to State interests but which were accepted 
by the Senate. Norris notes that on the Pacific Islands 
Labourers Bill 1901 Queensland Senators ignored the views 
of their State Government, as did South Australian Senators 
on the Sugar Rebate Abolition Bill 1903.99 Other examples 
are cited of legislation which had detrimental effects on 
all States: the Surplus Revenue Act 1908, the legislation
abolishing per capita payments to the States in 1927, and 
the Uniform Taxation Legislation of 1942.
The Uniform Taxation measures gave the Federal 
Government a monopoly over income tax collection and 
reduced the States to being beggars for Federal crumbs. 
There was fierce opposition from some States (there was
96 Cp.cit., pp. 11-12.
97 Australian Federal Politics and Law, Vol.l, 1909-1929, M.U.P., 
Melbourne,”1 9 p.26^
98 See R. Aitchison, op.cit., pp.240-244.
99 Ihe Emergent Commonwealth, M.U.P., Melbourne, 1975, p.205.
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a High Court challenge brought by South Australia). But 
the vote in the Senate went on party lines. Odgers fails 
to give any convincing explanation for this, and merely 
notes that in the 1950s the Federal and State Governments 
could not find any acceptable alternative; he adds that 
the people wanted uniform taxation.100 However, it is 
possible to view the Senate's acceptance of the Uniform 
Taxation measures as an example, par excellence, of 
protection of States' interests, when one remembers that 
it was only the large States which opposed the scheme.
Small States generally recognised that payments made to 
them by the Federal Government under uniform taxation would 
exceed the amount of finance which they could raise through 
income tax on their own small populations. Thus it is 
possible to view the passage of uniform taxation as a 
victory for the smaller States.
This raises one interesting facet of the States 
House function which is normally ignored. To talk of 
the Senate being supposed to safeguard the States hides 
the more important question of which States? The particular 
State which feels it is under attack, by the Federal 
Government or even by other States? All States (when 
threatened by the Federal Government's power of the purse)? 
Some States but not others (this may be a large versus 
small States division, or a regional matter, or a reflection 
of the party colouration of particular State and Federal 
Governments)?
10 0 Op.cit., p.10.
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A further problem arises when one seeks to determine 
what are matters of State interest. A possible answer 
is: any matter which is not Constitutionally denoted
as an area of exclusive Federal activity. But what of 
the areas of concurrent activity (both those listed in 
Section 51 of the Constitution and the areas in which 
the actual operation of the political system since 1901 
has led to an intermingling of State and Federal activity)? 
Given developments in the Twentieth Century, and especially 
in the period in which the Federal Government has been 
the sole income taxing power, it is highly likely that 
Federal and State Parliamentarians will disagree as to 
what are matters of purely State interest. Who is to 
choose between their claims and counter claims?
Another problem which besets the Senate is the 
determination of the most effective means and forum for 
promotion and protection of State interests (however 
defined). It has already been noted that the Federal 
Parliament is seen by State MPs to be of only minor 
importance as an arena for pursuit of State interests.
Most negotiations on these matters are conducted at 
meetings of State and Federal ministers or officials, 
or occur at meetings of party leaders. Moreover, on 
occasions the States have shown a specific preference 
for such extra-Parliamentary consideration of their 
interests. A striking example was the unfavourable 
reaction of the small States in 1931 to the Public Accounts
2 6 8 .
Committee's enquiry into the financial problems of these 
States. John Curtin, arguing on behalf of Western 
Australia, successfully lobbied for the creation of a 
permanent committee, outside the Parliament, to investi­
gate these problems (the Commonwealth Grants Commission).101
Apart from these problems of determining what are 
matters of State in te re s t ,  i t  is also d if f ic u l t  to decide 
what the paucity of examples of State bloc voting means.
Is i t  because few such matters arise within Federal 
Parliament (a sign that they are normally debated elsewhere)? 
Or a by-product of the phenomenon noted by E.G. Whitlam - 
that the Senate would be foolhardy to re jec t leg is la tion  
based on a prior agreement, outside the Parliament, by 
State Premiers and the Federal Prime Minister?102 Odgers 
argues that one cannot fully determine the performance of 
the Senate as a States House by noting instances of State 
bloc voting because divisions represent only the final stage 
of the leg is la tive  process. He asserts that the promotion 
and protection of State in te res ts  (he neglects to define 
these) is  occurring continually within the party rooms.103 
Whilst there is  no formal evidence against which to verify 
such an assertion, some Senators interviewed between 1969 
and 1971 supported th is :
"The power of State members in caucus is 
su ffic ien t to avoid any problem of a majority 
being against the in te res ts  of a particu lar 
S ta te ."
See R.J. May, Financing the Small States in Australian Federalism, 
O.U.P., Melbourne, 1971, p.30.
See his reference to 'Federalism by Treaty' in CPD:H of R (2 June 1970), 
Cp.cit., pp.9-10, 13. P.2722.10 3
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"States rights issues do come up in the 
party room as threats, for example, over 
Gorton's offshore minerals issue."
"Equal’ State representation is important 
for, for example, Western Australia and 
Tasmania because it means an increased 
number of representatives for these States 
in caucus."
Odgers also argues that:
"The mere existence of the Senate operates 
to dissuade a Government from even con­
sidering proposals unfavourable to State 
interests. The Senate's potential therein 
alone justifies its existence as a States 
House."10 4
Some Senators agreed:
"The main concern here is that the Senate 
acts as a brake; a government won't be 
favourable to one State to the detriment 
of another. I agree with Odgers that the 
mere existence of the Senate inhibits a 
government."
"The States House function is terribly 
important - not so much in what the Senate 
does but the fact that the Senate is there 
to prevent any monkey business, for example 
New South Wales and Victoria using their 
majority in the House of Representatives 
to sell out the other States. The Senate 
is a watchdog and its existence means that 
the government doesn't bring forward 
anything which could unduly harm the 
interests of one State."
"The mere existence of the Senate stops 
matters inimical to States from ever 
reaching the Senate. MHRs can't favour 
one State over another because they know 
the Senate would never agree."
Senators also argued that the occasions on which 
they could speak publicly (and hence observably) for 
their State were rare:
104 Ibid, p.5.
"Only occasionally does one have to weigh 
up competing State versus national interests."
"So far I've never seen an issue arise in 
the Senate which would have required Western 
Australian Senators to vote in a bloc - but 
they would if necessary."
"I wouldn't discount the possibility, but 
it's hard to visualise a circumstance arising."
When querying Senators about the general function
of the Chamber as a States House, several interesting
points emerged:
a) few Senators regarded the States House function 
as an important aspect of Senate activity;
b) Senators stated that they would not feel bound 
to follow advice profferred by either their State 
government or by the State branch of their party;
c) 3 of every 4 Senators stated that it was impossible 
for the Senate to perform a States House function;
d) most Senators felt that other loyalties (especially 
that to party) should outweigh concern for their 
States.
The role of a Senator as spokesman for his State
was noted by only 5 Senators in response to a general 
question about their role; and only 12 Senators saw the 
States House function as an operational reality. Moreover, 
the States House function had more currency for Senators 
from small States: (10 of the 12 were from small States;
the other 2 were Victorians fearing the voting power of 
New South Wales MPs).
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One Senator viewed representation of his State 
as necessitating his acting as spokesman in the Senate 
for his State Government:
"A Senator is a person who represents the 
whole of the State so I think that he tends 
more to be the voice of the State Government."
This particular man was a close friend of his State 
Premier and before each trip to Canberra he consulted 
the Premier - much to his colleagues' disgust. A Senator 
representing the same State and the same party strongly 
denounced any such liaison:
"There shouldn't be any ties between a State 
government and Senators. Senators are beholden 
to the people of the State, not the State 
government."
And another Senator said: "A Premier can't tell a
Senator how to vote." A lone Senator regretted the lack 
of advice from his State party:
"I have on occasion complained to the State 
party that I am not lobbied enough to know 
the party's views. Twice I specifically 
asked the State to put a point of view to 
the Federal party - a point of view not in 
the sense of their telling the Senators 
how to vote, but of telling how they think."
Senators were unanimous that advice, not direction, was 
all they would accept from either a State government or 
a State party.
However, these Senators were in a minority; most of 
those interviewed stated that there was no possibility
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of the Senate acting as a States House. One echoed 
the former point about the imprecision on what is or 
should be a State issue:
"This is a source of argument. For example, 
in relation to offshore minerals; a lot of 
people will say that this is anti-States 
rights and should therefore be thrown out 
by the Senate. Yet it may be better to 
leave this power to the Commonwealth so 
that it can legislate for all and can 
negotiate internationally."
Senators also argued that the States are no longer units 
whose separate interests can be considered irrespective 
of national priorities. For example:
"Part of the Senate's uselessness stems from 
the fact that the States are now pretty 
powerless - and the Senate is pretty useless 
when the States are impotent."
"State Parliaments are a redundance; the 
States are just spending agencies for the 
Commonwealth and their powers have been 
whittled away. Australians are one people, 
the only dividing lines are those drawn by 
a surveyor."
"It's very vare that a State's interests are 
contrary to the national interest, therefore 
a real States House function is rare. Only 
occasionally does one have to weigh up competing 
State versus national interests."
"My loyalties are Australia first, Western 
Australia second. I ask myself - is this 
legislation good for Australia? I fought 
in the war for Australia, not Western 
Australia, and I wouldn't support Western 
Australia against the rest of Australia."
In the Questionnaire Senators were asked: "Which of
the following fields interests you most - international
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affairs, national affairs or State affairs?"105 Only 2 
Senators nominated State affairs (both were new Members);
50 per cent nominated national affairs as their prime 
concern, and a further 25 per cent gave equal priority 
to national and to international affairs.
The importance of party for Senators is demonstrated 
in the following quotations from those interviewed in 
1969-1971:
"My role is to help the party."
"I think a Senator represents a State only 
in the sense that his boundary is the State 
boundary; otherwise he represents his party."
"The Senate has never been a States House.
The wool was pulled over peoples' eyes from 
the very beginning. I put party first, the 
electorate second and the State doesn't 
really figure."
"I've always doubted that the Senate was 
there to do that job (protecting the interests 
of the States). I know if you look closely 
at some of the convention debates that that's 
put forward as a possibility, but I think 
Alfred Deakin knocked that on the head very 
well because he said that once the big issues 
arise then those issues will create their own 
party divisions and that will prevail. And 
so it has."
"The Senate is not a States House and I doubt 
whether it ever has been. In the Australian 
context the Senate could never be a States 
House. Whilst we have the party system MPs 
will always be bound by party rather than by 
State policies."
The following comment from a veteran Tasmanian 
Senator provides a suitable conclusion to this discussion
10 5 Question 5 (A) .
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of Senators' views of the States House function of the 
Senate:
"There is not so much need for the Senate 
as a States House except in the ultimate 
case. It's really a dormant power."
Conclusion
The final quotation above echoes remarks on the 
Senate's activity in relation'to Money Bills. It is 
apparent that in such areas the Senate has not greatly 
utilised its Constitutional powers; and yet the 
possibility of Senate action is always there like a 
sword of Damocles, a weapon to be used if the House of 
Representatives or a particular government acts in some 
unacceptable (usually unspecified) manner.
A general finding of this survey of Senate activity 
is the importance of political parties as a determinant 
of the pattern of Senate review. The nature and extent 
of Senate scrutiny varied over time, depending on the 
coincidence, or lack thereof, of similar party majorities 
in the two Federal Houses. Moreover, political parties 
(and especially those in opposition) provided a stimulus 
for changes in Senate procedures and committees, and were 
the major focus of Senators1 views on their role within 
the Chamber. There have been other factors which have 
influenced the performance of the Senate over time; 
these will be discussed in the next Chapter.
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CHAPTER VII
OTHER INSTITUTIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES 
Introduction
In previous Chapters various changes in the nature 
of Senate personnel, and in the general political environ­
ment (for example, an increase in the effective power of 
the Federal government through' its monopoly over the 
major sources of revenue) have been noted. Changes in 
both Senate personnel and Senate activity at certain 
points in time have been the result of a number of factors, 
one of which is the varying party composition of the 
Chamber. That in turn has depended markedly on the 
particular electoral method used for Senate elections 
during different periods. It is largely due to proportional 
representation, adopted for Senate elections from 1948, 
that the membership and activities of the Chamber were 
observed to have altered so markedly in the early 1960s. 
Representation of D.L.P. and Independent Senators, and 
of a fairly even number of major party members in the 
Senate, were made possible by the use of proportional 
representation. Out-of-step elections for the two Houses 
of Federal Parliament from 1963 enhanced the effect of 
this electoral method.
During this period the (seemingly endless) 
domination over the House of Representatives of the non- 
Labor coalition parties also contributed to changes in
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Senate personnel and activity. In the non-Labor parties 
there appeared a growing number of deviant Senators who 
did not hesitate to cross the floor to vote against their 
Government; the Labor Opposition used the Upper House 
as a medium for attacking and embarrassing the Government; 
and in both major parties (Labor and Liberal) there was 
an influx of young, ambitious Senators. In 1969 the 
Liberal Party selected a Senator, John Gorton, as Party 
Leader and hence Prime Minister.
The cumulative result of all these factors was a 
revitalization of the Senate and of Senators' morale. 
Concurrently, Senators themselves took steps to improve 
the image of the Chamber - by the creation of an extended 
committee role for the Senate - and demonstrated a general 
attitude I term 'Senate-mindedness'. The Clerk of the 
Senate, J.R. Odgers, actively encouraged this revitaliz­
ation .
Franchise and Electoral Methods
The Commonwealth Constitution provided (in Sections 
41, 10 and 30) that the qualifications for voting for both 
Houses of Federal Parliament would be the same and that, 
until Parliament otherwise provided, this would be 
eligibility to vote for elections for "the most numerous 
House of Parliament of a State", that is, the relevant 
State Lower House. An additional restriction was the 
ban on plural voting (Sections 8 and 30) which in 1900
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was allowed for certain State electors in Queensland, 
Western Australia and Tasmania. The Constitution 
further provided that any Federal Parliamentary legis­
lation on the method of election of Senators should be 
uniform for all States (Section 9).
The first Senate elections (29-30 March 1901) 
were therefore conducted with State criteria of 
eligibility for voting. This was: manhood suffrage
in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland; full adult 
suffrage in South Australia and Western Australia; and 
a restricted property franchise in Tasmania.1 The second 
Senate elections were conducted with the newly established 
uniform Federal criteria for voting, embodied in the 
Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902. This Act granted a 
vote in Federal elections to all adults of a minimum 
age of 21 who were native-born or naturalized British 
subjects and who had resided in Australia for more than 
six months. The criteria for eligibility to vote in 
Federal elections have been extended since 19022, always 
maintaining uniform qualifications for voting for both 
the Senate and the House of Representatives.
1 For full details see C.A. Hughes and B.D. Graham, A Handbook of 
Australian Govemnent and Politics 1890-1964, A.N.U. Press, 
Canberra, 1968, pp.279-285.
Developments since 1902 have been: (i) minimum voting age
(reduced to age 18 by the Commonwealth Franchise Act 1973);
(ii) extension of the franchise (to servicemen overseas not 
otherwise eligible, in the Cormonwealth Electoral (Wartime)
Acts of 1917, 1940, 1943, 1953, 1966), (to certain Asians, in 
the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1925), (to aboriginals (Common­
wealth Electoral Act 1949); (iii) period of residence in 
Australia (extended to three years for all ncn-native b o m  in 
the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1958) ; Compulsory enrolment 
(for all except aboriginals in the Commonwealth Electoral Act 
1911) and oonpulsory voting (for all on the electoral rolls,
by the Comrncnwealth Electoral Act 1924). For further details 
see Ibid, pp.282-286.
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The question of the most suitable electoral method 
for Senate elections had been discussed at the 1897-1898 
Convention where Barton and some other delegates proposed 
use of the Hare-Clark system of proportional representation.3 
A decision was deferred until the new parliament commenced 
operation and in the 1901 elections existing State electoral 
methods were used. On becoming Prime Minister, Barton 
further investigated the possibilities of proportional 
representation and Federal Cabinet's Electoral Bill 
endorsed this for Senate elections. However, in March 
1902 the Senate, by a majority of 18 to 9, rejected the 
proposal; in addition Barton's preference for the use of 
optional preferential voting for House of Representatives 
elections was rejected by that House; and the result was 
the institution of the simple majority system for elections 
for both Federal Houses.4
Twelve years later a Royal Commission appointed 
by the Cook Government similarly recommended preferential 
voting for the House and proportional representation for 
the Senate. After spasmodic debate (in which each of the 
then political parties gradually came to recognise that 
first past the post was detrimental to their interests, 
and the embryonic Country Party energetically pressed 
for preferential voting to maximise their chances of 
winning representation) the Barton-Cook proposals were
3 Convention Debates: Melbourne 1898, p.2446.
4 See B.D. Graham, "The Choice of Voting Methods in Federal Politics, 
1902-1918", A.J.P.H., vol. 8, 1962, reprinted in C.A. Hughes (ed.), 
Readings in Australian Government, U. of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 
1968, pp.205-207.
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submitted to Federal Parliament in 1918. Once again 
proportional representation was rejected; and the 1918 
Electoral Act provided for preferential voting for both 
Houses.5 It was not until 1948 that proportional repre­
sentation was finally adopted for Senate elections. The 
use of each of these electoral methods has had striking 
effects on the relative representation of political 
parties in the Senate.
The two voting systems used in Senate elections 
until 1949 - the simple majority vote and the preferential 
system - resulted in what Davies has termed a "windscreen 
wiper" effect.6 It was common for one political party 
to win most, if not all, of the seats contested at the 
three-yearly elections. In 1910 and 1943 the Labor 
Party won all the contested vacancies, and after the 
double dissolution in 1914 won 31 of the 36 vacancies; 
in 1917, 1925 and 1934 non-Labor candidates won all the 
seats contested. No one party ever held all 36 seats, 
but in the periods 1914-1917, 1919-1923, 1934-1937 and 1946- 
1949 either Labor or non-Labor held less than 6 seats in 
the Senate.7
The combination of multi-member constituencies, 
party tickets and either the simple majority or prefer­
ential system thus led to "dramatic successes and reversals 
of fortune:8 for both major political forces. For example,
5 Ibid, pp.208-213.
Australian Democracy, 2nd ed., Longmans, London, 1964, p.40.
See the table in J.R. Odgers, Australian Senate Practice, 4th ed.,
Ccmnonwealth Government Printer, Canberra, 1972, p.6.
8 Davies, loc.cit.
in 1909 21 of the 36 Senators were non-Labor; after 
two elections only 7 non-Labor members were left in 
1913. In the following Parliament a backbencher in 
the House of Representatives (Mr. P.M. Glynn) advocated 
the introduction of proportional representation for 
Senate elections; but debate on this motion lapsed.9 
In 1919 a further attempt was made in this direction, 
by members who were shortly to form the nucleus of the 
emerging Country Party; while supporting a switch to 
preferential voting for House of Representatives elections, 
they preferred the Tasmanian Hare-Clark system for 
the Senate - "claiming with justification that the 
application of the simple alternative vote would tend 
to give all the Senate seats in a State to one party."10 
Such grand slams did indeed result.
The eventual introduction of proportional 
representation from 1948 certainly removed this 
problem. In elections under proportional representation 
both major parties have won a comparable number of seats, 
and from the 1955 elections this meant a fairly evenly- 
divided Senate in terms of major party representation, 
with a steadily increasing number of small party and 
Independent members. (see Table V:15 p.159 )
C.P.D., H. of R., (28 October 1914) vol.75, p.410.
G. Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law, vol.I, M.U.P., 
Melbourne 1956, p.169.
10
281.
The previous electoral systems had presented 
a government with a Senate that was clearly either 
hostile or captive; and if a hostile Senate unduly 
chafed a government it could move towards a double 
dissolution. Proportional representation, however, 
produced a hitherto unknown element of uncertainty 
for governments. From July 1965 to December 1975 
no party held an absolute majority in the Senate; 
and the result of divisions depended on the 
inclinations of D.L.P. and/or Independent Senators, 
who frequently keep other Senators in suspense over 
which of the Labor and non-Labor measures or motions 
they would support.
It is amusing in retrospect to note that in 1950 
an opposition Senate select committee convinced the 
Menzies government that a stalemate situation - where 
government and opposition parties achieved equal 
representation in the Senate - was not likely to occur.11 
Fear of such a result led Prime Minister Menzies to 
introduce legislation in 1950 proposing a split ballot 
in any dissolution election.12 In introducing the 
Constitution Alteration (Avoidance of Double Dissolution 
Deadlocks) Bill 1950, Menzies remarked:
See Report of the Senate Select Conrnittee on the Constituticn 
Alteration (Avoidance of Double Dissolution Deadlocks) Bill 
1950, p.60.
The ten vacancies were to be filled by two ballots for five 
seats, in the hope that a 6-4 rather than a 5-5 split would 
result.
"... the Parliament of the people is called 
upon tonight to deal with an important 
question which involves the future of the 
relations between the two Houses, the 
stability of the Government in the House 
of Representatives and its capacity to 
give effect to the will of the people 
who elected it. Both sides in the Parliament 
therefore have a strong and proper interest 
in securing political stability."13
For many Senators, however, the introduction 
of proportional representation was welcome because 
they felt Senate performance would improve dramatically 
if the major parties were reasonably evenly represented 
in the Chamber. The following comments were made by 
Senators during debate on the 1950 Bill:
"It cannot be an effective house of review 
unless the system of voting makes it 
possible for the minority party to be well 
represented. ... When the parties are 
more evenly represented in the Senate, 
this chamber can act as a house of review, 
and its former standing, in such 
circumstances, could be restored."14
13 C.P.D. : H. of R. (4 May 1950) vol.207, p.2220.
1 4 Senator Reid, C.P.D. : Sen, (21 June 1950) vol.208, p.4606.
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"This chamber can cease to be a political 
echo under proportional representation 
when there is a fairly evenly divided 
house with the Government dominating it 
in the main."15
"Personally, I do not think that it is 
necessarily an unhealthy situation to 
have an opposition in this chamber with 
a small majority, or to have an equally 
divided Senate. That may well result in 
the Senate acting even more in accordance 
with the wishes of the framers of the 
Constitution. It may result in the Senate 
initiating more bills. It will certainly 
result in the Senate being able to give 
better consideration to the bills that are 
committed to it, and, after full discussion, 
to insert amendments considered to be wise.
All that is possible with an Opposition 
possessing a majority, or with an evenly 
divided Senate. That is not necessarily an 
evil thing. ...I think that under propor­
tional representation, with fairly well- 
balanced numbers, the Senate may act effec­
tively as a good house of review, and not as 
a mere house of rejection, towards which it 
is now tending."16
However the last speaker (later to be a Prime Minister and to 
be faced with a hostile Senate) recognised that there were dan­
gers inherent in opposition control of the Senate. He con­
tinued :
"But it could happen - and on occasions it 
very probably would happen - that in that 
situation an Opposition would become over­
bearing and arrogant, that it would insist 
that all of the Government's legislation 
should meet with the wishes of the Opposi­
tion in every small particular; that it would, 
from time to time, take the conduct of affairs 
out of the hands of the Government and seek 
itself, in effect, to become the Government 
of the country; that it would, from time to
15 Senator McCallum, C.P.D.:Sen. (20 June 1950) vol.208, p.4494.
16 Senator Gorton, C.P.D.:Sen. (20 June 1950) vol.208, pp.4500-4501.
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time, halt the Government's business 
and introduce its own measures or other 
matters that it considered should be 
discussed at length. By attention to 
those things, and by abuse of its power, 
an Opposition of that kind could make the 
conduct of Government business impossible."17
Senator Gorton's fears were realised not only during his
own term as Prime Minister, but also to some degree by his
predecessor Menzies, who during the 1953 election campaign
announced, "I am beginning to have second thoughts on the
policy of my party which is for the continuation of the
Senate."18 Surveying the problems which Gorton encountered
in the late 1960s, Menzies reiterated his viewpoint:
"It would be a falsification of democracy, 
if, on any matter of government policy 
approved by the House of Representatives, 
possibly by a large majority, the Senate, 
representing the States and not the people, 
could reverse the decision... Otherwise, a 
Senate opposition whose party had just been 
completely defeated at a general election 
would be in command of the government of 
the nation. This would be absurd, as a 
denial of popular democracy." 19
External observers tend to disagree with parliamentary 
leaders on this matter. For example, David Solomon argues 
that positive good may result:
Loc.cit.
Sun, 26 April 1953, quoted by Davies, op.cit., p.44.
Daily Telegraph, 11 March 1968, p.12. For similar sentiments 
see K.E. Beazley, CPD:H of R , (31 May 1950) vol.208, p.3481; 
and D.H. Drurnnond's references to government "at the mercy of 
the venal few" or of "a nark or a crank", Ibid, (31 May 1950) 
p. 3496.
"The fact that a government does not 
have a majority in the Senate does 
not necessarily mean a Senate out of 
control, or a Senate trying to run 
the government. It does mean that a 
government will suffer defeats in the 
chamber, that the government can be 
embarrassed politically whenever the 
ALP and DLP, given a Liberal-CP govern­
ment, or the Liberal-CP and DLP Senators 
under a Labor government, can agree on 
combined action, that governmental 
errors and evasion are less likely 
to go unnoticed or unpunished."20
Before the 1967 Senate election an editorial in the Australian
commented:
"The present deadlocked Senate has been 
active without being deliberately 
obstructionist and it has done more 
good than harm in the cause of effective 
government. A clear majority either way 
in next week's election would tip the 
balance against this cause.
A Liberal-Country Party majority would 
give the Holt Government more security 
and more room for complacency than is 
either desirable or warranted on its 
record. A Labor majority carries 
inescapable risks of obstructionism...."21
The editorial concluded:
"It is a fair reflection of the extra­
ordinary character of a half-Senate 
election with the Government's fate
20 "The Senate", H. Mayer & H. Nelson (eds) , Australian Politics: 
a third reader, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1973, p.532.
2 1 16 November, 1967, p.8.
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directly at stake that the best result 
in the national interest would be complete 
preservation of the status quo."22
Supporters of proportional representation as an 
electoral method argue: (i) that it enables representation
of minorities; (ii) that the results in terms of seats 
won closely parallel electoral support for particular 
parties; (iii) that gerrymandering is checked; (iv) that 
MPs elected under the system would be more intelligent 
or of outstanding ability; and that therefore (v) pro­
portional representation is the fairest and most democratic 
electoral method.23 The first three arguments are 
generally acceptable, but critics of proportional repre­
sentation note that they imply the possibility of 
fragmentation, of deadlocks and hence of political 
instability; these will be major problems within a 
cabinet system of government (especially if proportional 
representation was used in elections for the house of 
government) and/or if "party strengths are so equally 
matched as they are in Australia."24 Moreover, in 
Australia the combination of proportional representation, 
party tickets and relatively even electoral support for 
the major political party forces has meant that almost
22 Ioc.cit.
23 See for example, J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative 
Government, Ch.7; M. Duverger, Political Parties; Methuen, 
London, 1964; J.R. & H.P.C. Ashworth, Proportional Represent­
ation Applied to Party Government, A New Electoral System, 
Melbourne, 1900; E.Lakeman, How Democracies Vote, Faber,
London, 1970; K.N. Grigg, "The Value of a Voter", Australian 
Quarterly, vol.41, no.l, March 1969; J.F.H. Wright, "Elections 
and Parliamentary Democracy", Australian Quarterly, vol.43,
No.2, June 1971.
24 L.F. Crisp, Australian National Government, 2nd ed., Longman, 
Croydon, 1970, p.148.
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50 of the 602 5 Senate seats are safe - not only for the 
particular party but also for any incumbent who holds 
the number 1 or 2 position on his party's ticket.
Critics argue that this means:
i) political stagnation;
ii) lack of party vitality; and
iii) substitutes government by parties for government 
by the people.25
Irrespective of the validity of such criticisms, 
it is difficult to accept that such phenomena could be 
directly attributable to the method of proportional 
representation. Under those electoral methods used 
before 1949 the "winner takes all" result meant that 
those on a particular party ticket were either all 
winners, or all losers, depending on whether the State­
wide results were a plurality for or against their party. 
Between 1901 and 1948 a candidate's position on the 
party ticket was therefore unimportant. After the 
introduction of proportional representation, selection 
for the first or second position on either a Labor or 
Liberal (or joint coalition) ticket for a half-Senate 
poll guaranteed election. The important point is that, 
under any of the electoral methods used for Senate 
elections, a particular individual's chance of election 
depended primarily on his party label, and his merit
In 1974 legislation was enacted to provide for two Senators 
to be elected within each Esderal Territory; hence the 
current nuirber of Senators is 64.
See, for example, J. Dreijmanis, "Proportional Representation 
and its Effects: The Austrian Experience", in Parliamentary
Mfairs, Vol.24, No.l, Winter 1970/1971, pp.43-52; Joan Rydon, 
“The Electoral System", in H. Mayer & H. Nelson (eds), op.cit., 
pp.285-288.
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or prior performance was irrelevant. The introduction 
of proportional representation neither increased, nor 
lessened, the impact of party on most Senators' chances 
of election.
Bagehot rejected proportional representation 
on the grounds that:
"... the House would be made up of party 
politicians selected by a party committee, 
chained to that committee and pledged to 
party violence, and of characteristic, and 
therefore immoderate representatives, for 
every 'ism' in all England."27
The latter part of Bagehot's comment has some validity 
in an Australian context, in that the use of proportional 
representation for Senate elections has furthered the 
possibility of election of minor party and Independent 
candidates which, under the system of preferential 
voting, had little chance of winning seats. Retention 
of preferential voting for House of Representatives 
elections alongside the move to proportional represent­
ation for Senate elections, and the (albeit limited) 
success of minor party and Independent candidates in 
Senate, but not in House, elections from 1949, demonstrates 
that proportional representation has allowed for a wider 
range of political viewpoints in the Federal Upper House.
The English Constitution, Collins Fontana Edition, London, 1963,
p.168.
Minor Party and Independent Representation in the Senate
In a half Senate election conducted under proportional 
representation, the percentage of formal votes a party 
or candidate requires for election is:
for 1 seat - 16.67 per cent of the State vote;
for 2 seats - 33.34 per cent of the State vote;
for 3 seats - 50.01 per cent of the State vote;
for 4 seats - 66.67 per cent of the State vote;
for 5 seats - 83.34 per cent of the State vote.28
The need to obtain only approximately 17 per cent of the 
votes cast in a State to win a Senate vacancy has meant 
that Senate elections inspire quite a large crop of 
small party and Independent candidates. Table VII:1 
shows the relative increase in the number of candidates 
for House of Representatives and Senate elections over 
the past thirty years.
Table VII:1 demonstrates that: until 1955 the
largest grouping of minor party candidates were those 
running for the Communist Party; from 1958 the D.L.P. 
generally nominated about the same number of candidates 
(for both House and Senate elections) as did Labor and 
non-Labor; and from 1966 the Australia Party nominated 
increasing numbers of candidates.
28 Odgers, op.cit., p.51.
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TABLE VII:2
MINOR PARTY AND INDEPENDENT SENATE CANDIDATES 1943-1970
1943 1946 19 49 1951 1953 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970
Communist
Party _ _ 15 24 16 15 17 18 16 6 —
D.L. P. - - - - - 11 18 19 18 16 15
Australia
Party - — - - - - - - - 7 9
Other minor 
parties 12 6 24 7 .13 4 6 17 13 - 22
Independ­
ents 15 7 21 8 5 8 7 11 6 8 16
Parties are given their current labels , i.e. , D.L.P. includes
A.L.P. (Anti-Communist) and Australia Party includes Liberal 
Reform Movement.
Table VII:2 provides a numerical listing of minor 
party and Independent candidates for Senate elections 
between 1943 and 1970. The two Tables do not reveal major 
differences in the number of such candidates running for 
each of the Federal Houses. But can such candidates expect 
more success in achieving their aim of Senate, rather than 
House, representation? To win a seat in the House of 
Representatives, minor party and Independent candidates 
need both a concentration of support and (either in their 
own right, or as a result of preference distribution) an 
eventual majority vote. For reasons noted above, it is 
highly unlikely that a minor party or Independent candidate 
could satisfy both these requirements. The impact of 
such a candidate on House elections has at best been, 
through direction of preferences, an influence on which 
of the major party candidates would be elected.
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Even in Senate elections, the prospects of most 
of these candidates are slim. Under proportional repre­
sentation, the predictable result of an election to fill 
5 Senate vacancies in each State is that the A.L.P. and 
the coalition non-Labor parties will easily secure 2 seats 
each per State. The major contest then centres around 
which candidate will win the fifth vacancy. On the 
following occasions the fifth seat has been won by a 
minor party or by an Independent candidate:
1955 - Victoria - D.L.P. Senator
1958 - Tasmania - D.L.P. Senator
1961 - Tasmania - Independent Senator Turnbull
1964 - Victoria - D.L.P. Senator
- Queensland - D.L.P. Senator 
1967 - Victoria - D.L.P. Senator
- Queensland - D.L.P. Senator
- Tasmania - Independent Senator Turnbull 
1970 - New South Wales - D.L.P. Senator29
- Victoria - D.L.P. Senator29
- Queensland - D.L.P. Senator
- Western Australia - Independent Senator Negus
- Tasmania - Independent Senator Townley
It is interesting to note that in the 1970 Senate election 
the Australia Party also secured almost enough votes to win 
a Senate seat in New South Wales.
Ihere were actually 6 seats to be filled in these two States owing 
to casual vacancies; the D.L.P. victory in New South Wales was at 
the expense of the coalition parties; in Victoria the D.L.P. won 
a formerly Labor seat.
29
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The c h a n c e s  o f  m in o r  p a r t y  o r  I n d e p e n d e n t  c a n d i d a t e s  
w i n n i n g  a  v a c a n c y  a f t e r  a  d o u b l e  d i s s o l u t i o n  a r e ,  h o w e v e r ,  
m o re  on a p a r  w i t h  t h e i r  c h a n c e  o f  g a i n i n g  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
i n  t h e  H ouse  o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  (w h e re  t h e  o n l y  I n d e p e n d e n t s  
h a v e  b e e n  t h o s e  w h o , o r i g i n a l l y  e l e c t e d  u n d e r  a  p a r t y  l a b e l ,  
l a t e r  r e n o u n c e d  t h e i r  p a r t y  m e m b e r s h i p ;  on  n o  o c c a s i o n  h a s  
s u c h  a  c a n d i d a t e  b e e n  r e - e l e c t e d  a s  an  I n d e p e n d e n t ;  n o r  h a v e  
a n y  m i n o r  p a r t y  c a n d i d a t e s  m a n ag e d  t o  s e c u r e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
i n  t h e  H ouse  o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ) . U s i n g  p r o p o r t i o n a l  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  a  d o u b l e  d i s s o l u t i o n  e l e c t i o n  f o r  a l l  t e n  
S e n a t e  v a c a n c i e s  p e r  S t a t e  w o u ld  m o s t  p r o b a b l y  r e s u l t  i n  a  
5 - 5  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  s e a t s  b e t w e e n  t h e  m a j o r  p a r t i e s ,  ( o r  a  
c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  6 - 4  a n d  4 - 6 ) ,  a n d  h e n c e  a  S e n a t e  o f  3 0 30 L a b o r  
a n d  30 n o n - L a b o r  m e m b e rs .  A p a r t y  w o u ld  n e e d  t o  g a i n  
a p p r o x i m a t e l y  55 p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  f o r m a l  v o t e s  c a s t  i n  a  
p a r t i c u l a r  S t a t e  t o  s e c u r e  t h e  r e t u r n  o f  6 o f  i t s  c a n d i d a t e s . 31 
The d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  e l e c t o r a l  s u p p o r t  b e t w e e n  L a b o r  a n d  
n o n - L a b o r  s i n c e  1909 m akes  t h i s  v e r y  u n l i k e l y .  E ven  a  
m a s s i v e  d r o p  i n  s u p p o r t  f o r  o n e  o f  t h e s e  f o r c e s  i s  n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  a c c o m p a n ie d  by a  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  i n c r e a s e  i n  
e l e c t o r a l  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  o t h e r ;  v i z ,  t h e  19 7 1  S e n a t e  
e l e c t i o n ,  w hen t h e  c o a l i t i o n  p o l l e d  an  a l l - t i m e  low  o f  
3 8 . 1 8  p e r  c e n t ,  b u t  t h e  A . L . P .  v o t e  w as o n l y  4 2 . 2 2  p e r  c e n t .
On t h i s  o c c a s i o n  t h e  v o t e  f o r  s m a l l  p a r t i e s  a n d  I n d e p e n d e n t s  
p r o b a b l y  r e f l e c t e d  d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t  w i t h  b o t h  L a b o r  a n d  n o n -  
L a b o r .
The a d d i t io n  o f  T e r r i t o r i a l  S ena to rs  from 1974 p ro v id e s  a  new s e t  
o f  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .
31 Odgers, o p . c i t . , p .5 1 .  When a l l  60 Senate s e a t s  were a t  s ta k e  in  
1951 a f t e r  the  double d i s s o lu t i o n ,  Labor and non-Labor ga ined  5 
s e a t s  each in  4 S ta te s ;  in  b o th  Queensland and Western A u s t r a l i a  
th e  non-Labor team wen 6 s e a t s ,  and so th e  Senate had 32 non-Labor 
and 28 Labor nem bers.
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My survey of Senators of the Twenty-sixth Parliament 
revealed that the majority approved of the use of proportional 
representation in Senate elections, though A.L.P. Senators 
in particular were ambivalent about the resulting represent­
ation for small parties. In the Questionnaire Senators were 
asked:
Question 12.A. "The use of proportional representation
has enabled small parties to gain representation 
in the Senate. Do you think this is a good thing?"
A 'yes' or 'maybe' response was given by 26 of the 40 who 
answered this question; however, these were mainly non- 
Labor and D.L.P. Senators. Labor Senators' answers were 
2 to 1 against. Examples of favourable responses were:
"Minorities need representation. This may 
present difficulties to governments but a 
rigid two-party system is crude and 
insensitive."
"The only fair method to have minority 
views."
"If a quarter or half a million people 
want the D.L.P. who am I to deny it to 
them."
Typical negative responses were:
"I think that the democratic system works 
best under the two-party system; to the 
extent that PR fosters the growth of 
small parties I think it does not con­
tribute to stable government."
"I am of the opinion that the balance of 
power being in the hands of a small 
group - e.g. D.L.P. and Independents - 
permits dictation of policy which could 
be harmful to Australia."
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"The administration of a country can't 
get down to the sort of detail that I 
think a proliferation of parties involves."
"It's a bit unfair on the Senate to have 
to be the only house that has them."
Ambivalence was also common, for example:
"It is not necessarily a bad thing in 
itself though I doubt its benefit to 
the electorate. In fact there can 
arise a situation where a handful of 
people can virtually 'be the government."
"I have mixed feelings on this; it 
certainly provides for minorities but 
has inherent dangers if carried too 
far - France always seems on the verge 
of anarchy."
However, such ambivalence disappeared when Senators were 
asked:
Question 12.B: "Do you feel that proportional
representation has proved to be a 
satisfactory method of election for 
Senators?"
Only 4 Senators replied in the negative; the majority of 
replies are typified by the following comments:
"PR is a very democratic method and 
worth keeping in spite of the problems 
with small parties."
"The present system is much better 
than the previous system when it was 
on many occasions 'all in' or 'all out' 
which meant disproportionate 
representation in the Senate for the 
victorious political party."
"PR for the whole of the State, the 
whole of the State being a multi-member 
constituency is a very useful way of 
making sure that the Senate is still 
democratic and representative, but 
different from the House of Representatives."
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"Because it has kept the numbers more 
equally divided and makes the Senate 
less of a rubber stamp, Governments 
have to recognise that their path is 
not made so easy in a closely divided 
house."
A few Senators felt that the system was currently acceptable, 
but that in the future it may not be. For example:
"If the possibility of or the existence of 
PR induces individuals to develop new parties 
which get a minority/ a small group of people 
who support them, then this can break down 
the idea of PR because each can be self­
generating; as you get more individuals 
you get more parties and as you get more 
followers for them you get this proliferation 
of parties and ideas which will then bring 
about the destruction of the whole principle. 
So it's one where I think you're living 
somewhat on a razor's edge while you have 
it. But I see no reason for saying that 
it shouldn't continue at this stage 
although it may have to be reviewed at 
some time. It may prove itself in the 
fullness of time to have generated this 
impossible situation; but unless it does 
that then I think it's the best system."
Several Senators commented that the possibilities 
of instability and of small groups holding the balance 
of power would be lessened if elections for the two houses 
of federal parliament were held concurrently. The double 
dissolution of 1951 was followed by a separate Senate 
election in May 1953 - the first occasion on which House 
and Senate elections fell out of step. Elections were 
again synchronised in December 1955; but an early dis­
solution of the House of Representatives in 1963 was 
followed by another separate Senate election in 1964.
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From  1964  t o  1974 s e p a r a t e  H ouse  a n d  S e n a t e  e l e c t i o n s  
c o n t i n u e d ,  a n d  f a r  m ore  a t t e n t i o n  w as  f o c u s s e d  on U p p e r  
H ouse  e l e c t i o n s  a s  a  r e s u l t .  When e l e c t i o n s  f o r  t h e  tw o 
H o u se s  a r e  h e l d  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y ,  p u b l i c  a n d  m e d ia  a t t e n t i o n  
n a t u r a l l y  c e n t r e s  on  t h e  H ouse  o f  g o v e r n m e n t ,  a n d  p a r t y  
c a m p a i g n i n g  i s  l a r g e l y  d e v o t e d  t o  t h a t  e n d .  S e p a r a t e  
e l e c t i o n s  m e a n t  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  d r a i n  on p a r t y  f u n d s ;  b u t  
t h e  b o n u s  o f  m ore  p u b l i c i t y  f o r  t h e  S e n a t e  a n d  S e n a t o r s .  
S e n a t o r s  a n d  e x t e r n a l  o b s e r v e r s  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h i s  i n t e n s i f i e d  
an  a p p a r e n t  f r a g m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  p a r t y  s y s t e m  i n  A u s t r a l i a . 32 
F o r  many S e n a t o r s  t h e i r  a t t i t u d e  t o  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  m in o r  
p a r t y  a n d  I n d e p e n d e n t  S e n a t o r s  r e f l e c t e d  t h e i r  e v a l u a t i o n  
o f  t h e  p a r t  p l a y e d  b y  D .L .P .  S e n a t o r s  f r o m  1 9 5 5 .
D .L .P .  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n  a n d  i t s  C o n s e q u e n c e s
D u r i n g  t h e  e a r l y  1 9 5 0 s  a  s p l i t  o c c u r r e d  w i t h i n  t h e  
A . L . P .  o v e r  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  a l l e g e d  C o m m u n is t  i n f i l t r a t i o n  
o f  t h e  P a r t y .  A b r e a k a w a y  g r o u p ,  o r i g i n a l l y  c a l l e d  t h e  
A .L .P .  ( A n t i - C o m m u n i s t s ) a n d  l a t e r  r e n a m e d  t h e  D e m o c r a t i c  
L a b o r  P a r t y ,  c o n t e s t e d  t h e  1955 a n d  l a t e r  F e d e r a l  e l e c t i o n s  
a s  an  i n d e p e n d e n t  g r o u p .  The D .L .P .  h a s  b e e n  t h e  m o s t  
s u c c e s s f u l  m in o r  p a r t y  t o  c o n t e s t  S e n a t e  e l e c t i o n s .
T a b l e  V :1 5  sh o w e d  t h a t  b e t w e e n  1955 a n d  1 9 6 1 ,  a n d  1961  a n d  
1 9 6 8 ,  t h e r e  w e r e  tw o  D . L . P .  S e n a t o r s ;  i n  t h e  i n t e r v e n i n g  
p e r i o d  t h e r e  w as o n e ,  a n d  f r o m  1968  t o  1974 t h e r e  w e re  
f o u r  a n d  t h e n  f i v e  D .L . P .  m em bers  o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  U p p e r  H o u s e . 33
In th e  double d i s s o lu t i o n  e l e c t i o n s  o f  1974 and 1975 th e  v o te  f o r  
minor p a r ty  and Independent Senate c an d id a te s  dropped markedly.
To t h i s  d a te ,  th e  D.L.P. has  been unable  t o  win a  s e a t  i n  th e  
House o f  R e p re s e n ta t iv e s .
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A s t u t e  P a r l ia m e n ta r y  m anagem ent by t h e  m a jo r  
p a r t i e s  m in im is e d  th e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  th e  e a r l y  D . L . P .  
S e n a t o r s ; and f o r  a s  lo n g  as t h e  n o n -L a b o r  c o a l i t i o n  h e ld  
a m a j o r i t y  o f  s e a t s  in  th e  S e n a t e ,  e v e n  an A . L . P . -  D . L . P .  
c o m b in a t io n  (o r  an A . L . P .  -  D . L . P .  -  I n d e p e n d e n t  c o m b in a t io n )  
w as p o w e r le s s .  H ow ever, from  O c to b e r  1966 b o th  L abor and  
n o n -L a b o r  had  o n ly  28 members in  th e  S e n a t e ,  and s u p p o r t  
o f  som e o r  a l l  o f  th e  2 D . L . P .  and 2 I n d e p e n d e n t  S e n a t o r s  
w as r e q u ir e d  f o r  e i t h e r  L abor o r  n o n -L a b o r  t o  w in  a 
d i v i s i o n .
In  h i s  cam p aign  f o r  th e  1967  S e n a te  e l e c t i o n  th e
D . L . P .  L e a d e r , S e n a to r  G a ir , s t a t e d  t h a t  h i s  p a r t y  h a d :
" . . .  c o n s id e r e d  a l l  l e g i s l a t i o n  and 
p a r l ia m e n t a r y  b u s in e s s  on i t s  m e r i t s  
. . .  F or th e  tw o y e a r s  u n t i l  l a s t
O c to b e r , th e  r e c o r d  o f  o u r  v o t i n g  in  
t h e  S e n a te  show s t h a t  we h a v e  v o t e d  
w it h  th e  G overnm ent on 66 o c c a s i o n s ,  
w it h  th e  A . L . P .  on 64 o c c a s i o n s ,  and  
by o u r s e l v e s  o r  w ith  I n d e p e n d e n ts  on  
19 o c c a s i o n s .  In  o t h e r  w o r d s , we 
h a v e  s e e n  f i t  t o  v o t e  a g a i n s t  th e  
G overnm ent on 83 o c c a s i o n s ,  b u t  n e v e r  
h a v e  we m is c h ie v o u s ly  f r u s t r a t e d  th e  
G o v e r n m e n t." 3 4
M a ck erra s h a s  a n a ly s e d  th e  D . L . P . ' s  r e c o r d  o f  v o t i n g  in  
S e n a te  d i v i s i o n s  t o  c o v e r  th e  p e r io d  A u g u st 1965  t o  N ovem ber
O ff ic ia l  t e x t  o f  h is  campaign opening speech, w ith  emphasis as 
in  o r ig in a l. Quoted by M. Mackerras, The A ustralian  Senate 
1965-1967: Yho Held Control?, A .P.S.A . Monograph No.9 , 1968, p . 4 .
34
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1967.35 In the 190 divisions held during this period, 
Mackerras records that the D.L.P. Senators voted with the 
Government parties in 93, or 48.95 percent of divisions; 
with the A.L.P. in 68, or 35.79 percent of divisions; and 
on their own, or with rebel Government Senators and/or 
Senator Turnbull, in 23 or 12.10 percent of divisions. The 
attendance record and unanimity of the D.L.P. Senators was
3 6remarkably high.
Although these figures demonstrate that the D.L.P. 
was frequently in opposition to the Government during this 
period, the results in the 190 divisions demonstrate that 
the Government in fact only lost on 32 (16.84 percent) 
occasions - and 30 of these defeats reflected a tied vote.37 
From August 1965 to October 1966 there were 19 occasions on 
which a D.L.P.-A.L.P. combination did not prevent Government 
victory in a division; and 10 of the 11 actual Government 
defeats resulted from the defection of Senator Wright (alone 
on 7 occasions, supported by another rebel Liberal on 3 
occasions). In one division a combination of the A.L.P., 
D.L.P. and Senator Turnbull, with Senator Wright abstaining, 
led to Government defeat.38
During 1967 D.L.P. support for the Government rose
(66.25 percent of divisions) - but the number of Government
35 Ibid, p.4 ff.
36 Ibid, p.4.
3 7 Loc. cit.
3 8 Ibid., p.6.
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defeats doubled (23.75 percent of divisions).39 On 17 
occasions a D.L.P.-A.L.P. combination meant defeat for the 
Government.4 0
Comparable figures for the D.L.P.'s voting record 
in 1968 and 1969 are:
1968 - D.L.P. voted with the government in 68 divisions.
D.L.P. voted with the A.L.P. in 25 divisions.
D.L.P. voted alone in 1 division.
(a free vote occurred in 3 divisions).
1969 - D.L.P. voted with the government in 43 divisions.
D.L.P. voted with the A.L.P. in 16 divisions.
D.L.P. absent from 1 division.
(a free vote occurred in 6 divisions).
In 1968 a D.L.P .-A.L.P. combination resulted in 22 defeats 
for the Government; in 1969 such a combination led to 14 
Government defeats.
Thus the D.L.P. supported the Government in 70.10 
percent of divisions in 1968, and in 65.15 percent of 
divisions in 1969. The number of occasions on which a D.L.P.- 
A.L.P. combination meant defeat for the Government was 
similar to the figure for 1967; 22.65 percent in 1968 and 21.21 
percent in 1969.
During the interviews conducted with Senators during 
1969 and 1970, several cynical Labor Senators commented that 
the D.L.P.'s voting record in the Senate demonstrated a
3 9 Ibid., p.7.
4 0 Ibid., p.8.
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basic pro-Government stance, but with just enough support 
for the Opposition for it to continue its claims to be a 
critic of non-Labor. One member remarked to me in 1969 
that the D.L.P. Senators kept a running tally of their 
pro- and anti-Government votes, and that whenever the 
columns seemed too out of step they would shift their 
allegiance in a few divisions in order to redress the 
disparity'.
In the television program on the Senate produced by 
Frank Chamberlain, the Queensland D.L.P. Senator Condon 
Byrne was asked to assess the impact of the presence of 
his party in the Senate. Byrne commented, "Any third 
political force would have had a similar impact on the 
Senate." The D.L.P. cleverly exploited its position in 
the Senate, and the parliamentary perquisites which accompany 
that, to maximise its impact on Australian Federal politics.
Echoing the words of his parliamentary leader, a 
D.L.P. Senator commented in answering my Questionnaire:
"The D.L.P. represents those who disagree 
with the government or the A.L.P. In 
Senate votes, we vote for issues on their 
merits and the people appreciate this 
check on government."
Several non-Labor Senators felt that the D.L.P.'s 
record was "quite reasonable" and that its activities had 
been "pretty sensible". Labor Senators rejected this (not 
surprisingly since they did not overly benefit from D.L.P. 
support in Senate divisions). Typical Labor comments were:
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"The D.L.P. can avoid all responsibility 
or commitment; it can make outlandish 
statements without ever having to face 
up to them."
"The D.L.P. and Turnbull41 are just 
electioneering, trying to score points 
and not considering all policy or 
legislation, but only those issues 
which might have political advantage 
for them."
Many Labor Senators were antagonistic to their D.L.P. 
colleagues because only one had been elected in his own 
right; the others secured a seat by "feeding off the 
preferences of other parties".
Some non-Labor Senators shared these misgivings; 
for example:
"An evenly divided parliament is good, 
but a third party which can make or 
mar legislation, with no responsibility 
of being either the government or the 
official opposition, is terribly worry­
ing. The whims and fancies and moods 
and behaviour of the party's leader can 
mean defeat or otherwise for a government. 
Also it means the government has to man­
ipulate the D.L.P. to get its support."
Others felt that the electorate would quickly react to 
any situation in which it seemed the D.L.P. was actually 
abusing its position:
"But where you have a party such as the 
D.L.P. holding the balance of power 
then it's very easy for the electorate to 
see whether they are exercising that bal­
ance responsibly or not, and to be able 
to do something about it if they believe 
that they're not exercising it responsibly."
41 Independent Senator from 1963.
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"There's some people say they blackmail, 
but I've never seen this. I don't 
believe that they do. They're certainly 
in a position to do it but they'd have 
to keep in mind the fact that if it was 
brought out in the paper that they were 
blackmailing the Government and specific 
issues were quoted it would finish them 
as a political force. They've got to be 
very careful how they use their power."
However, a more realistic assessment is that increased 
representation in the Senate was a mixed blessing for 
the D.L.P. As a senior Labor Senator commented:
"The D.L.P. isn't really in a balance of 
power position. It is dependent on the 
A.L.P. opposing the Government for its 
votes to have any impact. Really one 
has to say that it's in an embarrassing 
position because it's forced to make 
decisions when it might prefer not to, 
given its pretension to being a sort of 
centre party. This also places the 
D.L.P. in an embarrassing position 
because it must strive to have a reason­
ably equal number of votes both for the 
A.L.P. and for the Government - therefore 
this has meant more successes for the 
A.L.P. than it would normally have had."
D.L.P. representation in the Senate was dependent 
on various factors: (i) the level of electoral support
for the party (and for other parties); (ii) retention 
of proportional representation for Senate elections;
(iii) continuation of preference trading between the 
D.L.P. and other non-Labor parties.
The D.L.P. astounded the pundits by, between 1955 
and 1974, continuing to poll between 7 and 16 per cent of 
primary votes in Senate elections, and between 5 and 9 
per cent" of first preference votes in elections for the
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House of Representatives. The blossoming of the Liberal 
Reform Group into the Australia Party and the general 
tendency for Australia Party second preferences to go to 
the A.L.P.42 tended to cancel out the effect of D.L.P. 
preferences in Lower House elections. However, in Senate 
elections D.L.P. candidates received the second preferences 
on non-Labor tickets and the addition of these votes to 
their own primary vote enabled«them to secure the fifth 
vacancy in States such as Queensland and Victoria.
In the short term, it is unlikely that proportional 
representation will be abandoned as the electoral method, 
for the feasible alternatives have been tried and found 
wanting. But a government that feels it is being unduly 
frustrated by a hostile Senate may attempt to alter the 
electoral method. My research demonstrated that in 1969- 
1970 any such move would have been rejected by a majority 
of Senators. It is more likely that steps to restore the 
coincidence of House and Senate elections will be successful 
either through Constitutional amendment or through the 
holding of an early House of Representatives election at 
the time of the next half-Senate election.
Moreover, if electoral support for either the Labor 
or the Liberal party decreases to the extent that one or 
the other achieves a majority of Senate seats in its own
42 Australia Party - A.L.P. preference trading is by no means as
tight or as predictable as Liberal-Country Party-D.L.P. preference 
trading, partly because Australia Party candidates frequently avoid 
guiding their supporters on preference distribution.
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r i g h t ,  th e n  th e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  and i n f l u e n c e  o f  any m in or  
p a r t y  S e n a to r s  i s  l i k e l y  t o  be a s  s l i g h t  a s  w as t h a t  o f  
th e  o r i g i n a l  D .L .P . S e n a t o r s . 43
The 1955 A .L . P .- D .L .P .  s p l i t  w as th e  f i r s t  s t e p  in  
a p e r io d  o f  f r a g m e n t a t io n  o f  th e  fo rm er  s t a b l e  tw o -p a r t y  
s y s te m  (w here t h e  c l o s e  a l l i a n c e  b e tw e e n  th e  L ib e r a l  and  
N a t io n a l  C ou n try  P a r t i e s  j u s t i f i e d  t r e a t i n g  t h e s e  a s  one  
f o r c e ,  a t  l e a s t  a t  th e  F e d e r a l  l e v e l ) .  A f t e r  L ib e r a l  
Prim e M in is t e r  M e n z ie s '  r e t i r e m e n t ,  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h in  
th e  c o a l i t i o n  d e t e r i o r a t e d ,  and w i t h o u t  h i s  r e s t r a i n i n g  
h a n d 44 i n t e r n a l  s q u a b b l in g  i n t e n s i f i e d  and becam e a m a t te r  
f o r  p u b l i c  d e b a t e .  The l a t e r  y e a r s  o f  n o n -L a b o r  r u l e  saw  
in c r e a s e d  m oves f o r  r e fo r m  w i t h in  b o th  t h e  L ib e r a l  and  
N a t io n a l  C ou n try  P a r t i e s ;  and t h e  d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t  o f  
some n o n -L a b o r  s y m p a t h is e r s  l e d  t o  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  
new g r o u p s  and p a r t i e s  s u c h  as  th e  A u s t r a l i a  P a r ty  and  
th e  L ib e r a l  M ovem ent. W hether th e  p o o r  p e r fo r m a n c e  o f  
m in o r  p a r t i e s  i n  th e  1974 and 1975  S e n a te  e l e c t i o n s 45 
r e p r e s e n t s  a r e t r e a t  from  a m u l t i - p a r t y  s i t u a t i o n  in  
F e d e r a l  p o l i t i c s  c a n n o t  a s  y e t  b e  d e te r m in e d .
43 A fter  two double d is so lu t io n  e le c t io n s  in  1974 and 1975, t h is  
has occurred.
44 For fu rther d e ta i l s  on the "Ming Dynasty", see : S. E ncel, Cabinet 
Government in  A u s tr a lia , 2nd e d . , M .U.P., Melbourne, 1974, Ch.10.
45 In the 1974 e le c t io n , the D.L.P. p o lle d  5 .2  per cen t o f  the House 
o f  R epresentatives vo tes  in  V ic to r ia  (the on ly  S ta te  in  which i t  
p u t up candidates) and 3 .6  per cen t o f  the t o t a l  f i r s t  preference  
Senate votes;-~  in  1975 i t  p o lled  4 .8  per c en t o f  the House vote
in  V ic to r ia , and 2 .7  per cent o f  Senate v o te s . Hie A u stra lia  Party 
p o lle d  2 .3  and 0 .4  per cen t o f the n a tio n a l House v o tes  in  1974 
and 1975 r e sp e c tiv e ly ;  and 1 .4  and 0 .5  per cen t o f  Senate votes  
in  th ose e le c t io n s .  See M. Mackerras, "Double D isso lu tio n  E lec tio n , 
1975: Results" in  H. Mayer and H. Nelson (ed s), A ustra lian  P o l i t i c s : 
a Fourth Reader, C heshire, Melbourne, 1976, p p .521-524.
306.
The impact of the D.L.P. in the Senate during the 
reign of the coalition non-Labor parties was to some degree 
enhanced by the overt and covert dissatisfaction of several 
non-Labor Senators, who were on some occasions willing to 
cross the floor. The division lists show that the D.L.P. 
generally only embarrassed the Government on matters on 
which there was a degree of public controversy; and on 
these occasions there were rumblings, if not overt signs, 
of similar reservations within the non-Labor parties. As 
a sometime rebel Liberal Senator commented:
"Oh, they embarrass the Government a little 
at times on certain issues but quite often 
the Government deserves to be embarrassed 
when these matters are brought up (because) 
the Government's trying to ride rough-shod 
over the parliament. You have a look at 
any issue that the D.L.P. launches forth on; 
you'll find usually it's started by Govern­
ment Senators; you'll hear a Government 
Senator get up and start the rot because he doesn't agree; it spreads then."
It is therefore necessary to discuss dissidence among non- 
Labor Senators.
Rebels and 'new blood' in the Senate
We have seen that not all Government defeats in the 
Senate resulted from the pattern of voting of the D.L.P.. 
Although A.L.P. Senators have maintained their record of 
unanimity continuously since 1901, the post World War II 
period has seen periodic rebellion within the ranks of 
the non-Labor parties.
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I n  t h e  p e r i o d  s t u d i e d  by  M a c k e r r a s ,  o n l y  10 L i b e r a l  
a n d  C o u n t r y  P a r t y  S e n a t o r s  h a d  n e v e r  v o t e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  
G o v e r n m e n t . 46 F o r  m o s t  S e n a t o r s  t h e r e  w as  o n l y  a  s i n g l e  
i n s t a n c e  o f  r e b e l l i o n ;  b u t  S e n a t o r s  W r i g h t  a n d  Wood ( a n d ,  
b e f o r e  h i s  r e s i g n a t i o n  f r o m  t h e  L i b e r a l  P a r t y ,  S e n a t o r  
H a n n a f o r d )  f r e q u e n t l y  c r o s s e d  t h e  f l o o r  t o  v o t e  w i t h  t h e  
O p p o s i t i o n .  S e n a t o r  W r i g h t  was  b y  f a r  t h e  m o s t  e f f e c t i v e  
r e b e l .  B e t w e e n  A u g u s t  1965 a n d  N o v em b er  1967 W r i g h t  v o t e d  
w i t h  t h e  A . L . P .  a g a i n s t  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  on 25 o c c a s i o n s ;  
on  19 o f  t h e s e  o c c a s i o n s  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  w as  d e f e a t e d ,  
a n d  i n  a  f u r t h e r  d i v i s i o n  W r i g h t ' s  a b s t e n t i o n  m e a n t  
a n o t h e r  G o v e r n m e n t  d e f e a t .  The v o t e s  o f  t h e  D . L . P .  a n d / o r  
S e n a t o r  T u r n b u l l  s a v e d  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  f r o m  d e f e a t  i n  t h e  
r e m a i n i n g  5 d i v i s i o n s . 47
D u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d  a n a l y s e d  b y  M a c k e r r a s  i t  i s  
i m p o s s i b l e  t o  t a l k  o f  a  h o m o g e n e o u s  g r o u p  o f  r e b e l s .  
H o w e v e r ,  v7i t h i n  t h e  new S e n a t e  w h i c h  m e t  f r o m  J u l y  1 9 6 8 ,  
o n e  c a n  i s o l a t e  a g r o u p  o f  n o n - L a b o r  S e n a t o r s  who 
o c c a s i o n a l l y  v o t e d  t o g e t h e r  i n  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e i r  
G o v e r n m e n t .  The g r o u p  i n c l u d e d :  S e n a t o r s  B u t t f i e l d ,
G r e e n w o o d ,  R ae ,  S im ,  Wedgwood a n d  Young ( L i b e r a l )  and  
S e n a t o r s  P r o w s e  a n d  W e b s t e r  ( C o u n t r y  P a r t y ) . T h e s e  
S e n a t o r s  w e r e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  r e s t r i c t i n g  
g o v e r n m e n t a l  e n c r o a c h m e n t  o n  i n d i v i d u a l  l i b e r t y .  T h e s e  
S e n a t o r s  w e r e  a l s o  c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  
b a c k b e n c h  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  p a r t i e s  -
4 6  
4 7
Op.g i t . ,  p .1 3 .  
I b i d . ,  pp.  10-13.
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with what one rebel called "governmental arrogance" - 
and with what they felt was an unnecessary stress on 
party discipline.
In 1970 a Liberal Senator commented to a journalist, 
"The Senate will remain the conscience of the Liberal 
Party."48 However, the desire to reform the Liberal Party 
(and to a lesser extent, its coalition partner) from within 
was not confined to Senators. Within the House of Repre­
sentatives there were similar signs of dissatisfaction 
amongst backbenchers. The list of rebels in that House 
included H.B. Turner, W.C. Wentworth, E.J. Killen,
E.H. St John and J.D. Jess. However, the Government's 
majority meant that rebellion in the Lower House was 
largely confined to speeches, rather than cross-voting.
New members of the House succumbed to the pressure to 
keep quiet and toe the line. Aspiring non-Labor politicians 
were not attracted to this atmosphere of cabinet dominance; 
and to young A.L.P. supporters their Representatives seemed 
to have been so long in opposition that they had ceased to 
function as a viable alternative majority party. For young 
ambitious candidates a seat in the Senate (at least in the 
first instance) seemed to offer more potential; in the 
Upper House they would have a better opportunity to speak, 
to build up expertise and a reputation.
48 Quoted by Russell Schneider, "New directions, new purpose", 
Bulletin, 31 October 1970, p.27.
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The result was the appearance within the Senate 
from 1961 of younger, enthusiastic and highly qualified 
members. Examples of the 'new blood' are Senators Greenwood,
Rae and Young (Liberal), Webster (Country Party), Murphy, 
Wheeldon, Wriedt and Douglas McClelland (A.L.P.). All 
can be described as active Senate men, who had a true 
appreciation of the importance and potential of the Senate.
They rose to prominence as lively, informed debaters and 
were diligent in committee work. They experienced fewer 
frustrations than their contemporaries in the House of 
Representatives; and all were promoted to positions in 
the Ministry or as Committee Chairmen. They acted as 
public ambassadors for the Senate, and their names became 
more well-known than those of their contemporaries in the 
House of Representatives. Membership of the Senate thus 
brought them political success as well as personal satisfaction.
A Senator as Prime Minister
The election of Senator John Gorton as Liberal 
Party leader was another boost to Senate morale. Never 
before had a Senator become Prime Minister. Sir Robert 
Menzies was moved to remark, in one of his few flattering 
references to the Senate:
"...the fact that, for the first time, a 
serving Senator of admittedly great ability 
has been chosen as Prime Minister must 
inevitably tend to increase the significance 
of the Senate and strengthen its hand in any 
conflict with the Lower House.
What seemed to be regarded by most people at 
the time as a fairly normal matter may turn 
out to be a quite remarkable and crucial 
event in our Constitutional history."49
49 "Senate Position in Australia", The Advertiser, 12 March 1968, p.2.
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As Prime Minister, Gorton did not appear to pay any 
more attention to the Senate than his predecessors. His 
views on federalism, dubbed as 'centralism' by his critics, 
aroused the ire of State Premiers and of his former Senate 
colleagues. He was unlucky in that the Senate by this time 
was living up to the role of a "good house of review", in- 
sering the "wise" amendments he had hoped for in 1950.50
The Influence of the Clerk of the Senate
James Rowland Odgers has been Clerk of the Australian 
Senate since 1965. He served a lengthy apprenticeship within 
Federal Parliament from 1937 and while progressing up the 
promotion ladder he became known as a strong champion of 
the Senate both within and outside the Chamber.
In his book Australian Senate Practice Odgers describes 
the position of Clerk of the Senate:
"The Clerk is the Permanent Head of the 
Department of the Senate and, subject to 
the direction of the President, is re­
sponsible for the administration and 
control of the department. ...
All proceedings are noted by the Clerk, 
and he is responsible for the preparation 
of the Journals of the Senate. ...
Whenever the office of President becomes 
vacant, the Clerk acts as Chairman of the 
Senate prior to the election of the Pres­
ident, and has the powers of the President
50 C.P.D.: Sen. (20 June 1950), vol.208, pp.4500-4501.
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under the Standing Orders whilst so 
acting. ...
The Clerk gives advice to the President, 
the Chairman of Committees, Ministers, 
the Leader of the Opposition and Senators 
generally in connection with the conduct 
of business, procedure and points of 
order. ...
Before a Bill is sent or returned to the 
House of Representatives, the Clerk cer­
tifies at the top of.the first page regard­
ing the manner in which the Senate has 
dealt with the Bill. ...
The Clerk of the Senate also acts as 
Secretary of the Standing Orders Committee..."51
The Clerk is thus both a top public service administrator 
and an adviser to elected Senators. As Maxwell Newton noted 
in 1968, "None of these are duties which are conducive to con­
troversy or cause the occupant of the position to be known to 
the public."52 However, Mr. Odgers has definitely not avoided 
the limelight and his activity has not been confined to playing
5 3administrative and institutional roles.
Mr. Odgers has contributed a host of articles on the Sen­
ate, not only to peer group journals such as The Parliamentar­
ian , but also to general periodicals such as Australian Quar­
terly . His Australian Senate Practice is a unique, detailed 
study of the Senate which has no parallel in the literature on 
Australian legislatures, and has been a steady seller since the 
first edition appeared in 1953. Woven into his descriptive
51 Op.cit., pp.86-87.
Management Newsletter, 13 August 1968, p.6.
See J.C. Wahlke et al, The Legislative System: Explorations in Legis­
lative Behaviour, Wiley & Sons, New York, 1962, p.189.
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accounts of Senate procedures and practice are his own 
forthright views on the importance and functions of the 
Senate. For example he argues that if any Federal Legis­
lative Chamber is to be abolished, it should be the House 
of Representatives and not the Senate, because: (i) the
former must, by its nature, operate as a rubber stamp 
whereas the Senate can and does act as a proper legislative 
body; (ii) the Senate is vital because it represents the 
States equally and hence embodies the federal concept.54
Mr Odgers has also aired his views to party leaders, 
occasionally reaping adverse criticism. For example, he 
publicly opposed the 1965-1967 attempt to abolish the 'nexus' 
and was accused by the then Leader of the Opposition, Mr Whitlam, 
of having supplied the material upon which dissenting Senators 
formulated the 'No' case for the 1967 referendum.55 In 1966 
he personally drafted a submission to federal cabinet urging 
extensions to the Senate committee system. He had been pro­
posing such moves ever since his return to Australia in 1956 
from a study trip to the United States. As a Clerk-Assistant 
he had then produced a paper on the committee system of 
American Congress and recommended a somewhat similar develop­
ment within the Australian Senate.55 Chapter VI noted the 
vital part played by the Clerk in setting the framework for 
the implementation of changes to the Senate committees 
system in 1970-1971.
54 Cp.cit., ch.l, especially pp.7-8.
55 C.P.D.: H. of R., (18 May 1967) vol.55, pp.2374-2380.
56 Parliamentary Paper No. 36 of 1956.
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These activities all reflect Mr. Odgers* desire to have 
the Senate acting as, and accepted as, a vital if not the most 
vital Federal Legislative Chamber. He is thus also concerned 
that the Senate and Senators are, in his eyes, acting respon­
sibly; that there are limits to the extent of the Senate's 
power which must always be observed. Thus he urges forcibly 
in his book that if a "matter in dispute is a question of prin­
ciple for which the Government may have a mandate", then "the 
Senate should yield". Not all Senators accept this view, as 
shall be seen in Chapter VII. However, the Clerk does make his 
personal views known to Senators, and on occasions his counsel 
has been accepted in place of Senators' original proposals.
One publicly noted example was in relation to the disallowance 
of telephone and postal regulations in 1967, when the Clerk 
prevailed on A.L.P. and D.L.P. Senators not to continue oppos­
ing proposed increases if they were (as they eventually were) 
included within the Budget. Odgers applauded the original 
Senate rejection of such increases, and the special one-day 
sitting, but felt that as a matter of principle Senators should 
not disagree with such increases if they were presented as part 
of the budget. 58
In my interviews with Senators many volunteered comments 
about the integrity, helpfulness and influence of Mr. Odgers.
He had particularly built up a rapport with those I previously 
termed the ’new blood'. Recently-elected Senators described
57 Australian Senate Practice, 3rd edition, 1967, p.2. It is interesting 
to note that in his 4th edition Odgers substitutes "may" for "should". 
See p.4 and pp. 13-14, 311. Do we note here the influence of Senators 
on Mr. Odgers?
58 See Maxwell Newton, op.cit., p.7.
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how he personally offered them every possible assistance and 
several said they frequently consulted him on tactical as well 
as procedural matters. It is quite clear that where the Clerk 
feels a Senator is responsive (especially in terms of also 
being a champion of the powers and importance of the Senate as 
a Chamber) quite a close association develops.
My conversations with the Clerk over the period 1969-1974 
revealed his increasing delight with what he saw as the ever- 
rising level of morale amongst Senators. In March 1973, when 
asked how he would classify Senators, Mr. Odgers replied that 
he distinguished between two types of Senators which could 
loosely be termed the "institutional men" and the "non- 
institutional men". The distinction rested on their view of 
the powers of the Senate and on the degree to which they were 
"proud to be Senators". During his early years on the Senate 
staff, he found very few Senators who could be termed "insti­
tutional men". From the introduction of proportional repre­
sentation and particularly since the onset of the period of 
uncertain party strengths in the Senate, however, he had been 
able to distinguish a readily expanding group of such Senators. 
He felt that Senators' satisfaction with their position and 
performance was given an especial fillip by the changes to the 
committee system and that this would continue (as would the 
expanded committee system) even if at some time in the future 
a Government gained a majority within the Senate. In fact, he 
felt that, having in a sense tasted the first fruits of added 
prestige, Senators would never be willing "to return to the
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old somnolence". Those who had in 1970 been sceptical 
about extending the committee system had generally altered 
their opinion and were now equally convinced that "the 
Senate could no longer do its job properly without the 
committee system".
Between 1972 and 1975 the Clerk actively urged 
Senators to reject two Labor proposals which he felt could 
inhibit the Senate's new-found'effectiveness. Firstly, he 
regarded any proposal to establish Territorial Senators as 
inimical and unconstitutional, in that this would destroy 
the essential States House nature of the Senate.59 (It has 
already been noted that Odgers is the States House apologist 
per excellence). Secondly, he feared Prime Minister Whitlam’s 
attempts to increase the number of Joint Committees as a 
move which, if implemented, would "destroy Senate independence 
and swamp the Senate in numbers", as well as deflect Senators’ 
attention from the Legislative and General Purpose Standing 
Committees. In interviews I discovered that at that time a 
majority of Senators shared his views. Prime Minister Whitlam 
did, however, succeed in achieving both proposals.
In 1968 Maxwell Newton remarked:
"Since the Government lost its control of 
the Senate, the Chamber has risen in public 
esteem and recognition. No man is happier 
as a result than Jim Odgers."60
It is fair to describe Mr Odgers as a catalyst for 
the resurgence of the Senate over the past two decades.
See Australian Senate Practice, 4th edition, op.cit., p. 42.
60 Op.cit., p.7.
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"Senate-mindedness"
In this Chapter I have listed six factors which 
emerged in the period from 1948, and which provide an 
explanation for a resurgence and revitalisation of the 
Senate. These factors were:
i) the introduction of proportional 
representation as the electoral 
method from 1949;
ii) the appearance of minor party and 
independent Senators from 1955;
iii) the activities of D.L.P. Senators, 
especially as a balance of power 
group from 1966;
iv) the calibre of new entrants to the 
Senate, especially in the 1960s;
v) John Gorton's elevation from being 
a Senator to being Prime Minister;
vi) the views and activities of the 
current Clerk of the Senate.
Most of these are exogenous factors in that the initial 
impetus came from outside the Senate. Their origin is, how­
ever, less important than the effects of any of these factors. 
The introduction of proportional representation was both the 
seminal and the most important factor; without this, minor 
party candidates (especially from the D.L.P.) would have had
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little hope of winning representation in the Senate. Moreover, 
the former somnolence of Senators undoubtedly reflected a feel­
ing of impotence. The Chamber had always been, from 1910, under 
the thumb of one of the major political forces, and Senators 
succumbed perhaps too easily to the feeling that they were pow­
erless. Even when proportional representation produced the pos­
sibility of uncertain party strengths in the Senate, few Senators 
were immediately alive to the effect this might have on their 
own legislative role.
Undoubtedly the activities of the D.L.P. Senators provided 
a necessary jolt. With no other power base the D.L.P. had to 
capitalise fully on its position in the Senate. For other Sen­
ators it then was demonstrated that a small political force which 
was officially a part of neither the Government nor the Opposi­
tion could nonetheless play quite an important part in the polit­
ical process.
At the same time a gradual increase in general community 
interest in politics was reflected in an increase in the number 
of people seeking election, whether as major or minor party, or 
as Independent candidates. The increased attractiveness of a 
parliamentary career meant greater competition for preselection 
within the established parties as well as in new possible chan­
nels outside these.
The combination of these factors meant that by the mid 1960s 
Senators could no longer validly see themselves as being in a 
"stagnant backwater". Events were forcing them to act. Yet
to talk in these terms is to imply that Senators merely reacted
6 1 H. Mayer in Introduction to Mackerras, op.cit., p.l.
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to events that occurred without taking any positive steps on 
their own. The moves to extend the committee system detailed 
in Chapter VI were, however, initiated solely within the 
Senate and were achieved in spite of some counter movements, 
especially by party leaders in the Lower House. In other 
words, Senators were themselves important agents in the 
revival process.
The fact that early Senate rebels such as Senator Wright 
were not effectively silenced or prevented from crossing the 
floor when they disagreed with their party undoubtedly inspired 
others in the coalition parties to seriously question the degree 
to which party loyalty was necessary, or desirable. The new 
non-Labor recruits of the 1950s and 1960s included many who by 
nature could not accept the role of mere party hack. Within 
the Labor Party the choice of Senators Murphy and Cohen as 
leaders in the mid 1960s provided an atmosphere within which 
loyal Labor Senators felt they could work within the party to 
achieve changes. Moreover, partisan differences did not 
necessarily colour Senate activities to the degree to which 
it seems they did in the 1930s and 1940s.
A similar background (especially prior legal training) 
and outlook is evidenced by many of the new Labor and non- 
Labor recruits over the past decade. Moreover, these new 
Senators were not willing to play an inactive role; they 
were ambitious and aimed to maximise the return on holding 
a position as Senator (even if it might only be a stepping- 
stone to higher things). Therefore they would not accept a 
degraded status. Certainly, exogenous changes provided an 
atmosphere conducive to their aims; but it is possible that
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even if proportional representation had not provided the 
initial basis for such activity, these Senators could well 
have extended the committee system or taken similar steps 
to enhance their legislative effectiveness.
Mr Odgers referred to an increasing number of what 
he termed "institutional men" in the Senate over the past 
twelve to fifteen years. My interviews with Senators sug­
gested an amazing degree of unanimity about the importance 
of the Senate, and many friendships across party lines.
This was particularly evident in the period when informal 
debate and consultations were occurring over extensions to 
the committee system. Even within the Chamber, where some 
formal display of partisan differences must be enacted, 
there was a great deal of informal negotiating between 
Senators of quite different political camps. One could 
say that, at least for the period 1969-1972, Senators were 
running their Chamber and that there was a general attitude 
of "Senate-mindedness" (not just Senate narcissism6 2) 
amongst the representatives of the various parties.
As evidence on this phenomenon it is interesting to 
relate the views of Senators interviewed in 1969-1971 on 
the relationship between the two Houses of Federal Parliament. 
I referred Senators to Odgers' views on this matter:
"'Senate narcissism' - the sensual justification that Senators 
find in their own institution". G.S. Raid, "Parliamentary- 
Executive Relations...", op.cit., p.512.
62
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Q.16 In his book on the Senate, the Clerk
stresses that the Senate should always 
remember that the House of Representatives 
is the governing House; and that the 
Senate should accede in cases where the 
government has a mandate. Do you agree 
with this?
Sixty-three percent of Senators did support this view,
some unreservedly:
"'This is a correct view; the House 
of Representatives is the popular 
house of government on which (sic) 
election results governments rise 
and fall."
"The House of Representatives is 
the house that reflects the 
immediate wishes of the electors, 
and the Senate should bow to any mandate that the lower house has 
received from the electors,"
Others noted that the issue hinges on the word 'mandate',
and that it is often difficult to determine whether a
mandate applies to any particular policy:
"Agree. Provided that it is clearly 
defined that the Government has a 
mandate. This of course is always 
open to debate,"
"It depends upon the measure; 
obviously the Government may not 
have a mandate for some legislation 
and unless the mandate is specific 
the Senate has a right to disagree,"
"In agreeing one must keep in mind 
the particular circumstances which 
could alter from the time when the 
mandate was given."
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One Government Senator who supported Odgers' view in principle 
commented that nonetheless there could be occasions where a 
Senator would be entitled to follow his mandate rather than 
that of the Lower House. He cited the current (mid 1969) 
about-face on Australia's relationships with Russia evidenced 
in statements by the Prime Minister and the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs which had not been discussed in cabinet or 
in party meetings:
"There is a great deal of antipathy 
to this abrupt change in policy.
If Gorton wins the 1969 elections, 
then he will regard this victory 
as a mandate for the new policy, .,.
But since I was elected before this 
change I have a different mandate 
and could talk against the new 
policy in the Senate,"
Three Labor Senators used a similar argument in opposing 
Odgers' prescription:
"The reason for having half the 
Senators only retiring each three 
years is to prevent action detri­
mental to the country because of 
a mandate granted during a sudden 
emotional crisis,"
"In a Federal Parliament I cannot 
concede that the House of Repre­
sentatives is a superior governing 
house. The power over finance 
resides with the House of Repre­
sentatives , but a Senate elected 
at the same time as the House of 
Representatives would have an 
equal mandate,"
"I believe that the Senate should 
examine the legislation on its 
merits and even if the government 
claims a mandate and the legislation 
is bad, the Senate should say so.
In modern politics when so many issues 
are put to the electorate, in many 
cases how can it be said that the 
Government has a mandate?"
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The latter comment refers in part to the Senate's function 
as a House of Review. A Liberal Senator responded:
"If you agree with this it makes 
a mockery of the Senate being a 
House of Review. I cannot agree 
with Odgers' position - a House 
of Review is meant to have wide 
powers because it's having a 
second look."
Some Senators felt that Odgers' view was incompatible with 
the States House function of the Senate, For example:
"I think that this is an over­
simplification, If it is true 
then the Senate has NO role as a 
States House. I believe that 
role is still important and that 
on occasions it has the right and 
duty to refuse to accede to the 
House of Representatives."
"The principle supported by the 
Clerk is the English practice 
because the House of Lords is 
hereditary. The Senate is elected 
by the people and also guards 
State rights."
"If the Government has an Australian 
mandate to pass legislation detri­
mental to a State the Senate has 
the Constitutional responsibility 
to block such legislation,"
Only two Senators (both then in Opposition) justified
rejection of this principle on purely partisan grounds.
Both implied a 'we'll give as good as we get' attitude:
"I believe that Labor should use 
every available Constitutional 
procedure open to it to further 
its policy (as do the Liberals),"
"When the Scullin Government was ,
thwarted by a non-Labor majority 
in the Senater the A.L.P, has no 
need to follow this dictum,"
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Those opposing "this dictum" were not deterred by the 
possibility of a double dissolution following on a dead­
lock situation between the two Houses. A rebel Government 
Senator commented:
"This is a risk that a Senate that 
gets a little bit too carried away 
runs. ... I t ’s something that any
Senate must bear in mind. If you 
wave the red flag at the House of 
Representatives until the bull 
charges at you, well I think you’ve 
just got to run the risk that there 
will be a double dissolution. It 
may be in the interests of the 
country that a double dissolution 
is the only answer and is the proper 
answer,"
In so far as it is possible to clarify the meaning of 
"mandate", Senators are thus mostly willing to accept that 
there are conventional as well as Constitutional restraints 
on the Senate’s power vis-a-vis the House of Representatives. 
However, only three Senators favoured any Constitutional 
change in the Senate's powers63 and these three were Labor 
proponents of Senate abolition. One argued:
"Government rests in the House of 
Representatives and it should not 
be frustrated by vagaries in the 
Senate,"
Several other Labor Senators supported their party's 
plank on abolition of the Senate, but realised that it 
was unrealistic:
Senators were asked (Q,20) : "It has been suggested that the Senate 
be allowed only to delay the passage of legislation (for, say,
6 months) and not to reject legislation. What do you think of 
this proposal?" These 3 Senators agreed that the Senate should 
only be allowed to delay the passage of legislation.
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"I feel that the Senate is 
redundant and should be 
abolished; yet this is 
very difficult. Therefore 
one just has to make use 
of committees and make the 
Senate as effective as 
possible."
"I am pro abolition but this 
is pretty idealistic. Instead 
one must work through the 
Senate because it's there and 
make the most of it. I feel 
that it’s unlikely that the 
Senate will ever really be 
abolished."
"I don't think it's possible 
for the Senate to ever be 
abolished because Tasmania 
and the other small States 
will never vote in a refer­
endum to disenfranchise them­
selves - especially with the 
ever-increasing importance of 
New South Wales and Victoria.
The best idea is to work hard 
at making the Senate work, say 
through committees,"
We can therefore conclude that Senators would react 
strongly against any attempt to curb the powers of the 
Senate relative to the House of Representatives, The fate 
of the House of Lords is not for them.
"I’m quite happy as long as we 
keep our powers that we’ve got 
at the moment. I wouldn’t like 
to see any watering down of them; 
the same thing would happen that's 
happened with the House of Lords; 
it would destroy the Parliament."
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Conclusion
By responding/reacting to a variety of forces and 
changes in the political environment the Senate - led 
partly by its own members but above all under the 
stimulus of the aims and activities of political parties 
emerged as a revitalized institution in the period from 
the early 1960s.
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CHAPTER VIII
OBSERVERS' EVALUATIONS OF THE SENATE AND SENATORS 
Introduction
Within any society there are expectations about 
the performance of political institutions, based on 
perceptions of the purposes for which the institutions 
were established and on the observed pattern of activity 
of those institutions over time. The resulting image1 
of a particular institution will thus reflect both 
functional expectations and an assessment of the degree 
to which the institution has satisfied those expectations.
An observers' image of the Australian Senate will 
therefore be based on:
A/ His perception of:
i) the Constitutionally defined powers of the Senate;
ii) the Constitutionally prescribed functions of the 
Senate as a Federal and as a traditional Upper 
House (States House and House of Review);
iii) the formal relationships between the Senate and 
other Australian political institutions;
iv) the functions of political parties within the 
Australian political system.
B. His expectations about governmental and legislative 
activity at Federal and State levels which will
l For any individual the image will be a personal construction 
based upon what he knows and understands about the institution.
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explicity or implicitly sanction or condone certain 
types of performance (his notions of legitimacy).
C. His evaluation of Senate activity in relation to his 
perceptions and expectations; this includes not only 
some degree of recognition of which powers and functions 
are used or performed, but also his views on which 
powers and/or functions should be used and/or performed.
An observer's image of the Senate may be either 
positive or negative, that is, flattering or unflattering. 
This will reflect both his cognitive and his affective 
reactions to Senate activity; he is evaluating performance 
not only in terms of what he thinks the Senate actually 
does but also in relation to what he expects or desires 
it to do. An unflattering image of the Senate may reveal 
dissatisfaction with Senate performance because:
a) the Senate should but has not made full 
use of its Constitutional powers; or
b) the Senate cannot make full use of its 
Constitutional powers; or
c) the Senate should but has not acted as a 
States House and/or a House of Review; or
d) the Senate cannot act as a States House and/ 
or House of Review;
or any combination of these attitudes.
These views relate to the degree to which the Senate 
realises its potential as a legislature; the observer may
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( (b) and (d) ) or may not ( (a) and (c) ) recognise the 
existence of constraints which operate to limit the 
Senate's ability to achieve this potential.
In previous Chapters the views of members of the 
Senate - a particular set of observers - have been noted.
In evaluating the performance of an institution of which 
they are themselves members, Senators could be expected to 
be more percipient observers of the constraints on Senate 
activity. At the same time, Senators must also take account 
of other observers' expectations and perceptions of Senate 
activity. This Chapter provides a collection of comments 
about the Senate and Senators from a variety of observers - 
especially journalists, academics and randomly sleeted 
voters. Needless to say, this is not a compendium of all 
possible comments; it should be noted, however, that there 
is not a wealth of observers' comments about the Senate, 
and that these comments are very repetitive, in that there 
is a common reaction to the Senate at any point in time 
which is reflected by most observers. Comments are presented 
in an approximate chronological order to facilitate reference 
back to the detailed information presented in Chapters V 
and VI.
The Image of the Senate: academics, journalists and
Parliamentarians
For at least the first decade after federation the 
membership of both Houses of Federal Parliament included 
several of the founding fathers of the Constitution, and
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their assessments of the performance of the Senate during this
period are thus especially interesting. Alfred Deakin provides
a particularly lucid picture of the early activities of the
Senate, particularly its relationship with the Lower House.2
"The first feature of interest revealed (in 
the Commonwealth Parliament) relates to the 
attitude assumed towards each other by the 
Senate and the House of Representatives, 
both elective and both filled with strong and 
ambitious men. In every Colony there have 
been frequent duels between its two Chambers, 
never equally representative of the electors, 
and in the more populous states strife of this 
kind, more or less open, has been chronic. As 
a rule, the popular House has been the aggres­
sor, and it has been by a policy of passive 
resistance that its rival has sought to wear 
it down. In the new Federal field Senators 
and members with such reminiscences have from 
the first eyed each other askance, with evident 
susceptibility to any hint of offence and some­
thing very like latent antagonism. A State 
Legislative Council would have waited for an 
attack. The Federal experience was at once 
novel. While the House of Representatives 
confined itself to the business before it, the 
Senate has been as much, if not more, exercised 
as to how it could best assert its equality of 
power and function. The distinction between 
the Chambers is stated by Sir Josiah Symon3 to 
consist merely in a different method of pro­
cedure in respect to a small number of measures.
His colleague from South Australia, Sir John 
Downer, more than hinted that the Ministry 
might be held responsible to the Senate as well 
as to the House of Representatives, and claimed 
that the right reserved to it to make suggestions 
with regard to money bills amounted to a power 
of amending them. Senator Stewart of the Queens­
land and Labour Party distinguished the Senate 
from the Upper Houses of the States by the emphatic 
declaration that while the (Legislative) Councils 
had been brakes on the wheels of progress, the 
Senate would prove a stock-whip and be employed 
to hasten them." (28 May 1901).
"Clearly they are a power to be reckoned with.
It may be wariness on the part of the represent­
atives which has induced them to allow the 
challenge from such a body to pass in silence 
though evidently not unheeded. In any Colony 
the language of the Senators would have at once
Alfred Deakin: federated Australia^ (ed. J. La Nauze), Melbourne
University Press, Melbourne, 1968, pp.57-59.
Attorney-General in the Reid-McLean Ministry. From South Australia, 
Symcn was also unofficial leader of the Opposition in the Senate from 
1901-1903 and 1906-1907.
3
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provoked an exception in its [Legislative] 
assembly, a denunciation of the usurpation 
threatened, and demand for reprisal. The 
most significant, and probably the most 
fruitful and important development of the 
first work of the Federal Parliament, is 
the demonstration in the Senate of a deter­
mination to use all its endowment of author­
ity and the meekness, real or strategical, 
with which the warring has been accepted by 
the more numerous House of Representatives.
Members may come and go, but the relation 
between the branches of the Legislature 
once settled is likely to become permanent."
(6 July, 1901).
A fortnight later, after the Senate had issued a challenge 
to the Lower House over appropriation clauses in the Post Office 
Bill, Deakin urged restraint. "The fussiness, aggressiveness, 
and waywardness of the Senate, if manifested often in this way, 
must lower its reputation and its influence."4
By 1906 Deakin was noting, with surprise, "the subordinate 
position into which the Senate is drifting"5 in spite of deter­
mined efforts by its members to assert its equality to, if not 
supremacy over, the House of Representatives:
"The President, Sir Richard Baker, a technical 
constitutional lawyer, has been sleepless in 
his vigilance in order to unveil and defeat 
any attempts at encroachment upon either real 
or assumed prerogatives. By his help they 
have scored several successes and at one crit­
ical moment in 1901 threatened the life of the 
tariff at its last stage, after it had been 
twelve months in preparation.6 But in spite 
of themselves the current of events has been 
too strongly against the ambitious Senators.
The one assumption against which they have 
protested perpetually and with feverish anxiety
Ibid., p.60.
Ibid., p.193.
The Senate sent back 238 items of the proposed Tariff Schedule for 
reconsideration by the House of Representatives. See J.R. Odgers 
Australian Senate Practice, 4th ed., Ccmmonwealth Government Printer, 
Canberra, 1972, p.355.
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has been that which classed them with the 
Legislative Councils of the States. The 
one thing that popular opinion tenaciously 
insists upon is in taking that assumption 
as beyond dispute. The man in the street 
cannot divest himself of the conviction 
that wherever there are two Chambers they 
are to be ranked in order of importance as 
first and second ... At the beginning 
Senators were exasperated by this miscon­
struction of the Constitution, but every 
year find themselves sinking deeper into 
the well-worn ruts of constitutional prac­
tice. ... one has only to look at the 
manner in which Parliamentary business is 
transacted to see how in fact the Senate 
is subsiding into the second place instead 
of occupying the position of equality which 
our written law in terms undoubtedly confers 
upon it."*
By the end of the first decade after federation, this view 
was being echoed outside the Parliament. In 1911 the historian 
H.G. Turner commented:
"As a chamber of review, as a check on hasty 
legislation, or as the originator of states­
manlike measures of national utility, it had 
become a failure. [Yet] it had great possi­
bilities, under the Constitution, ample 
leisure to do good work and thoroughly to 
investigate the basis upon which proposed 
legislation rested. It had almost unique 
power, for a Second Chamber, to enforce its 
amendments." 8
L.F. Crisp concedes "there were some very notable debates 
on major national policy issues",9 and W. Harrison Moore admired 
"a fiery zeal for experiment";10 however, the supremacy of the
Deakin, op.cit., pp.193-194.
Ihe First Decade of the Commonwealth, Melbourne, 1911, p.259, quoted by 
L.F. Crisp, Australian National Government, 2nd ed., Longman, Croydon, 
1970, p.343.
Loc.cit.
"Ihe Political Systems of Australia", in M. Atkinson (ed) , Australia: 
Economic and Political Studies, Macmillan, London, 1920, p.lll.
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House of Representatives was firmly established and the 
Senate could not be "taken seriously as an effective part 
of the constitutional machinery."11
During the first decade of the operation of the 
Senate, its membership had ceased to group themselves in 
loose, ever-realigning factions; tightly-disciplined 
political parties were the norm from about 1907. This 
immediately affected both the activity and the image of 
the Senate. The viev/s of Sir John Quick, a Founding Father, 
have already been noted.12
In 1920 W. Harrison Moore confidently asserted:
"As a federal House of States, the Senate has long ceased 
to raise any expectations of activity as a guardian of 
State powers and functions ,.."13 The 1929 Royal Commission 
on the Constitution hopefully noted:
"There were signs during the inquiry by this 
Commission that there might be a grouping of 
the States which depend mainly on primary 
production in defence of common interests."14
but these hopes were not realised. The Report of this 
Commission continued:
"At present the Senate does give the less 
populous States representation at the Seat 
of Government and in Commonwealth Ministries
11 hoc.cit.
12 See Chapter IV, p.92.
13 Cp.cit., p.lll.
14 Report, ch.5, p.47.
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greater than they could obtain on a pop­
ulation basis, and does to some extent 
counteract the effect of a concentration 
of people in the two great cities. More­
over, it does enable a State to exercise 
an incluence on matters in which it is 
particularly interested."15
Yet where is this influence exerted? The answer, according 
to H.S. Nicholas, counsel assisting the Commission, was in 
party meetings prior to the formal deliberations of the 
Senate:
"It may be that the fact of each State having 
six Senators gives each small State a far 
greater weight in the councils of parties 
and Ministers than it otherwise would have 
had."16
It has already been noted that it is difficult to either 
prove or disprove this assertion. However, to the external 
observer the Senate was demonstrably not acting as a States 
House; and from 1920 the image of the Senate was that of 
a party house. Comments on Senate performance over the 
past fifty years occasionally include a wistful desire 
that the Senate should act to promote and protect State 
interests; but observers could not be said to expect 
that this will actually occur. For example:
"Had the Constitution operated as its 
framers intended that it should, with 
the House of Representatives represent­
ing the people upon a population basis 
and the Senate representing the States, 
the number of deadlocks would have been 
very few because each House would have 
approached the problems of the Parliament 
from an entirely different standpoint.
15 Loc.cit.
16 Quoted by Odgers, op.cit., p.9.
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The House of R ep resen ta tiv e s  would have 
d e a l t  w ith  them on broad p a r ty  l in e s  and 
the  Senate would have reviewed the  
r e s u l t s  o f  the  d e l ib e r a t io n s  o f  the  House 
of R ep resen ta t iv e s  on the  b a s is  of the 
i n t e r e s t s  o f the  S t a t e s , " 17
Not only d id  p a r t i s a n s h ip  a f f e c t  the  S en a te ’s 
performance as a S ta te s  House; to  many observers  i t  
h e ra ld ed  the in f lu x  o f  a new breed  of Senators  -  u n d is ­
t in g u ish e d  p a r ty  hacks - who were very i n f e r i o r  to  D eakin 's  
"men o f  f i r s t - c l a s s  a b i l i t y " .  Yet in  the  e a r ly  1970s 
R u sse ll  Schneider and David Solomon argued t h a t  "a 
co n s id e ra b le  change" had occurred  in  Senate p e r s o n n e l .18 
What were o b se rv e rs '  e v a lu a t io n s  o f  the  impact of the  aims 
and a c t i v i t i e s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  on S en a to rs ' behaviour?
S lo th  and H o s t i l i t y
The image of the  Senate has a lso  r e f l e c t e d  the  
degree to  which the Senate i s  under the  c o n t ro l  o f the  
Government. Alan Davies no tes  t h a t  du rin g  those  p e r io d s  
when the Government a lso  he ld  a m a jo r i ty  in  the  Senate, 
d ebates  in the Upper House merely echoed those  in  the  
House of R e p re se n ta t iv e s ;  the  second review was o f te n  
h a s t i e r  than  the  f i r s t ;  and most amendments were proposed 
by M i n i s t e r s . 19 I t  was in  such a p e r io d  t h a t  W.M. Hughes 
no ted  an atmosphere o f  somnolence and d ep ress io n  and 
d esc r ib e d  Senate incumbents as " t h i r t y - s i x  bodies  on a 
s lab "  . 20
17 F.M. Osborne in debate on the Constitution Alteration (Avoidance of 
Double Dissolution Deadlocks) Bill 1950, CPD:H of R, (1 June 1950) 
vol.208, pp.3628-3629.
18 See Chapter V, pp.138.
Australian Democracy, 2nded., Longmans, London, 1964, pp.41-44.
20 Quoted by Ibid, p.43.
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L .F . C r is p  s i m i l a r l y  rem a rk s:
"So lo n g  as  t h e  p a r t y  m a j o r i t i e s  in  th e  
tw o  h o u s e s  w ere  o f  th e  sam e c o l o u r ,  th e  
p o s i t i o n  w as s a t i s f a c t o r y  en ou gh  as  
r e g a r d s  s h e e r  d e s p a tc h  o f  b u s i n e s s .
T here w as n o t ,  h o w e v e r , a lw a y s  a 
c o r r e s p o n d in g  a d d i t i o n  t o  th e  
d i g n i t y  and l u s t r e  o f  t h e  S e n a t e .  
C o n s id e r a t io n  o f  m e a s u r e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y  
o f  t h o s e  w h ich  r e a c h e d  i t  to w a r d s  th e  
c l o s e  o f  a S e s s i o n ,  h a s  n o t  i n f r e q u e n t l y  
b e e n  f a r c i c a l . " 21
D i s i l l u s i o n m e n t  w it h  S e n a te  a c t i v i t y  i s  a l s o  r e f l e c t e d  
in  th e  f o l l o w i n g  comment by an MHR:
"More o f t e n  th a n  n o t  th e  g o v ern m en t o f  
t h e  d ay h a s  commanded a m a j o r i t y  in  b o th  
H o u s e s , and th e  r e s u l t  o f  t h a t  p o s i t i o n  
h a s  b e e n  no s e a r c h in g  r e v ie w  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  
and few  c o n s t r u c t i v e  am endm ents in  th e  
S e n a t e .  I n s t e a d ,  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  a c o s t l y  
and cum bersom e d u p l i c a t i o n  o f  a u t h o r i t y . " 22
D a v ie s  te r m s  th e  a c t i v i t y  o f  t h e  S e n a te  i n  p e r io d s  
when th e  G overnm ent h a s  a m a j o r i t y  in  b o th  h o u s e s  
" d e p r e s s iv e " ,  in  c o n t r a s t  t o  w h a t h e l a b e l s  "m anic"
S e n a te  p e r fo r m a n c e  when a g o v ern m en t i s  f a c e d  w it h  a 
h o s t i l e  m a j o r i t y  in  th e  U pper H o u s e .23
L.F. C risp , Parliam entary Government o f  the Commonwealth o f  
A u stra lia , 3rd e d it io n , Longmans, Lenden, 1961, p p .178-179.
A.R. Dcwner, during debate on the C o n stitu tion  A ltera tio n  
(Avoidance o f  Double D isso lu tio n  Deadlocks) B i l l  1950,
CPD:H o f  R. ,  (31 May 1950) v o l.2 0 8 , p .3487 .
2 3 C p .c it . ,  p .4 2 .
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As Crisp notes:
"An entirely different place is enjoyed 
by the Senate when the colours of the 
majorities in the two Houses are not 
identical. The Senate is then the sub­
ject of very considerable thought on 
the part of the Cabinet and of notice­
ably more consideration by the House of 
Representatives. For there is likely 
to be in a Senate hostile to the Govern­
ment none of what Shane Leslie described 
as 'the languid and dignified indignations 
peculiar to opposition in the House of 
Lords.' The Senate majority is in a 
position to snipe at, obstruct, reject 
or hold up to ransom, every measure of 
Government business."24
Dynamic Activity
A television program about the Senate screened 
in 1972 gave a picture of an active, invigorated Chamber 
far removed from earlier gloomy descriptions. For example, 
a former President of the Senate asserted, "It very 
definitely is a House of Review now. ... It's being 
accepted now and treated as it should be as a States 
House." The then Opposition Leader, Senator Murphy, 
stated,
"The Senate is changing its approach to 
matters. Once it used to be a leisurely 
debating society ... The Senate's becoming 
more effective."
24 Parliamentary Government..., op.cit., p.180.
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and the former Senator who had become Prime Minister, John 
Gorton, commented that the Senate "... has been playing an 
increasingly important role in government." The Independent 
Senator Turnbull felt, "The Senate now has teeth." Frank 
Chamberlain concluded, "The Senate today is a dynamic house."25
The following quotations from academics and journalists 
further demonstrate the favourable reaction of external obser­
vers to signs of revivification of the Senate from the 1960s:
"... the Senate, in the past 25 years, has 
emerged from the wings of the Federal Parlia­
mentary system to one of the central positions 
on the stage, to the advantage of everyone."26
"... the Senate has only begun to operate as a 
successful parliamentary institution because 
it has dared not to be overawed by convention."27
"The unique nature of the Senate, its frequent 
use of its powers, and its insistence upon the 
recognition of its equal status, means that 
consideration of it intrudes into almost every 
facet of parliamentary activity. It stands in 
contrast to the House of Representatives for it 
has not been dominated by the government to the 
same extent. Indeed, for those who see the 
role of representative institutions as offering 
restraint to the excesses of governmental 
authority the Senate must be the main hope in 
Australia." 28
25 Quotations are from the transcript of Frank Chamberlain’s television 
program "Is the Senate Really Necessary", commissioned by CTC-7 and 
screened in Canberra on 16 May 1972. The hour-long program was written, 
researched and presented by Chamberlain.
26 Alan Hughes, The Melbourne Sun, 4 August 1971, p.37.
2 7 Maximilian Walsh, Australian Financial Review, 5 January 1973, p.6.
28 G.S. Reid, "Australia's Commonwealth Parliament and the 'Westminster 
Model", in Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, vol.2f No.2,
May 1964, reprinted in C.A. Hughes (ed), Readings in Australian 
Government, U. of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1968, p.114.
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"It is difficult, therefore, to label the 
proceedings of the Australian Senate as 
'ritualistic'."2 9
"The Senate is no longer a joke, no more the 
forgotten part of the Australian Parliament. 
It is alive and well. It provides a lead 
for those in the House of Representatives who 
seek to reform their Chamber and bring into 
being changes which other Parliaments saw 
necessary many years ago to make them sig­
nificant and viable in a technological age. 
Its deeds are quoted by MPs and its achieve­
ments envied. And the Senate is only just 
beginning to discover its role."30
The Image of the Senate: the electorate
In the previous section it has been shown that the image 
of the Senate in the eyes of academics and journalists has 
varied over time. Members of the electorate are generally un­
likely to be personally surveying the activities of Senators 
(or of politicians generally) in any detail. A survey of re­
sults of nation-wide public opinion polls indeed reveals that 
a large proportion of the electorate has little knowledge of 
the Senate in terms either of its functions or of whether it 
is a valuable or even necessary part of the Australian polit­
ical system.
Gallup Polls
Since 1950 Roy Morgan's Australian Gallup Polls Associ­
ation has been questioning selected members of the Australian 
electorate on their attitudes to the Senate. In November 19543 1
29 G.S. Reid, "Parliamentary-Executive Relations: The Suppression of
Politics", in H. Mayer (ed.), Australian Politics: a second reader,
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1969, p.516.
30 D. Solomon, "The Senate", op.cit., p.527.
31 Gallup Poll number 1054.
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respondents were asked what they thought was the chief reason
for having a Senate. The results were:
60 percent - had no idea;
13 percent - felt the Senate was there to check 
on the House of Representatives;
18 percent - referred to the Senate as a House of 
Review, or as a body to stop extreme 
bills, or as a body exercising stricter 
control;
3 percent - said the Senate represented the States.
When asked, "Is the Senate doing its job satisfactorily?"
37 percent - replied 'yes 1;
26 percent - replied * n o ';
37 percent - had no opinion.
In March-June 196532 respondents were asked, "What would you 
say is the chief function of the Senate today?"
53 percent - had no opinion;
10 percent - gave unfavourable answers (e.g. 'it 
has no useful purpose';
'it's a waste of time and money');
17 percent - described the Senate as a check on 
legislation, or a watchdog, or a 
safeguard;
14 percent - said the Senate had the last say, or 
ratified decisions of the lower house, 
or was a House of Review;
1 percent - referred to the Senate safeguarding 
the States.
These results demonstrate general ignorance about the 
functions and purposes of the Senate. However, a somewhat 
higher percentage of the electorate is willing to commit itself 
when specifically queried about whether or not the Senate should 
be retained.
3 2 Gallup Poll number 1825.
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Between 1950 and 1965 the Gallup Polls included eight 
queries of the type, "Do you think the Senate should be retained 
or abolished?"33 The results of these are presented in Table IV:1.
TABLE VIII:1
GALLUP POLL ATTITUDES TO THE SENATE (percentages)
Year of 
Gallup Poll Abolish Retain Don't Know
1950 45 37 18
1953 45 32 23
1954 28 45 27
1955 23 45 25
1958 33 32 35
1962 26 52 22
1964 21 44 35
1965 26 42 32
Table VIII:1 demonstrates that the number of people favouring 
abolition of the Senate fell quite sharply between 1950 and 1965. 
However, less than a majority positively favoured retaining the 
Senate; and there was a significant increase in the number of 
voters who were undecided on the question.
In relation to each poll Morgan generally provides a break­
down in terms of the sex, age, state of residence and political 
preference of respondents. Unfortunately this information is 
incomplete, so no composite table can be presented. However, 
general trends can be summarised:
3 3 Gallup Polls numbers 734 (December 1950-January 1951); 920 (April-May 
1953); 1054 (November 1954); 1137 (November-December 1955); 1358 
(October-November 1958); 1584 (February-March 1962); 1783 (September- 
October 1964) and 1825 (March-June 1965).
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(a) Sex
Table VIII:2 provides a breakdown of attitudes to the reten­
tion/abolition question by sex for the four polls for which such 
information is provided. The general conclusion is that women 
are disproportionately undecided about whether or not the Senate 
should be retained, although they are less likely to favour 
abolition than are men.
TABLE VIII:2
GALLUP POLL ATTITUDES TO THE SENATE BY SEX (percentages)
Year of 
Gallup Poll
Abolish Retain Don t Know
Male Female Male Female Male Female
1950 49 41 43 31 8 28
1953 55 35 34 30 11 35
1958 45 21 38 26 17 52
1965 34 18 46 38 20 44
(b) Age
The only figures provided by Morgan are in relation to the 
1950 poll, when he commented that support for abolition rose 
through the age groups, from a figure of 35 percent of respon­
dents in their twenties and thirties to 55 percent of those in 
the fifties and sixties.
(c) State
Some information on the distribution of abolition and 
retention attitudes by States is provided for six of the polls.
In the 1950, 1953 and 1958 polls a plurality of respondents in 
4 States favoured abolition of the Senate. Only in Tasmania was 
there consistently a plurality favouring retention of the Senate;
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in 1950 Queensland and in 1958 South Australia also produced 
more in favour of retention than abolition, and in 1953 the 
South Australian result showed a fairly even distribution of 
support for retention and for abolition. Respondents in New 
South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia consistently fa­
voured abolition of the Senate.
For the 1962 poll, however, there was a majority favouring 
retention in every State. Table IV:1 demonstrated that this 
was the only occasion when a majority of respondents favoured 
retention of the Senate.
For the 1964 and 1965 polls Morgan provides information on 
preferences in only two States (Queensland and Victoria). On 
both occasions there was greater support for retention (39 and 
40 percent respectively) than for abolition (27 and 30 percent).
(d) Party preference
The general trend of Gallup poll results is that (not 
unexpectedly) non-Labor voters are more in favour of retention 
of the Senate than are A.L.P. voters, and that slightly fewer 
non-Labor than Labor voters support abolition.
Table VIII:3 is an attempt to represent these differences. 
Morgan does not provide any breakdown of attitudes by party for 
the 1955 or 1964 polls. In relation to the 1954 poll he merely 
commented, "A.L.P. and L.-C.P. voters were in fairly close agree­
ment." The results for 1953 and 1958 are notional only, as 
Morgan provides no actual percentages but instead refers to 
A.L.P. supporters as being 2 to 1 in favour of abolition where­
as non-Labor were evenly divided (1953); and to A.L.P. voters 
as being inclined to favour abolition while non-Labor supporters 
were inclined to favour retention (1958).
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TABLE V I I I : 3
GALLUP POLL ATTITUDES TO THE SENATE BY PARTY PREFERENCE
(p e r c e n t a g e s )
Y e a r  o f  
G a l l u p  P o l l
A b o l i s h R e t a i n D o n ' t Know
ALP LCP ALP LCP ALP LCP
1950 43 49 37 38 20 13
1953* 51 38 26 38 23 23
1958* 34 31 . 31 34 35 35
1962 35 17 42 62 23 21
1965 34 20 38 50 28 30
* P e r c e n t a g e s  f o r  t h e s e  p o l l s  w e r e  d e r i v e d  b y  t a k i n g  t h e  
r e l e v a n t  DK f i g u r e  f o r  t h a t  p o l l  (1953=23% , 1958=35%) 
a n d  a p p l y i n g  i t  w i t h o u t  a d j u s t m e n t  t o  e a c h  p a r t y .  An 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  M o r g a n ' s  comment  a b o u t  i n c l i n a t i o n s  
w as  t h e n  made t o  a c h i e v e  a n  a b o l i t i o n / r e t e n t i o n  b r e a k ­
d ow n .  T h u s  t h e s e  f i g u r e s  a r e  n o t i o n a l  o n l y .
O c c a s i o n a l l y  M o rg a n  r e p o r t s  e x a m p l e s  o f  v e r b a t i m  a n s w e r s  
g i v e n  t o  p o l l s  on  t h e  r e t e n t i o n / a b o l i t i o n  q u e s t i o n . 34 S t a n d a r d  
a r g u m e n t s  p r o f f e r e d  b y  t h o s e  f a v o u r i n g  a b o l i t i o n  o f  t h e  S e n a t e  
w e r e  ' I t ' s  a  w a s t e  o f  m o n e y '  a n d  ' T h e r e  a r e  t o o  many p o l i t i c i a n s  
a l r e a d y ' .  T h e s e  a r e  a l s o  t y p i c a l  a n s w e r s  t o  q u e s t i o n s  a b o u t  
i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  F e d e r a l  MPs , o r  a b o u t  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  
s a l a r y  a n d / o r  a l l o w a n c e s  o f  P a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s . 35 T h o s e  who f a ­
v o u r e d  r e t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  S e n a t e  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  S e n a t e  h a s  a 
s t e a d y i n g  i n f l u e n c e :  ' W i t h o u t  t h e  S e n a t e  t h e  H o u se  o f  R e p r e s e n ­
t a t i v e s  w o u l d  h a v e  a b s o l u t e  p o w e r ' ;  ' H a v i n g  a S e n a t e  g i v e s  m o re  
s t a b l e  g o v e r n m e n t ' ;  'T h e  S e n a t e  i s  a  c h e c k ' ,  a n d  t h e  s t a n d a r d
34 See Gallup P o l l s  numbers 1358, 1584, 1783.
See,  e . g . ,  Gallup P o l l s  numbers 267 (May 1945),  443 (July-August  1947),  
496 (February-March 1948),  504 (March-April  1948),  1878 (December 1965- 
January  1966) and numbers 425 (March-May 1947),  840 (February-March 
1952),  1388 (September-October 1958).
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status quo reply, 'I'm quite happy with the present system'.
This range of responses is similar to those advanced by support­
ers of bicameral State Parliaments.36
An overall view of the Gallup Poll results reveals that:
(i) there is little general knowledge about the functions 
of the Senate;
(ii) women are especially ill-informed or apathetic about 
the Senate;
(iii) the level of support for retention of the Senate has 
gradually risen since 1950;
(iv) in the smallest Australian State electors consistently 
favour retention of the Senate (but this is not neces­
sarily true for the other smaller States);
(v) non-Labor voters consistently are more in favour of 
retention of the Senate than are Labor supporters.
The Australian Survey Proiect 1969
The Gallup Poll results do provide a measure of electoral 
attitudes to the Senate over time. However, it was felt that a 
more detailed breakdown of voters' attitudes in relation to a 
broad range of socio-economic characteristics was necessary, and 
that more information on voters' verbatim views about the Senate 
would be illuminating. In 1967 and 1969 Don Aitkin and Michael 
Kahan of the Australian National University conducted a nation­
wide survey of Australian political attitudes and voting patterns. 
The second wave of interviews in this Australian Survey Project
See, e.g., Gallup Polls numbers 719 (September-October 1950), 1418 
(September-October 1959).
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(involving a total of 1873 respondents) yielded responses to 
three questions on the Senate designed by me to elicit informa­
tion for this thesis.
The first of these questions was designed to discover the 
extent of respondents' recall of the names, party labels and 
States represented by individual Senators. Respondents were 
asked:
Question 69 (a): "Do you happen to know the names of any
Senators?"
(Ask for each): "And which party does
he/she belong to?"
(b): "Are any of them (Is he/she) from your
State? (Which ones?)"
Respondents' answers to these questions are presented in 
Table VIII:4.
Only 38.4 percent of the respondents correctly 
mentioned the names of one or more Senators. It is interesting 
to note that the most frequently mentioned names were those of 
the D.L.P. Senators Gair and McManus and the A.L.P. Senator 
Murphy. Some respondents were a little confused in naming the 
American Senator Fullbright as a member of the Australian Senate!
Only 30.3 percent of respondents were able to correctly 
identify the party affiliation of one or more Senators. Again 
the D.L.P. Senators were the most frequently credited with their 
correct party label.
These results can be compared with those to similar questions 
about members of the House of Representatives ascertained in 1967:
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TABLE V I I I ;4
ELECTORS' KNOWLEDGE OF SENATORS 
A u s t r a l i a n  S u r v e y  P r o j e c t  Wave 2 Q u e s t i o n s  69 ( a ) , (b)
N %
C o r r e c t  R e c a l l  o f  S e n a t o r s '  Names
1 name 329 1 7 . 6
2 n am es 198 1 0 . 6
3 n am es 86 4 . 6
4 name s 48 2 . 6
5 nam es 41 2 . 2
m o re  t h a n  5 nam es 15 0 . 8
i n c o r r e c t  r e c a l l 223 1 1 . 9
n o  r e c a l l  on  N . A . 1 933 4 9 . 8
C o r r e c t  I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  S e n a t o r s '  P a r t y  L a b e l s
1 l a b e l 281 1 5 . 0
2 l a b e l s 150 8 . 0
3 l a b e l s 63 3 . 4
4 l a b e l s 37 2 . 0
5 l a b e l s 28 1 . 5
m o re  t h a n  5 l a b e l s 8 0 . 4
N .A .  2 1306 6 9 . 7
C o r r e c t  I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  S e n a t o r s '  S t a t e
1 s t a t e 281 1 5 . 0
2 s t a t e s 116 6 . 2
3 s t a t e s 33 1 . 8
4 s t a t e s 16 0 . 8
5 s t a t e s 6 0 . 3
m o re  t h a n  5 s t a t e s 1 0 . 1
N .A .  3 1420 7 5 . 8
1 N.A. s tan d s  f o r :  n o t  a sk ed , n o t answ ered, n o t a s c e r ta in e d , n o t a p p l ic a b le .
2 These re sp o n d en ts  e i t h e r  had been unab le  to  c o r r e c t ly  id e n t i f y  any members 
o f  th e  S en a te , o r  were unab le  to  g iv e  th e  c o r r e c t  p a r ty  a f f i l i a t i o n  fo r  
th o se  S en a to rs  th ey  co u ld  name.
These re sp o n d en ts  e i t h e r  had been unab le  to  c o r r e c t ly  id e n t i f y  any members 
o f  th e  S en a te , o r  were unab le  to  g iv e  th e  c o r r e c t  S ta te  o f  th o se  S en a to rs  
th e y  cou ld  name.
3
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34.2 percent of respondents were able to correctly name their 
local member in the House of Representatives; when informed of 
the name of their local member, 65.2 percent correctly identified 
his party affiliation.37 One would expect that members of the 
House of Representatives would be better known in their geog­
raphically smaller electorates than Senators, who must attempt 
to build up a following (with the very necessary support of a 
party ticket) within a whole State.
Respondents found it slightly easier to identify a Senator's 
party than his State; but the gross figures are disappointing, 
as over two-thirds of the sample could identify neither party 
nor State.
Public exposure of Senators also did not seem to be very
great; a further question to those respondents who had been able
to correctly mention the name of one or more Senator(s) was:
Question 69 (c): "Have you seen them/him/her in
person or on television?"
181 (9.66 percent) had seen the Senator(s) they mentioned
in person;
278 (14.84 percent) had seen the Senator(s) they mentioned
on television;
178 (9.50 percent) had neither seen the Senator(s) in person
or on television;
15 (0.80 percent) couldn't remember whether they had seen
the Senator(s) in person or on 
television;
In contrast, 31.4 percent of respondents to the 1967 survey had 
seen their House of Representatives member in person.38
Australian Survey Project, Wave 1 results, questions 58 and 59. In 
sore electorates knowledge of local candidates is very high - see 
J. Hutchison, "Hume: A Dampened Swing", in H. Mayer (ed.), Labor to
teer, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1973, pp.139-140.
3 8 Australian Survey Project, Wave 1 results, question 61.
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The answers to Question 69(a) about recall of Senators' 
names were analysed in terms of respondents' socio-economic 
characteristics - sex, age, religion, occupation, class, edu­
cational level and party preference. The results of this break­
down are presented in Table VIII:5.
Interesting findings in Table VIII:5 are:
(i) Respondents over 35.years of age had a low 
level of recall of Senators' names;
(ii) Respondents in professional occupations had 
a higher than average recall of Senators' 
name s;
(iii) Respondents who voted for minor parties, es­
pecially the D.L.P., had a relatively very 
high recall of Senators' names.
These findings are not unexpected. The response of 
professional employees is very similar to that of respondents 
with tertiary education. One could expect supporters of small 
parties to be more cognizant of their members' names - espe­
cially D.L.P. voters whose only parliamentary representatives 
were in the Senate.
We can thus conclude that amongst the Australian elector­
ate thereWas a widespread inability to recall the names of 
Federal parliamentarians, be they Senators or Representatives. 
This may reflect reliance on party labels and party tickets in 
Australian politics.
A second question put to the Australian Survey Project 
sample was designed to discover whether the electorate could 
differentiate the nature and functions of the two houses of
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TABLE VIII:5
ELECTORS' RECALL OF SENATORS' NAMES (percentages) 
Australian Survey Project Wave 2 Question 69 (a)
No recall 
or N.A.
Correctly 
recalled 
1 or 2 names
Correctly 
recalled more 
than 2 names
Sex: 
male 45 32 14
female 55 24 6
Age:
under 35 47 27 10
35 and over, 62* 28 10
Religion:
C of E 51 29 7
R. C. 50 27 11
Other Prot. 47 30 12
Occupation:
professional 38 33- 22*
semi-prof. 44 34 12
office/sales 45 36 12
skilled 55 24 8
semi-skilled 54 22 6
Education:
did not com­
plete high
school 54 23 5
completed high
school 50 28 8
tertiary 41 32 19*
Class:
upper 50 42* 0
middle 46 32 13
lower/working 48 31 8
Party:
Labor 46 27 10
Liberal 45 33 14
Country 43 42* 10
D.L.P. 14* 45* 33*
Other & Ind. 18* 45* 9
Total Average 50 28 10
* Asterisks mark interesting variations from the average.
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federal parliament.
Question 70: "Suppose you had to explain to a
friend, who knew nothing at all about Australia 
and Australian politics, what the Senate did and 
how it was different from the House of Represen­
tatives, what would you say?"
Respondents' first three distinct answers to this open-ended 
question were coded, yielding a total of 2227 answers. Table 
VIII:6 presents a detailed breakdown of these answers.
Approximately 47 percent of the responses to Question 70 
were coded as 'don't know'. Excluding these and the N.A. 
category left 1088 answers which were analysed in terms of con­
tent into ten categories.
The first three categories relate to the functions of the 
Senate as a House of Review or traditional Upper House; and 
collectively accounted for approximately 40 percent of all re­
sponses to the Question (82 percent of responses coded in the 
first ten categories). In contrast, the function of the Senate 
as a States House was mentioned in only 4 percent of responses 
(8 percent of codes 1-10). There were only 25 distinct uses 
of the actual phrase "States House", and one can conclude that 
representing or promoting the States was not seen to be an im­
portant or distinctive function of the Senate. Moreover, re­
spondents frequently expressed disillusionment with the Senate 
in relation to the States House function, whereas evaluative 
reactions to the Senate as a House of Review were generally 
favourable.
The general trend of these responses is similar to those
3 9reported by Morgan in the 1954 and 1955 Gallup Polls. It is
3 9 See above, pp.
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interesting to note that the catchphrases about the Senate 
being a "rubber stamp" or an "old men's home" were rarely men­
tioned. In fact, most responses to this Question were descrip­
tive rather than evaluative.
Respondents' descriptions of Senate functions and of the 
relationships between the two Houses were generally accurate.
A small number (mainly women and/or elderly respondents) con­
fused Senators with members of the High Court or of Cabinet 
(for example, "The Upper House are the blokes who hold the port­
folios and all the power"), or described the Senate as being 
more powerful than the House of Representatives. Respondents 
under 36 years of age demonstrated greater knowledge of Senate 
functions than their elders, paralleling the findings on know­
ledge of Senators' names.
The following selected verbatim answers demonstrate the 
common responses to Question 70.
Many of the respondents expressed a bafflement which is 
amusingly summed up by a middle-aged housewife:
"I don't think I could explain. I'm flat 
out trying to sort these things out for 
myself without explaining it to anyone 
else."
Those who could reply to the Question generally upheld the 
desirability of having a second chamber which could restrain 
or curb the Lower House, and could occasionally reject rash, 
ill-considered legislation. Several compared the Senate to 
a policeman or a supervisor. For example:
"I'd say it was designed to over-rule the 
Government in certain cases as a safety 
valve." (Male, 22, dry cleaner A.L.P. 
voter).
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"It stops the other house from being too 
rash. It's a bit of a brake." (Female,
41, clerk, Liberal voter).
"An opportunity is given to really study 
the full implications of any legislation - 
a cooling-off period in other words."
(Male, 44, farmer, Liberal voter).
"It's a means of checking the popularity 
and validity of government measures."
(Male, 41, toolmaker, A.L.P. voter).
"[It's] a House of Review - to weed out 
bad or corrupt legislation." (Male,
47, farmer, Liberal voter).
"A House of Review. A place that at 
times is cursed by the House of Repre­
sentatives ... but it is the buffer we 
need." (Male, 58, farmer, D.L.P. 
voter).
"[The] Reps, [is] like a manager, the 
Senate like a boss. The boss will 
usually go by his manager's recommend­
ation, but occasionally he will stand 
up and put his foot down." (Male, 52, 
pastry cook, A.L.P. voter).
"It's the policeman of the parliament."
(Male, 37, foreman, D.L.P. voter).
"It stops the others from having too 
much power." (Female, 31, housewife,
Liberal voter).
"I think it is there to keep the thing 
on an even keel." (Female, 38, house­
wife, Liberal voter).
"It's the upper house - it stops the 
lower house falling over." (Male, 41, 
insurance company manager, Liberal 
voter).
The States House function of the Senate was described as 
being "especially important for small States so [they're] not 
overwhelmed as in the House of Representatives" (Male, 42, 
teacher, Lib./Lab.). For most respondents this was not a
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function which the Senate actually performed; for example:
"The Senate is supposed to be a house 
that represents the interests of the 
States ...but effectively I think the 
Senators vote along party lines in any 
case and therefore I'm dubious as to 
how effective the Senate is in protect­
ing the interests of the various States."
(Male, 25, clerk, Liberal voter).
"[The Senate] should be a safeguard 
against federal policy subjecting one 
or two States to different or unfair 
treatment. But the Senate hasn't done 
much for South Australia in the last 
few years." (Male, 36, steel worker,
A.L.P. voter).
"It was originally called a States House 
where each State was represented so as 
to protect the small States. That's a 
fiction rather than fact now." (Male,
21, student, A.L.P. voter).
"[Senators are there] to protect State 
interests - but they don't. It's the 
party they support so they're useless, 
not doing their right job." (Male, 42, 
public servant, Liberal voter).
Many of these respondents favoured abolition of the Senate 
because it was not effectively promoting or protecting State 
interests. Other unfavourable comments on the Senate urged its 
abolition because it was merely a rubber stamp, or because it 
wasn't an effective House of Review. For example:
"Well, the Senate is supposed to be a 
House of Review of legislation passed 
in the House of Representatives.
However, unless the State of the Parties 
in the Senate is such that each party 
has nearly equal numbers, this review is 
rarely carried out and legislation is 
merely rubber stamped." (Male, 24, bank 
officer, A.L.P. voter).
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"[They're] watchdogs, but I don't think 
they are. I don't think they live up 
to it." (Male, 57, milk bar proprietor,
C. P. voter).
"The Senate has the final power of ratify­
ing or rejecting legislation and in rare 
cases, that power has been to some advan­
tage to the country. But certainly not 
to the extent that would justify their 
existence." (Male, 52, insurance broker,
D. L.P. voter).
"The Senate is a stumbling block to gov­
ernment action. I would abolish it."
(Male, 64, Liberal voter).
Respondents also made unflattering comparisons between the 
Senate and the House of Lords. For example:
"It's a relic of our allegiance to Britain 
and the House of Lords. The rest of Aus­
tralia should follow the lead of Queensland 
in abolishing the Senate." (Male, 53, 
shopkeeper, Liberal voter).
However, such unflattering references to Senate performance 
were, as noted earlier, infrequent and the general tenor of 
answers to Question 70 is exemplified by the words of a seventy- 
year-old female Labor supporter:
"[It's] a House of correction and therefore 
must be retained."
The final Australian Survey Project question relating to 
the Senate was the standard query about retention or abolition 
of the Chamber:
Question 71(a): "Some people say that the
Senate ought to be abolished, while others 
say it ought to be retained. What do you 
yourself feel about this? Would you like 
to see the Senate abolished or would you 
rather have it retained?"
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937 (51.99 percent) favoured retention of the Senate;
271 (15.04 percent) favoured abolition of the Senate;
586 (32.52 percent) didn't know whether the Senate should be
retained or abolished;
8 (0.44 percent) were coded as N.A.
Thus 67 percent of the sample expressed a preference either 
for retention or for abolition; the 'Don't Know' percentage is 
comparable to that of the 1964 and 1965 Gallup Polls. In this 
survey 52 percent of respondents favoured retention of the Sen­
ate; this is slightly higher than the results of those two 
Gallup Polls but the same result as that obtained in the 1962 
Gallup Poll. The figure of only 15 percent favouring aboli­
tion is, however, considerably lower than the results of any 
Gallup Poll.
Answers to Question 71(a) were also analysed in terms of 
respondents' socio-economic characteristics. The results are 
presented in Table VIII:7
Notable results from Table VIII:7 are:40
(i) Very few female respondents were in favour of 
abolition of the Senate; and Morgan's findings 
that women are far more likely to answer 'don't 
know' than men were reconfirmed;
(ii) Respondents under 35 rarely favoured abolition 
whereas older respondents were slightly more 
likely to;
(iii) Professionals and those with tertiary education 
had a mild preference for retention of the 
Senate;
The other/independent group records a seemingly high preference for 
abolition of the Senate; however, only 11 of the total of 1873 respon­
dents were categorised under this label, so the percentage is not sig­
nificant .
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TABLE VIII;7
ATTITUDES TO THE SENATE BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
CHARACTERISTICS (percentages) 
Australian Survey Project Wave 2 Question 71(a)
Abolish Retain
Don11 
Know
Sex:
male 19 52 27
female 8 * 47 43
Age:
under 35 9 * 47 42
35 and over 17* 50 30
Religion:
Church of England 14 50 34
Roman Catholic 1 2 50 36
Other Protestant 14 51 32
Occupation:
professional 16 60* 23
semi-professional 14 55 29
office/sales 18 49 30
skilled 13 39 45*
semi-skilled 13 47 37
Education:
did not complete high
school 16 43 37
completed high school 1 1 49 37
tertiary 15 58 25
Class:
upper 15 53 31
• middle 14 57 28
lower/working 15 49 35
Party:
Labor 2 1 * 44 33
Liberal 1 2 61* 26
Country 16 63* 18*
D.L.P. 7 * 74* 16*
Others & Independent 27* 36 27
Total average 14 50 35
* Asterisks mark interesting variations from the average.
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(iv) Skilled workers were disproportionately
represented in the 'don’t know' category;
(v) In terms of partisanship Labor voters were 
more in favour of abolition than were sup­
porters of non-Labor parties; non-Labor 
support for retention of the Senate cor­
relates with the results of the 1962 Gallup 
Poll;
(vi) Minor party respondents, especially supporters 
of the D.L.P., were strongly in favour of re­
tention of the Senate and very few record 
'don't know' responses.
The reasons why respondents favoured either retention or 
abolition of the Senate were elicited in response to Question 
71(b): "Why do you think so?"* The first three distinct answers
were again coded, yielding the distribution of responses de­
picted in Tables VIII:8 and VIII:9. The types of responses were 
similar to those obtained in answer to the previous open-ended 
question about the functions of the Senate. Thus the vast 
majority of arguments for retention of the Senate related to 
the House of Review function; combining the first four cate­
gories in Table VIII:8,73 percent of responses justified reten­
tion on this ground. Similarly, combining codes 13, 15, 16 and 
17 in Table VIII:9 demonstrates that 72 percent of responses 
favouring abolition of the Senate expressed a view that either 
the Senate was not acting as a House of Review, or that a second 
chamber was unnecessary.
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For a small number of respondents, the presence of 
minor party and/or Independent members in the Senate was an 
argument for either retaining or abolishing the Senate.
Other interesting general observations about the responses 
to Question 71(b) are that one fifth of the arguments sup­
porting retention of the Senate presented status quo type 
answers; and that 11 percent of responses favouring abolition 
referred to an excess of parliamentarians within Australia.
Verbatim answers to Question 71(b) are similar in 
content to those expressed in relation to Question 70. The 
following are a selection of comments favouring retention 
of the Senate:
Curb or "Somebody's got to stop the top brass
restraint: doing just what they like." (Male,
39, farmer, Liberal voter).
"When it is evenly divided it provides 
some sort of check on the government." 
(Male, 21, teacher, A.L.P. voter).
"If we get a mad government, as we have 
had on occasions, it keeps firm control." 
(Female, 72, Liberal voter).
Safeguard: "Well, if you get a party in power in
the Reps, with a majority like the Holt 
government had, if there wasn't this 
approving body they could legislate un­
fairly, with too great a bias."
(Female, 28, housewife, Liberal voter).
"It is a brake against autocratic or 
totalitarian government, against com­
plete irresponsibility of government." 
(Male, 51, manager, Liberal voter).
"Quite often they do return a bill for 
further review which I think is a sound 
policy and one which does safeguard the 
public." (Male, 45, company manager, 
Liberal voter).
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Second 
thoughts:
Status 
quo :
Other:
"I think it acts as a conscience to the 
Government, when it disapproves of 
certain points in a bill, causing the 
government to reconsider. Only good 
can come of this if not abused by an 
opposition controlled Senate."
(Male, 34, carpenter, Liberal voter).
"It is a constitutional safeguard par­
ticularly in the sense of badly drafted 
bills which have been passed by the Reps, 
and have loopholes in them if only in the 
technical sense (as is in the House of 
Lords often)." (Male, 23, hairdresser, 
A.L.P. voter).
"It's going along nicely. You can't jump 
out of the frying pan into the fire." 
(Female, 72).
"Just basically I'm very conservative,
I'm rather against change." (Female,
39, receptionist, Liberal voter).
"I suppose because it's part of a system 
and most systems don't perform properly 
unless they have every link in the chain." 
(Male, 21, driver, Liberal voter).
"Don't know much about it - and you can't 
abolish anything till you know about it." 
(Male.. 21, engineer, A.L.P. voter).
"I think its doing its purpose, although 
I don't know what its purpose is."
(Male, 21, student, Liberal voter).
"I think it would be better to keep the 
Senate and abolish the House of Rep­
resentatives. The Senate looks after 
the States; this is most important, 
we're so big it has to be divided up 
into smaller parts." (Female, 56, 
housewife, Liberal voter).
"I think they possibly have a clearer 
picture of things because they're not 
befuddled with local arguments. Their 
views are on a nationwide scale and 
not so political."
(Male, 37, fireman, A.L.P. voter).
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"The government being composed of M.H.R.s 
and in a majority would be completely 
unopposed in all matters of legislation, 
policy, etcetera. Whereas the Senate 
usually comprises a cross-section of 
various political parties and thought 
and can therefore exercise a restraining 
but not detrimental effect on the govern­
ment." (Male, 58, accountant, Liberal 
voter) .
Respondents who favoured abolition of the Senate 
commonly felt either that curbs or restraints on the 
activity of the government were unnecessary, or that 
the Senate was ineffective as a watchdog. For example:
Unnecessary: "We don't need a second look." (Male,
22, drycleaner, A.L.P. voter).
"It is all red tape again; you vote for 
men to govern the country in the House 
of Representatives therefore they should 
have the right to govern outright." 
(Male, 25, salesman, C.P. voter).
"Australia should have one government 
and one government only - they're all 
parasites." (Male, 54, swinging voter).
Ineffective: "They simply pass the buck from one to
another now; it does not function as a 
House of Review and is used as a party 
machine." (Male, 64, builder, Liberal 
voter).
"They don't seem to review the laws now,
• just seem to agree with the House of
Representatives. Don't seem to do any­
thing". (Male, 66, clerk, A.L.P. voter).
"They all sit around and rehash and rehash. 
I can't see any reason why they should 
have it." (Female, 39, tailoress, A.L.P. 
voter).
"It's a surplus House at present; hasn't 
always been, but is now." (Male, 70, 
clerk, Liberal voter).
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"It can't carry out the job it was 
designed for - it's politically 
aligned." (Male, 27, computer 
operator, Liberal voter).
Frustrates: "Can't see any value for it; the House
of Representatives is sufficient.
Some twits in the Upper House knock 
things back that have been well-thought 
about, for little reason." (Male, 26, 
sound technician, Liberal voter).
"The Senate shouldn't be able to step in 
and alter the government's decisions." 
(Female, 53, housewife, C.P. voter).
"It is only a rubber stamp if the one 
party controls both houses. If the 
opposition controls the Senate then it 
hinders the government." (Male, 44, 
barrister, A.L.P. voter).
Needless expense:
"Only doubling up the discussion - 
something the working man is paying 
for that he shouldn't have to pay 
for." (Male, 29, mechanic, A.L.P. voter).
"I think we have too many politicians 
already." (Male, 60, retired, swinging 
voter).
"Save Australia some dough. At the 
moment it is being used as a political 
backstop for minority parties." (Male, 
41, building inspector, Liberal voter).
Other: * "The House of Representatives governs;
the Senate has no power to govern but 
has power to stop legislation being 
implemented. As now a minority party 
(the D.L.P.) controls the Senate this 
is controlling the country." (Male, 42, 
A.L.P. voter).
"It seems odd that one little party can 
control everything from upstairs, so to 
say." (Male, 32, clerk, A.L.P. voter).
I've noticed Mr Gorton seems to have 
lost impact as a leader and I think it 
was because he has been a Senator for 
quite a spell." (Female, 65, housewife, 
Liberal voter).
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The detailed analysis of responses to the Questions 
on the Senate inserted in the Australian Survey Project 
provides a great deal of illuminating information about 
electors' views on the Senate in the late 1960s. The 
general trend of increasing support for retention of the 
Senate evidenced in Gallup Poll results was attested to.
A high proportion of the Australian electorate was still 
ignorant about the nature and>functions of the Senate; 
but the verbatim answers demonstrated that voters who 
were knowledgeable about the Senate had strong views 
about its effectiveness.
In 1968 Boynton, Patterson and Hedlund argued that 
citizens' support for legislatures varied dependant on 
their socio-economic status: those at the bottom of the
status scale expressed less, and those at the top more, 
support for American legislatures.41 Table VIII:7 revealed 
that there was slight evidence for such a phenomenon 
amongst Australian observers of the Senate.
Conclusion
The comments reported in this Chapter demonstrate 
that there were remarkable similarities of attitude to the 
Senate amongst all types of observers. There was a close 
relationship between observers' perceptions of Senate 
performance at a point of time and their general image 
of the Chamber; changes in the internal structure of
41 G.R. Boynton, S.C. Patterson & R.D. Hedlund, "The Structure of 
Public Support for legislative Institutions" in Midwest Journal 
of Political Science, 1968, Vol.12, pp.163-180.
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the Senate and in the behaviour of Senators were reflected 
(though with a time lag) in changes in observers' images 
of the Senate. By comparing the content of this Chapter 
with that of Chapters VI and VII we can also conclude 
that observers' images of the Senate in any period were 
generally accurate perceptions of observable Senate 
activity at that time.
The general trend of observers' comments over time 
reflects a positive reaction to the Senate's and Senators' 
attempts to assert their independence, and a negative 
reaction to the Senate when it was seen as performing 
merely as a rubber stamp. During periods when the Senate 
was relatively inactive (especially in the 1930s and 
1940s) the image of the Senate was poor. When the Senate 
asserted itself (especially in terms of differing with 
the government and the House of Representatives) observers' 
evaluations were either castigating (evidenced in the 
very phrase 'hostile Senate') or highly flattering (as 
in the comments of observers in the 1960s and early 1970s).
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CHAPTER IX
ABOLITION OR REFORM OF THE SENATE?
Introduction
"Theoretically, a severe crisis of support 
should occur for legislative systems in 
which there is a very wide gap between what 
citizens expect it to be like and how they 
actually perceive it to be operating. Wide 
gaps in civic perception - expectation dif­
ferentials of this sort for substantial 
proportions of the population - presumably 
contribute heavily to political reforms or, 
ultimately, to revolution."1
If an observer expects the Australian Senate to 
operate in the manner predicted by the majority of delegates 
to the Federal Conventions of the 1890s, he is likely to 
be disappointed - especially if he is a States' rights 
supporter. Yet the answers to the Australian Survey 
Project Questions on the functions and utility of the 
Senate did not demonstrate widespread dissatisfaction 
with the Chamber because of its record as a States House; 
and showed evidence of support for both the expected 
function and actual performance of the Senate as a House 
of Review. To what degree have observers who have been 
dissatisfied with the record of the Senate pressed for 
reforms? Has there ever been sufficient dissatisfaction 
for "revolution" to be a possibility?
Abolition
The ultimate sanction against the Senate is the 
threat to abolish the Chamber. This has formally been
S.C. Patterson, G.R. Boynton and R.D. Hedlund, "Perceptions and 
Expectations of the legislature and Support for It", American 
Journal of Sociology, 1969/1970, Vol.75, pp.63-64.
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a p la n k  w i t h in  th e  F e d e r a l  L a b o r P a r ty  p la t f o r m  s in c e  
1 9 1 9 ; and b o th  F e d e r a l  and S ta te  A . L . P .  p la t fo r m s  p le d g e  
a b o l i t i o n  o f  S ta te  L e g i s l a t i v e  C o u n c i ls .2 In  th e  L i b e r a l  
P a r t y ,  on th e  o th e r  h a n d , s u p p o r t  f o r  th e  S e n a te  is  p a r t  
o f  t h e i r  g e n e r a l  s ta n c e  on b ic a m e r a l is m  and f e d e r a l i s m . 3 
One can  q u e s t io n  th e  d e g re e  to  w h ic h  e i t h e r  P a r ty  has  
s e r io u s ly  d e b a te d  t h i s  i te m ;  f o r  L i b e r a l s ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  
i s  t h i s  m e re ly  a s ig n  o f  u n c r i t i c a l  a c c e p ta n c e  o f  th e  
s t a t u s  quo? In  th e  L ab o r P a r ty  c r i t i c i s m  o f  th e  S e n a te  
o f t e n  seems to  be a h i s t o r i c a l  le g a c y  o f  w o r k e r s ' r e a c t io n s  
to  c o l o n i a l  U pper Houses w h ic h  w e re  in d e e d  b a s t io n s  o f  
c o n s e r v a t is m  and eco nom ic  p r i v i l e g e .
To w h a t d e g re e  has th e  L a b o r P a r ty  a t te m p te d  to  
im p le m e n t i t s  p la n k  on a b o l i t i o n  o f  th e  S e n a te ?  The 
M in u te s  o f  th e  F e d e r a l  L ab o r P a r ty  Caucus do n o t  re c o r d  
any d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  a b o l i t i o n  p la n k  b e tw e e n  1901  and  
1 9 4 9 . 4 One m ust t h e r e f o r e  presum e t h a t  th e  m o tio n  f o r  
a re fe re n d u m  on a b o l i t i o n  o f  th e  S e n a te  r a is e d  by L ab o r  
S e n a to r  Dunn on 29 O c to b e r  1931  was a p e r s o n a l  g e s tu r e  
n o t  s a n c t io n e d  by c a u c u s . Dunn m oved:
" T h a t ,  i n  th e  o p in io n  o f  t h is  S e n a te , an  
am endment o f  th e  C o n s t i t u t io n  to  p r o v id e  
f o r  th e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  th e  S e n a te  s h o u ld  be  
s u b m it te d  by re fe re n d u m  t o  th e  e le c t o r s  
a t  th e  n e x t  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n ,  and t h a t  
th e  p assag e  o f  t h i s  r e s o lu t io n  be an 
i n s t r u c t i o n  t o  th e  G overnm ent to  in t r o d u c e  
th e  n e c e s s a ry  l e g i s l a t i o n . " 5
For example, see A .L .P . P latfo rm , C o n stitu tio n  and Rules 1967,
C .S. Vfyndham, Canberra, 1967, Item  IV , 3 a ( i i )  and 8, p .1 0 .
See, fo r  example, O f f ic ia l  Federal P latform  o f  the L ib e ra l Party  
o f A u s tra lia , I9 6 0 , Land Newspaper, Sydney, n .d . ,  p a ra .22, p . 5 .
P. W elle r (ed. ) ,  Caucus Minutes 1901-1949: Minutes o f  the Meetings 
o f the Federal Parliam entary Labor P arty , 3 v o ls , M .U .P ., M elb .,1975 . 
CPD:Sen, V o l.132 , p .1321.5
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Debate on the motion was rather desultory. Dunn 
made an eleven line speech; his seconder (Senator Rae, 
also from New South Wales) spoke for somewhat longer; 
and only one other Senator spoke to the motion before 
it was put and lost.6
Senator Rae expressed a preference for unicameralism 
because of "the enormous amount of useless repetition"; 
because "practically all the important Bills are introduced 
in another place"; and because of party divisions in 
the Senate.7 On equal State representation, Rae commented:
"I also object to the principle of the 
numerically smaller States having the 
same representation in the Senate as 
the larger States. The fact that 
federation had to be bought practically 
by the granting of this concession is 
no reason why it should be perpetuated."8
Rae's conclusion was:
"The general neglect on the part of the 
people to understand what the Senate does, 
and why it exists, shows that it is more 
or less a superfluous wing of the Common­
wealth legislature."9
"Digger" Dunn had been the Government Whip in the 
Senate; both he and Senator Rae transferred their 
affiliation from the Scullin Labor Party to that of 
Lang Labor (the breakaway group supporting New South 
Wales Premier Jack Lang). The only other speaker on
6 Hie vote on the motion was 14 to 5 against. Ibid, (12 Nov.) p.1635.
7 Ibid, p.1631.
8 Ibid, p.1632.
9 Ibid, p.1634.
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Dunn's motion, Senator P.J. Lynch, had originally been 
a Labor Member who followed W.M. Hughes into the Nationalist 
Party in 1916. He 'was certainly not a supporter of Senate 
abolition; he stated:
"They knew that, in attempting to give effect 
to a prominent plank in the platform of their 
party, they were attempting the impossible.
They felt in their heart that that plank was 
only a shell; that it was honey-combed and 
white-anted with insincerity; that it was 
not a real plank at all."10
Senator Lynch felt that the A.L.P. was making this half­
hearted attempt to raise the question of Senate abolition 
only because of an election rebuff to the Party in the 
previous Senate elections; and he advised Labor MPs 
"to keep religiously clear of any attempt to give a party 
complexion to great constitutional changes."* 11
Several of the witnesses who gave evidence before 
the 1927-1929 Royal Commission on the Constitution argued 
for Senate abolition. The majority Report of this Commission, 
however, linked federalism and bicameralism and strongly 
supported the desirability of both for Australia. A 
Labor Commissioner, T.R. Ashworth M.H.R., produced a 
minority report which included arguments in support of 
abolition of the Senate. He commented:
"The Senate has failed in the aims for which 
it was designed."12
10 Loc.cit.
11 Ibid, p.1632.
12 Report of the Royal Corrmissicn on the Constitution, November 1929, 
Government Printer, Canberra, 1929, Parliamentary Paper No. 16 of 
1929, p.289.
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"It is not a house of revision; it 
discharges no function that is not better 
undertaken by the House of Representatives; 
it lacks the sense of responsibility which 
comes from the knowledge that the fate of 
the government depends on its decision. 
Obviously, this unnecessary member should 
be lopped off in the general good, or, in 
the alternative, a new purpose should be 
infused into its views."13
Ashworth's suggestions for a reformed Senate will be 
discussed later in this Chapter. He certainly did not 
pursue the totally negative course common to many Labor 
politicians and Party members.
Lynch's criticism about Labor MPs supporting 
abolition of the Senate purely because of their frust­
ration with a hostile (to their Government) or alternatively 
an inactive (when they were in Opposition) Senate receives 
some credence when one looks at the views of former Labor 
Leaders. E.G. Theodore, Federal Treasurer in the Scullin 
Government, was a vehement critic of the Senate in 19 30- 
1931; in this period much of his financial legislation 
was rejected by the hostile, non-Labor dominated Senate.
A.A. Calwell, Leader of the A.L.P. in Opposition between 
1960 and 1967, criticised the Senate on traditional Labor 
grounds (the undemocratic feature of equal State represent­
ation, the unnecessary cost of bicameralism) and stated:
"The best definition of a Senator is that he is an 
unnecessary Parliamentarian."14 Calwell concluded:
13 Ibid, p.290.
14 Be Just and Fear Not, Lloyd O'Neil, Victoria, 1972, p.255.
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"The Senate has equal power, with a few 
exceptions, with the House of Representatives. 
Boiled down, however, it has power without 
responsibility. It exercises power without 
glory."15
Many of the Labor Senators interviewed between 
1969 and 1972 actively supported the Party's abolition 
plank. This may seem a rather curious situation - to 
support the removal of the Chamber of which one is an 
incumbent. Some Senators sought to escape from this 
dilemma by arguing that abolition was an unrealistic 
aim. For example:
"I feel that the Senate is redundant and 
should be abolished; yet this is very 
difficult. Therefore one just has to make 
use of committees and make the Senate as 
effective as possible."
"I am pro abolition but this is pretty 
idealistic. Instead one must work through 
the Senate because it's there and make the 
most of it. I feel that it's unlikely that 
the Senate will ever really be abolished."
"I don't think it's possible for the Senate 
to ever be abolished because Tasmania and 
the other small States will never vote in 
a referendum to disenfranchise themselves - 
especially with the ever-increasing importance 
of New South Wales and Victoria. The best 
idea is to work hard at making the Senate 
work, say through committees."
Since 1967 there has been serious debate within 
the Labor Party on the necessity for retaining the Senate 
abolition plank. The 1969 Federal Conference debated,
15 Ibid, p.254.
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but did not vote on, a motion for removal of the 
abolition plank. Various levels of the Party reconsidered 
the plank and started to urge removal. For example, the 
Tasmanian Branch supported the abolition plank by a large 
majority in 1967; but in 1968 the Branch voted 93 to 41 
in support of a recommendation that the Party delete the 
plank. By 1971 the Federal Parliamentary Leader,
E.G. Whitlam, was converted to support removal of the 
abolition plank; and at the Federal Conference of that 
year a vote on a motion to that effect was defeated by 
only a narrow majority.16 However, the non-Labor Opposition's 
use of the Senate to harrass and frustrate the Labor 
Government between 1972 and 1975, and in particular the 
events of October to November 1975, have undoubtedly 
reinvoraged Labor Party support for abolition of the Chamber.
One of the most interesting statements of a non- 
Labor view on the Senate is that of Senator R.C. Wright 
in his dissent to the 1959 Report of the 1956-1959 Joint 
Committee on Constitutional Review.17 Wright quoted a 
variety of texts supporting the virtues of bicameralism; 
noted the extensive powers of the Senate; and counter­
acted Labor arguments for abolition:
"Because the Senate has been for the most 
part acquiescent in the Representatives' 
legislation, it is said that it is useless 
as a House of Review. Because it usually
D. So lemon, "Hie Senate", in H. Mayer and H. Nelson (eds), 
Australian Politics: a Third Reader, Cheshire, Melbourne, 
1973, p.533.
Parliamentary Paper No. 108 of 1959, Commonwealth Government 
Printer, Canberra, 1959, p,176ff.
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d i v i d e s  on p a r t y  l i n e s  and n o t  on a l i n e  
o f  d e m a r c a t io n  by S t a t e s ,  i t  i s  c la im e d  
t h a t  i t  h a s  f o r f e i t e d  i t s  r o l e  as  r e p r e ­
s e n t a t i v e s  o f  t h e  S t a t e s .
I t  i s  n o t  t o  b e  d e n ie d  t h a t  on p a s t  
e x p e r i e n c e  t h e r e  i s  some grou n d  f o r  b o t h  
c r i t i c i s m s .  But i t  i s  t o  be  d e n i e d  t h a t  
e i t h e r  c r i t i c i s m  w a r r a n t s  a c o n c l u s i o n  
t h a t  t h e  S e n a t e  s h o u ld  be  u n d e r m in e d ." 18
W r ig h t  t h e r e f o r e  c o n c e d e d  t h a t  t h e r e  was j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  
f o r  c r i t i c i s m  o f  t h e  r e c o r d  o f  t h e  S e n a t e ;  b u t  a r g u e d  
t h a t  t h e  m a jo r  p r o b le m  was p a r t y  (he made a v e r y  t r e n c h a n t  
a t t a c k  on t h e  A .L .P .  c a u c u s  and p a r t y  d i s c i p l i n e 1 9 ) .  He 
w a s ,  h o w e v e r ,  c o n c e r n e d  t o  s e e  r e f o r m s  i n s t i t u t e d  w h ic h  
c o u l d  e n h a n c e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  Chamber b e i n g  an 
" in d e p e n d e n t  r e v i e w " . 2 0
T h is  i s  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  n o n -L a b o r  l i n e .  B ut when  
t h w a r t e d  by t h e  S e n a t e  e v e n  L i b e r a l  L e a d e r s  h a v e  w o n d ered  
a b o u t  t h e  u t i l i t y  o f  t h e  Chamber. D u r in g  t h e  1953  e l e c t i o n  
c a m p a ig n ,  L i b e r a l  Prim e M i n i s t e r  R .G. M e n z ie s  r a i s e d  th e  
q u e s t i o n  o f  a b o l i t i o n  o f  t h e  S e n a t e ,  and t h e  New S ou th  
W ales Branch o f  t h e  P a r t y  a d o p te d  su ch  a p l a n k . 21
Some a c a d e m ic s  h a v e  s u p p o r t e d  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  a b o l i t i o n  
o f  t h e  S e n a t e ;  f o r  e x a m p le ,  G e o f f r e y  Sawer i n  1 9 5 4 :
"A part from  o r d i n a r y  a n n u a l  f i n a n c i a l  m e a s u r e s ,  
no l e g i s l a t i o n  w h a t e v e r ,  i n c l u d i n g  e m e rg e n c y  
l e g i s l a t i o n  r e q u i r e d  i n  t im e  o f  w a r ,  n e e d  e v e r
18 Ib id , p .1 8 2 .
19 Ib id , p .183 .
2 ° Ib id , p .185.
21 A.F. Davies, A ustralian  Democracy, 2nd e d . , Longmans, London,
1964, p .46 .
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come into force within six months of its 
first being mooted in Parliament. A con­
stitutional amendment to this effect would 
be more valuable than any number of Senates."22
However, most observers (whether academics, journalists 
or MPs) believe that "such an extreme proposition as 
abolition is academic".23 As a Liberal MHR argued in 
1950 :
"The Opposition's plan to abolish the Senate 
resembles an attempt to cure an injured limb 
by cutting it off. It begs the whole question. 
Honourable Members of the Opposition know 
perfectly well that if such a proposal were 
put to the people of this country they would 
not be prepared, at a referendum, to sanction 
so drastic a surgical operation on the 
Constitution."2 4
L.F. Crisp is a supporter in principle of abolition of 
the Senate who nonetheless realizes that such an aim is 
impractical:
"... some critics have suggested the Senate 
would do better to disappear from the scene.
In practice, however, institutions are usually 
reluctant to vanish and it would seem unlikely 
that the Australian electorate, with its high 
propensity to vote against centripetal tendencies 
in the Constitution, would liquidate the Senate 
in cold blood."25
The major reasons for concluding that abolition 
of the Senate is an unrealistic proposition are:
i) the general lack of electoral support for
Constitutional amendments26; and the
22 "Constitutional Issues" in A. Davies and G. Serie (eds), Policies
for Progress: Essays in Australian Politics, Cheshire, Melbourne,
1954, p.33.
23 K.E. Beazley (A.L.P.), CPD:H of R (31 m y  1950), Vol.208, p.3481.
24 A.R. Dcwner, Ibid, p.3488.
Parliamentary Government of the Commonwealth of Australia, 3rd ed., 
Longman, London, 1961, p.191.
2 6 See L.F. Crisp, Australian National Government, 3rd rev. ed., 
Longman, CrcydaiT-1974, Lhaprer 11. '
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possibility that this particular proposal 
would need to be accepted by a majority of 
voters in each State27;
ii) the predictable reaction of State politicians
(possibly a determining influence on (i)); 
iii) the practical problem of deleting all references
to the Senate from the Constitution.
One cannot ignore the symbolism of the Senate as a vital 
feature of the federal framework in Australia. Only if 
this federal framework were dispensed with - by the move 
to a unitary state - could abolition of the Senate be 
envisaged. However, the practice of bicameralism seems 
so entrenched in Australia that, even under a unitary 
system, it is likely that there would be two Chambers of 
the national legislature.
Reform
On the ground that abolition of the Senate is 
unlikely, most critics of the Chamber's performance have 
concentrated on suggesting methods for enhancing the 
utility of the Senate. The first set of proposals concern 
the method of selection of Senate personnel;
a) changes in the electoral method;
b) changes in the method of filling casual vacancies;
c) increasing the required minimum age of Senate 
candidates;
d) altering the length of the Senate term.
See the view of C.J. Latham, quoted by Ibid, pp.347-348.
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Secondly, there have been proposals to alter the size of 
the Chamber.
Such proposals envisage that the powers and expected 
functions of the Chamber would not be altered. Other 
suggestions for change do not accept that the Constitutional 
prescription should still be adhered to. One such set of 
proposals suggest:
a) removal of the Senate's' power to reject Supply;
b) removal of any Senate veto power;
c) a new set of provisions to lessen or provide means 
of coping with Senate-House deadlocks.
Finally, there are suggestions to completely restructure 
the Chamber: to make it a House of 'experts', or a House
of committees.
The Royal Commission on the Constitution considered 
various proposals for change to the Senate electoral method. 
The majority Report recommended a Constitutional amendment 
to institute, for an initial period of ten years, pro­
portional representation for Senate elections.28 Individual 
witnesses before the Commission suggested other changes: 
division of the States into electoral districts with 
special weighting for rural areas29; cessation of direct 
popular election of Senators and substitution of election 
by State Parliaments30.
28 Report, op.cit., p.267.
29 Dr Whtson; see Report, p.47.
30 Professor Siam; Ibid, p.48.
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Two of the 1927-1929 Commissioners proposed that 
casual Senate vacancies should be filled by candidates 
elected not by both Houses of State Parliament, but by 
a vote of the State Lower House alone.31 This question 
was again considered by the 1956-1959 Joint Committee on 
Constitutional Review; the Committee sought to frame a 
Constitutional amendment to require that any appointee 
to a casual vacancy be of the «same party as that of the 
prior incumbent. The major difficulty was stating such 
an aim without specifically referring to political parties, 
which are not mentioned in the Constitution. The Committee 
concluded by urging total adherence to the principle of 
appointing members of the same political party so that 
a constitutional convention would operate.32 The 
Parliamentary Labor Leader, E.G. Whitlam, has also argued 
that a Constitutional amendment is not necessary.33 The 
repercussions of breaking of the Convention by two State 
Premiers in 1974 and 1975 may lead to reconsideration 
and further arguments for a Constitutional amendment; 
alternatively, the fact that the convention was broken 
could mean that a State Parliament with a majority opposed 
to that of a particular Federal government would find 
the temptation to appoint one of their own number too 
great to avoid.
31 7 b i d ' P-304.
32 Report, pp.42-43.
See his answer to a Question without Notice, 10 Septerrber 1975,
CPD:H of R, Vol.16, p.1191.
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Some witnesses before the 1927-1929 Royal Commission 
suggested that a better calibre of Senators would result 
if a higher minimum age for both Senate candidates and 
electors were adopted. A minimum age of either 30 or 
35 was suggested?4 Most observers feel, however, that 
merely varying the minimum age of either electors or 
Senators would not necessarily result in any change in 
Senate personnel.
One of the most frequently suggested machinery 
changes is a Constitutional amendment to alter the length 
of the Senate term. On 3 December 1914 the A.L.P. caucus 
adopted unanimously a proposal that:
"... the terms of tenure of the present 
Senate shall be co-terminous with the date 
hereby applied to the present House of 
Representatives; also that in future the 
term of either House (be that of the House) 
havng the longer term to run."35
The 1956-1959 Joint Committee on Constitutional Review 
recommended;
"... that Senators should hold their places 
until the expiry or dissolution of the second 
.House of Representatives after their election...".36
This proposal that a Senate term should be for the duration
of two consecutive House of Representatives' terms was
34 Report, p.47.
Caucus Minutes,.., op.cit., Vol.l, p.390.
1958 Report, paragraph 49, and 1959 Report, pp.34-38, 195-196.36
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rejected by Senator R.C. Wright in a dissenting to the 
Report.37 He agreed that simultaneous House and Senate 
elections were desirable on grounds of economy and voter 
convenience, but felt that:
:... the Prime Minister should not have the 
power to treat the States' House as an 
appendage of the Popular House and take one- 
half of the Senate to election at the will 
of the Executive Government."38
The Labor Government proposed a Constitutional 
amendment to this effect in May 1974; it was rejected 
by a majority of voters in all States except New South 
Wales.39 Only 14 of the Senators who answered the 
Questionnaire in 1969-1971 supported such a change. The 
most common reasons for retention of the six-year term 
were: the need to provide a lengthy apprenticeship for
new Senators; the importance of retaining continuity; 
and the preservation of a clear difference between Senators 
and MHRs. At the same time, Senators felt that out-of­
step elections were costly and inconvenient; but agreed 
with Wright's view that the executive should not have the 
Senate under its thumb and should exercise more responsi­
bility about the timing of House of Representatives elections.
At various points in time either an increase or a 
decrease in the size of the Senate has been advocated.
Most of the discussion has revolved around the question 
of whether the 'nexus' provision should be retained or
37 1959 Report, p.186.
38 Loc.cit.
39 Crisp, Australian National Government, op.cit., p.48.
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discarded. The 1959 Report of the Joint Committee 
recommended Constitutional amendment to remove the 
2 to 1 ratio and specify a minimum of 6 and a maximum 
of 10 Senators per State.40 The Committee argued:
"... that the original notion of the Senate 
as a states house was not realised and, 
therefore, does not justify further increases 
in the number of Senators even though future 
increases in the number of members of the 
House of Representatives will probably occur."41
and:
"... the Committee's view is that the Senate 
can perform the orthodox functions of review 
only within the permissable limits of the 
party system of Federal politics."42
and concluded:
"The Committee considers that a Senate com­
prising ten Senators for each original State 
should always retain its prestige and standing. 
Dignity does not rest on numerical strength."43
The traditional justification for retaining the 
'nexus' has been the importance of the relative number 
of MHRs and Senators in any joint sitting utilized for 
resolution of inter-House deadlocks. The two to one 
ratio prevents the small States from being impotent to 
withstand large State views in any joint sitting. So 
argued Senator Wright in his dissent to the 1959 Report4 4; 
and support for this view led the 19 50 Senate Committee 
on the Constitution Alteration (Avoidance of Double
40 Report, op.cit., p.17.
41 Ibid, p.14.
42 Ibid, p.16.
43 Loc.cit.
44 Ibid, p.178.
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Dissolution Deadlocks) Bill45 to recommend retention of 
the 'nexus' in a referendum in 1967.46 The official 'No' 
case argued that:
"The Government dislikes the growing exercise 
of the Senate's power of review. The Yes men 
wish to multiply the number of Representatives 
and dwarf the Senate, and then will say - How 
dare such a small group of Senators (60) oppose 
the will of the Representatives (150 or 300) 
with any amendment or review'.1,47
Opponents of the referendum concluded that the result of 
removal of the 'nexus' provision would be the subordination 
of the Senate and hence of smaller States.
Until 1974 there was also spasmodic discussion of 
the validity of providing for representation of Federal 
Territories in the Senate. Whilst most Senators inter­
viewed between 1969 and 1971 felt that the then size of 
the Chamber was sufficient, they supported retention of 
the 'nexus' (partly arguing that increases in the size of 
the House of Representatives would be justified in the 
future and that the consequent increase in the size of 
the Senate would provide more members to staff Senate 
committees). However, they were evenly divided on the 
question of Senate representation for Federal Territories. 
Those against Territorial representation based their 
opposition on the size of the population in the Territories
Parliamentary Paper Number S.l of 1950, paragraph 87.
The proposal received majority support in any cne State; Crisp, 
Australian National Government, op.cit., p.48. The official 'No' 
case, prepared by D.L.P. and seme dissident Government (non-Labor) 
Senators, also argued against any increase in the number of 
Federal MPs because Australia was already over-governed.
The Arguments For and Against the Proposed Alterations, Ccmmonwealth 
Government Printer, Canberra, 1967, p.8.
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rather than on any point of principle about the Senate 
being only a House for States. Labor Senators (who were 
2 to 1 in support of Territorial representation) argued 
that some representation was a basic democratic right 
for voters in the Australian Capital Territory and the 
Northern Territory. The Whitlam Labor Government's 
legislation providing for Territorial representation was 
passed in the joint sitting a£ter the 1974 double 
dissolution election.48
Suggestions for restriction of the powers of the 
Senate generally arose from those who would prefer out­
right abolition of the Chamber, but who recognised that 
piecemeal reform is all that is possible. The fact that 
the Senate (even when hostile) never utilized its power 
to reject Supply - although occasionally such action was 
threatened - meant that few people debated seriously 
removal of the power. The events of 1974 to 1975 have, 
for the first time, prompted spirited argument about 
whether the Senate should be restricted in a manner similar 
to the House of Lords. The 1911 Parliament Act - enacted 
in retaliation to the House of Lords' rejection of the 
1909 Budget - provides a general curb on the Chamber's 
veto power. Is this likely to be instituted in the 
Australian Federal Parliament?
Whilst the non-Labor Parties have continuously 
rejected the idea of abolishing the Senate, they have 
debated moves to restrict the legislative powers of
4 8 Each Territory was granted two Senators.
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the Senate. For example, in 1950 Liberal Prime Minister 
Menzies introduced the Constitution Alteration (Avoidance 
of Double Dissolution Deadlocks) Bill to, in his own words, 
ensure "the stability of the Government in the House of 
Representatives and its capacity to give effect to the 
will of the people who elected it."49 In 1969 Menzies 
advised his successors:
"If the Government is not willing to reform 
the Senate, it should at least ensure that 
it cannot act against the principles of 
responsible government by holding up legis­
lation affecting expenditure...".50
On other occasions it has been argued that the most 
practical (and attainable) reform would be modification of 
the deadlock provisions set out in Section 57 of the 
Constitution. The Joint Committee on Constitutional 
Review argued:
"The Committee considers it to be quite 
inconsistent with the principle of responsible 
government at the Commonwealth level that a 
party or a coalition of parties returned with 
a clear majority in the House of Representatives 
and, for that reason, fully entitled and 
expected to form an effective government, may 
almost at once be unable to give effect to 
its policies because of party political 
opposition in the Senate, unless it either 
threatens or obtains a double dissolution.
One particularly adverse consequence is that 
a government may choose to forgo the imple­
mentation of its legislative policy rather 
than face another general election. In these 
circumstances, there is a danger that there 
will be government in only name and such a 
possibility is harmful to democracy."51
49 CPD:H of R (4 May 1950), Vol.208, p.2220.
Quoted in Australian Financial Review, 8 October 1965, p.3. 
51 Report, op.cit., p.23.
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The Committee noted that the use of proportional repre­
sentation for Senate elections increased the likelihood 
of deadlocks between the Federal Houses.52 The final 
recommendation of the Committee was that Section 57 
should be repealed and a new set of provisions enacted 
defining a deadlock situation and providing alternative 
methods for resolving inter-House disputes.53 In brief, 
this substitute section would:x distinguish between Money 
Bills and other legislation by removing the requirement 
for a second rejection of Supply before a deadlock is 
deemed to have occurred and by setting the time periods 
within which the Senate must act as 30 days for Money 
Bills and 90 days for other legislation; provide the 
Governor-General with the option of either calling a 
double dissolution or convening a joint sitting of the 
Houses when a deadlock situation occurs; and also allow 
for a joint sitting after a double dissolution (as is 
presently provided).
Further discussion of alternative deadlock machinery 
appeared in a Parliamentary Paper published in 1964.54 
This paper was particularly concerned about finding some 
procedure which would be more acceptable to the States 
by not appearing as an overt threat to the States House 
function of the Senate. At no time have any positive 
steps been taken to implement such proposals.
52 Ibid, pp.24-27.
53 J h i d ' PP-33-34.
G. Howatt, Resolving Senate - House Deadlocks in Australia without 
endangering the smaller States, Parliamentary Paper Nuirber 51 of 1964.
54
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In his dissent to the 1929 Report of the Royal 
Commission, T.R. Ashworth proposed reconstitution of 
the Senate as a House of "experts, technical and philo­
sophic"55; the basis of representation would be interests, 
rather than territorial distribution of population.56 
In recent years the success of Senate select and standing 
committees has led to suggestions that the Senate should 
be reformed as a House of committees. 'Observer', in the 
Bulletin, argued in 1970:
"This suggests the fanciful thought 
(at present rated nil in terms of 
practical politics, but you never know) 
that a really useful Senate would be 
one entirely stripped of political 
power, with the right of referral and 
comment on Bills but no power to block 
them, but with expansive investigatory 
and recommendatory powers. The 
political game could be played in the 
Lower House: the Senate would be a
body of men who appointed investigatory 
committees (to which they could co-opt 
experts) and also meet together as an 
assembly that from time to time told 
the Lower House what it thought of 
its Bills. After 70 years of near 
uselessness the Senate would find a 
really useful role.
With such a Senate, party control might 
diminish, or even collapse. The 
incentive to vote on party lines would 
be greatly weakened, and might even 
disappear. It might be possible for 
really good independent candidates to 
be elected who would be concerned not 
with the necessary expediencies of 
political life, nor with the political 
necessity to keep close to shifts in 
public opinion, but with expert classific­
ation of options and leadership toward 
intelligent and complex decision-making.
Report, op.cit., p.290.
56 Ibid, pp.290-292.
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For the moment there is no political 
possibility for such a move. It would 
affront too many vested party interests. 
But the rest of this century will be an 
age of even more rapid change than the 
most changeable of centuries has so far 
seen, and if Australia is to move into 
the technological age and more or less 
keep its present placing in the pros­
perity world league tables, if it is to 
develop distinctive technocratic styles 
in town planning, transport, education 
and so forth so that it provides cities 
uniquely attractive to immigrants, and 
if it is to react to its unique situation 
as a country of European origin set in 
a South-East Asian Geopolitical context 
then it will have to change many of its 
ways of going on. There will be no room 
for seat-of-the-pants government.
If the Senate started all over again so 
that while there were still politicians 
in the House of Representatives there 
were statesmen in the Senate, Senators 
would be worth a six-year term, and 
worth the extra expenditure of a 
separate election."57
Both of these proposals envisage the Senate acting only 
as an advisory body, with no power to veto (though perhaps 
the power to delay or suspend enactment for a certain period).
Conclusion
A variety of suggestions have been made for 
restructuring or even abolition of the Senate. The Report 
of the 1956-1959 Joint Committee on Constitutional Review 
provided the most far-reaching discussion of the composition 
and powers of the Senate; but this Report suffered the 
same fate as any other considered review of Constitutional
57 21 Noveirber 1970, p.27.
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matters - non-implementation. It has been noted that 
only on rare occasions have any proposals for reform 
been presented for electoral consideration at a 
referendum; and the voters have not accepted any 
proposed changes.
A major problem is that any proposal for change 
must first be accepted by an absolute majority of the 
members of each Federal House. Therefore government 
support is a necessity. It is noticeable that governments 
usually only become concerned with the question of reform 
of the Senate when their legislative program is under 
attack within the Upper House. In that situation, however, 
a hostile Senate can defeat any proposal for change (as 
Menzies found) . 58
If a proposal for Constitutional amendment achieves 
the necessary majorities in both Federal Houses, it must 
then be put to the electorate. Whatever the content of 
a particular proposal, the chances of it receiving support 
from a majority of voters in a majority of States are, 
for reasons stated earlier in the context of moves for 
abolition of the Senate, unlikely. State governments 
are another major problem. They may not desire the Senate 
to act as a States House; but it is difficult to see them 
urging their voters to support any proposal which would 
destroy the symbolism of the Senate as a States House.
It is possible for the Governor-General to present to the electors 
an Amendment proposal passed by only one House. However, this 
procedure has not, to date, been utilized.
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It is evident that from October 1975 far more 
serious discussion has occurred within political parties, 
the media and academia on the composition and powers of 
the Senate. If the Whitlam Labor Government had been 
returned in the elections of December 1975, concrete 
legislative proposals to reform the Senate might have 
been aired. However, the Fraser Government's election 
success, especially its securing of a majority of seats 
in both Houses, reduces the likelihood of moves for 
reform. Given past political history, the current level 
of concern about Senate powers will probably dissipate, 
only to be revived on a future display of Senate hostility. 
Even then, a "revolution" is highly unlikely.
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CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSION
Introduction
This Chapter provides a final assessment of the 
performance of the Senate and of Senate personnel between 
1901 and 1972. The conclusion is that the major determinant 
of Senate and Senators' activity is undoubtedly partisanship.
Senate activity
The detailed survey of the Senate over a seventy- 
two year period demonstrated that there have been considerable 
variations in Senate activity in different periods. One 
can distinguish between various phases between 1901 and 
1972, where in any one period the performance of the Senate 
was markedly different from that in prior or subsequent 
periods. The five such periods are: 1901-1909; 1910-1948;
1949-1962; 1963-1966; and 1967-1972.
1901-1909
In this period the Senate's membership included 
several former Founding Fathers and other men of stature 
from Colonial politics. Voting blocs gradually became 
evident, but Senators did on occasions act as groups 
defending particular State interests. Senators shared 
the common goal of seeking to explore the boundaries of 
Senate powers vis-a-vis the House of Representatives 
and governments over the period accepted (if only by 
default) the Senate's power to press requests
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for amendment of financial legislation. Senate activity in 
this period even led to some expressions of alarm by governments 
in reaction to the aggressive assumption of power by the Upper 
house.
1910-1948
This was, however, a short-lived phenomenon. By the end 
of the first decade after federation political parties had 
solidified in both Federal Chambers, and from 1909/1910 
partisanship in the Senate in most cases annulled the possibility 
of the Senate performing as a States House. Thus one of the 
original prescribed functions of the Senate became largely 
inoperative (and inoperable). In addition, the appearance 
of disciplined party groupings affected the Senate’s performance 
as a House of Review, and led to the image of the Senate as 
being either a rubber stamp (in periods when the government 
also held a majority in the upper house), or a hostile curb 
(when an opposition dominated the Senate). One can distinguish 
between such periods; for example, the reaction of governments 
to the Senate varied between either increasingly cavalier 
treatment (in the rubber stamp periods) or continuing threats 
to use Section 57 of the Constitution against a hostile Senate.
In addition, there was a marked contrast in the member­
ship of the Senate during this and the previous phase which 
demonstrated to a large degree the impact of partisanship. 
Political parties increased their hold over Senators, 
particularly after the introduction of preferential voting
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in 1919; and the spoils system of appointment became the 
accepted practice. The 'winner takes all' effect of both 
electoral methods used during this period contributed to 
the rubber stamp or hostile curb phenomenon. The consequence 
was an observable decrease in the calibre of Senators and 
few examples of their seeking to achieve Senate rather 
than partisan goals.
1949-1962
For many reasons 1949 can be seen as a crucial 
turning point in the chronology of Senate activity. The 
introduction of proportional representation enabled the 
election of some minor party and independent Senators: 
and the consequence was a balance of power situation in 
which the major parties were vying for support from these 
minor party or Independent members. The 1955 A.L.P. - 
D.L.P. split produced a stable minor party which immediately 
acted to capitalise on the potential balance of power 
situation. The phenomenon of a Senate election held 
separately from Lower House elections also generated 
added public and governmental interest in the Senate.
The membership of the Senate was enlivened by the 
election of new younger members, especially in 1949 and 
in 1961. Several of the new Senators demonstrated a 
willingness to consider the nature of Senate functions 
and powers in a manner akin to the early Senators.
1963-1966
In this period the externally-imposed factors which had 
led to gradual changes in the composition and activity of the 
Senate in the previous thirteen years were reflected in 
internal changes. The removal of former constraints such 
as decisive government or opposition majorities undoubtedly 
triggered changes in the individual aspirations and behaviour 
of Senators, especially non-Labor Senators. There were 
occasional examples of Senators voting as State blocs 
irrespective of party lines. Minor party representation 
increased; and within the major parties there was a further 
turnover of personnel, with culling out of older Senators 
and their replacement by younger, more highly educated and 
motivated members.
In consequence there was a revival of the power struggle 
between the two Federal Chambers which had rarely appeared in 
the preceding fifty-four years; and again the Senate appeared 
occasionally to be the victor in such situations.
1967-1972
By 1967 the Senate could be seen to be actively exploring 
the limits of its powers and functions. There were numerous 
examples of deadlock situations between the two Houses, and 
Senate views triumphed without retaliatory action such as a 
Double Dissolution (which had become a rather empty threat 
rather than a. governmental weapon for keeping Senators in line).
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Senate elections continued to be out-of-step with those 
for the Lower House, and resulted in further increases in 
the numerical strength of minor party and Independent 
Senators to the detriment of both major forces. There 
were further turnovers in Senate membership and changes 
in party leadership within the Chamber.
A general desire to pursue Senate, or legislative, 
rather than purely partisan goals intensified and was 
eventually formalised by the establishment in June 1970 
of a range of new standing committees. A growing sense 
of co-operation between Senators across party lines was 
reflected to some degree within the Chamber, but especially 
within these new committees.
It must be noted that these variations in Senate 
performance were a matter of degree rather than of sub­
stantive difference. This raises the question of whether 
the level of Senate activity during the 1960s and early 
1970s was only a temporary phenomenon - whether in the 
future there would be a retreat to a phase of somnolence 
and relative inactivity, or a return to overt hostility. 
With hindsight, one can see that the Senate has, from 1972, 
entered a new phase of activity (to be strictly accurate, 
one should refer to two phases: 1972-1975, a period of
uncertain party strengths and complete partisan hostility 
from the then Opposition; and a new period commencing in 
1976, with a large Government majority in the Chamber).
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Düring the 1960s there was a multiplicity of 
forces each attempting to wield influence through the 
Senate. The Labor opposition used the Senate not only 
as a weapon for frustrating the Government (assuming it 
could attract D.L.P. support) but also as an element in 
the information-gathering process and as a forum for 
publicity of its proposed policies. Rebel Government 
Senators frequently exercised an independent stance from 
their party colleagues - and pleaded as justification 
their role as members of a House of Review and occasionally 
as State representatives. For the D.L.P. this was its only 
parliamentary forum; it capitalised on its balance of 
power position in order to exact concessions from the 
Government in return for the delivery of votes (both 
within the Senate and electorally).
From the beginning of 1973 the former spirit of 
assessment of issues on their merit decreased, and instead 
there was near monolithic partisan obstruction from the 
non-Labor Opposition Senators. Although there was still 
a multi-party situation in the Chamber, in practice the 
numerical majority of non-Labor Senators (including D.L.P. 
and so-called Independent Senators, and boosted by the 
appointments of Senators Bunton and Field) operated to 
lessen the spirit of bi-partisanship which had been 
evident before the change of government.
The attitude of Senate-mindedness - of a conscious 
plan for action and widely accepted (amongst Senators) 
recognition of the special functions and potential of
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the Senate - had, during the previous decäde, outweighed 
partisanship for some non-Labor Senators. The unpredict­
ability of division results in a Chamber where no party 
or formal coalition held a majority of seats provided 
an impetus for this pattern of behaviour. Yet this cannot 
be a sufficient explanation, for Senate-mindedness was 
non-existent after the change of government in December 
1972, in spite of continuation of the multi-party situation.
During the period 1910-1960, and 1972-1975, the 
Senate was used by either governing or opposition parties 
to achieve their respective aims of near-automatic assent 
to legislation, or of hindrance to a government's legis­
lative program. In the latter case, harrassment of a 
government is seemingly (at least in the opposition's 
view) more legitimate if it is backed by Senate majority.
It is certainly more effective than any tactics an opposition 
can use in the House of Representatives, which is usually 
securely under the control of the government.
Senators
The detailed examination of members of the Senate 
over the seventy-two year period demonstrated that, whilst 
there have been some changes on the socio-economic 
characteristics of Senators over time, such changes have 
also occurred in the membership of the House of Represent­
atives. Moreover, both Senators and MHRs have generally 
been unrepresentative of the electorate at any point in 
time.
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As a representative a Senator is distinguished 
from other Australian MPs in that he has a geographically 
extensive electorate - a whole State. He will therefore 
be exposed to a wider variety of opinions and interests 
than a Member of the House of Representatives, whose 
electorate will generally reflect a very narrow range of 
interests. A Senator is more likely to encounter conflicting 
demands and expectations from within this extensive 
electorate. On the other hand, given the size (in terms 
of population and geography) of his electorate, a Senator's 
relationship to his constituents will not be as direct as 
that between an MHR and his electorate.
The parliamentary aspect of a Senator's role is 
similar to that of an MHR, with an added stress on scrutiny 
or review. A Senator faces the same restrictions on his 
ability to carry out these duties as does the MHR.
Executive dominance over the legislative process means 
that individual members of both Houses are generally not 
makers or initiators of policy. The number of Private 
Members' Bills initiated in either House is small, and the 
success rate minimal. Moreover, the individual MP's 
ability to scrutinize governmental legislation is severely 
limited. Firstly, he is hampered in gathering information 
about governmental activity - both by executive secrecy 
and by competing pressures on his time. Secondly, he has 
limited opportunities for participation in the Chamber.
To some degree a Senator is less restricted than 
an MHR in the performance of these parliamentary duties.
He is usually less involved with day-to-day constituency 
matters and does not need to man a weekly 'clinic'. A 
Senator therefore tends to spend more time in Canberra 
than an MHR, and so has greater personal access to the 
facilities of the Parliamentary Library. However, a 
Senator will generally devote a larger proportion of his 
time to attendance at committee meetings (both Senate and 
party committees); and committee membership generates an 
added necessity for research activity.
A Senator has more opportunity to participate in 
debate within the Chamber than his Lower House colleague, 
due to the smaller size of the Senate and the relatively 
freer Standing Orders. In addition, in the Senate (unlike 
the House) the committee stage of consideration of 
legislation is an important opportunity for backbench 
contributions.
However, both Senators and MHRs suffer because of 
executive reluctance to divulge information which may be 
vital for an MP to understand, let alone criticise, govern­
mental policy and administration. A Senator may get more 
opportunity to participate in Question Time, but this does 
not necessarily mean that he will be able to elicit more 
information from a Minister, whose answer may be inadequate 
or even uninformative. A recent President of the Senate 
once by mistake remarked "Questions without answers have 
been received", which many Senators felt was only too true'.1
Quoted by J. Spigelman, Secrecy: Political Censorship in Australia, 
Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1972, p.19.
l
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Moreover, Senators are especially affected by the 'floodgate 
phenomenon' as they must await receipt of bills from the 
Lower House.
The partisan aspect of an MP's role provides a further, 
if not the most important, restraint on his ability to per­
form these parliamentary duties. The most significant forum 
for discussion and criticism of policy is the party meeting 
or caucus, not the Chamber. Within the party rooms individual 
attitudes are aired, but a majority or consensus viewpoint 
will eventually be determined and both MHRs and Senators 
are then forced (if Labor), or at least heavily constrained 
(if non-Labor), to support this view within the Parliament. 
Both government and opposition parties seek to present a 
unified front in Parliament. A Member who publicly opposes 
the views of the majority of his colleagues is courting 
expulsion (if Labor), or the possibility of being sent to 
Coventry, reprimanded and/or denied future pre-selection 
(if non-Labor).
The influence of partisanship is both overt and vital 
within the House of Representatives because it is the house 
of government. The fact that rebellion may lead to defeat 
of their government is a powerful sanction over government 
backbenchers in the House. In the Senate, however, party 
leaders and whips cannot enforce unanimity by use of this 
sanction. Defeat of a government in the Senate does not 
precipitate a general election unless such defeat occurs 
on a matter relating to the 'ordinary annual services' of 
the government. This allows non-Labor (but not A.L.P.) 
Senators to exercise a degree of independent action if they
so desire.
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Partisanship is also important in relation to an MP's 
representational role. The MP elected under a party label 
is certainly not a delegate bound by his constituents' 
instructions. On occasions he may be forced to accept a 
party policy which is at odds with the expressed interests 
of his electorate. Nonetheless, the MP usually has been 
elected because of his party label; his personality and 
diligence within the electorate may enhance his appeal, but 
for the electorate as a whole he is 'the Labor Member' or 
'the non-Labor Member'.
For a Senator the party label is especially important. 
The task of making oneself known over the broad expanse of 
a State (except perhaps in Tasmania) is extremely difficult 
for an individual candidate, but not for a political party; 
thus most Senators need a party label to secure election, 
and in return their dependence on the party is increased.
The use of party tickets (introduced when the method of 
election of Senators changed from the simple majority system 
to that of preferential and later, proportional representation) 
also stesses the Senator's accountability to his party rather 
than to his electorate.
Another approach to categorising Senate personnel 
is the construction of a general typology of Senate 'types'.
Several researchers have isolated general types of 
legislators reflecting their shared socio-economic character­
istics and/or their style of legislative behaviour. Thus 
after studying American Senators D.R. Matthews concluded
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that a 'typical Senator' was very different from a 'typical 
American' in that Senators were "with few exceptions, from 
near the top of the society's class system."2 Matthews 
surmised that the explanations for this unrepresentativeness 
were:3
a) that "voters seem to prefer candidates who are 
not like themselves but are what they would like 
to b e ;"
b) that only upper and upper-middle class Americans 
have the necessary money to seek a Senate position;
c) that upper and upper-middle class Americans are 
"more politically aware" and so "may be more 
prone to entering politics;"
d) that upper and upper-middle class Americans "are 
more likely to possess the requisite skills for 
successful political careers".
Chapter V revealed that the background of Australian 
Senators was by no means so restricted in class terms.
In fact, it is hard to isolate any who could be termed 
upper class; Senators were as middle or lower class as 
the general population. Moreover, Matthews' comments 
relating degree of political awareness and skills to class 
categories would seem to be inapplicable in Australia.
Matthews also allocated American Senators into four 
categories based on their 'type of career', which is a
"United States Senators - A Collective Portrait", International
Social Scienoe Journal, vol.13, 1961, p.632.
3 All quotes fron Loc.cit.
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composite reflection of their social status and their degree 
of active involvement in politics prior to election to the 
Senate.4 Thus Patrician Politicians were those ranking high 
on both these criteria; Agitators ranked relatively low on 
both criteria; Amateur Politicans had a high social status 
but little prior experience in politics; and Professional 
Politicians were those with a long career of involvement in 
politics but who were in a sense self-made men without high 
social status.
These categories are not very useful for Australian 
Senators, as most would be best labelled as Professional 
Politicians; this is the accepted type of background for 
Senators and the type of candidate which most parties seek 
for nomination.5 A Parliamentary career (and one could perhaps 
say, until recently, especially a Senate career) is not 
regarded as a position carrying significant status and so 
the Patrician or Amateur Politician types are unlikely to 
be found amonst Australian Senators. Matthews comments 
that Agitators are most likely to emerge where there is "a 
relatively fluid social structure with almost leaderless 
political parties;"6 these conditions do not occur in 
Australia, though it might be reasonable to label some of 
the Independent Senators as Agitators. Generally, however, 
use of these categories does not provide much illumination 
about types of Australian Senators.
4 Ibid, pp.632-633.
Cf. The recruitment process for meirbers of The German Bundestag, 
detailed by G. Loewenberg, in Parliament in the German Political System, 
Correll U.P., Ithica, 1966, espec, pp.128-130.
Cp.cit., p.633.6
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In analysing the membership of the membership of the 
British House of Lords between 1964 and 1970, Janet Morgan7 
identifies six types of peer, according to their personality, 
outlook on the world and legislative role conceptions. Her 
category of Apprentices is less applicable to Australian 
Senators, in that their period as new Members who should 
be seen but not heard is generally short (partly a function 
of extensive extra-Parliamentary political experience).
Among the Senators interviewed between 1969 and 1971 
there was one striking example of an Innocent: a man whose
major contribution during his brief stay in the Chamber was 
his discovery of rabbits and of noxious gorse on the lake- 
shore in front of Parliament House). Morgan's category of 
Elder Statemen (those who expound and defend the customs 
and prestige of the Chamber) applies to some Australian 
Senators (in the 1970s, for example, to Senator Sir Magnus 
Cormack and Senators Cope and Wright); but these MPs differ 
from those Morgan typifies in that they concurrently are 
partisanly motivated.
Because of the different recruitment process for the 
House of Lords (the vast bulk of whose Members are hereditary 
peers) as against that for the Senate, it is not surprising 
that, using Morgan's typology, most Senators would have to 
be labelled as Politicians. In the House of Lords most such 
Members were either life peers or former members of the House 
of Commons who inherited a seat in the Upper House.
J.P. Morgan, The House of Lords and the Labour Government, 1964-1970, 
O.U.P., Oxford, 1975.
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Morgan's fifth category was that of Legalists - 
described as masters of detail, members who are keen on 
scrutinising to remove flaws in legislative drafting. It 
has been noted that there has always been a reasonable 
representation of lawyers in the Senate. However, I 
would regard this category, and her final type of member - 
Adventurers - as interesting but overlapping with the previous 
categories. According to Morgan, Adventurers are those 
peers who enjoy using the Chamber as a forum for promoting 
their favourite causes and for manipulating procedures to 
this end, and for generally embarrassing or annoying the 
front bench.
When seeking to apply this typology to Australian 
Senators, one can best begin by classifying almost all 
Senators as essentially Politicians, who nonetheless may 
on certain issues or in particular situations exhibit 
behaviour which can be categorised under one of the other 
types.
After studying members of the Connecticut State 
Legislature J.D. Barber distinguished four types of legis­
lators: Spectators, Advertisers, Reluctants and (to him,
the most desirable) Lawmakers.8 Barber's legislator types 
are distinguished on the basis of personality and motiviation, 
socio-economic characteristics and legislative style.
The Lawmakers: Recruitment and adaptation to legislative Life, Yale U.P., 
New Haven, 1965, especially pp.214-216.
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Categorising Senators under these types requires a great 
deal of subjective assessment of their personality traits 
and behaviour using psychological tools beyond my command.
It can, however, be superficially commented that there 
was only a very small (and ever decreasing) number of 
Spectators in the Australian Senate; the demands of 
extensive committee work (especially from 1970) on such 
a small Chamber tended to force Senators either to play 
an active role or to retire.9
Barber's category of Advertiser refers especially 
to a young, upwardly mobile and ambitious legislator who 
may see a short term in the Legislature as an aid to his 
professional (usually legal) career. In Australia a Federal 
political career is generally the Member's full-time occupation 
and most Members view it as their final position (electors 
willing). A small number of Reluctants have already been 
noted; such legislators are likely to diminish in number 
given added competition for Senate preselection.
Those Senators previously designated as the 'new 
blood' could also be labelled Lawmakers. They exhibited 
Barber's characteristics of: a high level of legislative
activity and commitment: youth; high educational qualifi­
cations; high self estimate of their ability and rationality.
I therefore propose to adopt Barber's title of Lawmaker 
for these Senators. It must however be noted that several 
of the older (both in terms of chronological age and of
9 At least 3 Senators took the latter course and did not stand for 
re-election in 1971.
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length of service) Senators could also merit this title - 
for example, Senator Wright (Liberal), Senator Lacey (A.L.P.) 
and Senator Byrne (D.L.P.). Considering all who were 
members of the Senate in June 1970, the label Lawmaker 
could be applied to between 12 and 15 Senators - that is, 
to between a fifth and a quarter of the total membership.
The remaining Senators fall readily into two groups, 
distinguished by party label a^ nd by socio-economic character­
istics. On the one hand there are the bulk of Labor Senators, 
most of whom were previously employed as full-time salaried 
party or union officials. They had therefore been exposed 
to similar socialisation. They were self-made men in that 
their fathers were generally unskilled tradesmen. Their 
education was often curtailed (either by the war or by the 
need to seek a job in early or mid-teens to add to the family 
income). Their Senate nomination was indeed a reward for 
their past activity within the unions and/or the party.
On the other hand there is the group of non-Labor 
Senators, the clear majority of whom were farmers or graziers, 
(irrespective of whether their party label was Liberal or 
Country Party). These Senators held a succession of positions 
as President of their local, State or Federal primary producer 
organisations. They continued to act in the same role of
spokesmen for primary producers within the Senate as they 
performed previously as sectional group leaders outside the 
Parliament. Most had a private school education; many 
inherited their land from their parents and carried on the
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traditional family occupation. Several had relatives who 
had also stepped from extra-Parliamentary to Parliamentary 
politics.
A variety of labels could be applied to these two 
types of Senators; for example, union fliers and rural 
spokesmen, or machine men and country organisers. However, 
as the division on party lines is so decisive, it is simple 
to merely designate them as 'typical Labor' and 'typical 
non-Labor' Senators.
A small number of Senators cannot readily be fitted 
into any of the three categories. The Wahlke et al Opportunist 
category10 could well be used for D.L.P. Senators, the Liberal 
Senator Wood and Independent Senators. Alternatively, these 
Senators could be labelled as Agitators using Matthews' criteria.
Legislative functions and legislative effectiveness
Before final evaluation of the Senate's performance 
of its intended functions as a House of Review and as a 
States House it is necessary to consider the general question 
of legislative functions and legislative effectiveness.
In The English Constitution, Walter Bagehot described 
the functions of the British House of Commons in the first 
half of the Nineteenth Century under five headings: the
elective function(Parliament's most important task of deciding 
who was to be the Prime Minister and who were to form the 
Cabinet); the lyrical or expressive function (expression
J.C. Whhlke, • et al, The legislative System: Explorations in Legis­
lative Behavior, Bela, John Wiley'& Sens, N.Y. 1962, p.249~.
10
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of the views of the people); the teaching function (his 
prescription to Parliament to educate the people); the 
informing function (debates and general airing of grievances); 
and the legislative function.11 For Bagehot the elective 
and the educative functions were by far the most important; 
the making of legislation had been (rightly) removed from 
Parliament into the hands of Cabinet and the bureaucracy, 
and the House of Commons' function in relation to legis­
lation was to scrutinise and, where necessary, to improve 
such legislation. In other words, the House of Commons 
was "to elect a business-like board to rule the country and 
then keep an eye on its proceedings."12 Bagehot's contemporary, 
John Stuart Mill, similarly denied that a house of parliament 
can (or should) govern or actually make legislation:
"Instead of the function of governing, for which 
it is radically unfit, the proper office of a 
representative assembly is to watch and control 
the government; to throw the light of publicity 
on its acts; to compel a full exposition and 
justification of all of them which any one con­
siders questionable; to censure them if found 
condemnable, and, if the men who compose the 
government abuse their trust, or fulfil it in a 
manner which conflicts with the deliberate sense 
of the nation, to expel them from office, and 
either expressly or virtually appoint their 
successors."13
Bagehot's analysis of the working of British government in 
the mid-Nineteenth Century still has contemporary relevance 
due to his stress on the importance of cabinet (ignored by
11 Collins Fontana edition, London, 1963, pp.150-155.
12 R.H.S. Crossman, Introduction to Ibid, p.19.
"Considerations on Representative Government", in Cn Liberty, 
Representative Government and the Subjection of Women, O.U.P., 
World Classics ed., London, 1948, p.226 (Chapter V).
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M i l l ) . M o re o v e r , T w e n t ie th  C e n tu ry  d e s c r ip t io n s  o f  th e  
fu n c t io n s  o f  p a r l ia m e n t  f o l lo w  h is  m odel c lo s e ly  -  f o r  an  
A u s t r a l ia n  e x a m p le , see A u s t r a l ia n  N a t io n a l  G overnm ent by  
L .F .  C r i s p . 14
From  th e  e a r l y  1960s t h e r e  has been e x t e n s iv e  d e b a te  
in  th e  l i t e r a t u r e  (o v e rs e a s )  a b o u t l e g i s l a t i v e  f u n c t io n s .  
P re v io u s  r e s e a r c h  has been  c r i t i c i s e d  f o r  i t s  em p h as is  on 
la w -m a k in g 1 5 ; and w r i t e r s  have  s t r e s s e d  th e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  
l e g i s l a t u r e s  in  th e  a re a s  o f  l e g i t i m a t i o n ,  r e c r u i t m e n t  and  
s o c i a l i s a t i o n 16 , and c o n f l i c t  m anagem ent and i n t e g r a t i o n . 17
G . S .  R e id  has n o te d  t h a t  a l l  o f  th e s e  d e s c r ip t io n s  
o f  p a r l ia m e n t a r y  fu n c t io n s  a re  " b e d e v i l l e d  by p re c o n c e p t io n s  
o f  a n o r m a t iv e  k in d  a b o u t P a r l ia m e n t 's  r o le  in  g o v e r n m e n t ." 18 
The a c t u a l  p e r fo rm a n c e  o f  a house o f  p a r l ia m e n t  may o r  may n o t  
be e x p la in e d  in  such te rm s . M o re o v e r , as R e id  n o te s ,  th e  o n ly
14 A u stra lian  N a tio n a l Government, 2nd e d .,  Longmans, Melbourne, 1970, 
p .2 7 4 .
15 For example, by T.R. Dye, "State le g is la t iv e  P o lit ic s "  in  H. Jacob 
and K.N. Vines (eds), P o lit ic s  in  American S ta te s , L i t t l e  Brown, 
Boston, 1965, p p .200-201; and by H. Jacob, "Dimansions o f  State  
P o lit ic s "  in  A. Board (ed ), S tate le g is la tu re s  in  American P o l i t ic s , 
P ren tice  H a ll ,  New Jersey, 1966, p p .34-36.
16 For example, see R.A. Packenham, "Leg is latures and P o l i t ic a l  
Development" in  A. Romberg and L .D . M usolf, Leg is la tu res  in  
Developmental P erspective , Duke U .P ., North C aro lina , 1970.
17 See, fo r  example, R.B. S ta u ffe r , "Hie Role o f  Congress in  the  
P h ilip p in e  P o l i t ic a l  System", in  Romberg and M usolf, o p .c i t .
"Parliam entary P o lit ic s " ,  paper presented to  the Eighth Annual 
Conference, A ustra las ian  P o l i t ic a l  Studies Association , August 
1966, p . l .
18
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prescribed function for the Australian House of Representatives, 
in terms of Constitutional prescription, is the legislative. It 
is also hard to sharply distinguish between, for example, seeking 
information, ventilating grievances, and administrative appraisal; 
moreover, any and all of these facets may also be seen as activi­
ties through which MPs accumulate background insights which can 
be marshalled into legislative activity.
A more important criticism of such statements of parliamen­
tary function is that they can be termed idealistic, in that they 
assume a degree of parliamentary performance which cannot be 
achieved. The vast literature on "the decline of parliament"19 
demonstrates only too clearly the gap between the ideal and the 
reality. The two major constraints on parliamentary performance 
are the superiority of cabinet, and the party system (especially 
the stress on party discipline). Cabinet, although of parlia­
ment, is also above parliament through its superior sources of 
information (the bureaucracy), its ability to be summoned together 
for the necessary speedy and continuous decision making (small 
elite) and through its procedural control of at least the lower 
house. Moreover, the conventions of cabinet government, espe­
cially secrecy, restrict parliament's ability to perform the 
teaching, informing and legislative functions.20 Proposals for 
parliamentary reforms to alleviate these problems are always
For example: B. Crick, The Reform of Parliament, 2nd ed., London, 1968; 
G.W. Keeton, The Passing of Parliament, London, 1952; A. Hillard &
A. Whichelow, What's Wrong With Parliament?, London, 1964; H. Berkeley, 
Crossing the Floor, Allen & Unwin, London, 1972.
For a host of examples from the Australian context see J. Spigelman, 
Secrecy: Political Censorship in Australia, Angus & Robertson, Sydney,
1972, especially ch.6. See also the Bulletin, 30 August 1969, p.29.
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likely to receive short shrift from cabinet for, as David Solomon 
notes, "Life is easier for a government when it can claim to be 
more knowledgeable about any particular subject than any of its 
critics."21
The practices of modern political parties, especially labour 
parties which prescribe solidarity and majority decision-making, 
are the other major constraint on parliamentary performance.22 
Decisions are now made in party meetings and merely ratified in 
the legislature; and conflicts between ideas and between person­
alities are now debated and resolved in these party meetings.
Both government and opposition parties attempt to be solid voting 
groups and are unwilling to tolerate public exposure of internal 
dissention.23 Opposition scrutiny of legislation is (as dis­
cussed in detail shortly) hampered by lack of information. In 
fact, if there is to be any executive accountability and ’improve­
ment' of legislation, it is most likely to result from activity
21 Australia's Government and Parliament, Nelson, Melbourne, 1972, p.35.
22 For detailed discussions of the impact of mass parties on parliamentary 
systems see Crossman, op.cit., pp.39-46; M. Ostrogorsky, Democracy and 
the Organisation of Political Parties, 2 vols., Macmillan, 1902;
R.T. McKenzie, British Political Parties, 2nd ed., Heinemann, London, 
1963; R. Michels, Political Parties, Constable, London, 1915.
2 3 "A political party is ostensibly a unity; it is also ostensibly a body 
of principle. That is to say, it ceaselessly proclaims its cwn inter­
nal harmony and insists that this is due to agreement on principle 
amongst its members, who are supposed to be engaged in the pursuit of 
a cause which they hold as an ideal. All political parties talk like 
this in their rhetorical moments. They do so, not because they knew 
it to be untrue and wish to hide the true state of affairs, but because 
they wish it to be true, and because, in many cases, it was once true." 
J.D.B. Miller, The Nature of Politics, Penguin, Victoria, 1962, p.81.
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within the government party.21*
The contrast between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth 
century House of Commons (and indeed between Bagehot's parlia­
ment and any modern chamber) is vividly portrayed in the follow­
ing quotations:
"It follows that much of the work of the House 
of Commons on Bills is to be read in the con­
text of the foregoing' - that formal support or 
formal criticism of a Bill is largely a party 
occasion, directed not to the rejection of a 
Bill but to the education of a wider public in 
the political stances of the vocal parties, or 
groups within parties. Detailed criticism 
related strictly to the purposes of the Bill, 
of a type which is likely to have some mild 
success, is reserved for the committee rooms - 
in the meetings particularly of the private 
backbench subject groups of the major political 
parties and Ministers in charge of Bills, or 
moved openly in the workaday atmosphere of the 
standing committee stage of legislation."25
"The party system, however, bears most respon­
sibility for the way parliament now functions. 
Political parties in Australia have developed 
in such a way that, even if parliamentarians 
were equipped with the necessary information, 
they would be inhibited from applying it in 
such a way as to 'improve1 legislation which 
the government has put before the parliament."25
As Griffith notes, the legislative process is now largely an
executive rather than a parliamentary preserve, and it is more
2 4 "Indeed, the Opposition normally has less pcwer to exert a check on the 
executive, or to modify government policy, than a dissident group on 
the government's back-benches. The government knavs that it could be 
undermined from inside by the dissident group, whereas it cannot be 
defeated by an attack across the floor from the opposite front bench." 
Crossman, op.cit., p.44.
S.A. Walkland, The Legislative Process in Great Britain, Allen & Unwin, 
London, 1968, p.70.
2 6 Solomon, op.cit., p .36.
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realistic to regard parliament as:
"... a body which has certain functions to 
perform in the legislative process and that 
these functions should be determined by its 
nature and by the time which it has at its 
disposal. Other arguments based on a priori 
conceptions of sovereignty or on the idea that 
the executive is encroaching on the domain of 
Parliament by taking to itself legislative 
powers which properly belong to Parliament 
alone are both historically unsound and un­
suited to modern conceptions of the nature 
of government. Moreover, these arguments, by 
insisting that Parliament should do more than 
it can and more than it is suited for, impede 
the necessary adaptation of Parliament to the 
new developments."2 7
These constraints on the performance of houses of 
parliament are especially important when one is considering 
the functions and effectiveness of the upper house in bica­
meral legislatures. For the above-mentioned reasons a house 
of government in a parliamentary system is often described 
as merely a 'rubber stamp'. Upper houses, which can at 
best be seen as an "auxiliary institutional check upon the 
lower house dominated by the cabinet,"28 are even more likely 
to merit the rubber stamp label. Thus Wheare has noted 
that it is unrealistic to expect that any upper house which 
has the power to vote on legislation (irrespective of whether 
this power is confined to mere suggestion of amendments 
or delaying passage for some period) will not become subject 
to partisanship to some degree.
J.A.G. Griffith, "The Place of Parliament in the legislative 
Process", Modem law Review, vol.14, 1951, p.435.
F.A. Kunz, The Modem Senate of Canada, 1925-1963: a Re-appraisal, 
U. of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1965, p.3. ——
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The Senate as a House of Review or a States House
Lack of foresight about the influence of the aims 
and activities of political parties was one of the 
previously isolated flaws in the Founding Fathers' pre­
conceptions about Senate functions and expected activity.
It was argued (in Chapter IV) that the Founding Fathers 
also did not appreciate problems which might arise because 
of their: combination of federalism with cabinet government;
prediction that the States would continue to be the pre­
eminent level of government; and views about inter-House 
deadlocks.
The notions of responsibility and accountability 
of governments are now seen to be frought with difficulties 
in terms of whether they are realisable in practice. As 
R.N. Spann notes29, one must ask: for what are ministers
to be held responsible, given the blurring of any distinction 
between ministers and public servants in policy-formulation; 
how the operation of statutory authorities can be included 
within any notion of executive responsibility to Parliament; 
and what is the responsibility of individual ministers 
where there is interdependence and overlap between departments 
and between the activities of governments.30
In commentary on G.S. Reid's paper, "Political Decentralisation, 
Co-operative Federalism and Responsible Government", in 
R.L. Matthews (ed.), Intergovernmental Relations in Australia, 
Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1974, pp.35-41.
See also: D. Solomon, "Ministerial Responsibility a severely
limited concept" and "A Principle often breached", Canberra 
Tines, 17 and 24 October respectively, p.2; G.S. Reid, "David 
Butler's Ministerial Responsibility", Joint Work in Progress 
Seminar paper, 7 November 1972, A.N.U., pp.14-17; H.V. Em/,
Hie Politics of Australian Democracy, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1975, 
p.337.
415.
Developments during the Twentieth Century have 
meant that the Senate (irrespective of whether its Members 
were or were not willing to act as spokesmen for their 
States) has rarely been afforded an opportunity to perform 
as a States House. State Premiers and Federal Prime 
Ministers have preferred to negotiate, at a government- 
to-government level, on matters concerning the relative 
power of governments.
The Founding Fathers would probably be amazed at 
the lack of use of their formal machinery for resolving 
inter-House deadlocks. Whilst one cannot say that the 
pattern of relations between the House of Representatives 
and the Senate has been trouble-free, the fact that inter- 
House disputes have been largely a product of opposition 
obstruction through manipulation of an Upper House majority 
in part explains the relative disuse of Section 57. The 
other explanation is the reticence of the Senate, until 
the mid 1970s, to so exercise its Constitutional powers 
as to make government impossible (though in certain periods 
the Senate, by rejection and amendment of legislation, 
hindered certain aspects of a government's legislative 
program).
The original expectations about the Senate were that 
it would reflect and promote geographically-differentiated 
interests; and that it would be a Chamber in which 
legislative and executive scrutiny could and would occur.
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For most of the period since federation, the Senate has 
not been used by the States, or the people of the States, 
or by Senators, to reflect and promote State viewpoints. 
The Senate has, at times, acted as a House of Review; 
but generally only within the context of party politics. 
One must agree with the view of the 1956-1959 Joint 
Committee on Constitutional Review: "... inexorable
historical processes of the twentieth century have pre­
cluded the Senate from becoming the practical expression 
of the Founders' intentions."31
In retrospect, the fears of Colonial critics about 
what they saw as the immense powers of the Australian 
Federal Upper House seem all too real given the events 
of 1974-1975; before then, the party system had generally 
operated to temper the Senate's use of its Constitutional 
powers. Conservative small State proponents of a powerful 
Senate, on the other hand, underestimated the effects of 
a stable party system on the Senate's ability to perform 
the States House function.
3 1 Report, p.ll.
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APPENDIX I
A. RESEARCH PROCEDURES
1. Questionnaire and Interview Schedule Design
Early work on this research project was devoted to 
construction and pre-testing of the Questionnaire and 
Interview schedules. These are' reproduced in Appendix III 
and demonstrate that I was seeking to follow, where approp­
riate and within the limits of my resources, the framework 
of the Wahlke et al model. Both Don Aitkin and Michael Kahan 
were very helpful at this stage of the project.
2. Administering the Questionnaire and Interviews
Each Senator was approached by mail in August 1969 and 
informed of the purpose of the research project and of my 
credentials. I had met with the Clerk of the Senate on 
several occasions before despatching these letters, and he 
was extremely helpful in drawing Senators’ attention to the 
project and giving it his approval. I had also approached 
the Liberal and A.L.P. Whips to secure their prior co­
operation; they were very helpful in introducing me to 
Senators from their own party.
Although my initial letter to Senators did not require 
any response on their part I was gratified to receive 
approximately 15 letters from Senators saying that they 
looked forward to participating in the project.
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Approximately two weeks later Questionnaires were 
distributed with another letter stressing that the anonymity 
of respondents would be maintained. Most Questionnaires 
were completed and returned by October 1969.
From the middle of September 1969 I commenced inter­
viewing Senators who had replied quickly. From this point 
until April 1970 I continued interviewing Senators in depth 
and retrieving completed Questionnaires.
3. Response Rate
My population was the membership of the Twenty-sixth 
Senate as at 1 July 1969. My final tally was 41 completed 
Questionnaires and 46 Interviews. In addition there were 
three partially completed Questionnaires. A total of 48 
Senators eventually participated in either or both the 
Questionnaire and the first Interview. Of the remaining 
12 Senators, three died in late 1969 or early 1970, two 
gave strong verbal refusals and the remainder successfully 
avoided responding to my advances.
At this time, party strengths in the Senate were:
A.L.P. 27, L.C.P. 28, D.L.P. 4 and Independent 1. Partici­
pating Senators, by party were: A.L.P. 21, L.C.P. 24,
D.L.P. 2 and the Independent. It can be seen that non-Labor 
Senators were therefore over-represented relative to A.L.P. 
Senators. The reasons for the lower response rate amongst 
Labor Senators included: (i) the party had a relatively
higher proportion of older Senators whose term was about 
to expire; they were generally uninterested and unwilling 
to participate; (ii) several younger Labor members claimed 
they were too busy on party work to spare the time.
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4. Second and Follow-up Interviews
These were conducted only with a small number of Senators 
whom I personally selected based on their previous contribution. 
For the second Interview, a total of 14 Senators was selected 
from different parties in approximate proportion to the 
strength of those parties in the chamber. These Interviews, 
which were conducted in May 1971, focussed particularly on 
the impact of the extensions to the Senate committee system. 
Finally, in May 1973, a further 12 Interviews were conducted, 
basically with those Senators with whom I had built up 
extremely good rapport. I made no attempt to pull out a 
representative group or sample. In addition, at this time,
I interviewed two men who had not been Senators in 1969/1970 
but who were already playing an important role on Senate
committees.
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B. AUSTRALIAN SURVEY PROJECT WAVE II 1969 
QUESTIONS 68-71
Question 68 The recent election campaign was, of course, 
about the House of Representatives. We're 
also interested in people's feelings about 
the Senate. Do you happen to remember how 
you voted in the Senate election of November 
1967, two years ago? (What was that?)
Liberal (Government) ............  1
Labor ...........................  2
Country Party ...................  3
D.L.P............................  4
Other ____________________________  5
Independent .....................  6
Didn't vote .....................  7
D.K..............................  8
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Question 69(a) Do you happen to know the names of any 
Senators? (Who are they?)
Names ASK FOR EACH
And which party does 
he/she belong to?
1
2
3
4
5
R knows more than 5 6
R knows none. Skip to Q.70 8
IF R KNOWS ANY SENATORS' NAMES
69(b) Are any of them (Is he/she) from your state? (Which ones?)
69(c) Have you ever seen them/him/her in person or on 
television?
Yes, in person ....................... 1
Yes, on T.V...........................  2
No, have not seen ....................  3
D.K...................................  8
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Question 70 Suppose you had to explain to a friend who knew 
nothing at all about Australia and Australian 
politics what the Senate did and how it was 
different from the House of Representatives, 
what would you say?
Question 71(a) Some people say that the Senate ought to be abol­
ished, while others say that it ought to be retained. 
What do you yourself feel about this? Would you 
like to have the Senate abolished or would you 
rather have it retained?
Skip to Q.72(a)
Abolish
Retain
71(b) Why do you think so?
L
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C. QUESTIONNAIRE Page 1
Attached to the back of the questionnaire are pages left 
free for any additional comments. I have also provided a wide 
margin and some space under each question for you to record your 
c omments.
Please tick in the appropriate box where relevant.
1(a) How much attention do you think outside groups 
(e.g. press, trade unions, public service, 
academics) pay to the Senate?
a great deal of attention
some attention
not much attention
1 (b) Is there enough public attention drawn to the 
Senate?
□
□
□
□  yes
□  no
2(a) As you are elected by a state-wide constituency, 
you perhaps have a less direct relationship with 
your electorate than an M.H.R. Do you get much 
correspondence from people in your state?
□
□
□□
a great deal of correspondence 
some correspondence 
very little correspondence 
no correspondence at all
[
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Page 2
2(b) Do you feel it is part of your job to cater to 
constituency queries?
3(a) Vhat influenced you to first run for election?
□
□
□
□
□
other and/or comments
other members of parliament
party officials
family
friends
interest in politics
3(b) Would you ever think of transferring to the 
House of Representatives?
□
□
yes
no
3(c) What about State Parliament? Would you ever leave 
the Senate to run for State Parliament?
□ yes
□ no
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Page 3
4(a) Do you feel you have enough time to study bills 
before they are discussed in the Senate?
4(b) How much influence do you think debate in the 
Senate has on the final vote?
□
□
□
□
a good deal of influence 
some influence 
not much influence
no influence 
it depends ________
4(c) Some writers think that Senators should be 
generalists, while others feel they should 
endeavour to gain an expertise in a few fields 
of legislation. What do you think about this?
5(a) Which of the following fields interests you most? 
I international affairs 
national affairs 
I I state affairs
L5(b)
6(a)
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Page 4
Which of the following domestic questions are 
interested in? (tick as many as desired)
□ conservation
□ primary industry
□ secondary industry
□ national development
□ transport and communications
□ social welfare
□ labour and trade union matters
□ education
□ housing
□ health
you
other
Are you able to devote much time to reading on 
issues and legislation?
□
□
yes
no
6(b) Would you like to spend more time on such research?
□□
□□
□□
□□
□□
□□
□□
□I
428 .
Page 5
7(a) Which of the following would be your most common 
sources of information on legislation? (tick as 
as applicable)
fellow Senators
M.H.R.s
debates in the Senate and House of 
Representatives
personal assistants 
wife and family 
c onstituents 
Parliamentary Library 
National Library 
news media 
academics 
public service 
interested pressure groups 
periodicals
political party research officers
travel and personal investigation 
7(b) Which source would you use first?
7(c) Which of these would you only rarely, or possibly 
never, consult?
L
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Page 6
8(a) Do you feel that you have adequate accommodation 
and secretarial assistance?
yes
no '
8(b) If dissatisfied with current conditions, could you 
suggest any improvements?
□
□
9(a) Do you feel that there are fundamental differences 
between the Liberal and Labour parties?
yes
□ no
9(b) What do you think is the major difference between 
these parties at the present time?
10(a) Do you ever think of yourself as being to the left 
or right of your party?
□  "«•
yes
(If yes, (b) Where would you put yourself?
□ left
| | right
□ c entre)
L10(c)
10(d)
11(a)
11(b)
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Where do you think other Senators would put you?
□ left
□ right
□ c entre
Do you feel these labels 
significance?
left and right have any
□ yes - significant for all parties
□ yes - significant for the Labour Party
□ little significance
□ no significance for any party
Under what circumstances (apart from free votes) 
need a Senator not vote with his party?
Have you ever found yourself in disagreement 
with the party whips?
□ no
□ yes
(If yes, (c)
(d)
Was this on a major or minor issue?
major issue
minor issue 
Were any sanctions applied against you?
yes 
no
□
□
□
□
L11(e)
12(a)
12(b)
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Do you feel that any of the parties currently 
represented in the Senate exert too much 
discipline over their members?
□ yes - all parties
□ yes - only Liberal Party
□ yes - only Labour Party
□ yes - only Country Party
□ yes - only Democratic Labour Party
□ no - for all parties
The use of Proportional Representation has enabled 
small parties to gain representation in the Senate. 
Do you think this is a good thing?
□ yes
□
Do you feel that Proportional Representation has 
proved to be a satisfactory method of election 
for Senators?
□  yes
□  no
I4 32 .
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13(a) There are several views on the length of the
Senate term and its coincidence with the term for 
the House of Representatives. Which of the 
following alternatives do you prefer?
□ 6 year
□ 3 year
□ Senate
□ Senate
term as at present
term
term to correspond with 2 H. of R.
terms
term to correspond with J_ H. of R.
term
other alternatives
13(b) Why do you prefer this alternative?
14(a) Do you feel that sufficient Ministers are 
recruited from the Senate?
□ yes 
□ no
14(b) Do you think all Senators should aspire to a 
Ministerial career?
□  yes
□ no
L
4 3 3 .
Page 10
15(a) It is said that the individual Member has more 
chance to speak in debate and even to introduce 
legislation in the Senate than in the House of 
Representatives. Would you agree?
yes-- more chance to speak and to introduce
legislation
yes - more chance to speak only
yes - more chance to introduce legislation
only
no - no difference between the Senate and
the H. of R.
□
□
□
□
15(b) How does the standard of debate in the Senate
compare with that in the House of Representatives?
generally higher standard in Senate
generally higher standard in H. of R.
standard much the same in each House
16 In his book on the Senate, the Clerk stresses that
the Senate should always remember that the House 
of Representatives is the superior House; and that 
the Senate should accede in cases where the 
government has a mandate. Do you agree with this?
□
□
agree
disagree
L
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Page 11
17(a) Do you see much value in the establishment of 
parliamentary committees?
no - do not favour committees SKIP TO NEXT PAGE 
yes — very valuable 
yes - some value
yes - but only for restricted areas of
enquiry
17(b) Would you like to see more Senate Committees? 
yes 
no
□
□
□
□
□
□
17(c) Would you like to see more joint committees of the 
House and the Senate?
17(d) Would you like to see wider responsibility and/or 
more power for Senate committees?
□  “
yes
(if yes, (e) What changes would you favour?
[18(a)
18(b)
19(a)
4 3 5.
Page 12
It seems that the Senate finds little or nothing 
to do at the beginning of a session, but is 
swamped with bills sent up from the House of 
Representatives in the last few sitting days. 
Vhat do you think should be done about this?
Would you favour increased initiation of legislation 
in the Senate?
□ yes
□  “
Would you like to see changes in either of the 
following areas?
(i) length of sessions
□
□
□
longer sessions 
shorter sessions
retain current length of sessions
(ii) number of members of the Senate 
increase in number 
decrease in number
retain the present number of Senators
i i
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u
19(b) Do you feel that the A.C.T. and the Northern
Territory should be represented in the Senate?
both territories should be represented
representation for A.C.T. alone
representation for N.T. alone
neither territory should be represented
□
□
□
□
20 It has been suggested that the Senate be allowed
only to delay the passage of legislation (for, 
say, 6 months) and not to reject legislation. 
Vhat do you think of this proposal?
□
□
□
agree - Senate should only be allowed to 
delay passage
disagree - Senate should retain its current 
powers
disagree - there should be some changes in Senate powers, but not as 
drastic as this
Thank you very much for your assistance.
Jennifer Hutchison
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D. FIRST INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
1. A. How were you first attracted to politics?
(Any other members of the family active in politics?)
B. Why did you choose the Senate?
2. What are the most important things you feel you should be 
doing as a Senator?
(Why are these the most important?)
3. Do you feel there is a difference between your conception 
of the tasks of a Senator, and the view of the general 
public?
(What differences?
Why do you think people see your job in this way?)
4. Did you have a clear-cut conception of what you would and 
should do as a Senator, before you were elected?
(What was that?
Has experience in the Senate changed that conception?)
5. Can you see any differences between your role as a Senator 
and that of an M.H.R.?
(What differences?
Are these important?
Do you feel the general public recognise these 
differences?)
6. Critics decry the six-year tern of Senators, arguing that 
half the House represents an out-dated mandate. What is 
your attitude to this?
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7. A. Do you think that a Government has the right to
threaten a hostile Senate with dissolution?
(Examples?)
B. Alternatively, do you think it is right for an
Opposition to force a dissolution through Senate 
rejection of legislation? (Circumstances?)
8. One of the traditional functions of an upper house is 
as a house of review. What should the Senate do as a 
house of review? (How well does it fulfil this role?
Could it do better? Is this role important?)
9. One major role envisaged for the Senate was as a pro­
tector of state interests. Do you think this is an 
important rule for the Senate? (Why?) How does the 
Senate act in this fashion? (But there's little public 
reporting of this?)
10. A. Have you ever voted against your party to protect
the interests of your own state? (Do such occasions 
arise frequently? Examples?
B. Can you recall any instances of state bloc voting?
C. How necessary is it to preserve equal state represent­
ation in the Senate?
11. In general, do you think it is a good thing for a small 
party (such as the DLP at present) to hold the balance of 
power in the Senate? (What about the present situation?)
12. Would you favour any changes in the powers of the Senate? 
(What changes? What would be the effects or consequences 
of these changes?)
13. What would you miss most if you retired from the Senate, 
or were not re-elected?
E. FOLLOW UP INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
1. What kind of an experience has being in the Senate been 
for you so far?
2. What are some of the things which have been enjoyable 
(unpleasant)?
3. You have mentioned enjoyable (unpleasant) things. What 
about some of the negative (positive) aspects?
4. How do you think you have done so far as a Senator? 
(successes? problems? things that might have helped/ 
hindered you?)
5. How would you go about classifying Senators?
6. How would you rate Senate morale ... two years ago? 
last session? this session? (reasons for changes?)
7. What would you say builds up Senate morale?
8. What has been your reaction to the new committees?
9. Have your ideas about committees changed at all now you 
have been a committee member (chairman)?
10. How would you say the members of the committees get on 
with each other?
11. Your views on the Senate - have they changed at all 
because of your committee experiences?
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12. (Where relevant). What differences can you see in 
your role as a Senator, now you're in the (shadow) 
Ministry?
13. Would you ever now think of transferring to the House 
of Representatives?
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APPENDIX II
CONCLUSIONS ON ROLE CONCEPTION ANALYSIS
Heinz Eulau argues that MPs' perceptions and 
conceptions of their role are worthy of study because:
"...what men say about themselves and others 
represents an infinitely rich source of 
information about behavior. And the meanings 
that people give to politics are appropriate 
data for scientific analysis because people 
behave in terms of these meanings. ... The 
meanings that political actors, consciously 
or unconsciously, attribute to their own 
behavior are of interest to the political 
scientist because they provide a partial 
explanation of the motives for that behavior."1
The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative
Behavior is an attempt to provide an understanding of the 
'why' of legislators' behaviour in eight American State 
legislatures. The authors describe their research as 
"exploratory, not definitive;"2 hypotheses are produced 
a posteriori rather than a priori3 and only subsequent 
research can determine whether or not these hypotheses 
have general validity. One of the aims of my research 
project was to test out both the methodology and the 
results of the Wahlke et al approach. Thus, as has been 
previously noted, many of the questions in the Questionnaire 
and Interview Schedules for the present study were closely 
modelled on those devised by Wahlke et al.
The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, Rändern House, New York, 1963, p.6.
J.C. Wahlke et al, The legislative System: Explorations in legislative 
Behavior, John Wiley & Sens, New York, 1962, p.3.
3 Ibid, p.38.
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Purposive Role Orientations
My conclusions were that:
i) the ritualist orientation is overwhelmingly 
predominant amongst Australian Senators; 
ii) the tribune, inventor and broker orientations 
are far less common amongst Australian than 
amongst American State Legislators.
The variations in distribution of these purposive 
role orientations (both between legislators from different 
American States and between these legislators and Australian 
Senators) may be more apparent than real. In seeking to 
apply the classification of Wahlke et al several problems 
appeared. For example, the Wahlke et al categories are 
imprecisely defined and on close reflection appear to be 
very woolly. The American researchers themselves admit 
that there is a problem of "overlapping codes and bi­
dimensionality within a code;"4 yet they do not provide 
any details of the process by which they overcame resultant 
coding problems.
A second problem inherent in the Wahlke et al schema 
of purposive role orientations concerns the labels selected 
for these orientations. The word 'ritualist' in particular 
has a pre-existing image in the mind of the researcher or 
reader which may not necessarily jell with the category as 
formulated in The Legislative System.
4 Ibid, pp.454-455.
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Thirdly, in examining Senators' responses I frequently 
found it difficult to determine how many orientations 
could be isolated from a specific response or set of 
responses; and whether one could weight these in order 
of relative importance for the particular Senator. The 
necessity of relying on intuition in these circumstances 
casts doubt on the applicability of the Wahlke et al schema, 
especially for purposes of comparative analysis.
iii) Wahlke et al did not utilise the category of
opportunist, but it seems especially applicable 
to minor party and Independent members of the 
Australian Senate. Both D.L.P. Senators and 
the Independent Senator specifically championed 
their right to use their Senate membership for 
purposes unrelated to Senate functions or even 
to general legislative goals.
It is surely eminently predictable that Senators 
purposive role orientations should relate to those 
activities in which they feel a greater sense of efficacy; 
the ritualist orientation recognises individual initiative 
within a reasonably coherent set of 'rules of the game'.
The tribune, inventor and broker orientations are indeed 
more difficult to act upon; the Senator may lack the 
necessary information or contacts.
Moreover, at the time when I conducted the first 
round of interviews, Senators were considering the various 
proposals for extension of the committee work of the Senate.
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These proposals had led them to review the nature and 
shortcomings of existing Senate procedures; and this 
is undoubtedly to some degree an explanation for Senators' 
frequent expression of orientations of the ritualist type.
Representational and Party Role Orientations
The attempt to isolate the Wahlke et al categories 
of representational and party role orientations was 
frustrating and largely fruitless.
The delegate and trustee orientations form the 
traditional dichotomy of representational roles based 
on Edmund Burke's distinction between the free agent and 
the member bound by instructions.5 However, a particular 
legislator may recognise the existence of alternative 
orientations and will then select which of these is 
appropriate for any specific circumstance; such behaviour 
is characteristic of Wahlke et al's politico.
The idea of an Australian Senator blindly taking 
instructions from constituents is farcical, given the 
variety of interests present within a State and the scope 
for conflict between different sectional demands.
A conscientious Senator is forced to adopt the 
trustee (and broker) orientation. He must personally 
sift between and weigh up this immense variety of 
pressures and demands.
See "Speech to the Electors of Bristol at the Conclusion of the Poll", 
in Collected Works, Vol.l, George Bell, London, 1876, p.446 ff; and 
"Thoughts on the Present Discontents" in Select Works, ed. E.J. Payne, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1936, p.86 ff. See also J.M. Ritchie, "The 
Modem Member of Parliament - Representative or Delegate?" unpublished 
Government III Thesis, University of Sydney, 1964, pp.42-46.
445 .
The ’party man' orientation is the norm for 
Australian Senators.
Given that neither the delegate nor trustee category 
as defined by Wahlke et al is applicable to the orientations 
or behaviour of Australian Senators, there is little point 
in seeking out politico orientations. Moreover, I feel 
there are grounds for some doubts about the applicability 
of these three categories even to American Legislators, or 
to any legislators who operate within a system less con­
strained by party discipline than the Australian system.
Norman Meller has described the politico orientation as 
"nothing more than a description of what a legislator does 
when he fails to follow a recognised norm".6 More correctly, 
it can be seen as a merging of two polar role orientations 
into a single orientation.7 I would agree with Sorauf8 
that all effective9 legislators are and must be politicos, 
in that the expectations to which a legislator is exposed 
are unavoidably ill-defined, conflicting and often latent 
rather than overt.
Conclusions
There is a high degree of consensus amongst 
Australian Senators in terms of legislative role conceptions.
"Representational Role Types: A Research Note, A.P.S.R., Vol.61,
1967, p.476. ------
See R.H. Turner, "Role-Taking: Process versus Conformity" in A.M. Rose 
(ed.), Human Behavior and Social Processes, Rout ledge and Kegan Paul, 
London, 1962.
F.J. Sorauf, Party and Representation, Atherton Press, New York, 1963,p.l
In the minimi sense of their being able to retain electoral and party 
support and hence their seat.
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The policy objectives and expectations of their political 
party were recognised as the major constraint on their 
legislative behaviour. It was generally felt that external 
expectations about the nature and purposes of Senate 
activity were often unrealistic. For example, Senators 
do not normally aspire to be law makers, though they feel 
they can influence the final form of legislation through 
participation in party meetings, and, to a lesser degree, 
in the Senate Chamber. That Senators could reflect and 
promote geographically differentiated interests was also 
felt to be an unrealistic expectation.
In relation to the various 'others' with whom they 
come in contact - for example, their colleagues, their 
party leaders, their fellow party members outside the 
parliament, and their constituents - the dominant norm 
for Senators is that of partisanship. Senators are expected 
(by themselves and by these others) to be 'party men'.
Their chief loyalty is to their party (not to their State 
or to the chamber itself); and any occasions of role 
conflict - for example, where their own convictions differ 
from the majority view of their party - will generally be 
resolved in favour of following party rather than personal 
judgment. They may participate in party discussions about 
policy alternatives (in caucus and in extra-parliamentary 
forums); but once goals have been defined they are committed 
to their achievement. In their behaviour within the 
parliament there is little leeway in terms of what they,
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as individuals, can do. The party not only provides the 
objectives to be pursued but also (through party discipline) 
prescribes the methods by which these goals will be achieved.
Since Senators generally accede both to party policy 
and to party discipline, partisanship is both the core of 
their role conceptions and the explanation for the striking 
uniformities in their observed behaviour.
One could expect to find different results when 
applying the American categories to an Australian setting 
because of structural and environmental differences between 
the American State Legislatures and the Australian Senate. 
The most important of these differences are:
i) the method of election and average tenure of the 
legislators;
ii) the nature and practices of political parties;
iii) the formal structure of legislative and executive 
institutions and their relationships.
That there are such significant differences between 
the American and Australian political systems demonstrates 
the difficulties to be overcome in formulating any general 
methodology which would be applicable for comparative 
analysis. Wahlke et al certainly have not provided a 
generally-applicable methodology. The fact that their 
categories were constructed a posteriori in itself limits
the possibility of their utility for comparative purposes.
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In addition, there are problems of fuzziness and 
overlap between categories, and the necessity for reliance 
on intuition when making classificatory judgments. Wahlke 
et al themselves admit that: "Coding this sort of material
is not a mere mechanical process, but requires both 
political insight and analytical judgment."10
10 C£>.cit., p.455.
449 .
APPENDIX I I I
SENATE ACTIVITY BY PARLIAMENT, 1901-1972
This Appendix presents a summary of the Senate's 
a c tiv ity  in scru tin izing  government leg is la tio n  in each 
of the Twenty-seven Parliaments. I t  provides further 
d e ta il to back up the s ta t is t ic s  on Senate amendment 
and re jection  of leg is la tion  presented in Chapter VI.
I t  also refers to the a c tiv itie s  of p o litic a l parties  
in the Senate, and to Senate - House rela tionsh ips.
The F irs t Parliament: 1901-1903
During th is  Parliament the Labor Party held the 
balance of power in both chambers. However, the f lu id ity  
of party groups and sh ifting  alliances meant that 
disputes occurred between parties within each house,3 
and i t  is  d if f ic u lt  to iso la te  cases of Senate - 
House disagreement. The Senate contributed several 
technical amendments which were accepted by the House
3 For example, on the Immigration Restriction and Pacific Island 
Labourers Acts, and the abandoned Conciliation and Arbitration 
Bill.
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are discovered and removed. Yet one would hope that ministers, 
public servants and parliamentary draftsmen are sufficiently 
adept as to avoid the perpetration of too many legislative 
errors; and thus one would expect that in the majority of cases 
a reviewing house would, after due consideration of proposals, 
find that amendment or rejection was unnecessary. Nonetheless, 
one must begin with observable ^evidence; and hence most studies 
of legislative activity use these approaches in spite of their 
shortcomings.
Senate Activity: The Formal Record, 1901-1971
The following section of this Chapter presents a summary 
of the Senate's activity in scrutinizing government legislation. 
I begin with a brief summary of scrutiny in each of the Twenty- 
seven Parliaments. Trends in Senate activity are then analyzed, 
particularly in relation to the relative degree of scrutiny ob­
served in periods when the Senate was or was not controlled by 
the Government party or parties.
The First Parliament; 1901-1903
During this Parliament the Labor Party held the balance of 
power in both chambers. However, the fluidity of party groups 
and shifting alliances meant that disputes occurred between 
parties within each house,3 and it is difficult to isolate 
cases of Senate-House disagreement. The Senate contributed 
several technical amendments which were accepted by the House
3 For example, on the Immigration Restriction and Pacific Island Labour­
ers Acts, and the abandoned Conciliation and Arbitration Bill.
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with little debate4; on other bills both Houses contributed 
amendments acceptable to the other.5 One bill which foundered 
because of irreconcilable Senate-House views was the Seat of 
Government Bill.6
The Senate from the beginning asserted its power in rela­
tion to financial legislation by insisting that the second 
Supply Bill specified that Supply was a joint grant of both 
houses7; and by forwarding a host of amendments and requests 
for amendment, many of which were accepted by the House after 
the Senate insisted on its right to press requests.8 
The Second Parliament: 1903-1906
Several issues inspired Senate-House disagreement during 
this Parliament, in which there were three changes of govern­
ment. Deakin's Conciliation and Arbitration Act was before the 
Parliament for nine months in 1904 with the House refusing to 
accept a Senate amendment. However, Senate amendments or re­
quests were accepted on a large number of bills9 (though on 
occasions only after Senate insistence10). One of the more 
interesting Senate amendments was that proposed by Senator
For example, on the Acts Interpretation, the Electoral and the Parlia­
mentary Allowances Acts.
For example, on the Post and Telegraph Rates and the Public Service 
Acts.
The House favoured Turnut, and the Senate Bcmbala, as the site.
The Consolidated Revenue (Supply) Act 1901-2 (No.2).
For example, on the Sugar Bounty Act 1903 and the Customs Tariff Act 
1901-2.
For example, on the Appropriation (Works and Buildings) 1905-1906, and 
the Commerce, Evidence and Life Assurance Companies Acts.
For example, on the Census and Statistics and the Excise Tariff (Spirits) 
Acts.
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Findley to the Excise Tariff (Spirits) Act 1906 which was the 
first motion passed in the federal parliament embodying the 
'new protection' policy11. Four of Deakin's bills were rejected 
in the Senate12. However, during this Parliament many bills 
initially foundered because of the recurrent political crises 
but were later enacted13, and the general nature of Senate 
reactions to government legislation was critical scrutiny rather 
than hostility.
The Third Parliament: 1906-1910
There were three ministries during this Parliament, but 
most legislation was enacted by the second and third Deakin 
Ministries. Major disputes concerned tariff measures; the 
Customs Tariff Act 1908, for example, was twice returned to the 
House with requests by the Senate14. The Senate successfully 
insisted on amendments to some bills15 but was unsuccessful on 
other occasions16. Again, although the Senate continued to 
amend or to request amendments to legislation, the government's 
legislative programs were not unduly affected and no bills were 
rejected outright by the Senate.
See G. Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law, vol. 1, 1901-1929, 
M.U.P., Melbourne 1956, p.47.
The Manufactures Encouragement (no.3), the Kalgoorlie to Port Augusta 
Railway Survey, the Public Service (Telegraph Messengers) and the 
Customs Tariff (British Preference) Amendment Bills.
For example, the Trade Marks Act.
On the first occasion the Senate made requests on 238 items, of which 
about 150 were ultimately accepted. Sawer, op.cit., p.70.
For example, on the Bounties, the Quarantine and the Invalid and Old- 
age Persons Acts.
For example, on the Commonwealth Public Service, the High Commissioner 
and the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Acts; nor did the 
Hause accept Senate requests on the Appropriation Act 1908-9.
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The Fourth Parliament: 1910-1913
The 1910 elections returned Labor as the first political 
party to win a clear majority of seats over all other parties 
in both houses; in addition, the Fisher Ministry held power 
throughout the Parliament. Thus there was an atmosphere of 
political stability in spite of the Fusion Opposition's dis­
like of many of Labor's 'socialist' policies17, and only two 
government bills were rejected by the Senate18. Senate amend­
ments were accepted on a large number of bills19; on some leg­
islation the Senate did not press its amendments20. In relation 
to financial legislation, most of the Senate's requests were 
accepted by the House21. By this time the Senate had so estab­
lished its right to pass amendments that, as Sawer notes, "rec­
ommendations were persisted with in a manner which made the dis­
tinction between 'making' and 'recommending' almost nil."22 
The Fifth Parliament: 1913-1914
This Parliament was preoccupied with political uncertainty 
due to the fact that in the House the Government and Opposition 
had equal voting strengths after the Government had provided the
1 7 For example, the establishment of the Cammonwealth Bank and the impo­
sition of Land Tax.
1 8 The Post and Telegraph and the Post and Telegraph (Recording Machines) 
Bills.
1 9 For example, on the Emigration, the Postal Rates, the Referendum (Con­
stitution Alteration) and the Seamen's Compensation Acts.
For example, the Appropriation (Works and Buildings), the Cammonwealth 
Conciliation and Arbitration and the Cammonwealth Workmen' s Compen­
sation Acts.
2 1 On the Surplus Revenue Act of 1910, and on the Customs Tariff Acts
of 1910 and 1911.
2 2 Op.cit., p.31.
Speaker and Chairman of Committees; and the Cook Government 
was faced with a hostile Senate. Thus the possibility of a 
double dissolution existed throughout the twelve months' 
duration of the Parliament, and only 27 Acts were passed.
Several bills lapsed or were laid aside in the general confusion, 
and some Senate amendments were not pressed.24
From October 1913 Cook concentrated on finding the grounds 
for a double dissolution. This first attempt - the Postal 
Voting Restoration Bill - was gagged through the House and 
then amended in the Senate by the Labor majority; the House 
again passed the Bill in its original form and the Senate 
again insisted on its amendments. The Bill was then put aside.
Cook gained his dissolution after the Government Preference 
Prohibition Bill was twice defeated in the Senate. There has 
been continuous debate as to whether this Bill was a vital 
Government measure and hence a legitimate ground for the 
granting of a double dissolution. Odgers comments:
"The Senate took a most serious view of the 
Government's action because, in the Govern­
ment's interpretation and use of section 57, 
the Senate feared a diminution of its con­
stitutional powers. The dissolution of the 
Senate, it claimed, ought not to follow 
upon the mere legitimate exercise of its 
functions under the Constitution, but only 
upon such action as makes responsible govern­
ment impossible, e.g., the rejection of a 
measure embodying a principle of vital 
importance necessary in the public interest,
2 3
24
For example, the Audit and the Committee of Public Accounts Bills.
For example, on the Commonwealth Public Works and the Norfolk Island 
Acts.
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creating an actual legislative deadlock and 
preventing legislation upon which the Minis­
try was returned to power."25
The Senate protested to the extent of presenting an Address 
to the Governor-General (Sir Ronald Munro-Ferguson) requesting 
publication of the relevant correspondence between His Excel­
lency and the Cabinet.26 The basis of the Senate’s objection 
was the view that the grounds for a double dissolution had been 
manufactured for purely partisan purposes.27 We shall see that 
similar objections arose in 1951 when the then Prime Minister,
R. G. Menzies, sought and was granted a double dissolution.
The Fifth Parliament was the first in which a Government 
was faced with an overtly hostile Senate; in this situation 
Senate rejection of Government legislation was seen not as con­
structive scrutiny but as partisan intransigence.
The Sixth Parliament: 1914-1917
Although Cook gained his double dissolution, the 1914 
elections were convincingly won by the Labor Party.28 This 
outcome undoubtedly made later Governments cautious about 
wielding (but not about threatening to use)the double dissolu­
tion procedure against a hostile Senate.
Australian Senate Practice, 4th ed., Commonwealth Government Printer, 
Canberra, 1972, p.23.
26 See Journals, 1914, pp. 86-88; a portion of the Mdress is quoted by 
Odgers, op.cit., pp.24-25. The documents were not released until 
after the elections.
27 For further discussion of the double dissolution see: Sawer, op.cit.,
pp.121-125; Odgers, op.cit., pp.22-26; and H. V. Evatt, The King and 
His Dominion Governors, 2nd. ed., Cheshire, Melbourne, 1967.
2 8 As a result of the elections Labor held 31 of the 36 Senate seats.
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For most of the Sixth Parliament W. M. Hughes was Prime 
Minister, heading a Labor and later a Nationalist (non-Labor) 
Ministry (after a schism within the Labor Party in November 
1916). Most legislation, however, was enacted by Labor Govern­
ments. Senate amendments to both financial and non-financial 
legislation were generally accepted by the House29 and no leg­
islation was rejected outright ,by the Senate. In relation to 
Senate requests for amendment of money bills, the Senate was 
successful.3 0
A Labor versus non-Labor viewpoint was evident on the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act (no.2) 1914, the Compulsory 
Voting Act 1915 and the Commonwealth Bank Act 1914; on the lat­
ter bill the Opposition walked out of the House during a vitu­
perative debate but proceedings continued regardless.
Throughout this Parliament major interest centred not on 
Senate-House relationships but on internal dissention in the 
Labor Party on the issues of conscription and national defence. 
The Seventh Parliament: 1917-1919
Hughes' Nationalist Government continued in office during 
the Parliament and was preoccupied with war-time and post-war 
legislation. The Senate did not reject any government legis­
lation and there was a fair degree of compromise between the 
Houses31. Senate requests for amendment to three financial
For example, on the Ccmmonwealth Electoral (War-time), the Crimes, 
the Entertainments Tax Assessment, the Income Tax Assessment and the 
Land Tax Assessment Acts. However, the Senate conceded on the Common­
wealth Public Service Act.
30 On the Land Tax Act and the Supply Act (no.3) 1916-1917.
31 For example, on the Australian Soldiers' Repatriation Acts of 1917 
and 1918, the Ccmmonwealth Railways Act, the Defence Acts of 1917 and 
1918, and the Income Tax Assessment Act 1918.
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measures were agreed to by the House32. The contrast between 
this period and earlier Parliaments reflects to a large degree 
the fact that the Nationalists had comfortable majorities in 
both Houses.
The Eighth Parliament: 1919-1922
After the 1919 elections the Nationalists depended on the 
newly-emergent Country Party for support in the House, but held 
all but one Senate seat. The Hughes' Cabinet continued to be 
involved with post-war legislation. Given the state of the 
parties in the Senate, any upper house amendments were either 
of a technical nature,33 or reflected divergent views amongst 
the ruling Nationalists.34 Several Senate-House differences 
were settled by compromise.35 The Senate requested amendments 
to six money bills; on four of these the requests were accepted 
by the House36 and on the remaining two the Senate achieved 
partial success.37 
The Ninth Parliament: 1922-1925
The 1922 elections returned the Bruce-Page Coalition 
Government with majorities in both Houses. As in the previous 
Parliament, Senate deliberations indicated only occasional
The Entertainments Tax Act 1918 and the Income Tax Acts of 1917 and 
1918.
33 For example, on the Imnigration and the War Gratuity Acts of 1920.
34 For example, the Senate's rejection of the Northern Territory Repre­
sentation and the Incane Tax Bills in 1920-21.
35 For example, on the Aliens Registration, the Australian Soldiers' 
Repatriation and the Navigation Acts.
3 6 The War Gratuity (no.2), the Excise Tariff, the Meat Export Bounties 
and the Superannuation Acts.
37 The Customs Tariff Act 1921 and the Appropriation Act 1921-1922.
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criticism of the Government's legislation. One bill was 
rejected;38 and a single request for amendment of a money- 
bill was proffered (successfully) by the Senate.39 Most 
Senate amendments were technical adjustments proposed by 
Government Ministers and hence readily accepted.40 
The Tenth Parliament: 1925-1928
The non-Labor coalition parties led by Bruce continued 
to hold extremely comfortable majorities in both houses. The 
major concern of the Parliament was the renegotiation of the 
pattern of federal-state financial relationships and the estab­
lishment of the Loan Council; this legislation and a host of 
bills granting money to particular States passed through the 
Senate without amendment.41 The Senate secured unwilling House 
acceptance of amendments to some bills42 and some requested 
amendments were made.43 The Senate did not reject any govern­
ment legislation. Overall, relationships between the Houses 
were peaceful, with internal party squabblings taking the 
limelight.
38 The Lessee Tax Bill 1924.
39 On the Wine Export Bounty Act 1924.
40 For example, on the Ccmmonwealth Shipping, the Main Roads Development 
and the Superannuation Acts.
41 Even though, for example, the Federal Aid Roads Act was objected to by 
the States. Sawer, op.cit., p .273.
42 For example, the Commonwealth Housing, the Commonwealth Bank (Savings 
Bank) and the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration 1928 Acts.
43 To the Customs Tariff Acts of 1926 and 1927 and to the Judiciary Act 
1926.
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The Eleventh Parliament: 1928-1929
Bruce continued as Prime Minister for a further ten 
months, with an overwhelming majority in the Senate. Only two 
bills were amended in the Senate (both lapsed44), no bills 
were rejected and no requests for the amendment of money bills 
were proffered. The major concern of this (and the previous) 
Parliament was industrial policy; the opposing Labor and non- 
Labor forces clashed repeatedly in the House. However, it was 
dissention within the Nationalist Party which led Bruce to call 
an early election.
The Twelfth Parliament: 1929-1931
The 1929 election gave the Labor Party a massive majority 
in the House; but with no simultaneous Senate election the 
Scullin Government was faced with a very hostile Senate - it 
held only 7 of the 36 seats. In contrast to its previous qui­
escence, the Senate acted with a vengeance and rejected 14 gov­
ernment bills.45 On the Commonwealth Bank Bill the Chairman of 
the Bank was called before the bar of the Senate to give evi­
dence; the Bill was then rejected. The Central Reserve Bank
The Audit (Public Service) and the Commonwealth Employees' Compensation 
Bills.
Bills rejected in 1930 were: The Central Reserve Bank, the Hop Market­
ing, the Iron and Steel Products Bounty, the Sewing Machine Bounty, the 
Wheat Marketing, the Constitution Alteration (Industrial Powers) , the 
Constitution Alteration (Power of Amendment) and the Constitution 
Alteration (Trade and Commerce) Bills. In 1931 the Senate rejected: 
the Commonwealth Bank, the Conciliation and Arbitration, the Fiduciary 
Notes, the Wheat Marketing, the Bank Interest and the Income Tax Asssess- 
ment Bills.
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Bill was originally deferred by reference to a Select Committee. 
The Government was forced to accept amendments to a host of 
other bills to ensure their enactment.46 On the Conciliation 
and Arbitration Bill 1930 the Senate made 30 amendments; a mid­
night conference produced a compromise in which 19 amendments 
were accepted and a further 7 were accepted with modifications.
On 6 financial bills the Senate requested amendments, and in 
only one case were these not accepted by the House.47
Thus the Scullin Government's legislative program was 
severely curtailed by Senate hostility. Why, then did not 
Scullin seek a double dissolution? From the beginning of 1930 
the Labor Party began to factionalise around three possible 
approaches to solving the economic depression. Increasing 
dissention amongst the Ministry and the backbench meant that 
Scullin would be unlikely to win a majority in the House of 
Representatives, even if Labor representation in the Senate 
could be increased. From early 1931 the Labor Party was in 
greater internal disarray than the Nationalists in 1928. Scullin 
wished to defer an election for as long as possible, and was 
therefore in no position to threaten the non-Labor Senate 
majority. His fear of electoral defeat was realistic, as the 
1931 elections gave the new non-Labor group, the United 
Australia Party, a landslide victory.
46 For example, to the Bankruptcy Acts of 1929 and 1930, the Cotton
Industries Bounty Act, the Financial Emergency Acts and the Land
Tax Assessment Acts.
The Appropriation Act 1930-31; the Senate did not press its request.
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The Thirteenth Parliament: 1931-1934
With a U.A.P. majority in both Houses, the Senate exhibited 
an attitude of complacency similar to that of the pre-Scullin 
period. No legislation was rejected. Several bills lapsed or 
were dropped, but only one because of Senate reaction.48 Sev­
eral Senate amendments were accepted by the House.49 The only 
money bill which caused dissention between the houses was the 
Customs Tariff Bill 1933; of the 1800 items in the Bill, the 
Senate requested 47 amendments. The House initially accepted 33 
of these requests; in response to the Senate's pressing its re­
quests, a further 3 items were accepted. Debate on this Bill 
continued over six months. However, it must be noted that 32 
of the Senate's 47 requests were put forward by the Government; 
and Labor support for the U.A.P. counteracted further Country 
Party attempts to request amendments to the Tariff Schedules.50
In fact, during the Thirteenth Parliament many'of the 
political issues revolved around U.A.P.-Country Party differ­
ences, and there was little significant Senate-House disagree­
ment .
48 The Crimes (no.2) Bill 1932.
49 For example, on the Flour Tax (no.l) Act 1933, the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission Act and the New Guinea Act.
50 Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law, vol.2, 1929-1949, p.61.
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The Fourteenth Parliament: 1934-1937
The new coalition Government had a majority in the House 
and all but 3 seats in the Senate; this set the scene for a 
continuation of the pattern of Senate-House relationships evi­
denced in the preceding Parliament. No legislation was rejected 
and only 19 bills were amended in the Senate. Several amend­
ments reflected Country Party pressure51. On financial legis­
lation requested amendments were made to three bills52, although 
on another - the Customs Tariff Act 1936 - the Senate had only 
partial success.
The Fifteenth Parliament: 1937-1940
The Labor party managed to improve its representation in 
the 1937 elections, but was still in the minority in both houses. 
During this Parliament the Coalition Government was dogged by 
leadership problems which eventually led to the breakdown of the 
Coalition and a solely United Australia Party Ministry led by 
Menzies. This Cabinet in turn suffered internal dissention, and 
for the final six months of the Parliament there was a new United 
Australia Party-Country Party coalition led by Menzies.
This Parliament was preoccupied with the war and with regu­
lation-making under the defence power. Labor opposed many of 
the Government's measures53 but was generally unable to achieve
For example, on the Dairy Produce and Dairy Produce Export Control 
Acts, three Flour Tax Acts and the Loan (Farmers' Debt Adjustment) 
Act.
The Flour Tax Act (no.3) 1934, the Primary Producers' Relief Act 1936 
and the Customs Tariff (Exchange Adjustment) Act 1936.
For example, aspects of the National Registration, the National Secu­
rity and the Supply and Development Acts of 1939.
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any concessions. In the pre-war period the major legislation 
concerned establishment"of a national health insurance scheme, 
which eventually foundered. On various bills relating to pri­
mary production Labor and Country Party Senators combined to 
secure amendments;54 and on another bill Government rebels 
joined Labor Senators and forced two recommittals of the bill 
before a compromise was reached.55 The only bill rejected by 
the Senate was the Gold Tax Bill of 1939, the provisions of 
which were later imposed under regulation. On two money bills 
the Senate secured acceptance of its requests.56 But basically 
the Senate did not impede the Government's legislative program. 
The Sixteenth Parliament: 1940-1943
The war-time election resulted in a deadlocked House (two 
Independents held the balance of power) and in a 19-17 non-Labor 
to Labor representation in the Senate. Additional uncertainty 
resulted from continuing animosity towards Menzies within the 
coalition. This anti-Menzies sentiment reached its peak in mid- 
1941, and led to Menzies' resignation. For a very short period 
the Country Party Leader, Arthur Fadden, attempted to unite the 
coalition parties. The two Independents in the House became in­
creasingly critical of this dissention within the Government and 
in October 1941 supported the Opposition's rejection of Fadden's 
budget. No election was held (partly because of the War and
For example, on the Apple and Pear Organization, the Apple and Pear Tax 
Assessment, the Raw Cotton Bounty and the Wheat Industry Assistance Acts 
of 1938.
55 The Seamen's Compensation Act 1938.
The National Health and Pensions Insurance and the Apple and Pear Tax 
Acts of 1938.
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more importantly because the Independents agreed to support a 
Labor Government) and the Curtin Government was then sworn in.
This Parliament was necessarily preoccupied with war-time 
measures, including the vital legislation establishing the fed­
eral government's monopoly over income taxation and providing 
for reimbursement to the States. On some of this legislation 
the Senate secured minor technical amendments;57 but the 
legislation was basically accepted by Senators - giving rise 
to later criticism that the Senate was not safeguarding State 
interests.5 8
The Parliament also enacted a series of bills relating to 
social services and primary production, on some of which the 
Senate secured amendments and requested amendments.59 On the 
Income Tax Act of 1943 the Senate pressed its requests and 
eventually the House accepted these.
During this Parliament no Government was unduly restricted 
or harassed by the Senate; a general spirit of political com­
promise was evident, which enabled Curtin to enact his legis­
lative program in spite of an Opposition majority in the Senate. 
The subsequent election removed this situation of a potentially 
hostile Senate.
The Seventeenth Parliament: 1943-1946
Throughout this Parliament the Labor Government had a 
majority in both Houses. An extensive legislative program 
was implemented with the Senate generally contributing only
For example, on the Income Tax (War-time Arrangements) Acts of 1941 
and 1943 and the Income Tax Assessment Act 1942.
58 See be lew, p.109.
For example, on the Widcws' Pensions Act 1942 and the Australian 
Soldiers' Repatriation Act 1943.
59
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technical amendments.60 No legislation was rejected by the 
Senate, and no requests for amendment of money bills were prof­
fered. Non-Labor attacked several Government measures,61 but 
did not have the numbers to achieve any alterations.
The Eighteenth Parliament: 1946-1949
The 1946 election resulted in the return of the Labor Gov­
ernment with a stranglehold on the Senate (33 of the 36 seats). 
As in the previous Parliament, there was no overt party dissen- 
tion, and a record amount of legislation was enacted. Inter­
party division was most evident on the key 'socialist' policy, 
the 1947 Banking Act, but the Opposition was powerless to af­
fect this.62 No legislation was rejected and there were no 
Senate requests for amendment of money bills.
The Nineteenth Parliament: 1949-1951
In the preceding Parliament legislation had been enacted 
to increase the size of each House from 36 to 60 in the Senate 
and from 75 to 122 in the House of Representatives. The Curtin 
Labor Government was defeated in the 1949 elections and Menzies 
returned as Prime Minister facing a hostile Senate.63 The signs
For example, on the Life Insurance, the Superannuation and the Wool Use 
Premotion Acts of 1945; and on the Overseas Telecommunications Act of 
1946.
For example, the Banking, the Australian National Airlines, and the 
Re-establishment and Employment Acts of 1945.
The Act was later declared invalid by the High Court. Other legisla­
tion which led to criticism of 'socialisation by stealth' was the 
National Health Service Act 1948 and the Pharmaceutical Benefits Act 
of 1949.
Although non-labor representation was dramatically increased from 3 
to 26.
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of a potential double dissolution situation were evident from 
the first assembling of the Parliament in 1950. On two bills 
Senate amendments were accepted by the Government.64 On a fur­
ther bill protracted disagreement between the houses led to a 
Senate request for a Conference; the request was refused and the 
Senate gave in.65
Major interest focussed on the three bills which Menzies 
presented to the Senate in the full expectation of Labor rejec­
tion. These were the Commonwealth Bank, the Communist Party 
Dissolution and the Constitution Alteration (Avoidance of Double 
Dissolution Deadlocks) Bills of 1950. The first of these Bills 
was severely amended by the Labor Opposition and then deferred; 
the second Bill was laid aside after Senate-House disagreement 
could not be resolved; the third Bill was referred to a Senate 
Select Committee. At this point (June 1950) the Senate ad­
journed till October; meantime the House again passed the first 
two Bills. The Communist Party Bill was returned to the Senate 
where a vote was for a time deferred by Opposition manoeuvring; 
the Government's anxiety to achieve the grounds for a double 
dissolution was then rebuffed when the Opposition finally de­
cided not to oppose this Bill in the Senate.
Attention was then focussed on the Commonwealth Bank Bill, 
to which the Senate was insisting on its amendments. Moreover, 
the Opposition had taken control over the business of the
6 4 The States Grants (Milk for School Children) and the Statute Law 
Revision Acts of 1950.
6 5 The Social Services Consolidation Act 1950.
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Senate66 and a Private Members' Bill on prices was given prece­
dence over the Bank issue. Debate on the Bank Bill resumed in 
November 1950 but was not completed before the adjournment of 
the Senate in December. On the resumption of Parliament in 
March 1951 it at first seemed that a dissolution would be 
avoided.67 Then the Menzies Government was faced with a miners' 
strike and with High Court invalidation of the Communist Party 
Dissolution Act. The Government threw down the gauntlet to the 
Senate Labor Opposition to reject the Bank Bill so that a 
double dissolution could occur. The Opposition instead referred 
the Bill to a Select Committee.
To many constitutional lawyers this action did not consti­
tute 'failure to pass' under the terms of Section 57 of the 
Constitution. However, Menzies did obtain a double dissolution 
from the Governor-General (Mr. McKell). The parallels with the 
previous occasion on which a double dissolution was obtained are 
obvious; in both cases the Opposition parties argued that the 
grounds had been manufactured and that the Governor-General's 
discretion had been exercised in error. In relation to the 1951 
double dissolution it has also been argued that the Constitu­
tional requirement for an interval of three months between suc­
cessive Senate rejections of legislation was not satisfied;68
This first occurred during debate on the Commonwealth Bank Bill in May 
1950, when the Opposition boycotted a Senate sitting on a Friday and a 
quorum was not present; the following week the Opposition successfully 
imposed a new sessional order about sitting days of the Senate. By 
October 1950 the Opposition was determining the order of business on 
the Senate Notice Paper. See Odgers, op.cit., pp.27-28.
67 Ibid, p.29.
68 The exact dates of events are presented in Ibid, pp.28-29.
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and that the Senate had not in fact 'failed to pass' the Bank 
Bill.6 9
The Twentieth Parliament: 1951-1954
Menzies had achieved his aim of gaining a majority in the 
Senate, as well as in the House, in the 1951 elections. Senate 
activity during this Parliament was similar to that in earlier 
periods when governments controlled both Houses. No Government 
legislation was rejected by the Senate. Requests for amendment 
were raised (successfully) in relation to only one financial 
measure.70 Most Senate amendments were proposed by Government 
Ministers and accepted without a division.
The Twenty-first Parliament: 1954-1955
The electorate again returned the Menzies Government to 
power, although its majority in the House was decreased. No 
legislation was rejected by the Senate during this Parliament, 
nor were there any requests for amendment of money bills. A 
small number of Government-sponsored amendments were accepted 
by the Senate and then the House. An interesting example of 
backbench activity was the series of 14 amendments proposed by 
Senator Wright to the Lands Acquisition Act 1955. These amend­
ments were accepted on the voices in the Senate and also ac­
cepted by the Government.
The Twenty-first Parliament was prorogued before the end 
of its term so that Senate and House elections could be syn­
chronized .
69 Cf. the opinion of the Solicitor-General quoted in Ibid, pp.32-33.
70 The Customs Tariff Act 1952.
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The T w e n ty - s e c o n d  P a r l i a m e n t :  1 9 5 5 -1 9 5 8
The 1955 e l e c t i o n s  c o n f i r m e d  t h e  C o a l i t i o n  G o v e r n m e n t 's  
m a j o r i t y  i n  t h e  H o u se , b u t  p r o d u c e d  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a  h o s t i l e  
S e n a te  i n  t h a t  t h e  n o n - L a b o r  p a r t i e s  o n ly  h e l d  30 s e a t s .  I f  t h e  
tw o  D .L .P .  S e n a t o r s  w e re  t o  s i d e  w i th  t h e  L a b o r  O p p o s i t i o n  t h e r e  
c o u l d  t h e r e f o r e  b e  a  t i e d  v o t e .
T he M e n z ie s  G o v e rn m e n t d id ,  s u f f e r  s e v e r a l  r e v e r s a l s  d u r i n g  
t h i s  P a r l i a m e n t .  S e v e n te e n  b i l l s  w e re  r e j e c t e d  b y  t h e  S e n a t e . 71 
A t i e d  v o t e  l e d  t o  G o v e rn m e n t d e f e a t  i n  tw e lv e  d i v i s i o n s . 72 
Many o t h e r  d i v i s i o n s  w e re  won o r  l o s t  by  a  m a r g in  o f  o n ly  o n e  
v o t e .  T h e s e  G o v e rn m e n t l o s s e s  r e f l e c t e d  n o t  o n ly  i n s t a n c e s  o f  
D . L . P . -  L a b o r  j o i n t  o p p o s i t i o n ,  b u t  a l s o  d i s s i d e n c e  a m o n g s t  n o n -  
L a b o r  b a c k b e n c h e r s  ( e s p e c i a l l y  S e n a t o r  W r i g h t ) . 73 R e b e l l i o n  
a m o n g s t  b a c k b e n c h  G o v e rn m e n t S e n a t o r s  w as e m e r g in g  a s  a n  im p o r ­
t a n t  r e s t r a i n t  on  G o v e rn m e n ta l  a c t i v i t y ,  e s p e c i a l l y  on  o c c a s i o n s  
w hen D .L .P .  S e n a t o r s  c h o s e  t o  v o t e  w i th  t h e  L a b o r  P a r t y .
7 1 The Banking (T ra n s i t io n a l  P ro v is io n s  B i l l  1957,) th e  Commonwealth Banks 
B i l l s  1957 and 1957/53, th e  Income Tax and S o c ia l S e rv ice s  C o n tr ib u tio n  
A ssessm ent (n o .2) B i l l s  1957 and 1957/58, th e  N a tio n a l Debt S inking  
Fund B i l l s  1957 and 1957/58, th e  N orthern  T e r r i to r y  (L essees1 Loans 
G uarantee) B i l l s  1957 and 1957/58, th e  O f f ic e r s ' R ig h ts  D e c la ra tio n  
B i l l s  1957 and 1957/58, th e  R e-es tab lish m en t and Employment B i l l s  1957 
and 1957/58, th e  R eserve Bank B i l l s  1957 and 1957/58 and th e  S a le s  Tax 
(Exemptions and C la s s i f ic a t io n s )  (n o .2) B i l l s  1957 and 1957/58.
On th e  A u d it, th e  Banking, th e  Banking (T ra n s i t io n a l  P ro v is io n s ) , th e  
Commonwealtli Banks (2 d iv is io n s )  and th e  R eserve Bank B i l l s  in  1957 
and in  1958, and on th e  Carmonwealth B nployees' Furlough B i l l  in  1957.
7 3 F or f u r th e r  d is c u s s io n  see  A. F u sa ro , "The A u s tra l ia n  Senate a s  a  House 
o f  Review: A nother Look", A. J .P .H . , v o l.1 2 , 1966, r e p r in te d  in  C.A. 
Hughes ( e d .) ,  Readings in  A u s tra l ia n  Government, U n iv e rs ity  o f  Queens­
lan d  P re s s , Q ueensland, 1968, p p .122-139.
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The Twenty-third Parliament: 1958-1961
The 1958 elections gave the Menzies Government a comfort­
able majority in both Houses. The Government no longer had to 
rely on the support of the D.L.P. Senators, and suffered no 
rejection of legislation. A few amendments were successfully 
moved by Government Ministers in the Senate, but the Opposition 
and Senator Wright were powerless in spite of continual at­
tempts . 7 4
The general tenor of Senate activity during this Parliament 
is evidenced by the procedure adopted in April 1959 when the 
Senate voted 30-20 in favour of the simultaneous consideration 
of eleven Bills; there was no detailed consideration of these 
Bills in the committee stage and no amendments were put forward. 
Yet eight of these bills contained identical or near identical 
provisions to Bills which had been rejected by the Senate in the 
previous Parliament.75
The Twenty-fourth Parliament: 1961-1963
The Menzies Government suffered a dramatic reversal in the 
1961 elections (voters reacted to the economic recession). In 
the House the Government retained a majority of only two seats 
(later reduced to one); in the Senate it was reduced to holding 
30 seats.
The Government's slim majority did not, however, prove to 
be unduly restricting. In the Senate no bills were rejected and
For example, on the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 and on the Air Navi­
gation, the Broadcasting and Television and the Crimes Acts of 1960.
For example, the Banking, the Banking (Transitional Provisions) and the 
Reserve Bank Acts of 1959.
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only one request for amendment of a money bill was made.76 
It seemed that the Government's near defeat influenced both 
Ministry and backbenchers to adopt a cautious stance.
The Twenty-fifth Parliament: 1963-1966
Menzies called an early election for the House and gained 
a very comfortable majority. The separate Senate election in
1964 did not alter the Government's position in that house in 
terms of seats but de facto increased its voting strength with 
the election of a second D.L.P. Senator. However, from July
1965 the non-Labor parties held only 30 seats, and so were again 
potentially dependent on D.L.P. support.
During this Parliament the Senate requested amendments to 
three money bills, but was successful in only one instance.77 
No legislation was rejected by the Senate but several bills 
were amended.7 8
The Twenty-sixth Parliament: 1966-1969
The atmosphere of the Senate dramatically altered during 
this Parliament. Although the House elections returned non- 
Labor with a massive majority (the Liberal Party almost had a 
majority of seats in its own right), in the following separate 
Senate elections non-Labor representation was reduced to 28 
seats. Four D.L.P. and one Independent Senator held the balance 
of power. The D.L.P. Senators, moreover, displayed continuous 
signs of independence from the coalition parties and supported
On the Phosphate Fertilizers Bounty Bill 1963 (accepted by the House).
The Live-stock Slaughter Levy Act 1964; unsuccessful requests were made 
on the Television Stations Licence Fees Act 1964 and the Customs Tariff 
Act (no.2) 1966.
For example, the Hemes Savings Grants, the Statute Law Revision (Deci­
mal Currency) and the Trade Practices Acts of 1965.
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th em  i n  o n ly  a b o u t  50 p e r c e n t  o f  d i v i s i o n s . 79
In  a d d i t i o n ,  th e  G overnm ent w as p r e s e n t e d  w ith  o c c a s i o n a l  
i n s t a n c e s  o f  b a c k b en ch  r e b e l l i o n  i n  t h e  S e n a t e . 80 A lth o u g h  o n ly  
tw o b i l l s  w ere  a c t u a l l y  r e j e c t e d  by t h e  S e n a t e 8 1 , th e  G overnm ent 
w as f o r c e d  t o  a c c e p t  a l a r g e  number o f  am endm ents t o  i t s  l e g i s ­
l a t i o n . 82 In  a d d i t i o n ,  14 b i l l s  w ere  w ith d ra w n  o r  l a i d  a s id e  a s  
a r e s u l t  o f  S e n a t e  c r i t i c i s m .  8 3>
In  many w ays 1967 w as a y e a r  o f  p ea k  a c t i v i t y  in  th e  S en ­
a t e .  In  t h a t  y e a r  a lo n e  t h e  G overn m ent s u f f e r e d  d e f e a t  i n  19 
d i v i s i o n s . 84 In  May t h e  S e n a te  t w ic e  r e j e c t e d  p r o p o se d  in - 3 
c r e a s e s  in  p o s t  and t e l e g r a p h  c h a r g e s .  The G overn m ent w as d e ­
te r m in e d  t o  in t r o d u c e  t h e  in c r e a s e d  c h a r g e s  and s o  p r o p o se d  t o  
in c lu d e  them  i n  r e g u l a t i o n s  g a z e t t e d  a f t e r  th e  P a r l ia m e n t  w en t  
i n t o  r e c e s s .  The S e n a te  r e s p o n d e d  by r e c o n v e n in g  in  Jun e f o r  a
s p e c i a l  o n e -d a y  s i t t i n g  and a g a in  r e j e c t i n g  t h e  p r o p o s a l . 85
79 For furthar d e t a i l s  see  Chapter V, pp. 180-185.
8 0 For a d e ta ile d  d isc u ss io n  o f  r eb e l Senators during t h is  Parliam ent see  
M. Mackerras, The A ustra lian  Senate 1965-1967: Who Held C ontrol?,
A .P .S .A . Monograph n o .9 , Sydney, 1968.
81 The Post and Telegraph Rates B i l l  1967 and the Aerodromes (Passenger 
Charges) B i l l  1968.
8 2 For example, on th e Customs and th e N a tio n a lity  and C itizen sh ip  A cts 
o f  1967, and on the N ational Serv ice  and th e S ta tes  Grants (Secondary 
Schools L ib raries) A cts o f  1968.
8 3 For example, the Commonwealth E le c to r a l and the Mapping Surveys B i l l s  
1969.
8 4 Mackerras, o p .c i t .
85 C. P . D. : Sen. ,  v o l .3 4 ,  pp.1815, 1894-1898, 1907-1967. According to
Prime M in ister  Harold H olt the one-day s i t t in g  c o s t  the Government 
$12,100. Sydney Morning Herald, 20 October 1967, p .1 2 .
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In October-November 1967 the Senate again attracted attention 
when Senator Gorton tabled documents relating to the use of 
V.I.P. a ir c ra f t .86 On these occasions an A.L.P.-D.L.P.-Senator 
Turnbull combination operated. 1967 was also the year in which 
a small group of Senators (the two D.L.P., four Liberal, two 
Country Party and the Independent Senators) waged a campaign 
against the Government's referendum on deletion of the 'nexus' 
provision.8 7
Finally, in 1967 a majority of the Senate rejected the 
right of the Leader of the Government to terminate Question 
Time by asking that further Questions be placed on notice.
As a resu lt, in that year Question Time in the Senate ran for 
an average of 60 minutes per day as against approximately 
40 minutes in the House.
The Twenty-seventh Parliament: 1967-1971
From the time of Sir Robert Menzies' retirement in 1966, 
the Liberal Party (and hence the Government) was plagued with 
internal dissentions and leadership disputes. The image of 
disunity (never overt during Menzies' reign) was undoubtedly 
a factor in declining electoral support for the coalition 
parties. In the 1969 elections for the House of Representatives 
the Government's majority was dramatically reduced.
86 There were allegations of misuse of V.I.P. aircraft by both Ministers 
and MPs. The responsible Minister, Peter Hews on, complicated the issue 
by alleging that the relevant flight manifests were missing or did not 
exist. It was at this point that Gorton, then Leader of the Government 
in the Senate, tabled the flight manifests. C.P.D.: Sen., vol.36, 
pp.1266, (5 October 1976), 1633, 1635-1638 (25 October 1967).
The rebels felt vindicated when the electorate rejected the Referendum 
by a national 'no' vote of approximately 60 percent. The State 
Governments predictably opposed the Referendum.
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However, the Labor Party was also beset with internal dis- 
sention; and the separate Senate elections of 1970 indicated 
electoral dissatisfaction with both major political forces.
From July 1971 Labor and non-Labor held only 26 seats each; and 
there were 5 D.L.P. and 3 Independent Senators. Bargaining and 
compromises were therefore necessary for either Labor or non- 
Labor to win divisions.
The Government was faced with a Senate of quite unpredict­
able reactions and voting strengths. The Senate during this 
Parliament cannot be termed a 'hostile Senate' in the accepted 
sense of the phrase; rather, it was a volatile Senate.
Not only was the Government dependent on the whims of minor 
party and Independent Senators; it was also plagued by continued 
rebellion amongst its backbenchers. The combination of factors 
meant an increased number of divisions in the Senate and contin­
ual uncertainty and unpredictability about the result of any 
division in the Chamber. This also meant continual observer 
(especially media) attention and interest in the Senate pro­
ceedings .
The formal record for the Twenty-seventh Parliament lists 
the rejection of 5 bills by the Senate.08 Two Government mea­
sures which were severely criticized by the Senate were dis­
charged.89 The Government was forced to accept Senate amendments
Five measures in 1970 concerning collection of Receipts Duties.
Hie House of Representatives (Quorum of Members) Bill 1970; and the 
Mapping Surveys Bill 1971 (which had been laid aside in the previous 
Parliament after Senate criticism).
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to 16 b i l l s . 90 To some degree th is underestimates 
the Senate's ac tiv ity  during th is  Parliament. The 
real impact of the rev ita lized  Senate of 1966-1971 
can be guaged from Table 111:1 depicting Senate 
ac tiv ity  in the year 1971.
Table I I I  si presents information on some 
matters not referred  to in the previous discussion 
of Senate a c tiv ity . The average number of s i t t in g  
days per annum, and the proportion of leg is la tio n  
in itia te d  in the Senate over the seventy-year period, 
are discussed la te r  in th is  Chapter. Senate Committee 
ac tiv ity  is discussed in Chapter V.91
For example, cn the Metric Conversion and the Export Payments 
Insurance Corporation Acts 1970; and on the Dried Fruits levy 
Collection and the Overseas Telecommunication Acts 1971. The 
National Health Act 1970 received detailed scrutiny and criticism 
in the Senate, resulting in amendments and requests for amendments, 
a large number of which were eventually accepted by the Government.
9 1 See below p.191 ff.
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